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2ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS.
As a physical presence, there does exists some form of contract law in Cameroon. 
This consists mainly of the English common law of contract, the French civil law of 
contract and to a lesser extent, the customary or indigenous contract laws of 
Cameroon. One might expect that these three, if put together, will produce what can 
be termed a Cameroonian contract law. Yet the status of such a Cameroonian 
contract law, considered in such terms, remains very uncertain for three reasons.
Firstly, while contract law in England and France can easily be found in the great 
mass of relevant reported decisions of their courts, in the great relevant statutes 
passed by their legislators and in the learned commentary on the subject, the same 
cannot be said of Cameroon where there is at present no law reporting, very little by 
way of legislation relating to contract law, and hardly any learned commentary on the 
subject of contract.
Secondly, contract law as applied by the courts is surely disfigured in some way 
by the persistent deference to English and French authority (some of which is dated), 
and thus stuck in the habit of derivation from foreign sources of diminishing 
relevance.
Finally, the courts and the legislator, by their continuous neglect of relevant 
indigenous laws, have failed to sufficiently "Cameroonise" the law of contract. The 
need to respond to the first problem and to elaborate on the second and third 
problems combine to form the focus of this thesis. This thesis therefore determines 
the place of customary contract law and its role, if any, vis-a-vis, the inherited 
western laws, examines and analyses the operation of English and French contract 
laws in Cameroon, bearing in mind any important developments in these two 
countries and provides a detailed overview of contract law in Cameroon.
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CHAPTER ONE.
INTRODUCTION.
The name Cameroon is derived from the Portuguese word, Cameroes, meaning 
shrimps. It is now variously spelt as Kamerun in German, Cameroun in French and 
Cameroon in English. I shall use the English spelling in this study, unless historical 
and other reasons dictate otherwise.
Cameroon was first colonised by the Germans in 1884 but with the defeat of 
Germany in the First World War, she was partitioned between Great Britain and 
France. Under the terms of the partition agreement, Britain gained control of about 
a third of the country while France controlled the rest.
In 1961, British Cameroon (Southern Cameroon) and the already independent ex- 
French Cameroon (Republique du Cameroun) re-united to form the Federal Republic 
of Cameroon. This federation was made up of two states - West Cameroon (the 
former British Cameroon) and East Cameroon (former French Cameroon). By 
national referendum in 1972, the federal state gave way to a unitary system and 
Cameroon became known as the United Republic of Cameroon. Since 1984, and by 
Presidential decree, Cameroon is simply known as the ’’Republic of Cameroon".
The country is administratively divided into ten provinces, two of which are made 
up of the former British Cameroon, later West Cameroon, hereinafter referred to as 
Anglophone Cameroon or Common Law Cameroon, with the other eight deriving from 
the former French Cameroon, later East Cameroon and hereinafter referred to as 
Francophone Cameroon or Civil Law Cameroon. The official languages are English 
and French.
Cameroon covers an area of 183.000 square miles with a population of about 12 
million inhabitants. Yaounde (in Francophone Cameroon) is the capital and the seat 
of the Supreme Court.
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I. THE CAMEROONIAN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM : A 
CONFLUENCE OF TWO LEGAL TRADITIONS.
The origins of the common law and civil law in Cameroon are traceable to the 
English common law and French civil law systems. As already mentioned above, at 
the end of World War One, Cameroon which was already a colony of defeated 
Germany, was handed over to Great Britain and France under a League of Nations 
Mandate. On the creation of the United Nations after World War Two, the status of 
Cameroon was changed to that of a Trust Territory but her partition between Britain 
and France was recognised and maintained. As soon as Britain and France gained 
control over Cameroon, they set about introducing their particular systems of law in 
their respective parts, of which Britain controlled about a third while France controlled 
the rest.
It had long been established in Calvin’s case,1 that English settlers are deemed to 
carry the common law with them whenever they settle new territory. Prior to 
acquiring part of Cameroon, Britain already controlled neighbouring Nigeria as a 
colony, where the common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application 
that were in force in England on or before January 1, 1900, had been earlier 
introduced. By a series of proclamations, Britain extended the application of English 
law that was already in Nigeria to her part of Cameroon.2 But Britain did not just 
introduce her laws. She was equally concerned with the erasing of German law, so 
it was decreed that German law, in so far as it was previously in force, was 
automatically superceded by English law.3
1 (1608) 7 Co. 1, 176, 77 E,R 397.
2 Nigerian Gazette, no. 15 of 19/3/1918.
3 The British Cameroons Ordinance No.3 of 28/2/1924. See also the 1922 British 
Reports for Cameroon, pp. 77-78.
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In 1951, the southern part of British Cameroon (the present day Anglophone 
Cameroon) broke away from Nigeria, obtained her own separate legislature and soon 
after, a separate judiciary. But these changes were not to put an end to the use of 
English law that had already been received via Nigeria. In order to continue with the 
tradition of English law, section 11 of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law 1955 
proclaimed that the general law to be applied by the courts in Southern (British) 
Cameroon should consist of (a) the common law, (b) doctrines of equity and (c) 
statutes of general application which were in force in England on or before January 
1, 1900, in so far as these laws related to any matter with respect to which the 
legislature of Southern Cameroon was for the time being competent to make laws. 
Therefore, by the time Southern Cameroon united with French Cameroon to form the 
Federal Republic in 1961, English law had firmly taken root there.
With regard to French Cameroon, France also took swift steps to endow it with a 
system of law that was based upon French law. This began with the enactment of a 
reception statute. Article 1 of the Decree of 22 May, 19244 rendered executory in the 
territory of Cameroon placed under the mandate of France the laws and decrees 
promulgated in French Equatorial Africa prior to January 1, 1924. Article 2 of that 
decree provided that such legislation would be applicable only in so far as it was not 
contrary to decrees made especially for Cameroon.
One other significant result of the 1924 decree was that all existing German law 
was replaced except to the extent that it was not expressly or impliedly contrary to 
French law or the principles of the new regime.5
Having introduced the basic body of French law to French Cameroons, France 
went on to impose a great mass of legislation upon it during the remainder of the 
colonial era. This was done by means of laws and decrees that either enacted legal 
principles especially for the colonial federations or mandates or declared applicable 
to them legislation already in force in France. In fact, for the most part, the law
4 See Article 1, Journal Officiel du Cameroun 1924.
5 Dareste: Traite de Droit Colonial, 1931, p. 260, cited in Salacuse: An Introduction 
to the Law in French-speaking Africa, volume 1 - South of the Sahara, 1969, p. 
29.
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imposed on Cameroon and other French speaking African territories was the same as 
or similar to the law in France.
Neither autonomy nor independence could serve to wipe out the laws that Britain 
and France had introduced in their respective portions of Cameroon. The modem 
legal system of Cameroon, therefore, comprises two distinct legal traditions. In most 
areas of substantive private law, such as the law of persons (family law),6 law of 
obligations (contracts and tort), law of matrimonial regimes and certain aspects of 
commercial law, the English common law is firmly entrenched in Anglophone 
Cameroon while the same is true for French civil law in Francophone Cameroon.
The laws of civil procedure are also different.7 By contrast, the substantive rules 
and procedures of the public law component (constitutional and administrative law, 
for example) throughout Cameroon reflects mainly the civil law. This is because the 
distinctive character of Droit Public in French law was extended to Common Law 
Cameroon via Civil Law Cameroon.8
A few areas of the law have already been harmonised. A notable example is the 
Penal Code which is of uniform application throughout the national territory. The 
Penal Code is said to have drawn inspiration not only from English and French 
criminal law notions, but equally from sources as diverse as the Swiss, the Brazilian, 
the German and the Italian Codes.9 Be that as it may, one must emphasize the fact 
it is predominantly fashioned on French penal notions. Also of uniform application
6 See Ngwafor, "Family Law Trends in Cameroon: A Non-Developmental Process"
(1985) Annual Survey of Family Law, pp. 5-15; also see generally Nkouendjin: Le 
Cameroun a la Recherche de son Droit de la Famille, 1975.
7 For a comprehensive discussion of the law of civil procedure in France, see Herzog 
and Weser: Civil Procedure in France, 1967.
8 See the discussion on controls administratifs and contrats civil in chapter 4.
9 Fombad, "The Scope for Uniformised National Laws in Cameroon" (1990) no. 3 
Rev. Jur. Afr. 63; See also the following articles by some of the draftsmen of the 
code:
Clarence-Smith, T he Cameroonian Penal Code: Practical Comparative Law" (1968) 
17 I.C.L.Q. 651, and Parant, Gilg, and Clarence-Smith,"Le Code Penal Camerounais, 
Code Africain et Franco-Anglais" (1967) Rev. Science Criminelle 339.
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are the Labour Code, the Highway Code, the General Tax Code and the Land Tenure 
Code. These codes generally embody elements of both common and civil law 
traditions, with the latter dominating in most respects.
As for Cameroon’s judicial system, its history so far can be described as one of 
many changes. As this has been very well documented,10 there is no need to discuss 
it here. It is sufficient for the present purpose to briefly describe the current structure 
which was set up by the Judicial Organisation Ordinance 1972,11 which purported 
to introduce a uniform system of courts throughout the national territory to take 
account of Cameroon’s new unitary status. Although this unified court structure was 
supposed to be an attempt at a synthesis of the former structures in the now defunct 
federated states of West Cameroon (British) and East Cameroon (French), the result, 
undeniably, is a structure very akin to that in France. It comprises four courts with 
ordinary jurisdiction and three courts with special jurisdiction. Only those courts with 
whose decisions this study shall be dealing are briefly considered here. They include 
the following:-
First Instance Courts (Tribunaux de Premier Instance): these courts were in 
operation in Francophone Cameroon prior to 1972. Today they operate throughout the 
country, having replaced the Magistrates Courts that operated in Anglophone 
Cameroon before 1972. They are the lowest rung in the judicial ladder i.e. if 
customary or native courts12 are excluded. They have original jurisdiction in both 
criminal and civil matters. Since 198713 their jurisdiction in civil matters (contracts
10 See generally, Anyangwe, op. cit., note ; Fouman Akame, "Les Grandes Etapes de 
la Construction Juridique au Cameroun de 1958 a 1978" (1979) 89 Pennant 189; 
Marticou-Riou, "V Organisation Judiciaire du Cameroun" (1969) 79 Pennant 32; 
Nguini, "La Cour Federale de Justice" (1973) 3 Rev. Cam. Dr.
11 Ordinance No. 72-4 of 26 August 1972, as amended.
12 These are courts of special jurisdiction and they are primarily concerned with 
customary law. English or French law cannot be pleaded in these courts.
13 Articles 13 and 16 of the Judicial Organization Ordinance 1972 limited their 
jurisdiction to claims of up to 500.000 francs but Law No 89/017 of 28 July 1989 as 
amended by Law no. 89/019 of 29 Dec. 1989 increased that amount to 5.000.000
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included) is limited to claims of up to five million francs CFA.14 Career magistrates 
(requiring a degree in law and some professional training) preside in these courts. In 
principle, every administrative Sub-division in Cameroon should have a First Instance 
Court.
The High Courts (Tribunaux de Grande Instance): these are also first instance 
courts in the sense that they have original jurisdiction. A high court is presided over 
by a single judge, except in labour cases where two assessors must sit with the judge. 
The difference between the high court and the magistrates court, inter alia, is that in 
civil matters the high court has jurisdiction over all suits in which the claim is over 
five million francs. Many decisions of the various high courts will therefore be 
considered during the course of this study. They are several high courts because each 
administrative division is entitled to one.
The Courts of Appeal: they are ten altogether, with one in every province. They 
have appellate jurisdiction and hear appeals from customary courts, first instance 
courts and high courts of their respective provinces. The courts of appeal are very 
important because for many Cameroonians, it is as far as they are prepared to litigate. 
This is not to suggest that appeals are never taken to the Supreme Court. The 
problem is that the prohibitive costs and delays involved in pursuing an appeal right 
up to the Supreme Court actually discourages many litigants from getting that far. 
This is especially true of Anglophone litigants and counsel who will also have to put 
up with a different language (French) and different legal procedures.
The Supreme Court: It is permanently based in Yaounde (the capital) and
operates very much like the Cour de Cassation in France. For example, it rarely 
decides a case on its merits. It hears applications alleging error of law and decides
francs CFA.
14 The currency used in Cameroon and most of French speaking West and Central 
Africa is known as the Franc CFA. Prior to the devaluation in January 1994, it had
a fixed parity to the French Franc at 50-1 i.e 50 francs CFA = 1 French Franc.
Although officially the devaluation was by 50%, in practice it is by 100% because the 
exchange rate is now 100 Francs CFA to 1 French Franc. The Franc CFA changes
at roughly 800 Francs CFA to the pound sterling. Francs as used in this thesis shall 
mean Francs CFA. Where the French Franc is involved, I will specifically state so.
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only on questions of law, not of fact.18 The Supreme Court cannot interfere with the 
finding of fact made by the court which tried the case. The Supreme Court generally 
considers matters relating to the interpretation of contracts as a question of fact19 and 
therefore within the pouvoir souverain of the trial judge. This does not mean that the 
trial judge has a completely free hand. The Supreme Court retains its power of 
control in the event that the trial judge’s interpretation of the primary facts is so 
unreasonable that he can be said to have been distorted (denaturer) them.
If the Supreme Court is satisfied that a Court of Appeal has erred in law in any 
matter before it, it quashes the decision in question and remits the case to another 
Court of Appeal or to the same court but with a different panel. This is known as the 
process of renvoi. The practice so far has been to remit appeals from the Anglophone 
provinces (i.e. of common law provenance) to one of the two Courts of Appeal in that 
part of the country while appeals originating from Francophone Cameroon are remitted 
to any of the eight Courts of Appeal in the Francophone provinces. But the Supreme 
Court may give a final decision if a particular matter comes before it a second time. 
To the extent that the Supreme Court entertains appeals emanating from the common 
law courts (to which is applies the common law if it decides to make a final ruling), 
it is similar to the House of Lords, which also hears appeals from Scottish courts, and 
to which it applies Scottish law.
It is clear from the foregoing exposition that the English common law and French 
civil law inherited by Cameroon are still very much alive today. French speaking 
Cameroon is derivatively19 a civil law jurisdiction because the legal principles that 
are employed in the area of private law, practice and procedure belong to the civil law 
tradition. Contract law, for example, is governed mainly by the Cameroonian Civil
18 For more on the role of the French Cour de Cassation, and by analogy the 
Cameroonian Supreme Court, see Planiol et Ripert, Droit Civil, vol. V I1, para, 855.
19 See Marty/Raynaud, Les Obligations, t. 1, 1988, para. 244.
19 See Watson, The Making of the Civil Law. 1981, p. 10. According to Watson, the 
term ‘derivative civil law jurisdiction’ refers to a country which historically was not 
part of the civil law world but rather derives its civil law system from others which 
had accepted the Corpus Juris Civilis.( Cameroon squarely fits into that description).
37
Code,20 which is a near facsimile of the French Civil Code. For similar reasons, 
English speaking Cameroon is derivatively a common law jurisdiction. But if the 
legal and judicial system is viewed in its totality, it is easily seen that even though 
there is always a common law flavour, the civil law has been more dominant in those 
areas where attempts at harmonisation or uniformity have been made. For instance, 
the legal institutions - the structure and competence of the courts, the relationship 
between the courts and legislative organs, the character of the legal profession and the 
system of legal education - follow the traditional French civil law approach. Further, 
the legal principles employed in the area of public law throughout Cameroon largely 
belong to the civil law tradition. How best then to describe the Cameroonian legal 
system, is not easy to say. It is common for commentators to refer to it as bijural, yet 
if one is to consider the gradual cross-fertilisation of legal ideas that is slowly 
diminishing and blurring the dividing line between the two systems, one may prefer 
to refer to it as a system sui generis.
2. THE AIM  OF THE STUDY.
The aim of this thesis is simple. It is to provide an insight into the state of 
contract law in Cameroon: what it has been, how it has fared and the observed trends 
for its future development. This entails (i) determining the place of indigenous or 
customary contract law and its role, if any, in relation to the inherited western laws, 
and (ii) examining and analyzing the content and operation of the English common 
law and French civil law of contract in the Cameroonian context. The latter objective 
is by far the major preoccupation of this thesis.
Given the different nature of the common law and civil law approaches to contract 
law, this study is intended to serve the growing need to examine and expose the 
respective developments in the law of contract in Cameroon and to highlight some of
20 The Cameroon Civil Code is largely a copy of the French version. The provisions 
and the arrangement are exactly the same, except in cases in the few instances where 
a particular provision has been abrogated in Cameroon. In both Codes, the provisions 
on contracts can be found in Book 111, Title 111. Book Three is entitled, "Of The 
Different Ways In Which Property Rights Can Be Acquired" while Title 111 is 
entitled, "Of Contracts or Obligations Based On Conventions In General."
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the different contractual ideas and judicial attitudes manifested by these systems. This 
should promote a better appreciation of both systems as well as provide essential keys 
to the understanding of these systems from a Cameroonian perspective. This is 
particularly important because the vast majority of Cameroonian lawyers (academics 
and practitioners alike) are trained either under the common law or the civil law, but 
not in both. Only a few can actually claim to be conversant with both systems.
Mindful of the argument that variations in the political, moral, social and economic 
values which exist between any two societies make it hard to assume that many 
problems are the same for both except on a technical level, it does need to be asked 
whether the needs and expectations of society and commerce in Cameroon differ from 
those in England and France in a way that calls for a different contract law or a 
different approach to contract law. For instance, is the legal problem relating to the 
requirement of writing in contracts the same both in Cameroon where illiteracy is 
widespread and in France or England where it is much less common. And can the 
legal problem of enforceability of contracts against minors be the same both in 
England and France on the one hand, where young people become accustomed to 
living on credit and start residing away from their parents at a much younger age and 
in Cameroon on the other hand, where credit is not readily available to any one, never 
mind young people and where it is very common to find children living and depending 
on their parents even into adulthood.
Siedman has stated, with some justification, that
"the simple adoption of western laws and customs often fails 
adequately to meet the needs of developing nations. A host of 
differences between established countries and the less developed states 
frequently make the received laws inappropriate for the newer 
nations".21
Why the same set of rules should produce different results in England and Cameroon 
for instance, can be explained by what Siedman calls the "law of the 
non-transferability of laws".22 By this, he means that a rule that induces one sort of 
activity in a particular social, political and economic milieu will not necessarily induce
21 Siedman, "The Communication o f the law and the Process o f Development" (1972) 
3 Wins. L. R. 686.
22 Siedman, op.cit., note 21, 697.
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the same activity in another social, political and economic milieu, save fortuitously. 
This study should provide the facts with which to test the validity of that statement 
with regard to contract law in Cameroon.
It should be unnecessary to say, but I do so ex abundante cautela, that this study 
is not intended in derogation of English or French law. Neither is it intended to serve 
as a clarion call for a complete repudiation of "foreign law" in Cameroon. Not only 
would that be sheer sentimental nonsense and wishful thinking, it would also be 
legally undesirable and irresponsible. In fact, if Cameroonian legislators were ever 
to be inspired by chauvinistic nationalism to repudiate the English and French models 
which are legacies of long centuries of experience, they would inevitably raise 
obstacles to the development of the law and the economy of the country.
In a way, this study aims to encourage and contribute to the analysis and 
reformulation of the law of contract in Cameroon in much the same way as those 
other countries whose laws are traceable to the common and civil law systems have 
done. The archetypal case is Canada, whose laws are also based on English and 
French law. Other good examples include Australia, New Zealand, the common law 
states of U.S.A,23 and the civil law state of Louisiana in the U.S.A. whose law is 
based both on civil law (French and some traces of Spanish law) and common law.24
Finally, a word on reform. It was no revelation to me to discover during fieldwork 
that Cameroonian lawyers and judges are generally agreed on the need for some 
reform in the law of contract. What I found surprising was the fact that most of them 
were either unwilling or unable to articulate with any kind of precision or certainty 
what exactly it is that needs to be reformed and how it should be done. This is not 
to disparage Cameroonian lawyers. I prefer to see this as support for the assertion that 
the shape, the content and the status of contract law in Cameroon is still uncertain. 
Further, I consider Cameroonian lawyers to be both miscreants and victims of this 
situation. Miscreants because they have failed to provide the necessary source 
materials on the law in Cameroon and victims because without such materials, they
23 See e.g. The Restatement of Laws, Second, Contracts 2d., 1979.
24 See Osakwe, "Louisiana Legal System: A Confluence o f Two Legal Traditions" 
(1986 supplement) 34 AJ.C.L. 29.
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are sometimes left to sail on in ignorance on some important aspect of the law. For 
this reason, I must stress that the emphasis of this work will be with analysis rather 
than reform. So often, the cause of the former is ill-served by confusing it with the 
latter. In order to reform something, one needs to know exactly what it is that needs 
reform. There is no point raging against something if one is not exactly sure against 
what one is raging about. That said, and notwithstanding the fact that the art of 
prophecy and that of law reform are not easy, I shall be willing to vouchsafe proposals 
and suggestions for reform whenever I find that there is clearly the need for changes 
in judicial attitudes or legislative control.
3. WHY THE LAW  OF CONTRACT.
It is not difficult to find justification for an inquiry into any branch of law in 
Cameroon. This is because of the staggering dearth of subject-specific literature on 
almost any topic of the law.25 This is not the place for an inquest into the causes of 
the conspicuous absence of local judicial literature. Suffice it to say that legal 
practitioners blame it on academics while academics in turn advance several excuses, 
many of which are indefensible. For example, the diffidence of Cameroonian scholars 
to produce any coherent treatise on the working of the law has been excused or 
explained on the rather unconvincing suggestion that the law in Cameroon is based 
on the law of their erstwhile colonial masters. The insinuation here is that the rich 
literature on contract law in England and France dispenses with the need for any 
critical study of the subject in Cameroon.26 This is a most lame excuse as it begs 
the question as to why there has been so much writing on the subject in jurisdictions 
such as the U.S.A, Canada, Australia, Nigeria27 and Ghana,28 whose contract laws
25 Dion-Ngute, Standard Form Contracts in Cameroon. Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Warwick, 1980 seems to be only work in contract law which incorporates a fair 
amount of local case law and legislation.
26 This is the impression I got from talking to some lecturers in the University of 
Yaounde.
27 Achike, Nigerian Law of Contract, 1972; Sagay, The law of Contract in Nigeria, 
1985; and Uche, Contractual Obligations in Ghana and Nigeria,-1971; not to
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are also traceable to English and French laws.
There is also the tiresome excuse of lack of sufficient contractual litigation in 
Cameroon to warrant a study of this kind. It is not possible to give an accurate 
response to this problem because of the absence of official records and law reporting. 
However, from my fieldwork experience, I would say that between the period 
1960-1992, the Anglophone courts have had to deal with no less than 800 contract 
cases while the Francophone courts, especially those in the big commercial centres 
have certainly disposed of more.
This is not to say that there are no problems with regard to local case law. First, 
it is difficult to come by because of the absence of law reporting and the lack of 
proper archives. Secondly, the cases that one lays ones hands on centre mainly on a 
few issues such as a the breach of a simple straightforward sale. In this respect, the 
major problem for any researcher, is the lack of variety in contractual litigation rather 
than the mere lack of cases. For example, I have been unable to find any 
Cameroonian cases (common and civil) on the questions whether a letter accepting an 
offer of a contract is effective on despatch or how a contract is affected by mistake 
in the identity of the other party. Similarly, one does not find many cases in which 
the issue turned on the presence or absence of cause or consideration.
In carrying out fieldwork, I also discovered that a good many contractual disputes 
do not lead to litigation. There are two possible explanations for this. First, is the 
ignorance of the legal process. It is the belief of many Cameroonians, especially those 
living in rural areas with no courts and legal practitioners, that the Police and 
Gendarmes are there to sort out all kinds of legal problems, criminal and civil alike. 
It is therefore not uncommon for a party to entreat the help of the Police in purely 
civil and commercial matters, such as the refusal to perform a contract. Interestingly 
enough, this is not always without success. Even where rural people settle their 
disputes without the involvement of the Police, they do so in customary courts or 
village councils where only native law applies.
The second reason involves costs. In Cameroon, litigation can be costly both in
mention regularly published articles.
28 Uche, op. cit., note 27.
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terms of money and in its adverse effect on personal relationships. In a country where 
the individual’s social security is guaranteed by the extended family, friends and the 
local community, it is not surprising that people are not too eager to bring suits 
against members of these groups. I noticed that people do readily litigate where the 
amount of money in question is large in relation to the cost of litigation, and where 
personal relationships are not too involved or where no future relationship is 
anticipated.
Because of the absence of law reporting, the lack of variety in contractual 
litigation, and the reluctance of some to litigate, it becomes difficult in some situations 
to state with certainty what the response of the Cameroonian courts would be, since 
the lack of judicial authority on any given point may suggest that either the problem 
does not really exist, or if it does, that it has not yet occupied the time of the 
Cameroonian courts. But I remain unwilling to conclude, from the evidence of the 
lack in variety in contract cases, or from the evidence that many disputes do not lead 
to litigation, that any study of contract law in Cameroon is unimportant or irrelevant. 
Neither can it be seriously suggested that of those that are litigated, the great bulk of 
which remains unknown and uncited, there cannot be some constituted apparatus of 
contract law.
As a jurisprudential prelude to this thesis, one may also question the relevance of 
the study of a subject that had been proclaimed dead in 1974 by Grant Gilmore’s 
provocative book, The Death of Contract.29 That spawned a new era of discussion 
and speculation on the nature of contract especially in the United States and 
Canada.30 The debate was taken up in England by Atiyah.31 All that can be said 
as far as Cameroon is concerned, is that the topic excited no interest whatsoever. On
29 Gilmore, Death of Contract, 1974.
30 In the United States, see for example, Barnett, "A Consent Theory o f Contract"
(1986) 86 Col. L. R. 269 and in Canada, see Reiter and Swan (eds.), Studies in 
Contract Law, 1980.
31 Atiyah, "Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 1979; see also Smith, "The Law o f 
Contract - Dead or Alive?" (1979) Law Teacher, 73.
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a general note, it must be said that Gilmore’s book, the title of which has been 
described as "reminiscent of a magazine cover of the period which proclaimed that 
God was dead",32 was a little premature. Smith, contrary to Gilmore, argues that 
contract law, far from being dead, is alive and growing.33 Gilmore’s book has also 
been described by some as "good literature, bad history, and questionable theory"34 
while others have pointed out that his picture of the development and decline of 
classical law is in many respects overdrawn or just wrong.35
One must concede though that there is some truth in the "Death o f Contract" thesis 
which challenges the distinctiveness of contract law. And support is not lacking for 
Gilmore’s argument that contract ought not to continue as a separate legal category 
but should instead be absorbed, or reabsorbed, into tort or a single law of obligations 
encompassing contracts, torts and restitution.36
Without delving into the respective merits of the above arguments, the simple fact 
is that contract is still alive and surviving in Cameroon, even if it is not entirely well. 
It is difficult to say whether the arrangement in Civil Law Cameroon whereby contract 
effectively falls under the law of obligations is satisfactory to Gilmore and his 
supporters. Perhaps the problem would be that even under such an arrangement, 
contract is still sufficiently distinct. What can be said for certain is that the classical
32 Coote, "The Essence o f Contract" (1988) 1 J. C. L. 91.
33 Smith, Op. cit., note 31, 74.
34 Feinman, "The Significance o f Contract Theory" (1990) 58 Cine. L. R. 1291.
35 See e.g, Gordon, "Book Review" (1974) Wis.L.R. 1216; Milhollin, "More on the 
Death o f Contract" (Book Review) (1974) 24 Cath.U.L.R. 29, 42-60; Speidel, "On the 
Reported Death and Continued Vitality o f Contract" (Book Review) (1975) 27 
Stan.L.R.1161, 1177-1182.
36 Fuller and Perdue, in their famous article "The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages", (1936) 46 Yale L J. 419, had earlier argued that the boundaries of contract 
and tort should be erased. Atiyah, "Contracts, Promises and the Law o f Obligation" 
(1978) 94 L.Q.R. 193 and The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (1979), is also 
in favour of it.
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or neo-classical law that seems to have bothered Gilmore so much is very much the 
staple in Cameroon, especially in the common law jurisdiction. Contract law, 
therefore, does not only maintain its distinctiveness in Cameroon but has some 
important role to perform.
The law of contract, in common with other branches of the law, is or should be 
concerned with the identification and protection of legitimate &pectotiint$> There is 
nothing new in this concept. As early as 1763 it was asserted by Adam Smith that 
a contractual obligation "arose intirely (sic) from the expectation and dependence that 
was excited in him to whom the contract was made".37 But unlike tort law, for 
instance, contract law does not proscribe behaviour but requires the court to levy 
sanctions if a party breaks an agreement. Few people will be prepared to buy goods 
unless they are sure that their ownership is going to be exclusive. So where property 
and tort law guarantee rights of peaceful possession, so too does contract law purport 
to ensure that promises, once made will be honoured.
Contract law is also important in that it enables individuals to engage in their own 
"private legislation". Subject to a limited number of restrictions, the law of contract 
can be said to have delegated to individual citizens a form of legislative authority. 
This is vital because people are always involved in contracts in their every day lives. 
Josserand’s observation that "Nous vivions de plus en plus contratuellement",38 is 
even truer today than when it was made over half a century ago.
From an international perspective, the law of contract is of paramount importance 
to international trade. It performs the role of promoting and providing confidence in 
the foreign investor. It also provides the basic legal framework within which most 
commercial and business dealings have to take place. Foreign investors will hardly 
trust their funds to a country whose legal system does not have some form of 
developed contract law that can guarantee some stability of expectation in the business 
deals they become involved in. A contract law that is hard to ascertain, impossible 
to predict and generally in disorder is hardly likely to inspire investors to trust their
37 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 1978 ed., p. 92.
38 Josserand, "Apergu General des Tendances Actuelles de la Theorie des Contrats” 
1937 R.T.D.C., 1.
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funds (whose security usually depends on the promised word) to a country whose 
contract law is in such a sorry state.
Reverting to Cameroon, one important consideration for the choice of contract as 
the theme for this study is to test the widely held assumption that the law of contract 
as applied in Cameroon is the same as in England (for Anglophone Cameroon) and 
France (for Francophone Cameroon). That assumption is certainly not without 
foundation, yet to suggest that all that one has to do in order to determine the 
Cameroonian position on any given contractual question is merely to refer to the 
handy and available English or French legal literature on the issue in question, is too 
simplistic, over presumptuous, and may be misleading. This is because for that to be 
possible, two basic conditions would have to be satisfied, namely: that the received 
laws in Cameroon are exactly the same as the current English and French laws on the 
subject and secondly, that the received laws develop contemporaneously with the 
present day English and French law, i.e. their rules are applied by the Cameroonian 
courts in the same manner as the courts in England and France.
The first condition is not entirely present in Cameroon. It will be shown in chapter 
two that the application of the received English law in Cameroon, is limited, at least 
in principle, to the common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application 
that were in force in England on or before 1st January, 1900 while the application of 
French law is limited to a mixture of the law that was in force in French Equatorial 
Africa and France on or before 1st January, 1924. As for the second condition, while 
it is true that the common and civil law in Cameroon have tried to pursue a path 
identical to that of England and France respectively, that congruence must have 
diminished in recent times. This is due to the fact that several developments in 
contract law that have taken place in England and France have not been followed or 
adopted in Cameroon. In England, for instance, there have been several legislative 
intervention such as the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the 
Misrepresentation Act (1967), the Unfair Contracts Term Act (1977) and the Sale of 
Goods Act (1979), the Sale and Supply of Goods Act (1994) to name only a few. In 
France, Loi du 10 Janvier 1978 (on consumer credit) and Loi du 13 Juillet 1979 (on 
credit concerning real property) are just two examples. In Cameroon, on the other 
hand, contract law has experienced very little legislative activity ever since
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independence.
4. THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS.
The curious dearth in legal writing in Cameroon tends to give a particularly 
pioneering tinge to any effort to collate and analyze the law on any subject. Having 
opted for contract law, I had to decide whether to concentrate on some specific aspect 
of the subject or on the general principles. I decided against the former possibility for 
two reasons. First, I suspected (a suspicion that was confirmed by fieldwork results) 
at the time that I might not be able to find sufficient Cameroonian material on any one 
aspect to adequately develop a Ph.D. thesis. So, simple logistics decreed in favour of 
general principles. Secondly, the need for some constituted framework of contract law 
in Cameroon in the light of what has already been said so far, cannot be over­
emphasised. I found that challenge all too inviting. The thesis focuses thus on 
general principles of contract law and deals mainly with what is known in common 
law as simple contracts39 - contracts made either by word of mouth or by writing.
Because the work has to be kept within prescribed and manageable limits, selective 
emphasis has been vital even though difficult. This difficulty is compounded by the 
fact that this work does have a comparative dimension to it. Since English and French 
laws are involved, it is impossible to undertake this study without reflecting on, and 
making some comparisons between these systems. There is always a certain risk in 
choosing topics for this kind of research with a comparative dimension, since to make 
a rational choice, it would be necessary to know the result of the comparison before 
undertaking it. In the very nature of things the choice can scarcely ever be made in 
full knowledge of all the relevant facts.
These problems notwithstanding, I settled for formation (offer and acceptance, 
cause and consideration), defective contracts and remedies. These topics broadly 
represent areas where basic liability in contract is determined and the relief available 
to an injured party. Any choice of topics will have its critics as well as its supporters
39 This is used conveniently in this context to embrace similar contracts in civil law. 
See chapter 4.
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and it may indeed be subjective. For that reason, I must stress that those topics not 
covered are not necessarily less important either from the point of view of practicality 
or for the purpose of comparisons between the two systems. But to consider all the 
fundamental areas of contract law is to sacrifice analysis for generalities. This is not 
to suggest that of the chosen topics, the analysis is exhaustive. Each individual topic, 
it will be observed, is dealt with only in so far as it illuminates the main theme. 
Hence the treatment of some parts is less detailed than the treatment of others. Any 
unevenness of treatment, therefore, is deliberate.
Finally, a consideration of the general principles of substantive contract law alone 
would still leave certain questions on the nature and status of contract law in 
Cameroon unanswered. To fill in any such gaps, I have added for good measure, a 
consideration of other topics such as customary contract law, the nature and structure 
of contracts and internal conflict of laws in contractual obligations.
5. METHODOLOGY.
In this study, English law, French law and to some extent, customary law are 
involved. It will become obvious early on that customary law does not have pride of 
place in the overall contract structure. For that reason, all important issues relating 
to customary contract law are discussed in detail in chapter two so as to make way 
for a consideration of the imported English common law and French civil law of 
contract, which are the main concern of this thesis.
Because contract law in Cameroon is still inextricably linked to the English and 
French civil law, it will be futile to attempt any study of Cameroonian contract law 
without regard to English and French contract law. I find it appropriate, therefore, to 
check on the development of contract law in Common Law Cameroon vis-a-vis 
English contract law, and do likewise for Civil Law Cameroon and French law.
As far the use of case-law, I have decided against relying exclusively on decisions 
of Cameroonian courts. Although I am primarily concerned with the working of 
contract law in Cameroon, I cannot overlook the fact that Cameroonian courts 
continue to cite and accord respect to decisions of English and French courts.
The selection of cases by any researcher is likely to be idiosyncratic. Mine is no
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exception even though I was handicapped in my ability to choose from local cases 
because of the thin judicial dicta in some areas. Some of the cases I have discussed, 
it will be noticed, are noteworthy, not because they are examples of "clear law" but 
because they are aberrant or represent the triumph of doctrine over practical necessity. 
But in my opinion I have tried to provide the best blend of available Cameroonian, 
English, and French cases to illustrate and explain the law of contract in Cameroon.
I have also made references to cases and academic writings from other common 
law (e.g. the United States, Australia, Ghana, and Nigeria) and other civil law (e.g. 
civil law Canada and the state of Louisiana (U.S.A)) jurisdictions. This certainly is 
not for the purpose of providing any exhaustive statement of their laws, but, instead 
for the purpose of comparisons. Although I cite academic works freely, I have 
avoided to engage in extensive theoretical discussion. In avoiding that temptation, I 
have heeded the advice of no less a figure in the law of contract than Farnsworth, who 
has lamented that too many scholars spend far too much time creating "elaborate 
theories" about the law of contract.40 Students of contract law would agree that 
Farnsworth is hardly the person to talk in this context. Nevertheless, his point is 
indeed important, particular in the case of Cameroon where the (received) law of 
contract is still in its infancy. So, this thesis strives, in a modest manner that recalls 
the American realists of the thirties, as manifested in the writings of Karl Llewelyn 
and Lon Fuller, to pay more attention in describing what Cameroonian courts actually 
do, rather than to analyze the doctrines which they offer as justification for their 
decisions. This does not mean that doctrinal discussions are barred. In fact, while the 
present analysis may not itself suggest any elaborate theories, it may say, where 
necessary, that such a theory should exist in connection with such judicially imposed 
compromise.
I have for the purpose of this study, adopted the unitary theory of contract. This 
theory holds that there exists a law of contract rather than a law of contracts. This 
is very much the traditional common law view,41 but I shall be extending its
40 Farnsworth, "A Fable and a Quiz on Contracts" (1987) 37 J. Leg. Educ. 208.
41 See, e.g. Treitel, An Outline of the Law of Contract (2nd ed., 1980), pp. 1-2. 
Contrast Gilmore, op. cit., pp.7-8.
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application to the civil law aspects of this work. I do so because even though
particular types of contract such as sale of goods, charterparties and so on attract
particular rules, the courts, whether at common or civil law, still proceed on the basis
that it is still legitimate to state general contractual principles which are, prim a fa c ie ,
applicable to all contracts. As Roskill LJ puts it,42
"It is desirable that the same legal principles should apply to law of 
contract as a whole and that different principles should not apply to 
different branches of that law."
That approach is also endorsed by academics. Smith has said,43
"What distinguishes contract as a subject of study from say, tort or 
criminal law, is the generality of the principles. It has principles which 
really are principles and not mere rules. We find the same principles 
governing the hiring of a prima donna as the hiring of an oil tanker; 
promises designed to encourage others to use a carbolic smoke ball 
may be same in legal effect as promises made to a stevedore to induce
him to load or unload goods from a ship".
Since this study is mainly about general principles, it accordingly proceeds from
the basis that it is possible to state general rules of prima facie  application to all types 
of contracts. There is thus no treatment for particular types of contracts.
I have thus far set out what I want to do, how I intend to do it, and what I aim to
achieve. W hether all that is at all doable, is another question. W hat is not 
problematical, is the need for getting to work on an attempt to do it.
42 Cehave M 7 v. Bremer Handelgesellscha.fi MbH  [1976] Q.B. 44 at 71.
43 Smith, Op. cit., note , 74.
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CHAPTER TWO.
A CAMEROONIAN CONTRACT LAW?
In this chapter, I propose to determine the respective places of customary law and 
the received laws in the overall contract law of Cameroon. I shall be considering, 
amongst other things, the extent to which each of them can be treated as a source of 
contract law, the extent to which they have influenced each other and the limitations, 
if any, to their respective application.
The question may be asked: Which law governs contractual obligations in 
Cameroon? When I put this question to Cameroonian lawyers (judges, practitioners 
and scholars), they considered it somewhat trite and vexatious. The answers I got were 
simple and straightforward. To the Anglophones, it is the (English) Common Law; to 
the Francophones, it is the (French) Civil Law. These answers may, by now, have 
achieved respectability, and even triteness, yet it is contended that the above question 
should not be answered in such a simple proposition. To do so would imply either 
that Cameroonian indigenous law was devoid of any notion of contract before the 
arrival of the British and the French, or that any such notion, if it existed, was 
completely suppresed and replaced with rules of English and French contract law upon 
their arrival.
The position is therefore slightly more complicated than it appears to be. If one 
were to accept the answers given above as correct, then, the country can be divided 
into two: the English speaking part, where the English common law of contract 
operates and the French speaking part, where the French civil law of contract operates. 
The problem with those answers though, is that they are not complete. Any 
comprehensive answer, it is suggested, must include customary contract law. To that
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end, I prefer to divide the subject of contract into two: unwritten contract law1 and 
written contract law. The former refers to indigenous or customary law while the 
latter refers to what I shall call modem (i.e. the imported English and French) contract 
law. Part one of this chapter deals with customary law and part two deals with the 
received English and French laws.
1. CUSTOMARY CONTRACT LAW.
(1). The Existence and Types of Customary Contracts.
I will take as a convenient starting point the once celebrated controversy as to
whether African customary law knows any distinction between crimes and civil
wrongs and whether there is any classification of civil wrongs into contracts and
torts.2 Influential early writers such as Maine favoured the view that contract was
only marginally known to ancient or primitive law:
"...the individual in primitive societies creates for himself few or no 
rights and few or no duties. The rules which he obeys are derived from 
the station into which he is bom and next from the imperative 
commands addressed to him by the chief of the household of which he 
forms part. Such a system leaves a very small room for contracts. The 
members of the same family are wholly incapable of contracting with 
each other and the family is entitled to disregard the engagements by 
which one of its subordinate members has attempted to bind it."3
1 A major characteristic of African customary law is its unwritten nature. See Allott, 
Essays on African Law, 1960, p. 62; French commentators on African law refer to 
its unwwritten character as "Voralite juridique". See e.g., E. Le Roy, "Justice 
Africaine et oralite juridique", I.F.A.N., no. 3, Juillet 1974, p. 566, cited in Anyangwe: 
The Cameroonian Judicial Sytem, 1987, p.9.
2 Elias: The Nature of African Customary Law. 1962, p. 10.
3 Maine: Ancient Law, (10th. ed,) 276-277; See also, Godinec: Le Droit Africain, 
tome. 1, 1968, p. 12.
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There is little doubt that contracts or legally binding agreements played only a 
small part in the early history not only of Africa but of all known peoples. The 
development of contract is largely an incident of commercial and industrial enterprises 
that involve a greater anticipation of the future than is necessary in a simpler or more 
primitive economy. In traditional African societies, therefore, the solidarity of 
relatively self-sufficient family groups and the fear of departing from accustomed 
ways limited individual initiative as well as the scope and importance of contracts. 
Yet it must not be assumed that contracts were, and are still, entirely unknown to 
these societies. Maine’s famous dictum that the progress of law has been from status 
to contract has generally been understood as stating not only a historical generalization 
but also a judgement of sound policy - that a legal system wherein rights and duties 
are determined by the agreement of the parties is preferred to a system wherein they 
are determined by "status."4 This movement can be said to be taking place now in 
traditional African societies in general and in Cameroon in particular, where social and 
economic changes have transformed contract into a dynamic institution. The 
institutions of communal ownership and family ownership are dying5 slowly but 
steadily and the individual is emerging as a new unit of economic activity the spheres 
of which have widened beyond peasant agriculture. As far back as 1959, Kanga was 
able to confirm, in his study of the Bamileke tribe of the Western Province of 
Cameroon, that the notion of individual responsibility was firmly rooted in their 
customary law.6 Today, it is all too clear that the individualistic ethic (and its
4 Cohen, "The Basis o f Contract" (1933) Harv.L.R. 553.
5 See the brilliant essay by Reisman, "The Individual Under African Law in 
Comprehensive Context" In: Takirambudde (ed): The Individual under African Law. 
Proceedings of the First All Africa Law Conference. October 11- 16, 1981. 
Swaziland, 1988, pp. 8-27.
6 Kanga: Le Droit Coutumier Bamileke au Contact de Droit Europeens. 1959, p. 
145.
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shadow, self-reliance) has gained much ground throughout Cameroon.
There is now a plethora of surveys that provide overwhelming evidence in favour 
of the view that there has always been, and there still is, what one can rightly term 
an African customary law of contract. Schapera, for instance, has suceeded in 
showing, as a result of the investigation of case material, that a generalised set of rules 
exist seperately in Tswana customary law7 while Elias has not only rejected strongly 
the suggestion that there is no general contract law under customary law, basing a 
good deal of his argument on marriage and its related contracts,8 but adds that 
customary law also recognises specific contracts such as contracts of agistment, co- 
perative labour contracts, personal service contracts and contracts of pledge and 
pawn.9 Further still, contracts such as cattle herding, house building, medical 
treatment, labour contracts, sale of cattle and pledges and pawn have variously been 
identified in Iteso customary law10 and South African customary law.11 The use of 
examples from various parts of Africa is deliberate. It is to show the remarkable 
similarity of the various types of contracts recognised by groups of people in Africa.
The best documented evidence on this subject in Cameroon remains that provided 
by Kanga.12 He does not only identify some particular contracts recognised by the 
Bamileke customary law such as sales, pledge and pawn and agricultural pacts. He
7 Schapera, "Contracts in Tswana Customary Law" (1965) 9 J.A.L., 142-153.
8 Elias, op.cit., note 2, pp. 144-148 and 152-155.
9 Elias: Grounwork of Nigerian Law, 1954, pp. 236-243.
10 Lawrence: The Iteso. 1957, pp. 234-240.
11 Seymour: Native law in South Africa. 1960, pp. 218-223.
12 Kanga: Op.cit., note 6; See also Monie, J.N, "The Development o f Laws and 
Constitution o f Cameroon." Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1970.
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goes further to determine the four conditions that are necessary for the formation and 
validity of such contracts, namely:- that there must be an object, the parties and their 
representatives must consent, the parties and their representatives must have capacity 
and finally, that the contract must not be contrary to any custom.
Although he does not discuss how these conditions are interpreted, it should 
perhaps be said that they are not necessarily interpreted in the same manner as would 
be the case in England or France. The capacity to contract under customary law for 
example, may not be determined by age but by status, such as marriage or 
membership of some secret society. Also, what may contradict English or French 
custom or law may not contravene Cameroonian custom. A good example is 
polygamous marriage. While that will certainly be contrary to English and French law 
(in France it will be void for an illicit cause) it is perfectly valid by Cameroonian 
custom once the parties have so elected.
As for consent, it has been suggested that it does not play the same role in African 
law as in European law.13 It may well be so in some cases14 but the writer goes
further to assert that,
"in certain contracts the validity of the obligation is not affected even 
if the consent is vitiated... A sale is complete once it has been effected 
with the seller’s consent. It does not matter if his consent was vitiated 
by fraud since in the world of dealings, everyone is trying to make a 
good bargain."
13 Keba M ’Baye, "The African Conception o f Law" In: International Encyclopaedia 
of Comparative Law, Vol. 11, chap. 1, p. 146.
14 This may be true in the contract of marriage to the extent that the consent of both 
the bride and groom may not be crucial. Even so, the families of both parties must 
consent. This can be explained by the fact that marriage as conceived in the majority 
of traditional African custom is a relationship between families to be concluded 
between families, not just the immediate individuals concerned. It must be said that 
this practice is gradually dying, largely as a result of the progressive westernisation 
of the African youth. The author himself cites some examples in African criminal 
law.
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It is respectfully submitted that this assertion in no wa*j represents the true position 
of African customary law. It should not go unnoticed that the writer conspicuously 
fails to cite a single example to support his assertion, perhaps because he could not 
find any. Customary law will definitely not sanction a contract of sale in which there 
is clear evidence that the seller’s consent was vitiated by fraud. Support for this view, 
if any was needed, can be sought in Monie’s finding that customary law does not 
recognise the maxim caveat emptor.15 It would appear from that finding that this 
jural postulate of a social philosophy of rugged individualism has not found favour in 
African customary law. If, therefore, the seller’s consent is vitiated by fraud, as where 
he sells a cow which he knows to be suffering from a serious illness, the contract will 
not be allowed to stand.
At this point, it may be relevant to briefly discuss a few contracts that are easily 
identified under customary law.16 The contract of sale is by far the most common 
type of contract under customary law. Articles such as knives, axes, swords, shields, 
rugs, mats, baskets, pipes, grindstones, canoes, ornaments, magical objects, various 
forms of clothing, food and wine and many more are not only transferred privately 
between individuals but are offered competitively in markets. In the past there was 
evidently no money or other medium of exchange; the mode of trade was direct 
exchange or barter. It does not follow, of course, that the concepts of value or pricing 
were missing. Quantity, superior quality, distance from source, scarcity of an item 
etc., were used to determine the respective values of the items to be exchanged. The 
introduction of money however has brought trade by barter almost to an end. It is 
now practised only in the most remote parts of the country. Sale, especially in the 
market place is now conducted on a monetary basis. The seller and the buyer do a
15 Monie, Op.cit. note 12, p. 513.
16 My observations and conclusions will be drawn partly from my experiences and 
partly from conversations with many very elderly people in various parts of 
Cameroon. The interesting thing was that these elderly people always painted a similar 
picture wherever I went.
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lot of haggling until a price is agreed. Some important contracts such as contracts for 
the sale of livestock (which forms the subject matter of many contracts in cattle 
rearing communities), even if not done in the market place, must nevertheless be 
concluded in the presence of witnesses.
The payment of the price and the passing of property to the buyer does not 
completely absolve the seller from all liability. It has already been mentioned above 
that customary law does not recognise the maxim caveat emptor. Thus, if before the 
expiry of a reasonable time after the sale, the animal is diagnosed to be suffering from 
a serious disease that could not be detected at the time of sale, or it is discovered that 
the seller had stolen it from someone else, the seller will have to refund the purchase 
price or provide another animal. This is when the witnesses become important as they 
will be called upon to testify.
The sale of land or an interest in land is probably the most important contract 
under customary law. In the past, land was never sold as it belonged to the whole 
community. The chief or king held all land in trust. These days land is being sold 
even if not frequently. The sale of land must be approved by elders of the seller’s 
lineage for it to be valid. It must be concluded in the presence of witnesses and it is 
usually accompanied by some element of feasting.
Not merely goods, but services too are traded. One major service contract is the 
contract of agistment. This type of contract is very important in the cattle rearing 
communities. It is a contract whereby the owner of cattle contracts them to someone 
else for custody and rearing. The consideration for this may either be a share of the 
resulting progeny or money. Other service contracts include co-operative labour 
contracts or agricultural pacts, building construction and medecinal treatment contracts.
It is not necessary for the present purpose to continue to enumerate and discuss the 
other contracts known to customary law. I believe that what has so far discussed 
establishes the existence, past and present, of a body of customary contract law, in the 
Cameroonian (and African) traditional society. This is not to say difficulties peculiar 
to this kind of society do not arise. Customary contract law may be different in legal 
character and form from the received English and French laws, it may desperately lack
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some systematic formulation, yet its existence is not in doubt and has, in fact, always 
received some official recognition during and after the colonial era.
(2). The Approbation of Customary Law.
Before the arrival of the Germans and later the English and French, every 
autonomous indigenous tribe in Cameroon had its own tribal law or legal system. 
Some of these were customary in character i.e. they drew their rules from habitual 
practices, while others were religious in character, for example in the north of 
Cameroon where the Islamic religion had been firmly implanted. There could not 
have been any great legal variation as many of the tribal laws were either uniform or 
closely related to the macro-ethnic group which shared similar laws, even as between 
tribes having different languages, history and culture. This is not to suggest, 
however, that there were no differences at all.
When Britain and France took over Cameroon, they were content to recognise and 
allow the natives to continue with their natural system of laws and legal institutions 
whilst they themselves (and a few "Europeanised Cameroonians") were subjected to 
their own metropolitan laws or a variant of it which they introduced into Cameroon.
In some cases, notably in the French territories, statutory recognition of native law
could be found in the enactments relating to the the jurisdiction of courts. Thus in
respect of these territories, Rolland and Lampue have stated that:
"ce sonts les decrets relatifs d V organisation judiciaire qui impliquent 
le maintien du droit traditionnel, en etablissant des tribunaux speciaux 
distincts des tribunaux de droit Frangais. Quequefois d’ailleur ils 
disposent expressement que le tribunaux en question juge suivant les 
coutumes."17
The statute in question in French Cameroon is the Decree of 31 July 1927 (later to 
be replaced by the Decree of 26 July 1944) that set up indigenous courts. In British 
Cameroons, Great Britain did not only recognise customary law but used customary
17 Rolland, et Lampue: Precis de Droit de Pays d’Outre-mer. 1949, p. 290.
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courts as official instruments of their colonial rule.18 It must be said that customary 
courts still operate today throughout the country even though the 1972 Judicial 
Organisation Ordinance declared that they were only to be maintained temporarily 
after that date. They apply only the native law and custom prevailing in the area in 
which they are located and are staffed by non professional locals. Appeals from 
customary courts now lie to the Courts of Appeal.
The recognition of customary law, however, was never going to halt the ever 
increasing influence of the received laws. Political, economic, and social changes 
brought about much greater interaction and contacts between the natives and the 
Europeans. This led to an unavoidable clash of cultures, a conflict which 
unfortunately was to spark the gradual demise of customary law. As a result of this 
conflict, the colonial regimes used their political power to cut down the extent to 
which customary law applied in many ways.
Criminal law was first to be affected. The criminal jurisdiction of customary 
courts was drastically reduced, leaving them to deal with only minor criminal matters. 
Serious matters such as treason, sedition, homicide, rape, were removed from their 
jurisdiction.19 The post independent legislator continued were the colonial legislator 
ended, so that even the limited criminal jurisdiction has now been finally taken away 
by section 26 of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance 1972, which completely 
suppressed the criminal jurisdiction of customary courts. The civil jurisdiction of 
these courts was also limited to areas of life where few direct conflicts would arise 
between the imported and indigenous laws, precisely to that part of native law which 
relates to marriage and family, property and succession, and in other spheres which 
were most closely bound up with the village social order. Understandably, they were 
given no jurisdiction in complex commercial matters like banking, which are foreign 
to customary law by their very nature.
18 See the Customary Courts Ordinance, Cap 142 of Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
1948.
19 For British Cameroons, see Customary Courts Ordinance, op. cit., note 18; For 
French Cameroons, see Decree of 31st July, 1927.
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One may thus conclude that the recognition of customary law by the colonial 
regimes was half-hearted and smacked of tokenism. Throughout the colonial era, 
customary law was not only restricted in its application, but the colonial regimes 
increasingly imposed their own systems and notions of justice on Cameroon. This 
process, which has been rightly desribed as "acculturation judiciaire",20 led to an 
irreversible transformation of indigenous laws and judicial institutions by the end of 
the colonial era. Sadly, the post independent legislator has done nothing to redress 
this imbalance.
20 Le Roy, Op. cit., note 1; Godinec, Op. cit., note 3, p. 20, defines aculturation as the 
imposition of a European system of education and values of civilization over African 
ones.
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(3). The Criteria of the Validity of Customary Law in Non-
Native Courts.
By non-native courts, I am referring to all the modem courts that apply the
common law and the civil law as their primary or basic law. They include for the
present purpose, the Magistrates’ Courts, the High Courts, the Courts of Appeal and
the Supreme Court. These courts are also free to apply customary law in certain
circumstances. It is intended here to determine those circumstances under which a
rule of customary law in general, and of contract in particular, can be successfully
pleaded before these courts. In other words, what is the criteria of the validity for
customary law in non-native courts? It is worth pointing out that in both Anglophone
and Francophone Cameroon, statutory and judicial criteria have been laid down for the
validity of customary law.
In the Anglophone part, these are to be found in the Southern Cameroons High
Court Law, 1955. Section 27(1) of the said law directs the high court to
"observe and enforce the observance of customary law which is not 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor 
incompatible either directly or by implication, with any law for the 
time being in force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any person 
of the benefit of any such law or custom".
Section 27(2) provides that:
Such laws and customs shall be deemed applicable in causes and 
matters where the parties thereto are natives and also in causes and 
matters between natives and non-natives where it may appear to the 
court that substantial injustice would be done to either party by a strict 
adherence to the rules of English law.
And section 27(3) enacts:
No party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any native law or 
custom, if it shall appear either from express contract or the nature of 
the transactions out of which any suit or question may have arisen, that 
such party agreed that his obligation with such transaction should be 
regulated exclusively by English law or that such transactions are
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transactions unknown to native law and custom.
The use of the disjunctive word ‘nor’ in section 27(1), it is submitted, suggests that 
the tests are alternative, not cumulative. In other words, under the above provision, 
it is enough for the purpose of its invalidation that a rule of customary law is found 
to be repugnant to "natural justice, equity and good conscience". Where such a 
finding is not possible, the rule may nevertheless be invalidated if it is found to be 
"incompatible" whether directly or otherwise, with any law for the time being in force.
In Francophone Cameroon, the criterion laid down for the validity of any 
customary law rule in the non-native courts is that it must not be contrary to public 
order, good morality, or incompatible with written law. Any rule of customary law 
that seemed to be incompatible with notions of French civilisation, ordre publique 
ou bonne meours" or "manifestement contraire awe concepts et principes moderne" 
was struck down.21 The use of the concept of ordre public by non-native courts to 
deny the enforcement of certain customary rules22 remains a source of controversy 
in Cameroon.23 One Cameroonian commentator has been moved to ask, with 
enjoyable acerbity, "De quel ordre public invoquaient ces decisions pour repousser 
les coutumes: metropolitain ou local ?"24 (on whose idea of ordre public (western 
or African) is the exclusion of customary law is based). No marks for guessing that 
he is pouring scorn on the idea of using western concepts of ordre public in an 
African setting.
21 Nguini, "Droit Modern et Droit Traditionel" (1973) 83 Pennant, 9; Melone, "Le 
Code Civil Contre la Coutume. La fin de la Suprematie" (1972) no. 12 Rev. Cam. Dr., 
1.
22 For a catalogue of some instances, see Enonchong,"Public Policy and Ordre Public: 
The Exclusion o f Customary Law in Cameroon" (1993) 5 RADIC, pp. 503-524.
23 See generally Melone, Op. cit.. note 21.
24 See for example, Nkouendjin, "Le Role de la JurJurisprudence dans les Nouveaux 
Etats D ’Afrique Francophones" (1973) 83 Pennant, 11, 15.
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(4). Judicial Attitudes.
It has been stated above that the application of native law in the non-native courts 
is usually limited by what may conveniently be called the ‘repugnancy and 
incompatibility clause’ i.e. a clause to the effect that it shall be applicable only in so 
far as it is not inconsistent with certain prescribed standards. The language used to 
describe these standards varies considerably as between Anglophone and Francophone 
Cameroon, and though in principle, the differences may not always be unimportant - 
the conception of V ordre public (the term used in Francophone Cameroon) would 
appear to admit of a wider discretion than the words "not repugnant to natural justice" 
(which constitutes the criterion in Anglophone Cameroon). It should be said
nevertheless that most of the terms seem to be equally general and abfect and
therefore lead to no real differences in their practical application. A consideration of 
the practical effect of these repugnancy or incompatible clauses, as exemplified in 
judicial proceedings in both the common and civil law jurisdictions in Cameroon will 
confirm that assertion.
The case of Etone v Ngeh25 decided in Anglophone Cameroon, provides a very 
interesting example of the application of the repugnancy clause. Even though it did 
not involve a contract, it nevertheless will throw some light on the present discussion. 
In that the case, the plaintiff and one Paulina Mekong had been married according to 
native law and custom for 10 years without issue. In 1952 she left the plaintiff and
went to live with Ngeh by whom she had twin sons. Thereafter the plaintiff brought
a suit in the then Kumba Native Court against Pauline for a declaration that the twins 
were his. It must be said that the plaintiff could not, and in fact, did not, make any 
pretensions to biological paternity. Rather he insisted on his "rights", basing his claim 
on a customary law rule to the effect that if a woman leaves her husband, A, and goes 
to live with B, by whom she bears children, those children will be deemed to belong
25 1962-1964 W.C.L.R. 32
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to A unless B has fully refunded to A the bride price he paid to the woman’s parents
or relations. Since Ngeh had not fully refunded the plaintiffs bride price, the native
court had little difficulty in finding for Etone. The Special Appeals Officer (the
District Officer) upheld the decision but on further appeal, the West Cameroon Appeal
Court took the view that the said customary law rule was repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience. The decision was therefore reversed and the children
given to Ngeh, their natural father. In Francophone Cameroon a similar decision was
arrived at in A rret du 20 Mars 196226 in which the Supreme Court of the then East
Cameroon, ruled emphatically that the native law rule
"suivant laquelle le versement dune dot en vue d’obtenir une femme 
en mariage suffit, en tout etat de cause, d faire attribuer la paternite 
des enfants de cette femme a celui qui d verse la dot est manifestement 
contraire aux principes ... ordre public. Paternite naturelle ne peut 
resulter que de Vexistence de liens du sang... d Vexclusion de tout 
motif fonde sur la dot”.
On the evidence of the few contract cases I have found involving customary law, 
the non-native courts have shown a greater inclination to applying rules of English and 
French contract law, even where it would have been more appropriate to have recourse 
to rules of customary law. The decision of the Bamenda Court of Appeal in Ronate 
Tapong v. Joshua M ob if1 illustrates by far the most blatant disregard for customary 
law. The case involved the breach of an agreement to marry. The respondent, was 
the senior brother to one Jerome Mobit and successor to their deceased father. He 
therefore stood in loco parentis to Jerome. Sometime in 1969, he approached the 
father of Ronate, the appellant and proposed a marriage between his junior brother, 
Jerome (who at the time was living and working in another town) and Ronate. When 
all the necessary arrangements had been put in place, Jerome went back home in 
November 1969 and an agreement to marry was concluded. The families of both 
parties, and no doubt the parties themselves, contemplated ceremonies pursuant to 
native laws and custom. As required by native law and custom, the respondent on
26 1962 Pennant, 576.
27 Suit No. BCA/31/74 (Bamenda, unreported).
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behalf of his junior brother paid a dowry of about 95.000 francs plus other gifts to the 
family of the appellant. In 1970, the appellant wrote to the family of the respondent 
that she was breaking off the engagement and in the same letter undertook to pay back 
the dowry and other sums of money which had been paid to her family. After paying 
about a third of that, she discontinued payment, whereupon the respondent brought an 
action for the full refund of the bride price. The trial court (the Bamenda Court of 
First Instance) found for the respondent. Ronate appealed, inter alia, on the grounds 
that (i) the trial Magistrate erred in law by enforcing a purported Native Law and 
Custom which was not proven before the court and (ii) that the trial Magistrate erred 
in law in giving judgement on principles repugnant and contrary to the laws governing 
contracts.
The Court of Appeal, while not disputing the fact that this was a purely customary 
law arrangement, chose to adjudicate upon the matter by applying the English contract 
law concepts of consideration and privity. On that basis the court took the view that 
the consideration for the appellant’s promise to marry Jerome was his own promise 
to marry her. In other words, the consideration was executory and the contract 
became binding as soon as the promises had been exchanged. Setting aside the 
decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeal opined that any action to enforce the 
contract should have been brought by Jerome and not Joshua, his elder brother cum 
father, because even though he had paid the dowry and conducted the negotiations 
which led to the contract, he was a stranger to the consideration and therefore could 
not sue on the contract.
The result reached by the Court of Appeal, with due respect, is unacceptable. 
Firstly, one must take issue with the courts’s outrageous statement that "it was 
irrelevant that the two families contemplated ceremonies pursuant to native laws and 
custom". This statement, if nothing else, only epitomises the contempt with which the 
courts treat customary law. Perhaps the Court of Appeal needed reminding that 
section 27 (1) of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law 1955 requires non-native 
courts to observe and enforce the observance of any native law and custom which is 
neither repugnant to natural justice nor incompatible with any other law. Under native
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law and custom, marriage is so important that it is regarded as a transaction between 
two kin-groups (i.e. the families of both parties), not just individuals. This can be 
contrasted with the modem or western conception of marriage as a voluntary union 
between individuals animated by personal romantic attachments. The traditional 
African perception of marriage as an affair between families all too well known, even 
to western observers.28 One would therefore prefer not to think that the Court of 
Appeal by any stretch of imagination considered this fact to be repugnant to natural 
justice, neither can it be said that it contravenes any known law in Cameroon. If that 
is not the case (and it should not be the case) why, then, did the court feel confident 
to declare that the parties’ contemplation of native law and custom was of no moment.
Secondly, the appellant’s argument that the trial court enforced a purported native 
law and custom not proven before the court is untenable. This is because the 
customary law rule that demands the return or repayment of the dowry in the event 
of a breakdown of a prospective marriage, is so trite and notorious as to dispense with 
the need to prove it in a court of law. For support of this assertion, one needs look 
no further than Rubin’s29 comprehensive survey of the matrimonial law among the 
Bali tribe of Cameroon. In paragraph 23, he states with regard to marriage 
negotiations and consideration, that "the proper persons to conduct the negotiations for 
the payment of marriage consideration are (a) in the case of a first marriage by an 
unmarried boy, his father or head of his family". On the source of marriage 
consideration, he states in paragraph 86 that: "Traditionally, the father of the 
bridegroom (or head of his family) was expected to provide the marriage 
consideration", and on the return of marriage consideration, he concludes in paragraph 
99 that "Where no marriage occurs, all obligations arising in terms of an agreement 
on marriage consideration, made in respect to a prospective marriage are terminated, 
and any payments made pursuant to such agreement must be refunded". It should be
28 Godinec, Op. cit., note 3, p. 12.
29 Rubin, "Matrimonial Law Among The Bali o f West Cameroon" (1970) 14 no.2, 
J.A.L. 66
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noted that although Rubin’s finding relate only to the Bali tribe in Anglophone 
Cameroon, similar conclusions will be reached in most parts of the country.
This light-hearted, perhaps apocryphal, yet poignant story recently reported in the 
Guardian Newspaper30 demonstrates that the customary law rule in favour of the 
refund of the dowry after the breakdown of marriage or an engagement is also well 
established in Francophone Cameroon.31 The story goes that a Cameroonian man, 
Michel Fotso, who was told by his wife’s relatives that she died in childbirth six years 
ago accused her of theft after seeing her in a bar with a new husband. He complained 
that he had paid 4 pigs, a little rum, 100 litres of red wine, five matchetes and a 
bicycle to her.
Whatever might have been the reasons for such a shameless lie on the part of the 
wife and her relatives, it is submitted that it could not have been totally unconnected 
with the need to avoid refunding the bride price, since the death of the wife is most 
likely to dispense with the need for any refund of the bride price. Such a devious 
attempt to avoid the repayment of the bride price by the wife and her family must be 
taken as an aquiescence in the native law rule that the bride price or dowry must be 
refunded on the breakdown of marriage, especially where such breakdown is at the 
instance of the bride.
In the light of the above, it would have to be said that the Court of Appeal was 
wrong to hold that the parties’ contemplation of native law and custom in the Ronate 
Tapong case did not matter.32 The court was equally wrong to exclude the 
respondent from the consideration even though it was never contested that he actually 
paid the bride price. It is thus submitted that the problem in this case does not lend 
itself to a solution based on rules of English contract law. Rather, the problem is
30 The (London) Guardian, Tuesday Sept. 27, 1994, p. 10.
31 It is presumed from the name of the man involved that the parties are Francophone 
Cameroonians.
32 The decision has also been the subject of a critical note. See Zama, "Can a third 
party to an agreement to marry under Customary law claim damages for breach o f 
contract o f an agreement to marry ?" (1991) 7 Jur. Info, pp. 35-37.
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about a customary marriage arrangement that collapsed because the bride pulled out. 
Any analysis in terms of English contract law, therefore, is simply a device to get 
around the issue of native law and custom. The neat way to have dealt with the 
problem would have been to apply native law and custom (as the trial court did) 
according to which the the respondent would have been privy to the marriage 
agreement and perfectly entitled to recover.
In another case, Mallam Bello v. Mallam Ngoni,33 a contractual dispute arose 
over cattle. Despite the fact that both parties were natives and had actually taken the 
matter to the customary (Alkali) court in the first instance, the Court of Appeal again 
employed rules of the English law of contract and tort such as negligence, duty of 
care, consideration and frustration. It does not matter that they arrived at the same 
conclusions that the customary courts would have reached. The point is that the 
courts should apply native law and custom whenever it is clear that that was the 
parties contemplated when they concluded their contract.
It must not be assumed, however, that the courts always reject or ignore customary 
law. In Neba Ndifor Rudolph v. Ngwa nee Tata Rosemary,34 the Ngwa family (to 
which both the appellant and respondent’s husband belonged), decided to transfer part 
of the family land to the respondent’s husband to enable him build a house and settle. 
He gladly accepted the offer and was told by the appellant that native law and custom 
required that he provided the family with wine and food. The respondent and her 
husband offered money (in lieu of the required items) to the elders of his family who 
then showed them the piece of land. The deal was thus concluded.
The respondent then proceeded to farm on the land and the appellant brought an 
action against her for destruction, conversion and breach of contract. He alleged that 
he and the respondent had entered into an oral agreement that she would compensate 
him for the crops that were on the land when she and her husband took it over. The 
respondent argued that the according to native law and custom the contract had been
33 Appeal No. BCA/33/85. (Bamenda, unreported).
34 BCA/1/89 (Bamenda, unreported).
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concluded with members of the entire family and therefore nothing was owed to the 
appellant. The trial court dismissed the claim and the plaintiff appealed. The Court 
of Appeal sought the opinion of two elders of the Bafut tribe (from which all the 
parties hailed) and they unanimously affirmed that in their tradition, if a child or a 
member of the family was given part of the family land, he was also entitled to 
whatever is on the land. Applying this custom, the court dismissed the appeal and 
upheld the decision of the trial court.
In Ngueou v. Ndjiosseu,35 decided in Francophone Cameroon, the parties (both 
of the Bamileke tribe) entered into a contract whereby the appellant bought the 
respondent’s house. The respondent then renounced the contract and refused to vacate 
the premises whereupon the appellant brought an action before the Yaounde Court of 
First Instance for breach of contract, asking that the respondent be evicted. The 
respondent argued that Bamileke native law and custom applied, according to which 
he was free to rescind the contract. The court agreed and held that the appellant could 
only recover what he had invested in the transaction but not the house. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the decision and the matter went before the Supreme Court. In the 
Supreme Court, the appellant argued that written law (i.e. the French civil law) and 
particularly, article 1134 of the Civil Code should apply to deny the respondent the 
right to unilaterally renounce a contract that had been freely and mutually agreed 
upon. The Supreme Court responded by saying that in the absence of any express 
provision in the contract that written law was to apply in the event of litigation the 
trial court and the Court of Appeal Court were correct to apply customary law. The 
appeal was again dismissed. The only problem with this decision is that the courts 
do not say (at least it is not mentioned in the judgements) how they came to be so 
sure about the custom that permitted the respondent to avoid the contract, yet what 
this case shows is that the non-native courts have the power and freedom to apply 
native law and custom without resorting to English or French law, if only they are 
willing to do so.
35 C.S.C.O. 26/3/1968; [1970] Pennant, 358.
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Despite the above examples in which customary law has been applied, the point 
must be made that on the whole, the courts have shown a greater inclination towards 
the received laws. They always seem more prepared to reject or ignore native law and 
custom than they are prepared to admit it. The courts seem to take it for granted that 
any matter coming before them is to be tried according to the received laws, even 
when it is pretty obvious that the parties had customary law in mind at the time of 
contracting.
Without necessarily defending the courts’ atitudes to native law and custom, it
must be conceded that the criteria by which the courts have determine the validity of
customary law are, by their very nature, inadequate, ambiguous and unfavourable to
customary law. This is hardly surprising considering that they were formulated by the
colonial legislator. For example, no lawyer has been able to say with certainty what
the phrases natural justice, equity, and good conscience mean. The judges (not only
in Cameroon but in other parts of Africa) who use the phrases again and again have
not been too keen on defining them. Osborne, C.J., was frank enough to admit it in
the Nigerian case of D.W. Lewis v Bankole:36
"I am not sure that I know what the terms natural justice and good 
conscience mean. They are high sounding phrases and it would of 
course not be difficult to hold that many of the ancient customs of the 
barbaric times are repugnant thereto, but it would not be easy to offer 
a strict and accurate definition of the term".
Little wonder that the courts have not been uniform in their application of these 
charged phrases. And, much to the dismay of those whose lives are governed by 
customary law, when the courts are in a quandary, they have tended to invoke these 
phrases to deviate from the strict application of customary law.
Again, section 27(4) of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law 1955, which still 
applies in English speaking Cameroon, provides that where no express rule is 
applicable in a matter of controversy (i.e between customary law and English law), 
the court shall be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 
There is also a similar rule in French speaking Cameroon, to the effect that where
36 1 NLR 81, 83-84, decided on 12th Nov., 1908.
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there is no express customary law provision on a subject, written law (i.e French civil 
law) should be applied. The fact that the parties contemplated native law and custom 
is irrelevant in such a case. This rule which is manifestly biased against customary 
law has proven to be a powerful tool in the hands of the judges, who have used it to 
discriminate against rules of customary law, often without good cause.
For example, in F.Innocent v M. Christine,37 the Supreme Court agreed with the 
Yaounde Court of Appeal that the native law and custom of the Beti tribe to which 
both parties belonged, could not apply to a dispute over a purported sale of a hut on 
the flimsy grounds that the said native law and custom did not provide for such a 
transaction. The fact that the sale of a hut or land in the village was unheard of in 
the past does not mean that such transactions should not be governed by native law 
and custom, if and when they do take place. After all, customary law, like life in the 
village that it governs, also evolves.
All the problems that beset customary law, however, cannot be blamed entirely on 
the colonial regimes or the post independence judiciary. The nature and the content 
of customary law as well as the question of those to whom it applies are not clearly 
defined.38 During the colonial era, customary law governed the natives and it was 
easy to determine who was a native, since all whites were excluded. In other words, 
it was done on a racial basis. Today, with the whites gone, it has become necessary 
to introduce a new and clearer approach in determining not only who is a native, but 
also when native law and custom should apply.
It is also well to be reminded that bodies of customary law do not stand alone and
37 Arret No. 10/CC du 22/2/1973 [1975] 7 Rev. Cam. Dr. 59.
38 For a discussion of some of these difficulties, see White, "African Customary Law: 
The Problem o f Concept and Definition"(1965) 9 J.A.L. 86; Alliot, "Problemes de 
L ’ Unification de Droit Africains", (1967) 11 J.A.L. 86; Monie, "The place o f 
Customary Law in Modern Africa" (1972) No.3 Annales de la Faculte de Droit du 
Cameroun, 65; and Pannier, "Le Source du Droit au Cameroon Oriental" (1972) No.3 
Annales de la Faculte de Droit du Cameroun, 101.
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are not self contained in Cameroon. Not all customary law rules span the length and 
breadth of Cameroon. Some vary from tribe to tribe and even within the same tribe 
may vary from village to village. They are divergent views on the issue of the 
resemblances and differences of customary law. Allott believes that "on the African 
continent the resemblances of customary law do not suddenly cease as one crosses a 
particular linguistic, ethnic or racial boundary...".39 Others are of the opinion, 
especially with regard to marriage, that the diversity in matters of detail between the 
customs of different tribes and localities is so vast that "it is not even possible, save 
to a very limited extent, to trace any broad uniformity of basic principles".40 My 
informed view, based on my experience and observation of customary law, is that 
while each tribal system may be undergirded by distinctive language, religious cult, 
myths of tribal and ethnic identity, whatever differences these may cause should not 
be exaggerated or overstated because a closer examination will reveal that they are but 
of detail, rather than principle; of form rather than substance. This, however, should 
not be taken to mean that these differences, small as they may be, are incapable of 
raising problems of interpretation and conflict of laws. Conflicts not only between 
customary laws and the received laws but between the various customary laws 
themselves. This conflict or potential conflict has no doubt , been exarcebated by 
the acceleration of migration within the country. This (labour) migration in which 
superfluous rural labourers migrate to towns and cities to settle and are transformed 
into a permanent workforce or "proletariat" has produced a mix of various tribesmen 
living together, working together and naturally intermarrying. The necessity for the 
exercise of choice of law therefore sometimes arises as a result of the multiplicity of 
tribal laws.
It is in the area of personal law such as marriage that problems are most likely to
39 Allott, Essays, p. 63.
40 Phillips and Morris, Marriage Laws in Africa. 1971, p.6.
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arise.41 To take a simple and increasingly common example, a man and a woman, 
who belong to two different tribes may contract a marriage, ostensibly in accordance 
with native law but without any clear indication as to which native law is applicable. 
Even where the parties come from the same tribe, a problem of conflict may arise if 
they do not happen to be resident in their tribal locality. The Bamenda Court of 
Appeal was confronted with this problem in Onana Essomba v. Onana nee Menye 
Jeanne D’Arc.42 The parties, both Francophone Cameroonians, had married in 
Yaounde according to the native law and custom of the Beti tribe, from where they 
both hailed. The wife brought divorce proceedings in Mankon Customary Court, 
Bamenda because both parties happened to be resident in Bamenda at the time of this 
action. The Mankon Customary Court assumed that it had jurisdiction and granted a 
divorce. The appellant took the matter to the Bamenda Court of Appeal where he 
challenged the jurisdiction of the Mankon Customary Court. The Court of Appeal 
noted that even though the parties were based in Bamenda, the place of their domicile 
remained Yaounde. From that the court went on to hold that "since the parties had 
married under the custom of the Beti people, the Mankon Customary Court had no 
jurisdiction to hear the matter".
Although examples in purely contractual matters do not readily spring to mind, 
Onana v. Onana does hint at some of the conflict of laws problems that may arise 
at the level of customary law per se, especially as a result of urbanization and 
migration. Perhaps the most difficult problems facing the courts will be to devise 
ways of resolving the conflict of laws that arise in such situations, while at the same 
time allowing the customary systems to operate in the homogenous rural communities 
to which they are most suitable and which will remain for years to come the social 
milieu of millions of Cameroonians. These problems may be difficult, but they are 
not insurmountable. The reality is that their solution needs more willingness and
41 This has been highlighted in the case of Ghana by Allott, "Marriage and Internal 
Conflict o f Laws in Ghana" (1958) vols. 2 & 3 J.A.L., pp. 164-184.
42 BCA/13CC/89 (Bamenda, 15.1.1990, unreported).
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endeavour than the Cameroonian legislature and judiciary are prepared to offer. I do 
not intend to propose any solutions here. My aim has simply been to highlight the 
fact that customary law itself is not devoid of problems.
2. MODERN CONTRACT LAW.
By modem contract law I am referring to the received English common and French 
civil laws. The phrase is used in contradistinction to customary law and hereinafter, 
contract law shall mean modern contract law. If there is any reference to customary 
law, it will be specifically made. In this section, I intend to determine the extent to 
which English and French law can be considered as sources of contract law in 
Cameroon. Are they also subjected to certain limitations or do they apply in their 
entirety? Since the English common law applies only in the Anglophone provinces 
(the common law jurisdiction) it is convenient to treat it seperately from French law 
which applies only in the Francophone provinces (the civil law jurisdiction).
(1). Sources of Contract Law in Anglophone Cameroon.
It has already been explained in chapter one how Great Britain became involved
in Cameroon, and how they proceeded to introduce English law into their part of
Cameroon. It was also shown that the Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955
(still in force) effectively guaranteed the continuous application of English law in
many areas (contract law included), after the British had left. On the extent of the
application of the law of England, section 11 of the said law provides:
"...(a) the common law; (b) doctrines of equity; and (c) statutes of 
general application which were in force in England on the 1st day of 
January, 1900, shall in so far as they relate to any matter with respect 
to which the legislature of Southern Cameroons is for the time being 
competent to make laws, be in force within the jurisdiction of the 
court".
Section 11 expresses in general terms the English law to be applied without 
spelling out the rules of the laws to be applied. Yet this lack of detail should
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confound no one as to the sources of modem contract law in Anglophone Cameroon. 
Briefly, this comprises of the English common law, English doctrines of equity and 
pre-1900 English statutes of general application, legislation passed by the Nigerian 
legislature before 1954 (when Southern Cameroons broke away from Nigeria), 
legislation passed by the Southern Cameroons legislature after 1954 and those passed 
by the National Assembly (Parliament) after the re-unification of the federated states 
of West (Anglophone) Cameroon and East (Francophone) Cameroon in 1972.
(a). The Common Law.
In English law, the expression common law can be used in contradistinction to 
civil law which comprises mainly enacted law (like the continental systems) or in 
juxtaposition to equity. For the most part of this study, it shall be used in 
contradistinction to the French civil law but for the purpose of this present section, it 
is used to denote that part of English law which is unenacted and which has been 
developed through the decisions of the courts.
There has been some controversy (not only in Cameroon but in Ghana, Nigeria, 
and other territories with a similarly worded reception statute) as to whether the 
limiting date of 1st January, 1900 only refers to the statutes of general application or 
whether it also extends to the received common law. In other words, will the courts, 
in order to determine the content of any common law rule, have regard only to pre- 
1900 decisions or will they consult post-1900 decisions and their possible 
modifications as well? Two opposing views are involved here.
The first view, which can be described as the orthodox one, maintains that the 
common law is limited in its application to that which was in force in England on or 
before 1st January, 1900. Allott is an eminent supporter of this view. He takes the 
view that the limiting date applies to the common law so that common law decisions 
up to 1st January, 1900 are binding while the decisions coming after that date are only
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persuasive.43
The other view, championed by Park,44 maintains that the limiting date applies 
only to statutes of general application and does not include the common law. In other 
words, the application of common law decisions is supposed to be timeless. The first 
view seems to me to be the better one. Firstly, it is in line with the interpretation of 
the provisions in several common law jurisdictions in the United States of America. 
The view taken there is that where a state constitution provided that "the common law 
in England shall remain in force, it is usually construed as referring to the common 
law of England as it stood at the time of the adoption of such a constitution."45 
Secondly, it gives the local courts, at least in theory, the opportunity to develop a 
case-law that reflects the local setting.
The decision of Cameroonian courts, unfortunately, do not provide any settled line 
of authority with which to resolve this issue. From the many decisions I have 
considered, I have been able observe that where the correctness or the appropriateness 
of a post-1900 English decision is in issue, the judges do not hesitate to assert that 
they are entitled to go their own way, especially if the said decision does not fall in 
line with their own reasoning of the particular problem in question. Even though the 
Bamenda Court of Appeal has ruled in Joseph Atanga v. Shell Cameroon S A ‘46 that 
pre-1900 English decisions are binding while post-1900 decisions are only persuasive, 
the general practice of the courts is still not quite clear. In contract law (as in other
43 Allott, "The Authority o f English Decisions in Colonial Courts" (1957) 1 J.A.L. 23; 
For more on precedents, see Allott, "Judicial Precedent in Africa Revisited1 (1968) 
J.A.L. 3-31.
44 Park, Sources of Nigerian Law. 1963, p. 17.
45 15 Corpus Juris Secundum "Common Law" (1939) 617. Cited in Daniels, The 
Common Law in West Africa. 1964, p. 122.
46 Civil Appeal No.BCA/43/81 (Bamenda, unreported)
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fields of law), the practice seems to be that post-1900 English decisions, where not 
specifically challenged, have continued to be cited routinely and applied as a matter 
of course, often without any acknowledgement, express or implied, that one line of 
authority is binding and the other merely persuasive. The point can also be made 
statistically.47
As far as this thesis is concerned, English cases decided before and after 1900 will 
be freely cited. For reasons given below, I do not consider it legally desirable and 
practical to limit the use of English case law only to pre-1900 decisions. It has been 
remarked that the Cameroonian courts do cite post-1900 case law on a regular basis. 
While there certainly have been some differences of emphasis which have been 
gradually changing the direction of contract law in England compared with the 
equivalent rules as applied by the Cameroonian courts, it is nevertheless still true that 
the basis of modem contract law in Anglophone Cameroon remains the English 
common law and it would be impossible to understand and analyse the present 
framework of contract law in the common law jurisdiction of Cameroon, let alone 
some of its nuances, without equally considering not only the past, but the present 
developments in the law of contract in England. It is also apparent that pre-1900 and 
post-1900 English cases, whether treated as binding or persuasive, will continue to be 
accorded respect in Cameroonian courts. Therefore, where a proposition has been 
established by an English case originally, I shall cite the English case as well as any 
significant Cameroonian cases that have followed or adopted it. And where the law 
is the same in Cameroon and England, or where there is no reason to suggest it is 
different, I shall look for the best judicial exposition of the law, no matter where it 
comes from.
47 Of a total number of 40 cases cited in a random selection of contract judgements 
by the High Courts and Courts of Appeal in Anglophone Cameroon, 13 were post- 
1900 English decisions, 15 were pre-1900 English decisions, 11 were Cameroonian, 
while there was 1 Nigerian and 1 Canadian decision respectively.
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(b). Doctrines of Equity.
In addition to section 11 of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955 which 
includes doctrines of equity as part of the general law to be applied, section 14 
provides that,
"where there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and 
the rules of common law, the rules of equity shall prevail".
Equity primarily means fairness but in a much narrower sense, it is used in 
contradistinction to strict law or common law. For example, it may compel the 
specific performance of a contract where the common law will only give damage for 
the breach of it. It is surely in this sense that it is used in section 11 of the South 
Cameroon High Court Law 1955.
The courts in Common Law Cameroon have been known to apply equitable 
doctrines to some contract cases even though they have been ambivalent in their 
decisions, perhaps because of the discretionary nature of equity. For instance, in 
Menyoli Motors Co. Ltd. v. Frederick Ezedigboh,48 the West Cameroon Court of 
Appeal, applying the English decision in Stocklosser v Johnson,49 upheld a general 
power to grant equitable relief against the forfeiture of the buyers deposit in a hire 
purchase contract after the rescission of the contract, where the sum forfeited was out 
of all proportion to the damage suffered by the seller and when it would have been 
unconscionable for the seller to retain the money. Yet in another case, Ets. Tsewole 
v John Holt Motors,50 the same court made an about turn and refused to grant 
equitable relief in very similar circumstances.
It would be fair to say that Cameroonian courts are generally not enamoured by 
equity. A close scrutiny of some of their decisions reveals a predilection for strict
48 Civil Appeal No. WCCA/7/68 (Buea, unreported).
49 [1954] 1 Q.B. 476.
50 Civil Appeal No. WCCA/21/70 (Buea, unreported).
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law. As a result, one often finds decisions which cannot be faulted as a matter of 
strict law, yet cannot be said to have done justice to the parties.
(c). Statutes of General Application.
According to section 11 of the South Cameroonians High Court Law 1955, statutes 
of general application that were in force in England on or before January 1, 1900 are 
also to be applied by the Cameroonian courts. But the question must be asked: what 
exactly constitutes a statute of general application? Section 11 is silent on this and 
once again Cameroonian courts have failed to provide authoritative guidance on a 
fundamental question.
For an answer, it may be necessary to look up to Nigeria whose reception statute 
is couched in exactly the same language as that of Cameroon. In the Nigerian case 
of Attorney General v. John Holt & Co. Ltd.,51 Osborne, CJ. made a gallant attempt 
at an interpretation of the phrase "statutes of general application". He said that in 
order to determine whether or not a statute is one of general application, two 
preliminary questions have to be answered: (1) by what courts is the statute applied 
in England and (ii) to what classes of the community in England does it apply? If, 
on or before January 1, 1900 a particular statute was applied by all criminal and civil 
courts, as the case may be, to all classes of the community, there is a likelihood that 
it would be in force within the jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, it were applied only 
by certain courts (e.g. a statute regulating procedure) or only to certain classes of the 
community (e.g. an act regulating a particular trade), the probability is that it will not 
be held to be applicable locally. Even though the learned chief justice was self 
deprecating in conceding that his test was not infallible, he must nevertheless be 
credited with providing the most usable guidance to the question as to what constitutes 
a statute of general application.
Statutes of general application, unlike the common law, are not trapped in any
51 [1910] 2 NLR 21.
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controversy over the time limit for their application. It is clear from the wording of 
the reception statute that only statutes of general application that were in force in 
England on or before 1st January, 1900 are to be applied by the Cameroonian courts. 
This has been confirmed by the the decision in Mbuh M. Mathias v Joseph A. 
Tata.52 In that case, the plaintiff orally agreed to sell his Datsun car to the defendant. 
It was agreed that the defendant would make an immediate advance payment of the 
price in cash while the balance was to be paid in eleven equal instalments. The 
plaintiff was later to seize the car, alleging defaults in payment by the defendant, and 
sue for the outstanding balance. The defendant counter-claimed for breach of contract, 
detinue and loss of use of the car.
The High Court, taking into consideration the fact that both parties admitted to 
having entered into a hire purchase agreement; that when the vehicle was seized it was 
still in the plaintiff’s name and that the defendant never resisted or attempted to resist 
the seizure, arrived at the conclusion that the contract was one of hire purchase. On 
that construction it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to seize the car and claim 
the outstanding balance. The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeal53 differed with the High Court on the important question of 
the nature of the contract. It stated that it is always inevitable and essential that a hire 
purchase agreement be evidenced in writing and that in the absence of any document 
spelling out the rights and obligations of both the seller and the buyer, a sale by 
instalment payments (as in the present case) will nevertheless be a conditional sale of 
goods at common law. The Court of Appeal then reversed the High Court decision 
and ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to a right of seizure. The proper remedy 
available to him, the court held, was an action for the outstanding balance. He in turn 
appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the proper remedy 
available to the plaintiff was an action for the balance and not seizure but disagreed
52 HCB/7/78 (Buea, unreported).
53 BCA/6/79 (Bamenda, unreported).
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with it on the question of the nature of the contract, taking the view of the High Court 
that the contract was one of hire purchase. The Supreme Court pointed out that at 
common law a hire purchase contract may take any form - it may be under seal, it 
may be written and it may be oral, as in the present case. Even though the Court of 
Appeal made no reference to it, the Supreme Court54 was also quick to point out that 
the requirement that hire purchase contracts must strictly be in writing is laid down 
in the British Hire Purchase Act, 1938 and emphasised that because it is a post-1900 
statute, it does not apply to Cameroon.
While in some areas of the law the courts in Common Law Cameroon are entitled 
to apply post-1900 English statutes,55 the general rule that only pre-1900 English 
statutes are applicable in Cameroon, applies to contract law. This means that the 
Cameroonian courts will apply only such statutes as the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (and 
not the 1979 version), the Statute of Frauds 1677 (to the exclusion of the changes 
introduced to it by the Law of Property Act 1925 and the Law Reform (Enforcement 
of Contracts) Act 1954) and other statutes of general application in the field of 
contract law enacted before January 1, 1900. In principle, all the 20th century statutes 
English statutes on contract, of which they are many, do not apply in Cameroon. But 
it will not be impossible to find instances in which the courts have applied them, 
especially where such application is not specifically challenged by either party.
For the purpose of this study, pre-1900 English statutes must take precedence over 
post-1900 statutes. However, where relevant I shall cite post-1900 English legislation 
on contracts, if only to find out what differences exist between the present day 
contract law of England, which has experienced a lot of legislative incursions over the 
last few decades and its progeny in Common law Cameroon, which has been marked 
by legislative inactivity. It remains to be seen during the course of this study whether 
the impact of modem legislation on present day English contract law, though
54 C.S. Arret No.l38/CC du 18/9/1980 (unreported).
55 For instance in family law, the English Matrimonial Cause Act 1973 still applies. 
It actually governs divorce in Common Law Cameroon.
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considerable, is exaggerated.
(2). Sources of Contract Law in Francophone Cameroon.
It was noted in chapter one that on May 22, 1924, the French government passed 
a decree, article 1 of which declared that the laws and decrees promulgated in French 
Equatorial Africa before January 1, 1924 shall apply to the territory of Cameroon 
placed under the mandate of France. These enactments56 became the applicable 
source of law and played an important role in private law and criminal law. La 
jurisprudence (case law) and le doctrine (legal writing) also played a significant role, 
even though, as sources of law, they remain secondary, at least in theory. Formally, 
only la loi is accredited as a source of French positive law. A brief discussion of 
these sources as they relate to contract will be helpful.
(a). La L o f 1 (Legislation).
A major characteristic of French law is the primacy of legislation. In Francophone 
Cameroon, as in France, law is perceived as being primarily and characteristically a 
body of rules enacted by the state, to be found in the codes and in legislation 
supplementary to the codes. A perusal of court decisions in French speaking 
Cameroon will confirm the formal view that the statute is the primary source of
56 They have since been compiled into four seperate volumes by two Frenchmem: 
Bounevet and Bourdin: Code et Lois du Cameroun. 1956 (Revised 1968) Volume 
II consist of, inter alia, the Code Civil, Code de Commerce and Code de Procedure 
Civile.
57 In the French language, they are two words for law: droit and loi. The first refers 
to the legal system viewed in its entirety; the second signifies a specific statute or 
legislation. The second meaning applies here.
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private law. The courts, required by statute to state the reasons for their opinion,58 
seldom fail to base them upon one or more statutory texts. In contractual matters, the 
courts invariably use the Civil Code, which is, in fact, the chief source of contract law 
in Francophone Cameroon. The Civil Code is contained in volume two of "Codes et 
Lois du Cameroun". The (Cameroon) Civil Code is arranged in exactly the same 
manner as the French Civil Code. Book 3 deals with Obligations (contracts included) 
and it is made up of 15 sections dealing with various kinds of contracts. Although the 
contents of both the Cameroonian and French Civil Codes are the same, any reference 
to the Civil Code throughout this study must be taken to relate to the Cameroonian 
version. Where the French Code is intended, I shall expressly state so. In addition 
to the Civil Code, there are some supplementary legislation relating to activities such 
as banking and insurance and formalities in contract.
(b). La Jurisprudence (Case law).
La jurisprudence in French law refers to court decisions and is therefore used in 
a completely different sense from the English meaning of the word. The attitude 
towards case law in Civil Law Cameroon is the same as in France. The constitutional 
theory that la jurisprudence cannot be a legal source is maintained. Formally, the 
function of the courts is to resolve disputes as they arise, not to create rules of law. 
Article 5 of the Civil Code forbids judges to decide cases submitted to them by laying 
down rules of a general or regulatory character. Article 4 on the other hand prevents 
a judge from refusing to decide a case on the ground that the law is silent, obscure or 
incomplete.
The effect of Articles 4 and 5 put together is that a judge may create a specific rule 
which he will apply to a case in hand. But the rule so created cannot, in principle, 
be of general application; in other words, it cannot serve as a binding precedent. I 
have stated the theory. In practice, decisions of a court of superior jurisdiction carry
58 See Article 5 of (Judicial Organisation) Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26/8/1972.
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more weight than theory is prepared to admit. As Carbonnier puts it, theory and 
practice may be reconciled by drawing a distinction between a source (in law) and an 
authority (in fact).59 There is thus no rule of binding precedent, but there is some 
established practice that the lower courts will follow the decisions of higher courts.60 
This is true for both France and Francophone Cameroon. Decisions of the French 
Cour de Cassation are not binding on the civil law courts in Cameroon but they are 
nonetheless treated with much respect and generally followed.
This is a convenient juncture for me to make some interesting observations on 
judgements by the courts Francophone Cameroon, which are modelled on the French 
approach. As an Anglophone Cameroonian, and by analogy a common lawyer, I was 
initially very intrigued by the style and content of judgements as I began to read 
successive cases of both French courts and those in Civil Law Cameroon. Although 
the judgements are generally structured in three parts, namely: the major premise 
(attendu 1), the minor premise (attendu 2), and the conclusion (attendu 3), they are 
notorious for their rigorous brevity. As a result, it is not always a straightforward task 
to discern the legal reasoning or policy in these decisions. As Rudden has pertinendy 
remarked,61 "the very act of decision implies a choice, but the French grammatical 
technique enables the judge to conceal it". But it is not just a question of gramatical 
technique. Bell has explained that French judges believe they must abstain from 
"providing reasons for reasons",62 which is to say that explanations for their reasons 
are not necessary as such explanations may be subjective and inappropriate to the 
judgement.
59 Carbonnier: Droit Civil.(13th.ed.) Vol.l, para.31
60 Nicholas, French Contract Law. 1982, p. 15.
61 Rudden, "Courts and Codes in England, France, and Soviet Union" (1973/74) 48 
Tul.L.R. 1010, 1022.
62 Bell, "English and French Contract Law: Not So Different?" This was the subject 
of a lecture delivered on Thursday 23rd February 1995 at University College London.
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While I was searching for relevant contract decisions in the Supreme Court, I was 
struck by a judicial practice, which was a relevation to me, largely because it has 
surprisingly not been noted in textbooks on the French legal system. I noticed that 
Supreme Court civil law judgements, brief at they are, are often extracted from 
detailed reports of the case. These reports, which are produced by the Advocate 
General or the Rapporteur, contain the full facts and history of the case, the legal 
arguments canvassed by both parties, as well as any relevant statutes or authorities to 
the case. A draft judgement (projet d’arret) is also produced for the benefit of the 
court. So, while the judgements themselves are often brief, it does not mean that they 
are lacking in legal reasoning. The reason why I make this observation is to 
demonstrate that civil law judgements of the Cameroon Supreme Court, as well as 
those of the French Cour de Cassation, are not always as syllogistic and deductive as 
common lawyers are wont to believe. Having said that, I am in a position to confirm 
that the civil law approach to writing judgements can be a source of frustration to 
many common lawyers. The detailed reports produced by the Supreme Court are not 
made available to the lower courts while the lower courts themselves do not prepare 
any such reports of their own. This implies that for most of the time one is 
confronted with sketchily written judgements, some of which actually smack of 
deliberate obfuscation of the legal issues.
(c) Doctrine (Legal Writing).
Legal writing or doctrine as it is known in French law, signifies the views of legal 
experts as expressed in books and journals. Doctrine, strictly speaking, is not a source 
of law in the sense that it does not lay down or establish the law but simply analyses 
and interprets the law. Yet, the importance and significance of doctrine to the law of 
contract in France and, by analogy, in Civil Law Cameroon, cannot be over­
emphasised.
While doctrine, as an organised body of legal opinion, is in no sense a binding 
guide to any decision, it possesses high persuasive authority. Legal writers see their
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mission as that of guide, collator of judicial decisions, commentator charged with 
maintaining cohesiveness and certainty in the law. The evaluation of the decisions of 
the courts is therefore an essential function of contemporary French doctrine. It is 
regrettable that doctrine remains largely undeveloped in Cameroon. There is therefore 
a heavy and an unavoidable reliance on the works and treatises of French writers, such 
as Carbonnier, Ghestin, Weill and Terre, Stark, Planiol and Ripert, etc. These are not 
only the presribed texts in the local university, they are also relied upon by legal 
practitioners and the courts.
3. CONCLUSION.
This discussion on customary and modem contract law reveals that of the supposed 
partnership between the two, the former is very much the unequal and lesser partner. 
Although it is statutorily and judicially recognised in Cameroon, not all of it is to be 
regarded as "law". It may indeed be so at one level (in the native courts) but it must 
be elevated to another level, by passing certain tests, before it can be applied in the 
modem (non-native) courts, which have so far shown little regard for it. This 
unfortunate fact has not been lost even on Western commentators. Lampue63 has 
lamented that it is in the domaine of obligations that the courts seem more prepared 
to discard customary law rules in favour of modem, written law. His view is lent 
credence by Pannier,64 who draws attention to the fact that even after independence, 
instances in which the rule of customary law of obligations have been successfully 
invoked before the Supreme Court are extremely rare. Customary contract law in 
Cameroon, therefore, has about it a second-hand quality. And because it has failed 
to influence significantly the received English and French laws, it will not be 
considered henceforth, except to the extent that a particular issue becomes significant,
63 Lampue, "Droit Ecrit et Droit Traditionnel en Afrique Francophone" (1979) 
Pennant, 245 at 265.
64 Pannier, Op. cit., note 38.
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in which case it will be discussed under the relevant section of the investigation. 
From now onwards I shall concentrate on the received English and French contract 
laws, which, it must be stresed, is of primary concern to this study.
87
CHAPTER THREE
INTERNAL CONFLICT OF LAWS IN CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS.
In chapter one of this work, the genesis of the plural legal system in Cameroon 
was explained. In subsequent chapters, some of the consequences of their existence 
and nature will be considered. But for now it is necessary to look more closely at the 
rules by which any conflict or potential conflict between one system of law and the 
other can be resolved within the framework of the general territorial legal systems 
which have been thus created.
As the title of suggests, this chapter is primarily concerned with internal conflicts 
of law as opposed to the ordinary international conflict of laws. Since internal 
conflict of laws may take various forms in Cameroon, it is important at the outset to 
delimit the boundaries of the sort of conflicts that are capable of arising. In the first 
place there may be a conflict of laws concerning customary and modern/western law. 
This sort of conflict has already been considered1 and is therefore excluded from the 
present discussion. There may also be a conflict between customary law per se, i.e. 
between the various tribal laws. This kind of conflict, which has been variously 
called "interpersonal"2 "intergentiel"3 and "inter-tribal",4 is of great interest but I 
propose to say no more about it here. Thirdly, customary laws may conflict with 
Islamic law. Such a conflict may arise in the north of Cameroon where Islam is
1 See chapter two which treats of customary contract law versus modern contract law.
2 Bartholomew, "Private Interpersonal Law" (1952) I.C.L.Q., 325; Pearl: 
Interpersonal Conflict of Laws in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. London, 1981.
3 This is a term employed mainly by Dutch writers. See e.g. Kollewijn, "Droit 
intergentiel en Algerie" (1954) no. 3 Rev. Jur. Union Frangaise, p. 312. See also 
Gohr, Intergentiel recht, Rechskundig Weekblad 1939-40, cited in Bouckaert, "Les 
Regies de Confl.it des Lois en Afrique Noire" 1967 Pennant, 3.
4 Allot: New Essays in African Law. 1970, p. 108.
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established as the dominant religion. In practice, however, Islam is treated as a form 
customary law in Cameroon.5 This sort of conflict is therefore a variant of the 
second type of conflict mentioned above and will not be considered here. Finally, 
there is the conflict between the two "western" legal systems which operate 
concurrently, but with spatial separation, in Cameroon. It is this conflict between the 
common law and the civil law that is my major pre-occupation here. Because social 
and commercial intercourse in the sphere of private relations takes many forms, this 
type of conflict transcends many areas of law, but treatment here shall be limited to 
contractual obligations.
A full comprehension of the need for the study of conflict of laws rules within 
Cameroon must begin with the recognition of the basic fact that the law of contract 
in both law areas of Cameroon is a reflection of their respective common and civil 
law origins. In other words, while both of them deal with the same phenomena of 
contract, in most cases they deal with it, or approach it, differently. This different 
treatment of contracts by different systems of law within the same country is bound 
to give rise to conflict of laws problems. It should go without saying that there 
should be established conflict of law rules under such circumstances, yet contrary to 
such expectations, these problems have so far received very scant attention in 
Cameroon.6 It is my aim here to highlight and expose some of these problems, to 
point out the undesirability of current judicial practices and the conspicuous absence 
of proper solutions, and to propose possible ways of bringing about more desirable 
solutions.
1. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
It has already been mentioned that the Cameroonian court structure is fashioned
5 Anyangwe: The Cameroonian Judicial System. 1987, p. 247.
6 Only recently has there appeared a brief commentary on this subject. See Nkweta 
Muna, "Conflict o f Laws in Cameroon - An Observation" (1992) Le Monde Juridique, 
(Special edition) 1992, pp 62-64.
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on the the French model, with the result that several courts of equal status exist 
throughout the country. Although the territorial jurisdiction of these courts is limited 
by administrative boundaries, they nevertheless do have jurisdiction over non-resident 
persons resident anywhere in Cameroon through the mere service of writs of 
summons.7 Of Cameroon’s ten provinces, two (the South West and the North West) 
are English speaking, with their courts applying the (English) common law of 
contract. The other eight provinces are French speaking and their courts apply the 
(French) civil law of contract. The Civil Code in particular governs contract in the 
civil law jurisdiction of the country. As a result of this legion of courts and the 
different laws that they apply, it is inevitable that problems involving the choice of 
law and choice of jurisdiction should arise.
Cameroonians move freely from the common law jurisdiction to the civil law zone 
(and vice versa) and as a matter of necessity, enter into relationships with others 
present or living in other territorial units that may end up in litigation. If the law of 
Province A is, on the relevant issues, the same as that in Province B, and if the 
applicable law may be that of Province A or B, there would be no need for any one 
to argue about whether the law that applies is that of Province A or Province B, and 
if no one is going to argue about that question, there will be no problem of conflict 
of laws. Therefore, where the contract has all its connections with one law area, no 
conflict of laws arises.
The basic pattern that precipitates internal contractual conflicts can be stated 
simply: A from Bamenda in the North West Province (common law) enters into an 
alleged contract with B in Douala in the Littoral Province (civil law) whereby B is 
to undertake the repairs of A’s car in his mechanical garage in Douala. This factual 
situation8 has as its main feature the fact that it contains one or more ‘foreign’9
7 It must be stressed that a writ, i.e. a court summons, can be served on anyone 
anywhere in Cameroon without leave, by reason of presence in Cameroon.
8 SHO Cameroun/Africauro v. Alberr Ngafor (BCA/3/74, unreported), see infra, note 
39.
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elements. Each relevant fact has a geographical connection with at least one 
territorial unit (the North West Province) other than the Littoral Province. In the 
event of a dispute, A may want the matter tried in Bamenda court where he knows 
the courts will apply the common law while B may consider it a matter for the 
Douala courts, in which case the civil law will apply. Ideally, any court confronted 
with this countervailing contentions must decide what law must be applied to resolve 
the controversy.
This case illustrates how and why a conflict of laws problem can arise within 
Cameroon. Bamenda was actually the jurisdiction in which A, the plaintiff, chose to 
bring the proceedings, or as conflict lawyers call it, the forum. The plaintiff selected 
that forum perhaps because he wanted its law (the lex fori) to apply, perhaps because 
he considered it cheap and convenient for him, since he was resident in Bamenda. 
The defendant, on the other hand, argued against the jurisdiction of the Bamenda 
court partly because Douala was the place where the alleged contract was formed and 
was to be performed, or as conflict lawyers call it, the lex loci contractus, and partly 
for the same reasons that the plaintiff chose Bamenda. Ultimately, the Bamenda 
Court of Appeal, affirming the High Court, resolved the question, rather 
unconvincingly as I shall explain later, in favour of the plaintiff.
2. THE PROBLEM OF FORUM SHOPPING.
The tactic whereby the plaintiff attempts to bring his suit before a forum that best
suits him is known as forum shopping. Forum shopping has been defined as:
"a plaintiff by-passing his natural forum and bringing his action in 
some alien forum which would give him relief or benefits which would
9 The phrase "foreign element" is used in the present context to mean a contact with 
another system of law or law area in Cameroon, other than that of the forum. It does 
not mean a system of law that is completely foreign to Cameroon.
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not be available to him in his natural forum."10
There is, however, a difference in the art or practice of forum shopping as 
between say England and Cameroon, even though the reasons for it may be the same. 
In most of the cases that have come before the English courts, such as The Atlantic 
S ta r,11 McShannon v. Rockvvare Glass L td .,12 and the Abidin D aver,13 the 
plaintiffs have been foreigners or non-residents who have sought to use the English 
courts for whatever reasons. But in Cameroon, the reverse is the case. Typically, an 
Anglophone who is resident in the Anglophone part of the country, will insist on 
bringing an action before the Anglophone courts. It is of little interest to him that the 
contract was most closely connected with the Francophone part. The same goes for 
a Francophone plaintiff, vis-a-vis, the Anglophone part. It is unlikely for an 
Anglophone who is resident in the common law area and involved in a contractual 
wrangle with a Francophone resident in the Francophone part, to sue voluntarily in 
the courts of the civil law area.
In the light of this peculiarly Cameroonian practice, I shall define forum shopping 
in Cameroon as the choice by an Anglophone (or vice versa for a Francophone) 
plaintiff of his local courts rather than the Francophone courts as the place in which 
to bring his litigation because he thinks there will be advantages, either real or 
imagined, in suing in his local courts. That explains why in the example just 
considered above, A chose to bring the matter before a court in Bamenda where 
common law applies while B was strongly opposed to that.
A choice between the courts of the civil and common law areas may be made for 
various juridical and personal reasons. Firstly, behind the issue of jurisdiction, lies 
the crucial implication that the court found to have jurisdiction shall apply exclusively 
the law of contract that operates in its part of the country to all aspects of the dispute,
10 Per Lord Pearson in Boys v. Chaplin [1971] A.C 356, at 401.
11 [1974] A.C. 436
12 [1978] A.C. 795
13 [1984] A.C. 398.
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even if the case has connections with the other law area. Cameroonian courts have 
not been known to admit of depegage, which allows for different aspects of a contract 
to be governed by different systems of law, so that for instance, questions of 
formation, validity and interpretation are governed by one system of law (e.g. the 
civil law) and question of performance by another (e.g. the common law).14 Neither 
do they practice 'splitting o f the contract’ whereby the obligation of each party would 
be governed by a separate system of law, such as the law of the place of his 
performance or the law of his domicile.15 To choose a court is also to choose the 
legal system of the territory in which that court functions, not just its law on 
contracts. Thus, for example, in the case of a contractual claim, the ultimate, 
dispositive, desire of one system of law that the plaintiff should or should not receive 
something, and if yes, what or how much, is what that system of law says on that 
claim. This ultimate desire is not fed by the law of contract alone. It also reflects 
the attitude of that system of law on such questions as, whether the claim has been 
made in time, whether the plaintiff is owner of the right, or whether, perhaps, the 
right has been passed, by assignment, succession or some other devolution, to state 
only a few.
If one considers that the answers to these questions can be different under both 
systems, it becomes clear that some advantages may be gained by suing under a 
particular system. The damages may be higher, the burden of proof may be less
14 See the cases of Salao Liman v. Abanda, (BCA/20/83), discussed infra, note 81, 
and Nche v Momolou & others, (BCA/18/82), discussed infra, note 82. In both cases, 
the contracts were concluded in Douala (civil law) while the actions were brought in 
Bamenda (common law) because that is where the parties did business and were 
resident. But at no point during either hearing did the court consider the fact that the 
contract was formed in the civil law part of the country as relevant. In other words, 
the Bamenda court applied common law to all apects of the contract, i.e. in 
determining whether or not the contract had been formed, the common law and not 
the civil law was applied.
For more on depegage, see Lando: International Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
law, Vol. 3, Chapter 24, no. 2 and nos. 15-22.
15 See the cases above, note ; see also, Lando, Op. Cit.. note 14, nos. 22-24.
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stringent, the limitation period may be more generous, and the trial may be faster and 
cheaper. In practice, however, it can be difficult to determine such procedural 
advantages and many litigants would not give it much thought.
More often, the real reasons for forum shopping are personal and cultural and are 
based on such considerations as cost, convenience, and confidence in a particular 
system. Cameroonians are mutually suspicious of the opposing legal systems 
operating in their country. Anglophones are generally mistrustful of the civil law 
system. They will tell you they have no confidence in it because it it is lacking in 
integrity and efficiency. By the same token, Francophones feel very uneasy about the 
common law system. This type of paranoia can be explained by the fact that the 
majority of Cameroonian lawyers are not conversant with both systems. The have 
generally been trained either in the common law or in the civil law tradition, but not 
in both.16
There is also the language problem. The courts in Anglophone Cameroon conduct 
business in English while those in Francophone Cameroon do so in French. Although 
the country is said to be bilingual, with English and French as the official languages, 
in reality most Cameroonians are not bilingual, in the sense that they are not 
proficient in both languages. This is also true of members of the Bench and the Bar. 
This language handicap means that lawyers do not have linguistic access to the 
oppossing legal culture and as a result, they encourage their clients to avoid it. In 
principle, it can be argued that by virtue of Article 1 (3) of the Cameroonian 
Constitution -"The official languages of Cameroon shall be English and French" - 
every Cameroonian can use the language of his choice in any court throughout the 
country. But Article 1(3) does not specifically guarantee any litigant the right to trial 
in the language of his choice and the justiciability of that provision is yet to be legally
16 There is an increasing number of Anglophone lawyers who have taking up the 
challenge to set up practice in the French speaking part but as of now only one 
Francophone Cameroonian is facing up to the corresponding challenge by moving to 
Anglophone Cameroon, and even then, he is still a pupil barrister.
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tested.17 While some of these problems may be overcome by translation, it should 
be noted that the courts, with the possible exception of the Supreme Court, do not 
have any translators on their staff.18 Besides, there are major disadvantages in 
translation in relation to legal problems, because the translation of legal terms from 
one language to another is not simply the translation of words but the translation of 
concepts, and there are peculiar problems in the translation of the law. Anything 
therefore that makes it less necessary to translate will clearly be an advantage to 
people involved in litigation. Finally, considerations of costs as well as sheer 
convenience are very likely to give rise to forum shopping.
Yet, despite the fact that there may be some real advantages in being able to 
choose the jurisdiction in which to litigate, the conventional view is that forum 
shopping is something to be discouraged.19 In the Atlantic Star, Lord Reid said,20 
"There have been many recent criticisms of ‘forum shopping’,... and I regard it as 
undesirable." The objections to forum shopping in England - often couched in terms 
such as public policy, sovereignity,21 judicial chauvinism and judicial comity22 - 
are already too well known to be given any treatment here.
While the undesirability of forum shopping should clearly extend to Cameroon 
too, objections based on sovereignty and chauvinism need not be invoked because one
17 There does not not seem to be any local case in which the issue has come up for 
judicial determination.
18 During my last visit (June 1994) to the Supreme Court I found 4 translators, 3 of 
whom have no legal background at all. Little wonder that some of the translation 
leaves a lot to be desired.
19 Diamond, "Harmonisation o f Private International Law" (1986) vol.4, Rec. des 
Cours, 245.
20 [1974] A.C. at 454.
21 Robertson, "Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: A Rather Fantastic 
Fiction" (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 398.
22 See Lord Diplock in the Abidin Daver [1984] A.C. 398 at 411.
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must therefore be based on more practical grounds. First of all, it can result in 
unfairness to the defendant. This is not to suggest that the defendant is always the 
persecuted saint: some defendants merely try to delay or put off the proceedings by 
applying for a stay or a transfer of the case to a forum where they believe they too 
may have an advantage. The case of Atabong Ets. v. Socmatsa & Ets. J . 
Lifebre,23 considered below, bears testimony to that. But whether the plaintiff is 
using it to gain unfair advantage or the defendant is using it to unduly delay the 
proceedings, it remains objectionable.
Another objection can be justified in terms of public interest. If an Anglophone 
plaintiff is allowed to sue in his local court over a matter that clearly has all its other 
connections with a Francophone province, the result will be that the witnesses and the 
evidence (which may all be in French) will have to come from that province at great 
cost not only to the parties but to the state as well.
Other related problems of forum shopping shall be considered below as I probe 
the questions of choice of jurisdiction and choice laws.
3. THE SCOPE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT OF LAWS.
The exact scope of the conflict of laws differs from country to country. Even 
leading academics are not agreed on it. Frederick Harrison thought that it is "solely 
concerned with the practice of the tribunal."24 According to Castel, it deals with the 
jurisdiction of the courts, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements, 
domicile, and choice of laws.25 Many American authorities consider it to deal 
mainly with the following five matters:-jurisdiction of the courts; foreign judgements;
23 Infra, note 38.
24 Harrison: Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws (ed. 1919). pg 125-126, cited in 
Graveson: Comparative Conflicts of Laws: Selected Essays, Vol. 1, 1977, p. 99.
25 Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws. 1986, p. 6.
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choice of law; jurisdiction to tax; and aliens and non residents.26
French writers are no more agreed on the scope of the subject either but view it 
similarly in terms of one or two or three or all of the following: choice of
jurisdiction; choice of law; aliens and nationality; and the effect of foreign 
judgements.27
Between these views on the scope of the subject stands the general view of the 
English writers that conflict of laws finds its uniformity and is built up around three 
major topics: choice of law, choice of jurisdiction, and recognition of foreign 
judgement.28
While it is admitted by some that a problem in the conflict of laws may involve 
only one of these three questions,29 the assumptions hai&been made by others which 
seem to raise it to a principle of law, that whenever a court is dealing with a question 
of conflict of laws it must necessarily consider both its own jurisdiction and the 
choice of the appropriate law.30 This appears to be the view taken in France as 
well.31
The corpus of conflicts of law in Cameroon has never been determined but one 
will not be out of place to assume that in the common law part, it covers the
26 Cheatham, Goodrich, Answold, and Reese, Cases and materials on the Conflict of 
Laws (3rd ed., 1951), p. 1 but see 8th ed. (edited by Reese and Rosenberg) 1984 pp. 
2-3, where the topics have been reduced only to the first three.
27 See Loussouarn, and Bourel: Droit International Prive, 1978, para. 3; and Mayer: 
Droit International Prive, passim. 1973.
28 Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Laws. 1987, vol. 1, p. 4-5; Cheshire and North, 
Private International Law 1992, p. 7; Graveson, Conflict of Laws. 1974, pp. 
12- 2 1 .
29 Graveson, "Choice o f Law and Choice o f Jurisdiction in the English Conflict o f 
Laws" In: Ibid, Graveson, Selected Essays, p. 99.
30 Castel, Op. cit.. note 25 , p. 7; Diamond, Op. cit. . note 19, p. 245.
31 Loussouarn and Bourel, Op. cit.. note 27, para. 439.
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traditional questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of foreign 
judgements while in the civil law part, it covers those same questions plus that of 
nationality. This assumption is based on the fact that the English and French conflict 
of laws were included in the package of laws that were introduced into Anglophone 
and Francophone Cameroon by Britain and France respectively.32 In other words, 
were a court in Cameroon confronted with an ordinary (international) conflict of laws 
problem as opposed to an internal conflict of laws problem, that court will apply the 
rules of conflict of laws that was in force in either France or England (depending on 
whether the court is based in Francophone or Anglophone Cameroon) at the time of 
the reception statutes.
However, as one is dealing with internal conflicts here, not all questions of 
international conflicts are pertinent. Only the question of choice of jurisdiction and 
choice of law will be considered. The question of the recognition of foreign 
judgements is excluded because it would not arise in a purely internal conflict 
situation in Cameroon. The Judicial Organisation Ordinance 1972 makes it clear that 
any judgement by any Cameroonian court is enforceable throughout the national 
territory. For example, a British national sues a Cameroonian in London over a car 
sale, gets judgement in his favour and then discovers that for some reason - perhaps 
the defendant has absconded with the car to Cameroon - the judgement cannot be 
enforced in the U.K. If he decides to pursue the defendant to Cameroon, he will 
have to go to a local court, which shall decide whether or not to enforce the British 
judgement. But if a British citizen successfully sues an Anglophone Cameroonian in 
Douala (civil law area) and discovers that the defendant had absconded to Bamenda 
(common law area) in an attempt to frustrate the enforcement of the judgement, he 
will not need any further court action inorder to get the judgement enforced. He will 
be able to enforce the judgement anywhere in Cameroon.
32 For the sources and reception of Conflict of laws in Africa, see generally Uche, 
" Conflict o f laws in a Multi-ethnic Setting: Lessons fo r  Anglophone Africa" (1991) 
vol. I l l ,  Rec. des Cours, p.273-283; Bouckaert, "Les Regies Conflit de Lois en 
Afiique Noir" (1967) 77 Pennant, 1-12, Lampue, "Le Conflits de Lois D ’Ordre 
International en Afrique Francophone" (1972) 82 Pennant, 455-472.
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Returning to the question of choice of jurisdiction and choice of law: In England, 
the assertion has often been made, that both the question of choice of law and choice 
of jurisdiction are common to all questions of conflict of laws. While there is 
historically very strong evidence that English courts have built up their rules on the 
conflict of laws on the general principles of the co-existence and mutual independence 
of the two broad questions of choice of law and choice of jurisdiction,33 it 
nevertheless must be pointed out that these questions are independent of each 
other.34 This is also the position in French law, as confirmed by the following 
observation, "les conflits des juridicrions sont prealables aux conflits de lois; ils sont 
distinct de ces dernier, mais lew  demeurent etroitemenr lies. "3S
(1). Choice of Jurisdiction.
For ease of exposition, I shall divide Cameroon into two states: the state of West 
Cameroon, as the English speaking part was known during the Federation, and the 
state of East Cameroon, that of the French speaking part. West Cameroon covers the 
current two Anglophone provinces which represent the common law area while East 
Cameroon covers the eight Francophone provinces representing the civil law area.
Two kinds of jurisdictional conflicts are possible in Cameroon. The one is intra­
state i.e. the conflict in the territorial jurisdictions between two courts within the same 
state or law area. Because all courts in one state or one law area apply the same 
system of law, any jurisdictional problem that may arise will not involve any choice 
of laws. There are rules governing this kind of jurisdictional conflict and some of
33 Graveson, Selected Esays, pp. 100-103.
34 Fawcett, " The Interrelationship o f Jurisdiction and Choice o f law in Private 
International Law" (1991) C.L.P., 39;
See Beale’s comments in Lectures on Conflict of Laws and International Contracts, 
1951, p. 2-3; and the familiar case of Robinson v. Bland (1760) 1 WBL 234. The 
importance of this case lies in the fact that it is one of the earliest cases to modify the 
elementary rule of locus regit actum into the more refined doctrine of the proper law, 
albeit in an undeveloped form.
35 Loussouarn and Bourel, para. 439
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them are highlighted below.
The second type of conflict, which is of immediate interest to me here, is the
conflict of jurisdiction that involves courts from the different states or law areas. Are
there any rules on jurisdictional conflict, and if so, what is their content. The answer
is that there are rules for intra-state jurisdictional conflicts but none for interstate
conflicts. In order to fill this gap, the courts have relied on intra-state rules when
confronted with an interstate conflict problem. These rules are to be found in the law
of procedure of both law systems.
In the common law part, Order 7 rule 3 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure)
Rules36 provides that:
"All suits for the specific performance or upon the breach o f  any 
contract, may be commenced and determined in the judicial division in 
which such contract ought to have been perfonned or in which the 
defendant resides"
For Civil Law Cameroon, Articles 8 and 9 of the Code de Procedure Civile?7
provide, inter alia, that such actions can be brought in the place where the contract 
was formed or where it was performed as long as one of the parties is resident in that 
place.
Before these rules are analysed, it will be helpful to illustrate by way of concrete 
examples, how the the courts interprete them in the first place. Atabong Ets v. 
Socmatsa & Ets J . Sifebre SA38 provides a very good example. The plaintiff was 
Anglophone, resident in Limbe, Fako Division (common law) while the defendants 
comprised a firm based in Douala, Wouri Division (civil law). By an agreement 
concluded in October 1982 and signed in Douala, plaintiff leased his building situated 
at Ombe (Fako Division) to defendants for a two year renewable period. In August 
1983, the defendants handed over the keys of the premises to the plaintiff thereby
36 Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, vol. 10, chapter 211 in Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1948.
37 This was introduced by Arrete du 16 Dec. 1954 and is to be foung in Codes et Lois 
du Cameroun, vol. II.
38 CASWP/19/85 (Buea, unreported).
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indicating a willingness to bring the lease to an end. The plaintiff then brought this 
action alleging that (i) the defendants owed rents, (ii) had failed to keep the premises 
in tenable repairs and (iii) had failed to give three months notice of termination of 
contract, contrary to the terms of the contract. The plaintiff sued in his local high 
court, (the Fako High Court, Buea). The defendants raised a preliminary objection 
to the jurisdiction of Fako High Court on the grounds that; (i) both of them 
(defendants) were resident in Douala, and (ii) the contract was entered into in Douala. 
They argued accordingly that it was the Douala High Court (Civil Law) that had 
jurisdiction over the matter. Their argument was no doubt based on articles 8 and 
9 of the Code, de Procedure Civile which governs such matters in Civil Law 
Cameroon. The trial judge agreed with the defendants and granted a stay.
The South West Provincial Court of Appeal (the plaintiffs local Court of Appeal) 
overturned the High Court ruling. It was pointed out that since 0.7 r.3 of the RSC 
allows for the suit to be commenced and determined in the judicial division in which 
the contract was performed (in this case Fako) or in the division in which the 
defendant resides (in this case Douala), the trial judge was wrong at law to have ruled 
against the jurisdiction of the Fako High Court, in the absence of any clause expressly 
stating that any dispute arising from the contract was to be brought only before the 
Douala court. The case was thus remitted to the Fako High Court for hearing and 
determination.
The Court of Appeal certainly needed no heroic feats of interpretation to eliminate 
Douala as the forum. If 0 .7  r.3 of the RSC gives the plaintiff a choice between the 
place of performance and defendant’s residence, there is no reason why a court 
should not honour the plaintiffs choice, in the absence of any contrary intention by 
the parties themselves. In the light of such clear and unambiguous provision, the 
decision of trial judge to ignore the first limb of 0.7 r.3 (the place of performance), 
in preference of the second limb (the place of defendant’s residence) was, to say the 
least, very curious. Worse still, the trial judge failed to address his mind to 0 .7  r. 1 
which states that in matters involving land, jurisdiction lies with the court in the place 
where such land is situated (the lex situs). Had he done so, he probably would have
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disposed of the case with much less difficulty by finding in favour of the Fako High 
Court. It is surprising that the Court of Appeal too lost sight of Order 7 r. 1. On 
the whole, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal ruling is the proper one, both on 
the interpretation of 0.7 r.3, which the court applied, and 0.7 r. l .  which it did not. 
Yet the case nevertheless indicates that there are real problems involved with 
interstate jurisdictional conflicts.
Another case in which a jurisdictional problem arose is S.H .O . 
Cameroun/Africauto v. Albert Ngafor.39 The action was founded on tort but it 
could equally have been based on contract, so it is instructive here. The 
respondent/plaintiff was Anglophone and was resident in Bamenda, North West 
Province (common law). He alleged that he had taken his car to the appellant’s 
garage in Douala (civil law) for repairs, that they had kept it for many months 
without repairing it and had refused to give it up on demand.
The appellants denied this allegation and averred that the respondent had 
abandoned his car in their garage, without paying the required deposit for repairs and 
leaving no name and address. They added that the car was badly damaged and that 
since the respondent never came back for it nor gave them any orders to repair it, 
they decided to sell the car after having unsuccessfully tried to locate the respondent 
with the assistance of the Ministry of Transport.
The respondent brought an action for detinue against the appellants, not in Douala 
where the alleged contract of repair was to be performed or where the alleged tort of 
detinue was committed, but in Bamenda where he was resident. Not surprisingly, the 
appellants applied for a stay of the Bamenda proceedings on the grounds that it 
violated Order 7 r.4 of the Supreme Court Rules.40 But as if the matter was not
39 BCA/3/74 (Bamenda, unreported).
40 Nowhere does Order 7 provides for torts but 0.7 r.4 provides with regards to other 
suits thus: All suits may be commenced and determined in the judicial division in 
which the defendant resides or carries on business. If there are more defendants than 
one resident in different judicial divisions the suit may be commenced in any such 
divisions; subject, however, to any order which the court may, upon the application 
of any of the parties, or in its own motion, think fit to make with the view to the
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already sufficiently convulated, counsel for the appellant/defendants argued, rather 
strangely, for the case to be transferred to the Buea High Court. It is impossible to 
find the legal basis for such an outlandish application. Buea is in a different province 
(the South West) from Bamenda (the North West) and Douala (the Littoral) and Buea 
had no connection whatsoever with the transactions that led to the action. Further 
still, the Buea High Court, assuming it was granted jurisdiction, would have had to 
apply the common law, not civil law, by virtue of its location in Common Law 
Cameroon. One would have thought that the main reason why the appellants opposed 
the jurisdiction of the Bamenda court in the first place, was not unconnected with the 
need to avoid having to face up to the common law, coming as they did from Douala. 
The proper place to have asked for a transfer therefore was to the Douala High 
Court. In any case, the trial judge refused to grant a stay, ruling that the Bamenda 
High Court was a proper forum. The appellants took their appeal to the Bamenda 
Court of Appeal. Prominent on their grounds of appeal was their initial objection in 
limine to the jurisdiction of the Bamenda High Court.
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court decision not to grant a stay, but on 
the rather flimsy ground that it was within the discretion of the trial judge, which 
discretion they saw no reason to interfere with. It then added, poignantly, that had 
the trial court succumbed to the appellant’s prayer for a transfer of the matter to the 
Buea High Court, the court would have acted in violation of the rules since the tort 
was committed in Douala and not in Buea.
The decision of the Court of Appeal not to overrule the trial court and grant 
appellants a stay is questionable. Implicit in the Appeal Court’s observation that a 
transfer of the case to Buea would have been at odds with the rules because the tort 
(detinue) was committed in Douala, not Buea, is an acceptance of the fact that the 
case had most of its relevant connection with Douala. It is therefore difficult to 
predict whether the Court of Appeal would have granted a stay had the appellants 
applied for a transfer to Douala instead of Buea. Whatever the case, it is strongly
most convenient arrangement for the trial of the suit.
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submitted that in cases such as this, it is important that the true grounds for the 
granting or the refusal of a stay should be expressly articulated, and not concealed 
behing misleading references to the discretionary power of the trial judge.
This case does not only highlight the problems that jurisdictional conflicts 
involving courts of both the common law and civil jurisdictions can generate but also 
serves to emphasize the inadequacies of the rules of intra-state jurisdictional conflicts 
as solutions to jurisdictional conflicts involving the courts of both systems of laws. 
More on these inadequacies later. I now turn to the related problem of choice of law.
(2). Choice of Law.
Choice of law problems in contractual matters may arise in three set of 
circumstances. The first is in relation to international contracts, where the 
introduction of a foreign element may give rise to a question of choice of law. This 
is an external conflict situation which should normally be resolved by applying 
conflict of laws rules, with which I am not directly concerned.
The second reason why a contract may give rise to choice of law is where 
litigation is in a ‘foreign’ court. The word foreign is again used here to refer to a 
court in a province other than that which might be regarded as the obvious place to 
litigate. If a contract has all its links with Province A (common law, for instance), 
any litigation before the courts of that province will not give rise to any question of 
conflict of laws.
But what if the contractual dispute linked only with Province A comes before the 
courts of Province B, a civil law province. For example, where the defendant moved 
his place of business from Province A to Province B after the contract was made. 
Should the courts in Province B not apply rules of conflict of laws in order to 
establish that the contract is governed by the law in force in Province A, which is the 
common law, rather than the law of Province B - civil law - which the courts would 
normally apply.
As already mentioned above, one would expect any country with the world’s two 
main legal systems operating in it, side by side, to have some highly developed choice
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of law rules in place, by which any conflict between these laws may be resolved.41 
Sadly, and perhaps, mysteriously, Cameroon has no such machinery. The courts 
have been left to their own devices to sort out the mess and they have responded by 
operating as though there was no such problem.42 So far, the question of choice of 
law has been inextricably linked to the jurisdictional question. Both questions have 
been taken to be one and the same thing. They have never been raised or treated 
separately in any internal conflict problem. The choice of jurisdiction automatically 
carries with it the law of that jurisdiction. On the face of it there is nothing wrong 
with that but the problem is that courts employ intra-state rules of jurisdiction to 
assume jurisdiction even in cases that have most of their connections with a different 
state or law area. The courts consider the crucial question to be whether the plaintiff 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the court which he has chosen rather than the 
appropriateness of that court to try the suit.
And because the emphasis in any conflict or potential conflict case is often placed 
solely on a point of jurisdiction and rarely on both a point of law and a point of 
jurisdiction, a lack of balance between the questions of choice of law and choice of 
jurisdiction has been reflected in the general body of law. The fact that the question 
of jurisdiction has overshadowed the question of choice of law does not ipso facto 
deny the existence of both questions but derives from the incompletely developed state 
of Cameroonian conflict of laws rules. To acknowledge this situation is the first step 
towards its proper solution.
41 The German government, in anticipation of internal conflict of laws problem after 
re-unification, took prompt steps to legislate for any such problems. Article 8 of the 
Reunification Treaty of 1990 practically unified all areas of the respective private 
laws of the defunct East and West Germany, with only few exceptions. See 
generally, Kreuzer, "Les Conflits de Lois Inter-Allemandes apres I ’Unification de 
L ’Allemagne" (1993) 82 R.C.D.I.P., 1, especially at pp. 6-7.
42 The reticence of Cameroonian courts on conflict of laws questions in the area of 
family law has been the cause of lament. See Ngwafor’s case comment of of Yufanyi 
v. Yufanyi (HCSW/25/MC/84) in (1990) no.2 Jur. Info 46.
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4. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT PRACTICE.
It was said above that the current practice of employing intra-state procedural rules 
on jurisdictional conflicts involving the courts of both law areas is largely inadequate. 
So too has the total emphasis on only the jurisdictional question been condemned. 
It is now proposed to elaborate further on both these issues.
The first significant point to make against the use of intra-state jurisdictional rules 
of Common Law and Civil Law Cameroon is that they were never intended to solve 
jurisdictional conflicts that transcend the legal frontiers within Cameroon. They were 
meant to solve questions of territorial jurisdiction between courts within the same 
legal system, in very much the same as the courts within France, for example, would 
do.43 This is obvious from the fact that these provisions were already in force long 
before Cameroon ever became independent.
For example, Order 7 rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules that applies in Common 
Law Cameroon is contained in the 1948 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, volume 
10, chapter 211. It may be recalled that at that time Britain treated British Cameroons 
as part of neighbouring Nigeria and it is through Nigeria that the common law was 
introduced to English speaking Cameroon. Directions under section 36 (2) of the 
above Supreme Court Ordinance provided for the division of Nigeria into judicial 
divisions. There were eight judicial divisions altogether, one of which was the 
Calabar and Cameroons Province, simply known as the Calabar Division. Order 7 
of the R.S.C titled: "Place of contracting and the trial of suits" was therefore meant 
to provide guidelines for determining the judicial division with the competent 
territorial jurisdiction in cases where there was such a conflict between these various
43 Order 7 rule 3 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1948 [Cap 211] 
apply only in common law Cameroon and derives from the laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria to which Common law Cameroon once belonged.
Articles 8 of the Code de Procedure Civile was passed by a law as far back as 21st 
November 1933. It is therefore clear that these provisions never envisaged the internal 
conflict of law problem as it is today, this problem having arisen as a direct 
consequence of the eventual re-unification of the English and French speaking 
Cameroon.
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divisions.
In the same vein, the Code de Procedure Civile, of which articles 8 and 9 governs 
jurisdictional matters in Civil Law Cameroon, was enacted by Arrete du 16 
Decembre 1954 in the then French Cameroons. Article 1 declares it to be a 
codification of the various decrees relatifs a. la procedure civile et commerciale devanr 
le tribunaux frangais du Cameroun. This article makes it clear that these provisions 
were aimed at jurisdictional conflicts arising exclusively within French Cameroons. 
In fact, these provisions, though different in content, were meant to perform the same 
functions as the present Article 42 of the Nouveau Code de Procedure CivileH of 
France, which determines the court with the competent territorial jurisdiction in the 
case of a conflict between the courts of several judicial divisions within France.45
At this point it becomes obvious that the intra-state rules extant in West Cameroon 
(common law) and East Cameroon (civil law) respectively, reflect an accomodation 
of interests that are very different from those involved in trans-state jurisdictional 
conflicts i.e conflicts involving courts or divisions from both law areas. Where the 
conflict involves courts of the same law area, there is much less at stake since all 
courts in that law area apply the same law. Any interests involved here are likely to 
be limited to costs and convenience. Where the conflict involves both law areas, 
there is a wider range of interest at stake. The applicable law, substantive and 
procedural, is different, and so is the language. Costs and convenience also come 
into consideration.
Order 7 and Articles 8 and 9 have the advantage of being flexible thereby giving 
the courts freedom from the tyranny of fixed and rigid tests. As such they are clearly 
appropriate in solving problems of territorial jurisdiction within the same law area. 
Yet, they can become very inadequate when applied to jurisdictional conflicts 
involving both systems of law operating in Cameroon because they may not
44 Dalloz, 1994.
45 It provides that the court with the competent territorial jurisdiction is, unless stated 
otherwise, is the place where the defendant is resident.
107
appropriately accommodate the wider interests involved in the latter case. That the 
courts have always applied them to all kinds of jurisdictional conflict is evidence of 
the failure to take into account the wider interests involved in trans-state jurisdictional 
conflicts. Any proper solution to this kind of jurisdiction conflict would have to take 
into account the fact that two systems of law are involved.
The other major objectionable aspect of the current practice is the almost total 
exclusion of the choice of law question. So far, the quest by the courts for conflict 
of laws solutions has been to select, exclusively with the aid of intra-state 
jurisdictional rules, the law of the state or province of the plaintiff’s choice, 
irrespective of how slight or fortuitous it is related to the contract. This, it is 
submitted, is bad practice, not least because the jurisdictional rules as pointed out 
above, never envisaged the conflict of laws problem at the time of their enactment. 
It is significant to note that even in the U.S.A, there has been in recent years, a 
steadily increasing number of commentators suggesting that such a quest is too limited 
because rational choice of law decisions frequently cannot be obtained by applying 
intra-state law of a particular state, regardless of how it is selected, to resolve trans­
state controversies.46
On the other hand, mention must be made of the fact that in England, the focus 
in Conflict of laws is shifting away from choice of law, which for so long has been 
the heart of the subject, and is now increasingly concerned with the issue of 
jurisdiction.47 This is borne out by the line of cases ushered in by the Atlantic
46 See, Von Mehren, "Special Substantive Rules fo r  Multi-State Problems: Their Role 
and Significance in Contemporary Choice o f Law Methodology" (1974) 88 Hav.L.R. 
347; McDougal IV, Luther, " Choice o f law: Prologue to a Viable Interest Analysis 
Theory" (1977)51 Tul.L.R. 207; Trautman, "The Relation between American Choice 
o f law and Federal Common law" (1977)41 Law & Contemporay Prob. 107.
47 See generally Fawcett, op. cit.. note 34, 39; see also Briggs, "Conflict o f Laws: 
Postponing the Future? (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 251, in which he criticises Jaffey’s 
Introduction to the Conflict of Laws, 1988, and Collier’s Conflict of laws, 1987, for 
failing to signal this change.
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S tar,48 which created the English doctrine of forum non conveniens; and the 
enactment in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgement Act 1982 of the Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgement in Civil and Commercial Matters.
By focusing more on the question of jurisdiction, the English courts have, thanks
to the introduction of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, been able to stay
proceedings in those cases in which litigational convenience and other factors clearly 
weigh against the English forum. Ironically, the emphasis on jurisdiction in 
Cameroon is producing the opposite results with courts taking jurisdiction when a stay 
would be more appropriate.
It is my contention, therefore, that the issue of choice of law must be treated as
an essential element in any conflict of laws situation by the Cameroonian courts.
Orthodoxy, I am sure, posits the same. The solution to conflict of laws problems 
should not end at the jurisdictional stage. Any system that places the greatest stress 
on the jurisdictional question, to the exclusion of choice of law must be rightly 
considered as having something unattractive about it.49
There are sound reasons why the choice of law must also be taken into 
consideration by the Cameroonian courts when faced with potential conflict of laws 
cases. The most obvious one is that rules of choice of law and jurisdiction perform 
different functions. In the Cameroonian context, the function of rules on jurisdiction 
is to determine which judicial division or place has the competent territorial 
jurisdiction to try the matter while the function of choice of law rules (which is yet 
to be formulated) would be to identify the judicial division or place whose law is to 
be applied. Just as their functions differ, so too are the considerations that should be 
taken when determining the place of trial and the applicable law. So far, the 
Cameroonian courts have failed to take any notice of such differences.
Secondly, the absence of choice of law rules only encourages forum shopping.
48 The Atlantic Star [1974] A.C. 460; McShannon v. Rockware Glass [1978] A.C. 
795; The Abidin Daver [1984] A.C. 398; and Spilada v. Camsulex [1987] A.C. 460.
49 Carter, "Rejection o f Foreign Law: Some Private International Law Inhibitions" 
(1984) 55 B.Y.I.L. I l l
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Choice of law still depends entirely or exclusively on the place of trial. But the place 
of trial is determined mainly, thanks to the rules on choice of jurisdiction, by what 
the plaintiff chooses. For example, the jurisdictional rules of both the common and 
civil law Cameroon allocate jurisdiction to more than one place. Armed with the 
choice of more than one forum and the knowledge that the court he chooses will 
apply only the law of the place in which it operates, the plaintiff has every incentive 
to pick that forum which he considers as offering him the best possible advantages, 
be they juridical or personal. The practice so far has been for Anglophone plaintiffs 
to use the freedom afforded them by these rules to bring their actions before 
Anglophone courts.50 There is no doubt that Francophone litigants would do the 
same. It is surely wrong in principle for the choice of law to be determined by such 
factors. Factors which have nothing to do with the sort of considerations, such as 
connections with the alternative jurisdiction, which are relevant for determining the 
applicable law.
The need for choice of law rules in Cameroon is also important because it will 
enable the courts to acknowledge or recognise "foreign law" more readily. The 
recognition, for instance, of civil law by a common law court in a case with relevant 
connections to the civil law part of the country may be necessary for the following 
reasons. First, the corollary of the confinement of conflict of laws cases to the 
jurisdictional issue is that only the law of the place of the court with jurisdiction is 
applied. This kind of unwavering and inflexible adherence to one system of law can 
lead to gross injustice. Suppose A and B enter into contract in Bamenda, to be 
performed in Bamenda. A is resident in Bamenda while B is resident in Douala. B 
happens to be an illiterate but A has made sure that the contract complies with the 
Illiterate Protection Ordinance, 194851 which aims to protect illiterate parties in 
Common Law Cameroon by requiring that any written document be read and
50 See the Atabong case, supra, note 38, and Africauto v. Ngafor, supra, note 39.
51 Cap 83 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958. For more on this see 
chapter 7.
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explained to them. Supposing A was later to bring an action for breach against B in 
the Douala High Court, should B be allowed to avoid this contract on the grounds 
that the contract did not comply with Decret No. 60/172 du 20/9/1960 which governs 
the position of illiterates in civil law Cameroon.52 Any logical answer must be in 
the negative but the current practice in Cameroon may not necessarily lead to such 
an answer. Such injustice could be circumvented by the use of choice of law rules 
which would undoubtedly point to the law of Bamenda (common law) as the 
applicable law, thereby denying B the chance of such a blatant escape from his 
obligation. It has been suggested, at least in the case of the U.S.A, that in such 
cases, courts should apply the law of the place of contracting if it would permit 
enforcement of the agreement or if not, the law of the forum if it would permit 
enforcement of the agreement.53 The Cameroonians courts would do well to adopt 
such a rule of alternative preference which can be justified on the basis that public 
policy demands that trans-provincial agreements be enforced to a maximum possible 
extent, irrespective of whether the parties are resident in the different law areas. But 
that can only be done if the courts include the choice of law question in the conflict 
of laws problems.
Also, if the courts are to carry out in a rational manner a policy of entertaining 
actions in respect of claims arising in the other law area, they must in the nature of 
things take account of the (different) law of that area. A plaintiff, for instance, 
claims damages for breach of a contract that was concluded, and was to be 
performed, in Douala. Under the existing practice, the Anglophone courts are 
prepared to create and enforce in his favour, a common law right, if he can
52 According to the Illiterate Protection Ordinance, it is sufficient that the written 
contract be read out to the illiterate party but Decree No.60/172 du 20/9/1960 require 
that such a contract must be written by a notary and then read out to the illiterate 
party by a sworn independent interpreter. The Francophone courts have been very 
strict in their observance of this provision as shall be seen in the chapter on 
formalities.
53 Lorenzen, " The Statute o f Frauds in the Conflict o f Laws" (1923) 32 Yale L.J., 
311.
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substantiate his case according to the English common law, to the total disregard of 
civil law. Strictly speaking, however, neither the nature nor^the extent of the relief 
to which he is entitled, nor, indeed, whether he is entitled to any relief, can be 
determined if the civil law (the law of Douala) is totally disregarded. To consider 
only the common law, might well be to reverse the legal obligation of the parties as 
fixed by the law, to which their transaction, both in fact and by intention (more often 
in fact), was originally subjected. A promise, for instance, made by an Anglophone 
in Douala and to be performed there, if valid and enforceable by the civil law of 
Douala, should not be held void by a common law court merely because it was 
unsupported by consideration. This fact which had long been acknowledged by the 
English courts in Re Bonacina,54 has been reiterated by article 8 of the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990.55 Again this can only be done if the courts are to have 
regard to the choice of law question.
5. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH.
As is the case with many other African countries,56 the problem of internal 
conflict of laws in Cameroon is characterised by the lack of proper solutions. But 
unlike other countries whose legal pluralism is confined to conflicts between 
customary and western law, the Cameroonian problem is made the more complex by 
the fact that she also has to grapple with the conflict between two western systems -
54 [1912] 2 Ch. 394
55 See article 8 of the Rome Convention entitled ‘Material Validity’. This article 
contains 2 provisions: 8 (1) is concerned with the "existence and validity of a 
contract" while 8 (2) deals with the existence of consent. The intention is that noy 
only are issues of material validity in the English sense covered (e.g. the issue of 
illegality), but also issues relating to the formation of the contract (for e.g. offer and 
acceptance and consideration).
56 See Vanderlinden, "A la Rencontre du Droit Internationale Prive Africain en 
Matiere Commerciale" In: The Harmonisation of African Law. 1974, pp. 221-243; 
with regard to Nigeria, see Agbede, Themes on Conflict of Laws. 1989, p. 6.
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the civil and the common law. An attempt has already been made in the preceding 
section to demonstrate that the present system of employing intra-state jurisdictional 
rules to internal conflict problems involving both law areas are inadequate and must 
thus be viewed as unacceptable, even though they may occasionally achieve the 
appropriate results. With the need for a new approach apparent, the problem now 
becomes one of ascertaining the best method for attempting to satisfy that need.
It is hereby proposed that the solution to the problem of internal conflict of laws 
in Cameroon lies in the adoption of rules of ordinary (international) conflict of laws. 
To avoid confusion between internal and international conflict of laws, I shall 
henceforth refer to the latter by its other name, ‘Private International Law’. Before 
I explain and analyse the relevance of rules of private international law to the internal 
conflict of laws problem, it is necessary to first of all justify my proposition. It must 
be conceded that there is nothing revolutionary about this proposed solution. It has 
already generated much debate in other juridictions and divergent views have been 
expressed as to the relevance of private international law rules in internal conflict 
problems. Some writers have warned that it is dangerous and fallacious to do so57 
while others argue that there is clearly an analogy.58 Others still, such as Professor 
Vitta have steered a pathway that is midway between the opinion of those who deny 
all possibility of considering in common the problems relating to interpersonal conflict 
of laws and Private international law and those who maintain that the two bodies of 
the rules are so similar that the rules of private international law can always be
57 Allott, New Essays, pp. 115-116; Tier, "The Relationship between Conflict o f 
Personal Law and Private International Law" (1976) 18 J.I.L.I. 240 et.seq.; 
Bartholomew, Op. cit.. note ,325 et.seq.; Bartin, Etudes de Droit International 
Prive, p. 169, cited in Battifol & Lagarde, Droit International Prive, vo l.l, 1983, 
para. 258.
58 For example Ph. Franceskakis, "Problemes de Droit International Prive en Afrique 
Noir Independante" (1964) t.II Rec. de Cours, pp. 275-361; Battifol & Lagarde, Op. 
tit., note 57, para. 258; Wolff, Private International Law, 1950, p. 6; Graveson, 
Conflict of Laws, 1969, p.4; Arminjon, "Les Systemes Juridiques Complexes et le 
Conflit de Lois" (1949) t.I, Rec. de Cour, p. 45.
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applied by analogy.’9
It is not my intention to settle this controversy here60 but my contention, at least 
on the basis of the internal conflicts of contractual obligations in Cameroon, is to 
support Vitta’s moderate line. In the field of contractual obligations in Cameroon, 
there is clearly a marked similarity between external and internal conflicts. Because 
the systems in conflict are the common law and the civil law, the problems involved 
are not any different from those that may arise between a French and an English party 
in a given case. Whether the conflict is external or internal, it is the variation of the 
substantive law which causes the conflict. It is therefore submitted that this similarity 
be exploited by the courts by applying private international law type solutions to the 
internal conflict of law problems, at least, in the area of contractual obligations.
Practical support for this approach is not hard to come by. It has already been 
followed in India and Pakistan, where the courts rely heavily on the doctrines of 
private international law to solve interpersonal conflicts.61 But Great Britain 
provides by far the best example. For the purpose of Public International Law, 
Britain is treated as a single nation whereas in Private International Law terms, 
Scotland which operates the civil law is considered a seperate country from England. 
The House of Lords, however, considers appeals from both English and Scottish 
courts. In the latter case, it applies Scottish Law. The situation in Cameroon 
therefore bears a canny resemblance to that of Great Britain and there is no reason 
why like Great Britain, the civil and common law jurisdictions in Cameroon cannot 
be treated as seperate "countries" for the purpose of conflict of laws. The need for 
a unique Supreme Court (like the House of Lords) does not arise since the present 
Supreme Court of Cameroon, though based in the civil law part, hears appeal from
59 Vitta, "The Conflict of personal Law" (1970) 5 Israel L.R. 170-202 and 337-351.
60 This debate seems to me to be more pertinent to the question of interpersonal 
conflict or the conflict between imported western laws and indigenous laws. There 
may be a good case for arguing against the use of Private International Law 
rules to this kind of conflict.
61 Pearl, Op.cit.. note 2, p.97
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courts in the common law part. In the same way that the the House of Lords applies 
Scottish civil law to cases emanating from Scotland, so too does the Supreme Court 
of Cameroon apply the common law to appeals whose provenance is Common Law 
Cameroon.
But how can private international law solutions be successfully transposed to 
problems of internal conflict of contractual obligations in Cameroon. There are 
several ways in which in private international law can be of especial relevance but I 
shall focus only on the two main issues of jurisdiction and choice of law. Let me 
suppose a typical commercial case in private international law, such as an action for 
damages for breach of contract. The defendant may argue that the proper law of the 
contract is that of a foreign country, that under that law he is not in breach, and so 
forth. Yet, if he has wits about him, the defendant has a better starting place than 
this: to argue that the court has not got (or if it does have, should not exercise) 
jurisdiction over him and that the action should be stayed. In other words, any 
private international law solution to the conflict problem starts at the jurisdictional 
stage. Only after the issue of jurisdiction has been resolved does the court need to 
consider the question of the applicable law. This approach can be explained with the 
help of the decision by the West Cameroon Court of Appeal in Neubeck v. Swiss Air 
Transport Co. Ltd.62 This was an international conflict (as opposed to internal 
conflict) case - the supposed conflict was between German and Cameroonian 
(common) law. The respondent, an air transport company, alleged that on the 
appellant’s instructions they had issued tickets to various persons for which the 
appellant was refusing to pay. The appellant denied having done any business with 
the respondents but admitted that he booked passenger tickets through Swiss Air, 
Munich, Germany when he was resident there. He argued that because he was not 
resident in Cameroon at the time, the High Court of West Cameroon did not have 
jurisdiction to try the case. The High Court rejected his application for stay, assumed 
jurisdiction and went on to determine the case in favour of the respondents.
62 Civil Appeal No.WCCA/9/68 (Buea, unreported)
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On appeal he further raised a number of points: that the proper law of the contract 
was German law and that the German law of limitation of action, not the 
Cameroonian one, applied. Traditional choice of law questions. The West Cameroon 
Court of Appeal brushed aside his argument that German law applied on the grounds 
(i) that he had failed to plead it in his statement of defence to the high court and ( n ) 
that he failed to prove that the claim would have been statute barred under German 
law. His appeal was consequently dismissed.
By summarily dismissing the appeal on the above grounds, the Appeal Court can 
rightly be accused of judicial escapism. How could the court accuse the appellant for 
failing to plead that German law applied at the trial court, when at that stage the 
appellant should normally have be concerned with the question of jurisdiction, as 
indeed he was. It is only after the question of jurisdiction has been determined that 
the question as to the applicable law should be addressed. The court was equally 
reticent on the question of the applicable law, only saying that German law had not 
been proven, thus leaving open the question as to whether it would have applied had 
it been proven. It certainly would not have applied in this particular case since the 
court had been quick to pick on a procedural flaw - that the appellant had failed to 
raise the issue of choice of law before the trial court. This case is symptomatic of 
the unease with which Cameroonian courts sometimes confront conflict of laws 
problem, yet it is significant for revealing that, as confused as they might be, in an 
international conflict problem, Cameroonian courts may be prepared to consider both 
the jurisdictional and choice of law issues in their attempt to determine which forum 
has jurisdiction and the applicable law.
Regrettably, when the conflict is internal, the courts, even though they rightly 
begin with the jurisdictional issue, always seem content to settle everything at that 
stage. They never seem to proceed to the choice of law stage, even when there is a 
clear need for that. Once a court decides that it has jurisdiction, it ignores any 
possible choice of law question. One may wonder what is wrong with that, but there 
is something definitely wrong. The present jurisdictional rules in Cameroon, as 
already demonstrated, were never formulated against the backdrop of conflict of laws
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between the civil and common law. It is possible, therefore, thanks to the intra-state 
jurisdictional rules, for a particular court to have jurisdiction without necessarily 
being the appropriate forum.
In SHO/Africauto v. Ngafor,63 for instance, the Bamenda High Court assumed 
jurisdiction solely on the basis of the plaintiffs residence. Yet, all the other relevant 
connections - defendant's residence, place of business, place of contract formation 
and performance and place of commision of the tort - pointed to Douala (civil law). 
In upholding the decision of the High Court not to grant a stay, the Bamenda Appeal 
Court said that unless it was shown that to try the case in any court other than the 
Douala High Court would result in a miscarriage of justice, that court (Bamenda) had 
a discretion to try or transfer the case as it thought fit. Dismissing the appeal, the 
court felt confident enough to declare that no substantial miscarriage of justice had 
been caused by trying the case in Bamenda and that the procedural irregularity was 
cured by the trial.
One must say straightaway that it is hard to agree with that conclusion. In 
refusing to grant a stay the court appears to have been unduly concerned only with 
the plaintiffs interests. That begs the question whether the same interests of justice 
do not have it that the defendant ought not to be compelled to submit to litigation in 
a particular forum if the dispute is clearly more closely connected with another 
forum, his preferred forum. That is to say, the applicable interests of justice are 
concerned just as much with where a man is sued as with the law which will be 
applied when he is sued. No doubt a plaintiff may consider that he has been hard 
done by when he institutes proceedings only to have them stayed when the defendant 
successfully pleads forum non conveniens; but the plaintiffs are not the only interests 
to be borne in mind by the court. In the Cameroonian context, it cannot be objected 
to that an anglophone plaintiff, for instance, obtains an improper advantage when he 
chooses a common law forum in which the available procedure, law and language 
suits him nicely, nor should it be much of a sustainable objection that the defendant
63 Supra, note 39.
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is able to use rules of local law to achieve no more than that litigation takes place in 
the most approppriate forum for it.
It is for these reasons that I take the view that Cameroonian courts would be better 
equipped to deal with internal conflict problems if these problems were to be 
subjected to the private international law regime, since they would more readily 
recognise the presence of a different system of law to which the case may be more 
closely connected.
The proposition that Cameroon should be treated as two seperate entities for 
private international law purposes invites the question as to whether the seperate law 
areas shall have to apply their seperate rules on conflict of laws. In other words, 
shall Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon apply the respective English and 
French conflict of laws rules they are supposed to have inherited.
Ideally, the emphasis should be on new and uniform rules on jurisdiction and 
choice of law. Inspiration for this can be sought in the recent efforts by the European 
Economic Community to harmonise conflict of law rules within the community,64 
as evidenced by the Brussels Convention, 1968 on jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgements in civil and commercial matters65 and the Rome Convention 198066 
which aims to establish uniform choice of law rules for contractual obligations 
throughout the community.67
In relation to the question of jurisdiction, the use of Order 7 rule 3 of the R.S.C. 
(Common Law Cameroon) and articles 8 and 9 of the Code de Procedure Civile 
(Civil Law Cameroon) should be limited only to intra-common law or intra-civil law 
jurisdictional conflicts, i.e. the reason for which they were formulated. New
64 See Lipstein, ed., Harmonisation of Private International Law by the EEC, 1978. 
This is a collection of proposals in the form of essays for the harmonisation of 
conflict of laws rules.
65 Given effect in the United Kingdom by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgement 
Act 1982.
66 Given effect in the UK by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.
67 Para. 3 of the Preamble.
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jurisdictional rules for conflicts involving both common and civil law courts must be 
developed. Such rules would have to be of uniform application throughout Cameroon 
as that would greatly reduce, if not totally discourage forum shopping. In that way 
the interests of both plaintiff and defendant would be taken into consideration and the 
plaintiff would only have himself to blame if he chose to sue in a forum from which 
the defendant may be able to escape.
As for the question of choice of law, it should be determined by the doctrine of 
autonomy.68 This means that the parties should be free to choose the governing law 
and only in the absence of that, do the courts have to consider the relevant connecting 
factors to the contract. This flexible approach, which was already being followed by 
many European Community countries with variations69 has been generally adopted 
by the Rome Convention 1980.7(1 Prior to the coming into effect of the Rome 
Convention, English law, for example, applied the flexible doctrine of the ‘proper law 
of contract’71 to determine the applicable law while French law also employed a 
similar flexible approach.72
It may be of some importance to illustrate how this doctrine can be applied to 
internal conflict problems in Cameroon by using some Cameroonian cases by way of 
examples. I shall briefly consider seriatim the situation where the parties have made 
an express choice, where there is an inferred choice, and where there is no express 
or inferred choice. The aim will be to prove that Cameroonian courts have in some 
cases followed the private international law approach to the problem of determining
68 Cheshire, North, and Fawcett, p. 458.
69 Lando, "The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations" 
(1987) 24 C.M.L.R. 159, 171-179.
70 See Article 3, entitled "Freedom of choice."
71 Cheshire and North, p. 447 ff.
72 See the briliant comparative account by Lando, 3 International Encyclopaedia 
of Comparative Law, chapter 24; Battifol, and Lagarde, op.cit.. vol.II pp. 257-311; 
Loussouarn & Bourel, op. cit.. note 27, para. 375-378.
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the applicable law of a contract, albeit without having having that in mind.
Where the parties expressly choose the law to govern their contract, the courts 
should allow that chosen law to prevail. Of course there should be some limits on 
the parties’ freedom to select the applicable law. Firstly, the choice must be, to 
borrow Lord Wright’s phrase, "bona fide and legal" and there must be "no reason for 
avoiding the choice on the grounds of public policy".73 Secondly, and more 
importantly, any choice of law should be limited only to either system of law in 
Cameroon. To allow Cameroonian parties to write into their contract a choice of law 
provision designating foreign law in a purely Cameroonian transaction is to allow 
them to free themselves from the power of the law of the land. So extraordinary a 
power in the hands of individuals is absolutely anomalous and should surely be 
against public policy.
In practice, however, it is very unlikely for Cameroonians to expressly choose 
which law to govern their contract. This may be partly due to the fact that people 
do not generally envisage litigation at the time of contracting and partly due to the 
ignorance of legal complications that may arise as a result of conflict of laws, if and 
when a dispute arises. It may also be misconstrued as an indication of future 
dishonesty. Not too many Cameroonians would be prepared to deal with someone 
who at the time of contract formation is already addressing his mind to the question 
of the governing law in the event of a dispute.
In the absence of an express choice of law, the court should consider whether it 
can ascertain that there was an inferred or implied choice of law by the parties. If the 
parties agree, for instance, that a court in the civil law area shall have jurisdiction, 
that is a powerful implication that the civil law should be applied. This was 
recognised obiter by the Buea Court of Appeal in the Atabong case74 where it was 
noted that there was no clause in the contract designating Douala as the place of trial 
in the event of a dispute, the clear implication being that had there been such a
73 In Vita Foods Product Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] A.C. 277 at 290.
74 Supra, note 38.
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clause, the court would have had little difficulty in upholding it, in which case the 
Douala court would have applied the civil law. Also, if the parties agree on a place 
for arbitration, it can be inferred that the law of that place is the applicable law. In 
Ste. Neoplan Gottlob v. Ste. Jetliner Cameroun S.A .,73 the parties had agreed that 
any dispute would be settled by arbitration in Switzerland. The plaintiff eventually 
brought an action in the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Yaounde and the defendant 
applied for a stay on the strength of the arbitration clause. The court held that the 
parties were bound by the arbitration clause and granted a stay.
Other factors such as the use of a particular language (French or English),76 the 
nature and location of the subject matter of the contract, the residence of the parties, 
the head office of the corporation party to a contract, may all help the court to infer 
the intention of the parties.
Where the parties have not expressed a choice and no such choice can be inferred, 
the applicable law of their contract should be determined by reference to the system 
of law with which the contract has the greatest nexus. This has been variously 
referred to as "the system of law with which the transaction has its closest and most 
real connection",77 the place of "the most significant relationship",78 and the "law
75 J.C. No.266 du 27 Mars 1991. (Trib. G.I., Yaounde, unreported).
76 But the courts must be careful not to read too much meaning in the use of a 
particular language sometimes. French, for instance, is the dominant language with 
over two thirds of the population using it. Some official documents are written only 
in French, so just because an Anglophone may sometimes transact his affairs in 
French should not necessarily be taken as an aquiescence by him that French would 
govern the relationship. At times he may simply have no choice. This too applies 
to a Francophone who may happen to deal in the English out of neccessity rather than 
choice.
77 See Cheshire and North, 11th ed., p.463. It is said that it is not clear whether 
reference should be made to "the law of the country" or the "system of law". In the 
present Cameroonian context, it clearly has to be with "the system of law" since one 
is dealing with internal conflicts within one country with two systems of law, rather 
than with conflict of laws between two seperate countries.
78 The Restatement of Laws, Second, Conflict of Laws, article 186 (1).
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of the country with which it is most closely connected".79 The vast majority of 
contracts in Cameroon fall under this category of no express or inferred choice of 
law.
In determining the system of law with which the contract is most closely 
connected, the court should look at all the circumstances. It is difficult to lay down 
any firm rules but the court should look for such factors as the place of contracting, 
the place of performance, the place of residence or business of the parties. The case 
of Klockner v Cameroun, 80 does provide a perfect illumination on how 
Cameroonian courts should go about the task of determining the applicable law in the 
absence of an express or inferred choice. The full facts of the case and the 
judgement are not relevant here. It is enough to say that the dispute arose out of a 
failed joint venture by Klockner, a German based multinational company, and the 
Cameroonian government to build a fertiliser plant in Cameroon. The project turned 
out to be a fiasco and the paint was shut down after a few months of unprofitable and 
sub-capacity operation. Even though this was not purely a domestic conflict of laws 
case, the arbitration tribunal (ICSID) raised, and answered, some interesting conflict 
of laws questions which are very pertinent to the present discussion. After the plant 
had been closed down, Klockner who had borne most of the construction costs, filed 
a request for arbitration against the Cameroon, claiming the outstanding balance of 
the costs of erecting the factory.
Although the parties had agreed on arbitration, they had not chosen the applicable 
law. Neither could it be inferred. It was therefore incumbent on the arbitration 
tribunal to determine the applicable law. It might have appeared a simple matter to 
apply Article 42 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID) which provides that in the 
absence of a chosen law, "the tribunal shall apply the law of the contracting state
79 The Rome Convention 1980, article 4 (I).
80 For a detailed discussion, see Jan Paulsson, "The ICSID Klockner v. Cameroon 
Award: The Duties of Partners in the North - South Development Agreements" 
(1984) J.Int.Arb., 143-168.
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party to the dispute (including its rule on the conflict of law) and such rules of 
international law as may be applicable."
Indeed, it was not contested that the applicable law should "naturally" be the "civil 
and commercial law applicable to Cameroonian". However, the tribunal was to 
discover that as a result of Cameroon’s dual heritage, it could not determine the 
applicable law in Cameroon without difficulty. In effect, the tribunal still had to 
decide on the system of law (common or civil) in Cameroon by which the dispute was 
to be resolved. This, the tribunal rightly determined to be that part of Cameroonian 
law that is based on French law. To arrive at that conclusion, the tribunal was 
influenced by the following considerations: the doomed factory was located in the 
French speaking part of the country, and all aspects of the contract were finalised in 
Yaounde, also in the French speaking part. In other words, French speaking 
Cameroon was the place both of contract formation and performance. Although the 
tribunal did not say so, one would be entitled to impute on the tribunal an application 
of what may be conveniently referred to as the "closest and most real connection 
test."
It must be a cause of more than mild concern that it has needed an international 
arbitration tribunal to raise such an obvious Cameroonian problem, and better still, 
solve it faultlessly. The mere fact that the tribunal was prepared to address the issue 
of Cameroon’s dual judicial system in their disposition of the conflict of laws problem 
is to be commended. It is hoped that Cameroonian courts would show the same 
awareness when confronted with an internal conflict of laws situation. This is 
certainly not asking too much of the courts since it is possible to explain some of 
their decisions in the context of "the closest and most real connection" test, even 
though the courts most certainly did not have that test in mind when they made such 
decisions. I will cite just two examples.
First, in Salao Liman v. Abanda,81 both parties were resident in Bamenda 
(common law) which was also their place of business. They entered into a contract
81 BCA/20/83 (Bamenda, unreported)
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of carriage in Douala (civil law) whereby the respondent (Abanda) hired the 
appellant’s lorry to transport his goods to Bamenda. The lorry was involved in an 
accident on the way (at Nkongsamba in the civil law part) and the goods were stolen. 
In an action in which both parties made claims against each other, the Bamenda High 
court (and later the Appeal Court) automatically assumed jurisdiction.
Also, in Nche v. Momolou & 2 others,82 all the parties were resident and doing 
business in Bamenda. They entered into a contract of carriage in Douala, for goods 
to be transported to Bamenda. The goods went missing and an action was brought 
before the Bamenda High Court and later to the Bamenda Court of Appeal, with no 
protest by the defendants over the jurisdiction of the Bamenda courts.
In both cases, neither the parties themselves nor the court seemed at all bothered 
by the fact that the place of contract formation was Douala, in the civil law 
jurisdiction of Cameroon. In the first case, the accident and loss occured in 
Nkongsamba (civil law). Yet each time the plaintiff brought their action before the 
Bamenda court and each time the court took it for granted that it had jurisdiction. 
It is not suggested that it did not have jurisdiction. The point I am trying to make 
here is that in those cases that have connections with civil law provinces, it would be 
preferable for the courts to take that little extra trouble to explain the basis on which 
they assume jurisdiction (or grant a stay as the case might be), which carries with it 
the application of the local law. In the above cases, the jurisdiction of the Bamenda 
court can be easily explained by the fact that all the parties were resident and did 
business there, and delivery to be made in Bamenda. Besides, had the Bamenda court 
declined jurisdiction, the parties would have had to travel to Douala for trial at great 
expense, never mind having to put up with a different language (French), a different 
legal culture (civil law) and all its different legal paraphernalia.
82 BCA/18/82 (Bamenda, unreported).
6. CONCLUSION.
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From the foregoing analysis of internal conflict of laws in Cameroon, one may 
make the following conclusions:
That it is chiefly or solely concerned with the the question of choice of jurisdiction. 
It is this question of choice of jurisdiction that determines the question of choice of 
law.
That the statutory provisions that govern the question of jurisdiction in the seperate 
law areas of Cameroon are inadequate and ill-suited as solutions to problems of 
conflict between both legal systems.
That despite the importance of the problem, it has so far received very scant 
attention by the courts and none by the legislature.
In the light of the above, it is proposed that a modernization of the antiquated 
rules of choice of jurisdiction be embarked upon so as to remove some of the barriers 
which now stand between the litigant and the substantive law applicable to his case. 
The most effective way of introducing any changes is by legislation, in which case, 
some recent legislative enactments of the European Community can be of invaluable 
help, if only in providing guidelines. Such legislation must strive or aim at 
formulating new and uniform rules on jurisdiction (as against the present dissimilar 
ones) and choice of law along the lines of private international law. This, it is hoped, 
will produce certainty, predictability and uniformity of results.
In the meantime, however, the courts must concentrate their endeavours in areas 
that are peculiarly theirs, i.e. be prepared to acknowledge and deal with any problem 
or potential conflict problem in a manner that reflects the interests of all parties 
concerned. The courts should desist from the present attitude whereby technical 
points for disposing a case are' invariably seised upon, when the merits should have 
been more fully explored. They should strive to understand the increasing interaction 
between Cameroonians of both legal systems in matters of private law in general and 
contracts in particular, and seek to penetrate some of the resulting manifestations of 
legal relativism.
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For my part, I note as a fact that there does exist an internal conflict of laws 
problem with regards to contracts in Cameroon. It is time for these problems to be 
accepted for what they are: real problems, arising or capable of arising out of actual 
circumstances. Although many examples in purely contractual matters have not been 
provided here, it should not in any way detract from the issue. That is better 
explained by the ignorance of the parties, the failure of counsel to plead ‘foreign’ law 
(in the sense of the other law in Cameroon other than that of the place of the court), 
and the courts unacceptable reluctance to confront the conflict problems. Even when 
counsel are aware that a particular case does have several connections with the other 
legal system as to bring it within the conflict regime, they are still prepared to have 
it treated as a local case, usually for sound tactical reasons.83 It can be safely 
projected that with the increasing fluidity and frequency in the movements of 
individuals across unguarded legal boundaries within Cameroon, the problem of 
internal conflict of laws is bound to assume a greater prominence, in the future than 
it has been accorded in the past.84
83 If they were to successfully raise the conflict problem, the court may be moved to 
grant a stay. This would mean a transfer of the case to the courts of a different legal 
system whose laws - substantive and procedural - they may not be familiar with. As 
a result, the majority of Anglophone lawyers generally avoid the civil law courts just 
as much as their Francophone confreres dread going before a common law court.
84 Recently, the muddied state of internal conflicts of laws in Cameroon was the 
subject of a brief but perceptive comment by Nkweatta Muna, C.B., Op.cit. note 6.
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CHAPTER FOUR.
THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF CONTRACTS IN 
CAMEROON.
It has already been explained how as a result of Cameroon’s colonial and legal 
history, contract law in Cameroon today is largely a reflection of the English 
Common Law and the French Civil Law respectively. In the preceding chapter it was 
demonstrated how these "imported" laws have come to "triumph" over Cameroonian 
customary law and how they have come to be regarded as stating the law of contract 
in Cameroon.
In this chapter, the nature and structure of contracts in Cameroon is explained. 
The aim is to provide an overall picture of modern contract law. This task will entail 
a consideration of such preliminary issues as the definition and classification of 
contracts, the distinction between civil and commercial contracts, and the particularly 
troublesome regime of contrats administratifs. This exercise is significant in that the 
nature and structure of contracts is different under the common law and the civil law 
and it will be of interest to determine the extent and effect to which such differences 
are reflected in Cameroon.
I. THE DEFINITION OF CONTRACT.
In this section, it is proposed to look briefly at the traditional common law and 
civil law definitions of contract law, if only to distinguish contracts from other forms 
of legal, obligations. Considering that in these systems the idea and the notion of 
contract are not exactly the same, it is difficult to achieve a common definition of 
contract for both of them, particularly in connection with the notion of promise. In
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fact, it has even been suggested that such a definition is impossible.1 It is 
convenient, therefore, to treat common law separately from civil law.
In Common Law Cameroon, neither the courts nor the legislature have ever 
bothered to define the term contract. The most obvious explanation for this is that 
they must have taken it for granted that the general common law definition of contract 
applies in the common law jurisdiction of Cameroon.
Yet, contract has been variously defined at common law and the meaning of 
contract is no more fixed and interchangeable today than it has been in the past.2 
Writers have defined it either in terms of agreement or promise or a combination of 
both.3 A third statement in some definitions is that contracts create rights in 
personam rather than rights in rem.4
Definitions in terms of agreement can be traced as far back to St. Germain’s 
Doctor and Student in the sixteenth century,5 through to Blackstone,6 and to recent 
writers like Cheshire and Fifoot,7 and Treitel,8 who defines contract as "an 
agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognised by law".
1 Alpa, "Le Contrat Individuel et sa Definition", (1988) R.I.D .C., 327 at 333.
2 Jackson, "The Scope o f the Term 'Contract'” t (1937) 53 L.Q.R., 525.
3 For examples of those who include agreement in their definitions while also 
referring to promises in the alternative, see Beale, Bishop, and Furmston: Contract 
Cases and Materials. 1985, p .3; James, Introduction to English Law. 11th ed. 1985, 
p.267.
4 Coote, "The Essence o f Contract" (1988) 1 J.C.L. 94.
5 The history of the usage is traced in Jackson, op. cit.. note 2, 526.
6 2 Commentaries, (1776), p.442.
7 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Law of Contract, 1991, p. 27.
8 Treitel, The Law of Contract, 1991, p. 1.
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On the other hand, Pollock9 and the American Restatement of the Law, Second, 
Contracts define contract in terms of promise. Section 1 of the latter provides that 
"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives 
a remedy or the performance of which the law in some way recognises as a duty".
Both the agreement and promise analyses of contract have their critics. Against 
the agreement analysis, for instance, it is said that it excludes those contracts which 
are not agreements, whereas such contracts can actually be made at common law by 
the use of a deed. It is also argued that the fact that agreement in this sense is not 
necessarily a contract,10 but is an essential element in every contract, creates certain 
difficulties. Cases of fraud and mistake have been cited as examples of situations 
where it would be difficult to see anything that could properly be called agreement 
because the minds of the parties are not ad idem.n
In favour of the promise analysis, it is said that it is wide enough to cover 
contracts which are not the subject of agreement. Against it is the assumption that 
promises must involve the doing (or refraining from doing) some act in the future,12 
the implication being that there could, prima facie , be no place in contract for a 
warranty, for example, the essence of which is a statement of past or present fact 
rather than the promise of something to be done in the future. Atiyah maintains, 
however, that past or present fact can be the subject of a promise.13 It is submitted 
that the arguments for and against both analyses of contract are complex and varied
9 Pollock, Principles of Contract, 1889, p. 1; Fried, Contract as a Promise: A 
Theory of Contractual Obligations, 1981.
10 For a discussion of agreements not amounting to contracts, see Balfour v Balfour 
[1919] 2 K.B. 571 at 578; Rose Frank & Co. v. Crompton Bros. [1923] 2 K.B. 261.
11 Jackson, op. cit.. note 2, 525.
12 For example, Peetz, "Promises and Threats" (1977) Mind (NS) 579; Stoljar, 
"Promise, Expectation, Agreement" (1988) C.L.J. 193.
13 Atiyah, "Promises and the Law o f Contract" (1979) 88 Mind (NS) 410.
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and need not be exhaustively considered here. The fact of the matter is that for many 
hundred years the orthodox theory of English law has regarded contractual liability 
as based upon the agreement of the parties, or upon the promises of the parties. No 
distinction of any importance has been drawn from these two views: agreement or 
promise has been the basis of contract law.14
In Civil Law Cameroon, there is no problem in finding the definition of contract. 
The Civil Code defines contract in Article 1104 as "an agreement by which one or 
more persons obligate themselves to one or more other persons to give, or to do or 
not to do, something". The agreement {convention) is the accord of two or more 
parties on a subject matter of legal interest. Agreements may have as an object not 
only the creation, but also the modification and extinction of obligation. However, 
the label contract is applied traditionally to those agreements designed to create or 
promote an obligation.15 Unlike the common law, the identification of contract 
solely in terms of agreement is unanimously adopted in Civil Law Cameroon and 
France,16 even though it has been argued by one observer that the definition should 
have included "cause" which is also a necessary ingredient for the validity of 
contracts.17
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this thesis, to fix the limits of contract or 
to declare in favour of either the agreement or promise analysis, since I do not
14 See Atiyah, "The Binding Nature o f Contractual Obligations" In: Harris and Tallon 
(eds.), Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons, 1989, p. 21.
15 6 Planiol & Ripert: Traite Practique de Droit Civil Fran^ais- Obligations- Part
1, 17 (2nd ed., Esmein 1952); Rouhette, Loc. cit.. note 16, p. 65.
16 Rouhette, "La Definition du Contrat et la Methode Juridique Frangaise", In: 
DROITS- Revue Frangaise de Theorie Juridique, vol. 12, Le Contrat. 1990, p. 
60.
17 Monateri, "Regies et Technique de la Definition dans le Droit des Obligation et des 
Controls en France et en Allemagne: La Synecdocque Frangais" (1984) R.I.D.C. 7- 
52.
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consider the question to be whether one view is correct and the other wrong. In 
terms of consistency and convenience, definitions based on agreement have the 
advantage of being centred on an incident of the vast majority of contracts whether 
under the common law or under the civil law system in Cameroon. In that sense, 
they correspond with popular perceptions of what contracts are about.
In conclusion, it is sufficient to note that what is generally regarded as a contract, 
or what, in other sections of the Civil Code,18 is stated to be a contract, will be 
without effect unless it has "consideration", (in the case of Common Law Cameroon) 
or a "lawful cause" (in the case of Civil Law Cameroon). Cameroonian courts 
generally do not have much difficulty in deciding whether a matter relates to contract. 
Even in the common law jurisdiction where no particular definition has been adopted, 
there seems to be a sufficiently common core on the meaning of contract.
2. CLASSIC A TION OF CONTRACTS.
In Cameroon, contracts are classified into a number of categories following the 
traditional civil and common law patterns. And in classifying contracts the common 
and civil law use widely different terminology. Only an outline treatment will be 
undertaken here.
In Francophone Cameroon, the Civil Code classifies contracts according to certain 
characteristics that appear as dominant features, such as the existence or non-existence 
of reciprocity of engagement, the introduction of a certain chance that a certain event
will or will not take place or that each of the parties has contemplated a
counter-prestation by the other. Along this path, the established classification of
contract under civil law has emerged as follows:
18 Some examples of transactions declared in the code to be contracts are: gifts inter 
vivos, accepted by the donee (art.755), sale (art. 1472), exchange (art. 1596), lease 
(1600), etc..
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Synallagmatic (bilateral) and Unilateral;19 
Commutative and Aleatory;20 
Gratuitous and Onerous;21 and 
Nominate and Innominate.22
Such an elaborate classification is not known in Common Law Cameroon which, 
like other common law jurisdictions, has devoted little attention to the classification 
of contracts. For example, no distinction is made between commutative and aleatory 
contracts at common law. It has been said that this distinction could well be made 
at common law but for the fact that the notion of lesion, which explains the inclusion 
of this distinction in the Civil Code, is not known to English law.23 The common 
law also does not distinguish between onerous and gratuitous contracts. Only onerous 
contracts are considered as valid contracts because they fulfill the requirement of 
consideration. This does not mean that in Common Law Cameroon, gifts are not 
recognised or that the courts will not give effect to them. The point is that, like 
English law, gifts and promises are not considered as contracts. Rather they are 
considered as unilateral acts which are governed by certain well laid down rules and 
they are generally considered to fall under property law instead of contract law since 
their object is to transfer some property and not to create any obligations.
The most significant classification in common law is that which divides contracts 
into bilateral and unilateral.24 It will have been noticed that the civil law also makes
19 Art. 1102 -1103.
20 Art. 1104, this is also referred by some common law writers as ‘Dependent and 
Independent Obligations’, see Carter: Breach of Contract, 1984, p .6.
21 Art. 1105 - 1106.
22 Art. 1107.
23 David and Pugsley: Les Contrats en Droit Anglais. 1985, p. 62.
24 Langdell, Summary of Contracts, 248-253, 2d ed. 1880, is credited with having 
first enunciated this distinction. See Stoljar, Loc. cit.. note 25. Llewelyn, "O f the
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a similar classification, yet it is important to point out that there is some 
terminological difference between common law and civil law with regards to the 
terms ‘unilateral’ and ‘bilateral’ as they relate to contracts. At common law, a 
unilateral contract is one in which there is a promise of performance by one party 
only, conditioned by the performance of an act by the other party.25 At civil law, 
the same term is used in a somewhat different sense - it refers to those contracts 
which typically produce legal obligations only on one party, e.g. a contract of 
donation.
The common law generally adopts a very simple classification of contracts which 
is unknown to civil law. In Anglophone Cameroon, contracts can be classified into 
contracts under seal and simple contracts, i.e. formal and informal contracts.
A contract under seal, sometimes referred to as a contract of specialty (e.g. a 
deed) is a written instrument to which a person attaches his seal, delivers it to another 
person and liability is thereby incurred under it by the person who fixes his seal. It 
is the form of the contract that secures its validity. Consideration, is not essential to 
the creation of a contract under seal. I do not know of any Cameroonian cases 
involving the formal validity of the sealed obligation but I suspect that Cameroonians 
have not only not had seals, they have not had or have not used wax as well. One 
can only assume that in Cameroon, the role of the sealed instrument is performed by 
other substitutes such as a written document that is duly notarized, i.e. drawn up by 
a solicitor or notary, or duly registered with the Department of Stamp Duty and 
Registration, for instance.26 In any case, this work is not concerned with formal
Good, True and Beautiful in the Law" (1953) 69 L.Q.R. 485, 500, has suggested that 
Langdell formulated this distinction only to achieve some symmetry in the welter of 
contractual principles.
25 For some discussion of the unilateral contract of the common law, see Llewelyn, 
Our Case-Law o f Contract: Offer and Acceptance" (1938, 1939) 48 Yale L.J. 1, 779 
passim; Stoljar "The False Distinction between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts" 
(1955) 64 Yale L.J. 515.
26 See chapter 7 below on formal requirements in contracts.
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contracts.
A simple contract is an ordinary contract which may be written or oral. The 
essential requisite of a simple contract is that it must be founded on consideration. 
The main characteristic of simple contracts is their foundation on agreement and 
consent. Unlike contracts under seal which may be quite unilateral in character, a 
simple contract is always bilateral. This study is in the main concerned with simple 
contracts. For the purpose of this thesis, therefore, the most important civil law 
category is that of the synallagmatic contract. This is a contract which is not only 
bilateral (in the sense that each party undertakes an obligation) but has the 
characteristic that the performance promised by one party is to be exchanged for 
another.
3. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS.
Francophone Cameroon has followed in the French tradition by making a 
fundamental distinction between civil law (and civil contracts) and commercial law 
(and commercial contracts).27 This distinction is not easy to explain in any simple 
proposition but it suffices to say that commercial law applies in principle to 
commercial transactions (acres de commerce) of which the Cameroonian Code de 
Commerce contains a list (for example, contracts of sale, if the subject matter is 
bought for resale, banking, brokerage and discount operations, etc) and it applies to 
other transactions entered into by merchants, (who are defined as those who make it 
their profession to engage in acres de commerce),28 provided that the transactions 
are accessory to their commercial activities. The Code de Commerce governs all such 
acts.
27 For commercial and civil contracts in France, see generally Dutilleul and 
Delebecque, Contrats Civils et Commerciaux, 1993, especially para. 19 which 
refers to the position in England and other countries.
28 Code de Commerce, Art. 1.
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In Common Law Cameroon, the term commercial law, if used at all, is merely 
for the purpose of convenience of exposition. It signifies those branches of law, 
known as "Mercantile law", comprising such important business contracts as sale of 
goods and agency. But there is generally no difference between the principles of law 
that apply to business and non-business contracts, neither is there any seperate body 
of rules for commercial transactions, except perhaps for those special laws and 
decrees that regulate activities such as banking and insurance. The position in 
Common Law Cameroon simply reflects that in England from which it derives.29
It is submitted, however, that the difference between the civil and common law 
on this issue is largely academic in Cameroon. This is because even in France where 
the distinction derives, the only consequences are to be found in the difference in 
jurisdiction and the simplified procedure of the commercial courts (tribunaux de 
commerce), where there is readier admission of oral evidence. But in Civil Law 
Cameroon, where the distinction is adopted, they are no seperate commercial 
tribunals, which means that the ordinary civil courts30 entertain what would 
otherwise be a commercial contract. It is true, at least in principle, that the 
requirements of proof can be less stringent in the case of commercial contracts, for 
example, the admission of oral evidence, but in practice the difference is not too 
visible since the law requires most of these commercial contracts to be in writing.31
The main difference from my research is that in cases involving commercial or 
business contracts, the courts in Civil Law Cameroon will consult the Code de 
Commerce while those in the common law jurisdiction will consult the 1893 Sale of 
Goods Act, for example, or any other relevant statute or standard textbook on the 
given area.
29 See Goode, Commercial Law, 1984, pp. 35-36.
30 The courts in Francophone Cameroon all have the Chambre Civile et Chambre 
Commerciale (Civil and Commercial Division) fused into one.
31 For more on the writing requirement, see chapter 7.
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Some eminent French writers have questioned the need for the distinction between 
civil and commercial contracts.32 In some civil law jurisdictions, notably the state 
of Louisiana, it is said that the gap between the two is narrowing down.33 Some 
African countries that inherited the distinction from France have since abolished it.34 
Be that as it may, the distinction is firmly entrenched in French law and there are 
many French writers who still support it.35 In England, there does not seem to be 
any calls from English commercial lawyers for a commercial code, except for 
Professor Roy Goode who, it has been said,36 has spoken for the need of a 
commercial code as self evident.
32 E.g. Leon Mazeaud, " Vers la fusion du droit civil et droit commercial frangais" In: 
Rotondi, ed., L’unite de droit des obligations, 1974, p. 333; Houin, "Droit civil et 
droit commercial en France" In Rotondi, p. 187.
33 Kozolchyk, "The Commercialisation o f Civil Law and the Civilization o f 
Commercial Law" (1979/80) 40 Louisiana L. R. 3.
34 See Decottignies, "Reflexions sur le Projet du Codes Senegalais des Obligations", 
(1962) 72 Pennant 497, 502.
35 E.g. Tallon, "Reflexions Comparatives sur la distinction du droit civil et du droit 
commercial" In: Etudes Jauffret, p. 649 et s.; Hamel, Lagarde and Jauffret, Droit 
Commercial, t. 1, 1980, para. 5.
36 By Lord Goff of Chievely, " Opening Adress to 2nd Annual Journal o f Contract law 
Conference in London on 11th Sept., 1991" (1992) 5 J.C.L. 1, 3.
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4. CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTS.37
(1). Conceptual Differences between English and French Law.
Modem governments are increasingly being required to enter into contractual 
arrangements in their usual course of business. To acquire necessary goods and 
services, public administration must enter into contracts of procurement, to provide 
public services and amenities such as the running of public transport and public 
museums, to carry out major public works, the administration must resort to 
contractual arrangements, either bilateral or multilateral. In these, the individual 
supplier, public works contractor, public utilities user, etc., must be included in the 
process through which the administrative act - the conclusion of a joint transaction 
of both parties - is done.
The French legal system admits of two seperate contractual regimes, namely: 
contrat de droit civil and contrat administratif. These two contracts, are as concepts, 
totally distinct and so too are the substantive laws that apply to them. Administrative 
contracts are governed by rules of an autonomous administrative law running parallel 
to private law, which governs ordinary civil contracts. Further still, the French have 
also developed a seperate administrative jurisdiction, distinct from the civil one. It 
consists of administative tribunals38 which have exclusive jurisdiction over 
administrative contracts.
37 The term civil contract as used here denotes a contractual form whose essential 
features derives from private law (civil or common law) and it is conveniently used 
here as an anti-thesis to administrative contracts: a contractual form shaped by rules 
of administrative law.
38 See Remington, "The Tribunaux Administratif: Proctector o f the French Citizen", 
(1976/77) 51 Tul.L.R. 33; Schwartz, "Administrative Courts in France", (1951) 29 
Can.B.R. 380.
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In sharp distinction to French law, English law has, or so it is said, no seperate 
theory of administrative contracts;39 neither does it admit of the private-public law 
dichotomy.40 Dicey’s rule of law theory is too well known to need any discussion 
here.41 In any case, the central theme is that, the control of administrative action 
must be maintained through the same institutions that administer the ordinary laws of 
the land, and on the same fundamental principles of justice. This is considered to be 
the basis of the rule of law in the common law world and its absence in the French 
system led to Dicey’s well-known criticism of the Droit Administratif.42 Dicey 
insisted that only law courts must determine questions of administrative law, and the 
applicable principles must be those that have been worked out from the ordinary 
private law by the method of judicial empirism.
There has been increased jurisprudential and doctrinal criticisms of Dicey’s 
classical views over the years. More recently, it has been suggested that the United
39 See generally, Langrod, ''Administrative Contracts: A Comparative
Sui'very ",(1954/55) 3-4 A.J.C.L. 335; Mewett, ''Theory o f Government
Contracts ”,(1957-1760) 5 Mcguill L.J. 233; Arrowsmith, ''Government Contracts and 
Public Law",( 1990) 10 Leg. Stud. 231; Phillips, and Jackson: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 1987, p .678.
40 See Mitchell, "The Causes and Effects o f A System o f Public Law in the United 
Kingdom" (1965) Pub.L. 95; Beetz, "The State o f Public Law in the United Kingdom" 
(1966) I.C.L.Q. 133; Harlow, " ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Law: Definition without 
Distinction" (1980) M.L.R. 241 and the response to that by Samuel, "Public and 
Private Law: A Private Lawyers Response" (1983) M.L.R. 558.
41 For a discussion and defence of Dicey’s views, see Lawson, "Dicey Revisited" 
(1959)7 Political Studies, 112-120.
42 Dicey: Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution; (10th edn. by 
E.C.S Wade) London, 1961.
1 3 8
Kingdom would do well to adopt a system similar to the French,43 and set up a 
seperate administrative jurisdiction,44 or alternatively, an Administrative Division 
of the High Court.4' It has been forcefully argued that government contracts should 
not be excuded from the field of public law.46
Some members of the judiciary too have been known to express the desire for 
some special kind of framework. As far back as 1956, Lord Devlin was able to say 
that,47
"I believe it to be generally recognized that in many of his dealings 
with the executive the citizen cannot get justice by process of law.
The common law has now, I think, no longer the strength to provide 
any satisfactory solution to the problem of keeping the executive, with 
all the powers which under modern conditions are needed for the 
efficient conduct of the realm, under proper control."
Echoing those sentiments Lord Reid was later to observe,48
"We do not have a developed system of administrative law - perhaps 
because until recently we did not need it, so it is not surprising that in 
dealing with new types of cases the , courts have had to grope for 
solutions and have found that old powers, rules and procedures are 
largely inapplicable to cases which they were never designed or 
intended to deal with"
He thus recognised in the same breadth both the absence and the need for some
special regime for administrative law.
Of the recent judges, Lord Diplock always expressed a desire to keep English
43 See generally, Mitchell, op. cit.. note 40, 94.
44 Mitchell, "Administrative Law and Parliamentary Control" (1967) 38 Political Q. 
360, 370.
45 Garner, "Public Law and Private Law" (1978) Pub.L. 230, 237.
46 For e.g. Arrowsmith, op. cit.. note 39, 232.
47 "The Common Law, Public Policy and the Executive" (1956) 9 C.L.P. 1, 14.
48 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] A.C 40 at p.72, cited in Mitchell, op. cit..note 40, 117.
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(administrative) law in a moving relation with developments elsewhere, especially in 
the continent of Europe.49 His interest in French administrative law is clearly evident 
in O ’ Reilly v. M a c k m a n in which he attaches some powerful generalisations to 
the distinction between public and private law to the terms of R.S.C. Order 53.
Finally, Lord Woolf has been most forthright. He has been unswerving in his 
view that,'1
"the distinction between private and public law needs to exist because 
public law requires the court to perform a different role from that 
which it has traditionally adopted in private law disputes".
Nevertheless, inspite of these calls, in English law, with limited exceptions, there is
no special corpus of rules governing contracts involving the government or public
authorities.52 In fact, in Britain and other common law jurisdictions, the perception
of contract, including those in which the administration is a party, as purely a matter
of private law is still being emphasised by the fact that (i) the courts are generally
reluctant to apply substantive principles of judicial review to the exercise of
contractual power by the government,53 on the grounds that a mere contractual
power is unreviewable54 and (ii) the (English) public law institution of the
Ombusdman has most contractual matters excluded from his jurisdiction.55
I have stated the conceptual differences between English and French law on the
49 Wilberforce, "Lord Diplock and Administrative Law" (1986) Pub.L. 6.
50 [1983] 2 A.C. 237.
51 Woolf, "Public Law - Private Law: Why the Divide ? A Personal View" (1986) 
Pub. L. 220; He also reiterates his views in "Judicial Review: A Possible Program 
For Reform" (1992) Pub. L. 221.
52 Wade: Administrative Law, 1982, p.678.
53 Arrowsmith, "Judicial Review of the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities"
(1990) 106 L.Q.R 177.
54 Arrowsmith, op. cit.. note 39, 238.
55 Arrowsmith, op. cit.. note 39, 240.
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subject of administrative contracts. No attempt will be made here to explain or 
discuss the substantive rules of administrative contracts.56 What I propose to do 
instead is to examine the juridical nature of administrative contracts in Cameroon. 
Is it an ordinary contract, governed by the rules of private contract law or is it a 
concept apart and distinct from the contract of private law. Until 1965, there was 
neither any distinction between civil and administrative contracts nor any seperate 
jurisdiction for administrative matters of any kind in Anglophone Cameroon. 
Contract was treated purely as a matter of private law, irrespective of the parties 
involved. Francophone Cameroon, on the other hand, had adopted the French system 
right from independence.57 In 1961, the Federal Court of Justice was created in 
Yaounde, and one of its five distinct functions was to preside over administrative 
litigation.'8
By Law No.65/LF/29 of 19 November 1965 (on the reform of administrative 
litigation), an administrative chamber of the then Federal Court of Justice was created 
in Buea59 (which was the main seat of the courts in Anglophone Cameroon at the 
time) and it assumed exclusive jurisdiction in disputes involving the administration,
56 For some discussion on that, Brown and Bell, French Administrative Law, 1991, 
pp. 192-200.
57 For the introduction and reception of the French system of administrative law in 
Cameroon, see Jacquot, "Le Contentieux Administratif au Cameroun" (1975) 7 Rev. 
Cam. D r., 16-21; Bipoum W oum ,"Recherches sur les aspects actuels de la reception 
du droit administratif dans les Etats d ’Afrique Noir d ’expression Frangais: Le cas du 
Cameroun" (1972) no.3 R.J.P.I.C. 359-387.
58 See Art. 33 of the 1961 Constitution and Ordinance No.62/OF/6 of 4th October 
1961.
59 Binyoum, "Bilans de 20 ans de Jurisprudence Administratif de la Cour Supreme du 
Cameroun. Ire Partie 1957-65" (1978) nos. 15 & 16, Rev. Cam. Dr., 23.
1 4 1
including contracts.60 The system in Francophone Cameroon was thereby extended 
to Anglophone Cameroon, with the result that the latter departed from its common 
law tradition in this respect. There is, therefore, a distinct regime of administrative 
contracts applicable in the whole of Cameroon. It is modelled on the French regime 
of contrat administratif and like in France, it is governed in important respects by a 
different legal regime (contrat de droit commun) from that of civil contracts.
For present purposes, I am not interested in any disussion as to the respective 
merits of the English or French system or whether the French system61 adopted in 
Francophone Cameroon should have been extended to Anglophone Cameroon. It 
seems true to say, from the lack of agitation in academic circles and from personal 
experience and observation, that Cameroonian administrative law commentators and 
writers (who are mainly Francophones), appear to be in favour of the French inspired 
seperate regime for administrative contracts in Cameroon.62 The crucial question, 
however, is whether that system has functioned as satisfactorily in Cameroon as it has 
done in France. Even those who feel that the public/private law division is a useful 
one admit that it has not always been easy for Cameroonians to draw the dividing line
60 See Nguini, "La Cour Federal de Justice" (1973) Pennant, 337-348. During the era 
of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the Federal Court of Justice was the 
administrative court in Cameroun. It was abolished in 1972 and the administrative 
jurisdiction today lies exclusively in the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme 
Court.
61 For a debate on the respective merits of both systems, see Mitchell, op.cit.. note 
40; Hogg: Liability of the Crown, 1989, pp. 1-3; Harlow, Public’ and ‘Private’ 
Law: Definition without Distinction" (1980) M.L.R 241; Samuel, op. cit.. note 40, 
558.
62 See generally Kamto, Droit Administratif Processuel du Cameroun, 1990; and 
Owona, Droit Administratif Special de la Republique du Cameroun, 1985.
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between these allegedly distinct areas.63
In relation to contracts, I shall now focus on what I consider to be the two main 
issues involved, namely:-(i) the fundamental problem of finding a suitable criteria for 
delimiting the respective domains of public and private contracts and (ii) the problems 
relating to the judicial organisation of administratuve litigation in Cameroon. The 
former issue has been particularly troublesome even in France.64
(2). Administrative Contracts Determined.
A fundamental characteristic of the administrative contract is that it presupposes 
an inequality of interest between the parties (since one of them represents the public 
interest) with the consequence that the consensual character of the contract is 
substantially qualified by the attribution to the public authorities of powers whose true 
basis is public policy rather than the agreement of the parties. Public authorities, 
however, are free to use either the administrative contract or the civil contract in 
transactions with private persons.65 In respect of any such transactions, a 
preliminary question of classification has to be resolved, in order to determine which 
legal regime governs the contract. If the contract complies with the rules for the 
determination of an administrative contract, it will be governed by the rules of 
administrative contracts and subjected to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. 
If the contract does not comply with the rules for the determination of administrative 
contracts, it is a civil contract and will be governed precisely by the same rules as 
any contract made between private persons. It must be said that in Cameroon, as
63 See, Kamto: op.cit.. note 62, p. 25.
64 Drago, "Paradoxes sur les Contrats Administratifs", Melanges Flour; Weil, P, 
"Les Cri teres du Contrat Administratif en Crise", Melanges Waline, p. 831.
65 Rivero: Droit Administratif. 1977, p . l l l .
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shall be seen later, such fictitious splitting of the nature of administrative activities 
- into public and private - is a myth because the administration never is on equal 
terms with individuals defending private interests. In French law, a contract can be 
classified as administrative either by statutory or judicial determination.
(a)&dtfb*y Determination.
An administrative contract is statutorily determined where there is some statutory
provision that defines a contract as administrative or expressly assigns it to the
jurisdiction of the administrative courts.66 Such contracts are known as
administrative contracts by statutory determination (icontrats administratif par
determination de la loi), the inference being that they are governed by public law.
The relevant statute in Cameroon is the Decree No. 79/35 of 2/2/1979 (governing
public sector contracts). Article 1 (i) defines a public sector contract as,
"a written agreement concluded under the the conditions laid down in 
this decree, by which a person who is governed either by public or 
private law, enters into an agreement with the state, a local authority 
or a public establishment to carry out any work on its behalf or under 
supervision or to supply it with goods or services, in return for a sum 
of money".
On the question of jurisdiction, article 133 provides that
"the administrative bench o f the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction 
in all cases in litigation concerning contracts subject to the provisions 
o f this decree."
It is clear from the definition above that at least one of the parties to a contract must 
be the state or a public body for it to be classed as administrative.67
66 Laubadere: Traite de Droit Administratif, tome 1, 1984, p. 387.
67 For the French position, see Prevost, "A la Recherche du Critere du Contrat 
Administratif: La Qualite de Contractants" (1971) R.D.P. 817.
1 4 4
(b) Judicial Determination.
Legislative or statutory determination apart, the differentia specifica between 
administrative contracts and those to which the public administration is a party on 
equal terms with the individuals (civil contracts) may be determined by the criteria 
developed by the courts and by doctrine,68 i.e. by judicial determination.
Essentially, there are two main criteria that the courts apply. I shall refer to them 
as the "exorbitant clause" criterion and the "object of the contract" criterion.
The exorbitant clause criterion derives from, and stresses the administration’s 
freedom to employ the form of contract and the contractual terms that it considers 
appropriate to the particular transaction. According to this criterion, a contract is to 
be classed as administrative if its terms include "clauses exorbitant de droit commun" 
(exorbitant clauses or clauses deviating from private law). These are contractual 
clauses that invest the parties with rights and obligations not normally assumed by 
private parties in their mutual contracts of a similar kind. For example, a clause 
which empowers the administration but not the private party, to vary or rescind the 
contract. While such a provision may be normal in public contracts, it will be 
anomalous in any other contractual context. It should be noted that contracts between 
public bodies of a commercial or industrial nature and users or consumers of their 
products belong to the realm of private law, even if they contain exorbitant clauses. 
That explains why litigation arising out of contracts of adhesion involving the 
National Water Corporation (S.N.E.C) and the National Electricity Corporation 
(S.O.N.E.L) are subjected to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Some 
commentators in France have claimed that the use of the exorbitant clause criterion
68 Judicial criteria are very important here because unlike other areas of French law, 
Droit Administratif is largely judge-made and uncodified.
1 4 5
is in decline69 and that it now plays only a subsidiary role70 while others have 
argued that the decisions of the courts do not support such a claim.71 In the case of 
Cameroon, one should be able to say, on the basis of the 1979 decree on 
administrative contracts, that the this criterion now plays a less than central role in 
the determination of administartive contracts.
The second criterion is founded on the object of the contract. By this criterion, 
a contract is classified as administrative if the effect of its provisions is to admit the 
contractor to a direct participation in the execution of a public service, as opposed to 
merely the making of a contribution to its performance. This criterion was 
authoritatively confirmed by the decision of the French Conseil d ’Etat in the famous 
case of Epoux Bertin.12 In that case, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the 
French Ministry incharge of ex-servicemen and victims of war whereby he was to 
cater for Soviet refugees (waiting to return to the Soviet Union) at a repatriation 
centre. It was held that since the object of the contract (to ensure the effective 
repatriation of refugees) was the performance of a public service, it must be classified 
as an administrative contract and that there was no need to find out whether there 
were any exorbitant clauses in the contract.73
69 Gaudemet, "Revue de Jurisprudence Administratif' (1982) R.D.P. 530; Lamarque, 
"Le Declin de la Clause Exorbitante", In Melanges Waline, 1.11, (1974), p. 497.
70 Odent, Cours de Contentieux Administratif, (1979-81) p. 566; Laubadere, "Les 
Critere du Contrat Administratif sont-ils hierarchises ?" (1981) A.J.D.A. 40.
71 See Amselek, "La Qualification des Controls de I ’Administration par la 
Jurisprudence" (1983) A.J.D.A. 3.
72 Conseil d’ Etat, 20 Avril 1956; D. 1956, 433.
73 For a detailed elaboration of the ‘object of the contract’ criterion, especially with 
regards to other cases (Ste. La Maison des Isolantes C.E 26/6/1974), see generally 
Auby, "Les Critere du Contrat Administratif" (1974) R.D.P. 1486-1498.
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(3) Definitional Problems in Cameroon.
The distinctiveness of the administrative contract and the seperate jurisdiction it 
carries with it has produced a crop of technicalities and subtlety of distinctions which 
have proven to be a trap for the courts and for the unwary litigant in Cameroon. The 
criteria for the determination of administrative contracts as outlined above may appear 
straightforward but Cameroonian courts have found the distinction between public and 
private contracts very elusive. More emphasis shall be given here to the common law 
jurisdiction because Anglophone practitioners and judges, more than their civil law 
confreres, have failed to grapple with the French law notion of the administrative 
contracts. This problem is not limited to administrative contracts, it extends to other 
areas of administrative law such as judicial review. In this regard, the problem is not 
peculiar to Common Law Cameroon. In a recent English case, R. v. Dairy Produce 
Quota Tribunal fo r  England and Wales, ex parte Carswell,74 on an application for 
judicial review, Lord Goff recounted how when the applicant consulted a local 
solicitor, he professed, with discomforting sincerity, that he knew nothing about 
judicial review.
Reverting to administrative contracts in Cameroon, a review of the cases decided 
in the common law jurisdiction reveals a catalogue of ambivalent and inconsistent 
decisions. In Chief Anufogo v. Kumba Urban Council,75 the plaintiff entered into 
a contract with the defendants (the local council) to build market stalls in the main 
market. In an action by the plaintiff for breach, the defendants raised a preliminary 
objection to the jurisdiction of the Kumba High Court on the grounds that the contract 
in question was administrative (they being a local authority) and that the proper place 
for bringing any such action was the administrative bench of the Supreme Court. The 
judge ruled against this objection, holding that the contract was governed by the
74 [1990] 2 A.C. 738 at 744C.
75 Suit no. HCK/1/82 (Kumba, unreported).
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ordinary principles of contract law.
Yet, in another case, Motase Ngoh David v Kumba Urban Council,1* decided 
by this same court and involving the same local council, a different conclusion was 
arrived at, even though the facts were very similar. This time the plaintiff had 
contracted to build an abattoir for the defendants. When he brought an action for 
breach in the high court, the defendants once again argued by way of a preliminary 
objection that the high court lacked jurisdiction on the grounds that the action was 
founded on an administrative contract. This time the court agreed and declined 
jurisdiction.
In a third case, Tayong Vincent v State o f Cameroon,11 the plaintiff supplied 
cement to the Rural Engineering Service (an arm of the Ministry of Agriculture) on 
credit terms and when payment was not forthcoming, he brought an action in the high 
court. The Ministry of Agriculture contested the jurisdiction of the high court, 
pointing out that the contract in question was administrative and therefore within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative bench of the Supreme Court. The judge 
ruled that the question of administrative contract did not arise here. "The transaction 
was an ordinary purchase of goods in the market by the state with no ingredients or 
character of an administrative contract in itself or contemplated", he declared. But 
he did not say what he considered these ingredients to be. Regrettably, it is not 
uncommon for many Anglophone judges to simply rule for or against the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts in these matters (the former is more often the result), without 
any discussion of the nature of administrative contracts.
For that reason, one must take a close interest in the recent Bamenda Court of 
Appeal decision in Institute o f  Agronomic Research v. Union o f  Cameroon 
Indigenous Company,78 in which Inglis J., was prepared to tread where his
76 Suit no. HCK/26/85 (Kumba,.unreported).
77 Suit no. HCB/101/86. (Bamenda, 22/6/1990, unreported).
78 Suit no. BCA/13/90 (Bamenda, 25/11/1991, unreported).
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colleagues have dreaded, by attempting to elucidate on the statutory and judicial 
criteria of administrative contracts. The appellants, a Research Institute attached to 
the Ministry of Scientific Research were defendants in the trial court. They entered 
into a written contract with the respondents whereby the latter was to construct for 
them two duplex staff houses at their research station. The respondents later 
discovered that the estimated cost of the project, prepared by the appellants experts 
was for only one of the houses and duly complained. The appellants re-estimated the 
cost and agreed to pay an additional sum. As the appellants were stalling over the 
payment of this extra sum after the full completion of the work, the respondents 
brought an action in the high court. Various issues were involved but the discussion 
here is limited to the issue of the nature of the contract and the incidental question of 
jurisdiction. The appellants, not surprisingly, argued that this was an administrative 
contract, thus objecting to the jurisdiction of the high court. The trial judge ruled 
against that objection on the basis that the appellants were a parastatal with a legal 
personality to sue and be sued and on this they appealed.
The Court of Appeal, relying on sections 9 (1) and 9 (2) of Ordinance No. 72/6 
of 6-8-1972 (the Judicial Organisation Ordinace)79 and Articles 1 and 133 of Decree 
No. 79/35 of 2-2-1979 (on public sector contracts), held that this was an 
administrative contract and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
administrative bench of the Supreme Court. The ruling of the trial judge was thereby 
reversed. Inglis, J. in the Court of Appeal did not only rely on those statutory 
provisions. He amplified the ruling of that court by emphasising that the contract 
contained exorbitant clauses:
"Articles 19 and 20 of the contract are what is called in French
Administrative law clauses exorbitantes du droit commun. These take
the contract out of the realm of private law."
Inglis. J ’s disposition of this case is admirable and noteworthy, not just because it is 
correct, but because it holds its place as as one of the rare instances in which a
79 See below, p. 152.
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common law judge has taken the pains to articulate on the elusive problem of the 
nature of administrative contracts. It is only by such gallant efforts that Cameroonian 
common lawyers will become accustomed to the problems posed by the special nature 
of administrative contracts.
The problems faced by Cameroonian common law practitioners in this area have 
often been attributed to their common law upbringing.80 Although that link cannot 
be discounted, I have also noticed a deliberate reluctance on the part of Anglophone 
practitioners, for reasons (to be explained later) other than their legal culture, to 
concede that a contract is administrative, even when the fact that it is otherwise is 
very clear.81
Even though the special regime of administrative contracts is more familiar to 
Francophone lawyers, who are generally grounded in the French Civil law tradition 
from where it derives, the Francophone courts have not been immune to the 
jurisdictional niceties that have caused trouble and frustration to the common law 
practitioners. There are instances, for example, in which individuals have brought 
actions for breach of contract against local councils in the ordinary civil courts, on
80 See Nguini, "Droit Modeme et Droit Traditionnel" (1973) 83 Pennant, 9; Ibid, "La 
Cour Federal de Justice" (1973) 83 Pennant, 348.
81 I made the following findings from interviewing 20 Anglophone practitioners on 
the subject: only one assured me he would readily take a matter straight to the 
administrative branch of the Supreme Court if he felt it clearly involved an 
administrative contract. And as if to prove that he meant what he said, he kindly 
offered me a copy of Law No. 75/17 of 8 December 1975 prescribing the Supreme 
Court Procedure in administrtative cases. 6 of them were alarmingly unaware of the 
nature of the problem while the rest confessed that they would invariably start 
proceedings in the ordinary courts and would only go to the administrative bench of 
the Supreme Court as a last resort. Not surprisingly, therefore, only 2 of them had 
actually appeared before the administrative bench of the Supreme Court.
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facts that point more readily to the administrative nature of the contract.82
The case of Societe Asquini Encorad v. Ebongue Hubert,83 vividly 
demonstrates that Francophone litigants and courts are also sometimes confused by 
the civil/administrative law dichotomy. The appellant, a construction company, was 
awarded a contract by the State and authorised to acquire and use all materials 
necessary for the execution of the contract. On the strength of that authorisation, the 
company extracted sand and gravel from land belonging to the respondent whereupon 
he sued in his local high court (Douala). The company contested the jurisdiction of 
the high court without success. The Douala appeal court upheld the high court ruling 
that it (the high court) was competent to deal with the matter because the subject 
matter of the action was over private rights over land belonging to a private person. 
The appellants carried on their appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
held that the dispute arose out of the execution of the contract between the the 
appellants and the State and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of its 
administrative branch. In other words, the involvement of the State automatically 
brought the matter within the jurisdiction of administrative court. The decision of the 
high court, upheld by the court of appeal, was thus overruled.
In discussing some of the cases cited above, my aim has been to expose the 
judicial confusion in this area rather than to provide examples of "clear law". As a 
result of this maelstrom of conflicting decisions on the nature of the administrative 
contract, especially in Anglophone Cameroon, one must attempt to provide a usable 
criteria here.
It has already been said that administrative contracts can be determined either 
statutorily or judicially. In France, much of it is determined judicially through the 
use of the clauses exorbitantes and service public criteria. This is because Droir
82 For example, Affaire Nde Benoit v. La Commune Urbaine de Yaounde, J.C. 
No.270 du 27 Mars 1991, Yaounde (unreported); Nkepche Pierre v. La Commun 
Urbaine de Yaounde, J.C. No.209 du 6 Mars 1991, Yaoude (unreported).
83 Arret no. 66/CC of 5/3/1981 (unreported).
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Administrarif in France, unlike all other areas of French law, is largely a creation of 
the judges.
As far as Cameroon is concerned, administrative law was largely introduced by 
means of legislation.84 This means that administrative contracts have had to be 
determined in the main by statute. Pre-1979 statutory provisions no doubt allowed 
the courts some scope to apply judicial criteria to the question as to the appropriate 
regime to apply to contracts in which the administration was involved. Take for 
example, Law No. 69/LF/l of 14 June 1969 on the organisation and functioning of 
the Federal Court of Justice (this law actually transformed the administrative 
jurisdiction of this court into one of national competence by extending its jurisdiction 
to Common Law Cameroon).85 Article 14 provided that administrative litigation 
consisted of, inter alia, disputes involving contracts (except those concluded, even 
implicitly, under private law)86 or public service concessions. The courts, therefore, 
did use such criteria as clauses exorbitantes and sernce public to distinguish between 
public and private contracts. In Robert Abunaw v Francis Wilson and Director o f  
Lands and Survey87 and Socopao v. Cameroon Development Corporation88 
respectively, the Federal Court of Justice ruled against the jurisdiction of the 
administrative courts on the grounds that the disputes involved were of a private 
nature and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The fact that 
the State and a State corporation were parties in both suits was not relevant. And in 
Affaire Fouda Mballa v. Etat Federe du Camerounf9 the court held that the 
construction of a sporting complex by the Electricity Corporation for its staff did not
84 See generally Bipoum-Woum, op. cit.. note 57.
85 Owona, op. cit.. note 62, 184-185.
86 The emphasis are mine.
87 C.F.J. Arret no. 3-A of 28/10/1971, cited in Nguini, op. cit.. note 60, 348.
88 C.F.J. Arret no. 6-A of 10/3/1972, cited in Nguini, op. cit.. note 60, 349.
89 Arret no. 160/CFJ/CAY du 8 Juin 1971, Rev.Cam.Dr. (1972) no .l, 40.
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amount in any way to the provision of a public service.
The position, however, has since been affected by statute. First, by Ordinance 
No.72-6 of 26 August 1972 (on the organisation of the Supreme Court) which 
provides in Article 9 (2): "Administrative matters shall include,....(e) any dispute 
expressly referred by law to the administrative courts" and more recently by Decree 
No. 79/35 of 2/2/1979 (relating to public sector contracts). Article 1 defines a public 
sector contract solely in terms of the presence of the state, a local authority or a 
public establishment while Article 133 provides for the jurisdiction of the 
administrative bench of the Supreme Court in all cases in litigation concerning 
contracts subject to this decree. The combined effect of all these provisions has been 
to exclude the use of judicial criteria or to relegate them to a subsidiary role. The 
mere presence or involvement of the administration will suffice to classify the 
contract as administrative.
This is best highlighted in Compagnie Forestiere Sangha - Oubagnui v. Etat du 
Cameroun.90 A French coffee plantation owner died in Cameroon, intestate and with 
no apparent heir. The Cameroon government (the ministry of agriculture) took over 
ownership and decided to lease out the plantation to the plaintiff company. It was 
agreed that in order to represent the public’s interest in the runnning and management 
of the plantation, the government would appoint a civil servant on secondment to 
work with the plaintiff company. The State was to continue paying the salary of the 
civil servant while the plaintiffs were to provide him with adequate means of 
transport. But when the civil servant was eventually appointed, the Minister for 
Public Service ordered the plaintiffs to pay his salary. They protested that such a 
requirement was a flagrant violation of the terms of their contract with the State. 
Aggrieved, they brought an action against the State in the administrative bench of the 
Supreme Court where it was held that the salary of the civil servant on attachment
90 Jugement No.07/88/89 du 27 Octobre 1988, (1991) 2 & 3 Rev.Jur.Afr. 131, (note 
Nlep).
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with the plaintiffs must remain the responsibility of the State in accordnace with the 
terms of the agreement between the parties.
The decision is beyond reproach but the case is of interest here because the view 
has been expressed that the running of the plantation by the plaintiffs with the aim of 
making profits does not in any way amount to the execution or the provision of a 
public service.91 This by implication calls to question the administrative character 
of the contract. If the view that the running of the plantation did not constitute a 
public service is correct, then, the classification of this contract as administrative is 
highly questionable. However, one must not be oblivious of the 1979 Decree. On 
the interpretation of that decree, this contract qualifies as administrative. The decree, 
it must be stressed, makes no mention of the object of the contract and therefore does 
not require that the contract should aim at the execution of a public service for it to 
be classed as administrative. The crucial factor for consideration is whether the state 
or a public authority is a party to the contract and the classification of this contract 
as administrative seems to have been based solely on the fact that the State was a 
party to it.
The Supreme Court has even extended the 1979 Decree to disputes arising out of 
the contract involving third parties who are not privy to it. For example, in the 
Asquini Encorad case,92 the contract was between the government and Asquini 
Encorad, yet when the plaintiff brought an action for trespass to his land, the 
Supreme court, overuling the Appeal Court, held that as the dispute resulted from the 
execution of an administrative contract, only the administrative jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court could be properly seised.
It should be clear from the legislative provisions and the Supreme Court decisions 
considered above, that the main criterion for the determination of administrative 
contracts in Cameroon today, is the mere involvement (direct or indirect) of the 
administration or public body as a party to the contract. The emphasis has now been
91 Nlep., op. cit.. note 90, 136.
92 Supra, note 83.
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shifted firmly towards statutory determination, precisely on the 1979 Decree on public 
sector contracts.
The main problem with the 1979 Decree, however, is that its purview is too wide. 
It automatically subjects to public law, certain contracts whose content is private in 
character - for example, contracts of a purely commercial nature like the one about 
the plantation lease above.
It is not clear what the legislator intended the 1979 Decree to achieve. It is not 
unlikely that it was a surreptitious, if ingenious attempt by the administration to 
indirectly subject to its own control, via the administrative bench of the Supreme 
Court,93 contractual dealings of any kind in which it becomes involved. If this be 
the case, then it should, perhaps, be pointed out that the 1979 Decree, by increasing 
the scope for for public law contracts, has merely added to the many logistical 
problems that already bedevil this area of the law.
It is also possible that the 1979 Decree was a genuine attempt by the legislator to 
put an end to the difficulties in the distinction between civil and administrative 
contracts, simply by labelling all contracts involving the administration as 
administrative. Such a sweeping approach, granted that was the intention, is still to 
be achieved. Some of the cases cited above clearly reveal how some judges, 
especially those in the common law jurisdictions, are registering their protest against 
such a blatant publicisation of all contracts involving the administration. They do so 
by ignoring the 1979 Decree and by refusing to consider contracts as administrative 
solely on the basis of the participation of the administration or public authority. Of 
course, doubt must occur whether it is proper for a judge to sidestep or ignore
93 Whatever one may say about judicial independence in Cameroon, the fact remains 
that judges are civil servants appointed by the government. It follows from this that 
they may not fancy awarding too many judgements against the government lest they 
stifle their own career prospects. To make this observation is not necessarily to 
impugn the professional intergrity or impartiality of the judges. But few judicial 
observers in Cameroon can deny the suggestion that where the interests of the 
government is directly involved, a kind of subtle pressure is mounted on the judge 
concerned.
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statutory provisions that have been duly enacted by the law making body of the 
country, the National Assembly (Parliament). Yet this only serves to emphasis the 
troublesome nature of the problem.
It would be dotty to think that all the problems relating to administrative contracts 
derive from the difficulties in distinguishing them from private contract. Many other 
problems of an even more practical nature are raised by the poor judicial 
organisation. I now turn to them.
(4). Jurisdictional Concerns.
In France, the control of administrative authority (and administrative contracts) are 
vested in the administrative courts, i.e the Tribunaux Administratif, the Cours d ’Appel 
adimnistrarif and the Conseil d ’Erar. The same is true of Cameroon except for the 
fact there is only one administrative tribunal and that is the administrative bench of 
the Supreme Court. In practical terms, therefore, it cannot be said that Cameroon 
has a seperate order of administrative courts. Nevertheless, the administrative bench 
of the Supreme Court performs the same functions as the administrative courts in 
France. Article 133 of the 1979 Decree provides that the administrative bench of the 
Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases in litigation concerning public 
sector contracts. This clearly guarantees too much jurisdictional protection to the state 
in the form of an overcentralised system of administrative justice which in turn has 
created some serious practical problems.
The first concern that one must have in mind is the high cost of going to the 
Supreme Court, especially if the plaintiff does not reside in Yaounde, the seat of the 
Supreme Court. This cost is not limited to legal costs but includes other expenses as 
travel and accomodation. When one considers the wherewithal of many 
Cameroonians and the geography of the country, one easily appreciates the size of 
this problem.
Suppose X, a small businessman in Kousseri intends to bring an action against his
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local council for the unpaid balance of stationery he supplied them. His claim is only 
for five hundred thousand francs. On the interpretation of the 1979 Decree, this will 
fall under the regime of administrative contracts, with the consequence that he can 
only bring his action before the administrative branch of the Supreme Court in 
Yaounde. Kousseri is over thousand kilometres from Yaounde. Unless he can afford 
to travel by air, it may take him at least a couple of days to get to Yaounde, and 
because the case will most certainly suffer some adjournments, they will have to 
make more that a few trips before the matter is finally adjudicated. As his expenses 
plus legal fees are more likely to be in excess of his claim, he may be forced to 
abandon it or not start any action at all, leaving him with no other remedy and no 
other access to justice. This is precisely the kind of predicament in which many who 
may be contemplating bringing an action against the administration are likely to find 
themselves. It serves as a very good example of denial of justice.
Then there is the problem of complex procedure.94 The procedure of the 
administrative litigation in Cameroon is governed in practically all aspects by three 
main texts: Ordinace no. 72-6 of 28/8/1972 (on the organisation of the Supreme 
Court), as modified by Law no. 76-28 of 14/12/76; Law no. 75-16 of 8/12/1975 (on 
the procedure and functioning of the Supreme Court) and most importantly, Law no. 
75-17 of 8/12/1975 (on the procedure of the administrative bench of the Supreme 
Court). This procedure is extremely onerous, especially for the private party and it 
would be no exi^geration to suggest that the above law only serves to secure to 
public bodies certain procedural protections.
Closely related to the issue of procedure is the language difficulty for Anglophone 
lawyers and litigants. Not only will they have to deal with unfamiliar substantive and 
procedural rules, they will also have to put up with a great deal of the French 
language, which they may hardly understand. Although some of the texts have been
94 Happily enough, there is now a practical guide on this problem. See Kamto, Droit 
Administratif Processuel du Cameroun - Guide Practique, Yaounde, 1990.
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translated into English, to suggest that the language problem can simply be overcome 
by translation, is to iacilely dismiss it.
The administrative bench also suffers from that ubiquitous malady of the modern 
state: judicial overload. It must be remembered that the administrative bench is not 
only concerned with administrative contracts but also with the legality of 
administrative action of any kind. It is consequently overburdened with cases which 
it cannot conveniently deal with within a reasonable time.
Another matter of jurisdictional concern is the conflict between civil and 
administrative jurisdiction. Bearing in mind that only the administrative bench of the 
Supreme Court has administrative jurisdiction throughout the entire country, one 
would expect that there should be no conflict. But because the distinction betweeen 
civil and administrative contracts is elusive, not only to litigants as some observers 
would have us believe,95 but to the courts as well, it is not always very clear 
whether the ordinary or the administrative jurisdiction should be seised.
In France, the Tribunal des Conflits resolves conflicts between the civil and 
administrative courts. In Cameroon, the Tribunal des Conflits is conspicuous by its 
absence. Which is not to suggest that Cameroon has no solution to the problem.96 
This is to be found in Articles 13 and 15 of the Ordinance no. 72-6 of 26/8/1972. 
They provide that all courts with non-criminal jurisdiction, the administrative bench 
of the Supreme Court included, must decide by way of a preliminary ruling on the 
objections by one party to its competence. In the case of the administrative bench, 
if either of the parties is not satisfied with the ruling, they have a right of appeal 
(within eight days) to the full bench of the Supreme Court, whose ruling is final.
95 Some commentators appear to attribute the difficulty of the public private law 
distinction solely to the parties, for e.g. Binyoum, op. cit.. note 59, 2eme. Partie, 
1961-72; and Mescheriakoff, "Le Regime Juridique de Recours Gracieux Prealable 
dans la Jurisprudence Administrative Camerounaise" (1978) 15 & 16 Rev.Cam.Dr. 
54.
96 For a discussion on the question of conflict in Cameroon, see Owona, op. cit.. note
62 p .202.
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This looks sound on paper but it does not pass well the test of reality.
First, it must be pointed out that although the courts are required to make only a 
preliminary ruling on their competence, that alone usually takes quite a long while 
especially if appeals are involved.97 Secondly, these provisions seem to presuppose 
that the parties to any alleged administrative contract will take their disputes at first 
instance to the administrative bench of the Suprem Court. But that is rarely the case 
in practice. In fact, of the cases cited above, only in one, Cie Forestiere Satigha- 
Oubangui v. Etat du Cameroun,98 did the plaintiff directly start proceedings in 
administrative bench of the Supreme Court.
The actual trend as disclosed by the cases is as follows: The plaintiff (always the 
private party) starts his action in the local high court. The public party or the 
administration objects to the jurisdiction of the high court on the grounds that the 
action is founded on an administrative contract. If the high court rules that it is not 
competent, the private party is likely to appeal. If it decides that it has jurisdiction, 
the public party or the administration invariably appeals. And these appeals may be 
taken all the way to the Supreme Court. Thus far, every bit of litigation, plus the 
costs and time involved, has only been to determine the proper jurisdiction to try the 
case. Nothing substantive as yet. At this point, spare a thought for my hypothetical 
plaintiff from Kousseri. It is surely ridiculous that he should have to go through the 
high court, the court of appeal and possibly the Supreme Court, hundreds of 
kilometres away, only to determine the competent court or jurisdiction to try his case. 
And worse still, the Supreme Court may rule in the end that the contract over which 
the dispute arose after all, was a civil one and therefore within the competence of the 
high court. It will be recalled that this actually happened in the cases of Robert
97 For e.g. it took three years to dispose of the dispute over the nature of the contract 
in the case of the Institute o f Agronomic Research v. Union o f Cameroon Indigenous 
Company from when it was was first instituted in the Bamenda High Court in 1988 
(suit no. HCB/55/88) to when the Court of Appeal finally ruled on the appeal on 
25/11/1991 (Appeal no. BCA/13/1990).
98 Supra, note 90.
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Abunaw v. Francis Wilson and the Director o f Lands & Surrey99 and Socopao v. 
Cameroon Development Corporation,KK) Such a system which can be described as 
one in which the parties have to litigate in order to litigate is characterised by undue 
delay and too much expense for the litigants, especially the private party.
As a result of the high costs and delay involved and the excessive jurisdictional 
and procedural supremacy that the state enjoys, there is not much confidence in the 
system of administrative justice in Cameroon. It is partly for these reasons (the other 
being the common law upbringing of the lawyers, in the case of Anglophones or the 
fact that they are not specially trained in administrative law, in the case of 
Francophones) that some lawyers, especially the Anglophone ones, improperly and 
flagrantly seek to avoid the administrative bench of the Supreme Court by taking suits 
arising from contracts that are clearly administrative in character to the ordinary 
courts. They are encouraged by the fact that such attempts are not always without 
success since there is always chance that an ordinary civil court may consider the case 
on the grounds that it is an ordinary civil or private contract. The problem with this 
ploy is that if the administration or public authority appeals, as they often do, it is the 
private litigant who suffers the most from the delay and costs involved in moving 
from the ordinary to the administrative jurisdition.101 Sometimes the State or public 
body appeals against the jurisdiction or judgement of an ordinary civil court not so 
much on merit but simply to obtain the benefit of the delay involved in obtaining a 
hearing from the administrative branch of the Supreme Court.
99 Supra, note 87.
100 Supra, note 88.
101 For example, while the private party may be expected to pay a court deposit 
during litigation, art. 3 (3) of Law no. 75-17 of 8/12/75 exempts public parties from 
the payment of such deposits. Obviously, a private party or individual will find it 
difficult to forgo the use of such amounts of money during litigation, especially if is 
lengthy.
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(5). Conclusion.
It is clear from the analysis so far that the special regime of administrative 
contracts in Cameroon is a poor imitation of that of France, from where it derives. 
Yet as already pointed out, it would be wrong to assume that the problems that beset 
Cameroon are all due to the distinctiveness of administrative contracts and the special 
jurisdiction they carry with them. After all, the system works fairly well in France 
and is full of admirers in the common law world. The problems in Cameroon are 
caused more by the poor mechanics or the malfunctioning of the system than by the 
sheer distinctive nature of contrats admisrratif. And these problems are not 
insuperable by any means.
The obvious step in the direction of obviating these problems is to decentralise the 
administrative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by creating administrative courts of 
inferior jurisdiction in the provinces. This is what the French have done in response 
to the problem judicial overload. By the Decree of 30 September, 1953, the old 
Conseils de Prefecture,102 which previously had only limited administrative 
jurisdiction were transformed into Tribunaux administratifs and given general 
jurisdiction as administrative courts of first instance. The Conseil d ’Etat thus became 
for most purposes a court of appeal. This two tier structure, however, suffered from 
a major defect in that it denied the disatisfied litigant the fundamental right to 
challenge a decision on cassation.103 But even more urgent was the recurrent 
problem of too many cases - the very disease that it was meant to cure. More reform
102 For its history and functions, see Remington, op. cit.. note 38, 46.
103 This must not be confused with the right of appeal which was readily available to 
the disatisfied litigant. The right to challenge a decision on cassation is not, in 
principle, a right of appeal - it exists even where appeal is specifically excluded - and 
it rests on the idea that a decision which is based on an error of law, substantive or 
procedural, cannot be allowed to stand. If a decision is quashed on cassation, the 
case will normally be remitted elsewhere for a fresh decision.
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was again needed and the French legislature obliged by passing the Law of December 
31, 1987 which came into force on January 1, 1989.104 Article 1 of that law 
created five cours administratifs d ’appel (administrative courts of appeal) with 
jurisdiction to hear appeals105 from the tribunaux administratifs and from whose 
decisions recourse in the form of cassation is available to the Conseil d ’Etat.
It is not suggested that these reforms have solved all the problems of 
administrative justice in France but it is submitted that if they are carefully transposed 
into Cameroon, many practical problems would be erased. Firstly, the creation of 
administrative courts at provincial level will not only cut down costs for the litigants 
as they will not necessarily have to go to the Suprerme Court in Yaounde but will 
also be seen as a genuine attempt by the administration to reduce the excessive 
jurisdictional advantage that it unduly enjoys presently. Secondly, it will give 
Anglophone lawyers and litigants the opportunity to conduct cases in English thereby 
solving the language problem.
Against the proposition for decentralisation may be raised that perennial argument 
of want of resources and personnel, precisely that they may not be enough 
administrative judges. But this argument can be easily countered. The 
"administrative judge" in Cameroon, unlike in France, is not specially trained in 
administrative law. Judges of the civil or ordinary courts are assigned to the 
administrative bench of the Supreme Court. If this can be done in the Supreme 
Court, there is no reason why it cannot be done in the high courts too. The
104 For more on this law and the reforms it brought about, see: Jolowitz, 
"Administrative Justice in France - A New Step in the Hierarchy" (1988) 47 C.L.J. 
367, and Brown & Bell, "Recent Reforms o f French Administrative Justice" (1989) 
8 C.J.Q. 71. Much has been written about this reform in France. Pages 74-134 of 
the February 1988 edition of the A.J.D.A. are devoted to various analyses of these 
reforms, but see particularly Franc, "Commentaires sur une reforme", p .79.
105 Certain matters e.g. appeals challenging as ultra vires, decisions of a legislative 
character and local election cases are excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
administrative courts of appeal but contract is included.
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suggestion here is for special administrative sections to be attached to the high courts 
and be given some limited jurisdiction over administrative contracts. This could be 
linked to the amount of the claim so that disputes arising from contracts with the 
administration involving small claims can be settled locally. The courts of appeal too 
should have such administrative sections to hear appeals from the high courts on such 
matters. In order to maintain the special character of administrative contracts, the 
administrative sections of the high courts and the appeal courts, shall have to apply 
only substantive and procedural rules of public law when adjudicating on disputes 
arising from administrative contracts.
Decentralisation, though, will not necessarily put an end to the problems caused 
by jurisdictional uncertainties. To solve such problems, a French style Tribunal des 
Conflits is certainly not needed. What is needed is something much more simple and 
much less formal. It has already been proposed that limited administrative 
jurisdiction should be extended to high courts. On the problem of jurisdictional 
uncertainty, it is hereby proposed that the courts at all levels should have a panel of 
judges drawn from those who sit mainly on the administrative bench and those who 
sit mainly on the ordinary or civil bench, whose task would be to act as a tribunal des 
conflits in cases of conflict or in cases in which the parties or their counsel are not 
exactlu sure of the proper jurisdiction. This panel should determine such conflicts 
in chambers, but the disatisfied party must retain the right to appeal against its ruling. 
A scheme like the proposed one has two main advantages. By drawing on judges 
who sit on both the administrative and civil sections to decide on the question of the 
proper jurisdiction, the possibility of suing in the wrong one is greatly reduced, 
thereby saving the parties involved from the nightmare of having to exhaust the entire 
court hierachy in a bid to determine where to sue. Secondly, it is much faster and 
less costly than the present system because everything can be sorted out in chambers.
The view has been put forward that one major reason for the problems of 
administrative law in Cameroon is the absence of the juge administratif i.e. the
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specially trained administrative judge.11)6 It is, in fact, ironic to have a distinct 
regime of public law that is manned almost entirely by judges trained in private law. 
This can no doubt be explained by the fact that there were hardly any trained 
administrative judges of Cameroonian nationality in the immediate aftermath of 
independence. In that regard, their absence was understandable. What is less 
comprehensible however is the fact that thirty years on there have been no attempts 
to train administrative law judges, even though there is a centre for the training of 
private law judges.107 The introduction of the specially trained administrative judge 
will definitely help, but that will not dispense with the ned to decentralise 
administrative litigation.
These proposals may not be a panacea to all the problems relating to the special 
regime of administrative contracts but if implemented, they should help to achieve 
what is considered, at least on paper, to be the advantages of a seperate administrative 
jurisdiction, namely: speedier settlement of disputes, a flexible and informal 
procedure and the protection of the respective interests of the private individual and 
the all powerful public authority. Proposals such these would have to be put in place 
if Cameroonians are to regain confidence in a system which they regard quite 
correctly to be too close or too much in favour of the administration.
However, while many reorganisation of judicial institutions are often suggested 
and much debated in Cameroon as well as in other countries, in the case of 
Cameroon, the sad reality appears to be that changes are only implemented when
106 Kamto, op. cit.. note 62, p. 11; Bipoum-Woum, op.cit.. note 57; Nlep, op.cit.. 
note 90, 133.
107 The Ecole Nationals de VAdministration er de la Magistrature (E.N.A.M.) 
Yaounde, is an elite school for the training of senior civil servants and judges 
fashioned on the French "Grande Ecole". But it trains judges primarily in the field 
of private law. In France, there are seperate centres for the training of administrative 
and civil judges respectively. Two centres are not needed in Cameroon, not least 
because of the likely cost to be involved in that. It will be sufficient if a section of 
E.N.A.M. is devoted to the training of administrative judges or better still, for the 
specialisation of those civil judges who may want to work as ad mi strati ve judges.
164
deemed politically necessary or advantageous. It is therefore unlikely that the present 
government would be bothered about changing a system that is overwhelmingly in its 
favour. Ironically, there are three public law professors in the present cabinet,108 
some of whom in their pre-government days, were complaining about the 
inadequacies of the system of administrative justice in Cameroon, especially in its 
treatment of the private party or individual. It is certainly not lost on Cameroonians 
that they are now eerily reticent on the issue.
108 Professors Joseph Owona - until recently, government secretary, now the Health 
Minister and author of Droit Administratif Special de la Republique du Cameroun; 
Kountchou Koumegni - Minister of State for Information; and J.M. Bipoum-Woum - 
Minister of Culture.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.
In the previous chapters, various general aspects relating to contract law were 
considered. Following that, it is now proposed to concentrate on some of the 
substantive rules or principles of contract law in Cameroon, starting with the rules 
that govern the formation of contracts. As might be expected, they are very much 
the same as those in England and France.
In Common Law Cameroon, the courts always recite the traditional common law 
requirements of offer and acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal 
relations as being necessary for the formation of any contract.
In Civil Law Cameroon, Article 1108 of the Civil Code lays down the four
conditions that are essential to the validity of an agreement as follows:
-the consent of the parties;
-their capacity to contract;
-a definite object and finally,
-a licit cause to the obligation.
It will be observed that the basic requirements for the formation of contracts under 
both systems are broadly the same even though they are certain material differences 
as to how these systems conceptualize these rules. For example, both systems are 
agreed on the rule that for there to be a contract, there must be a firm offer, followed 
by an unqualified acceptance. But in Common Law Cameroon, there is a further 
requirement of consideration, while the corresponding rule in Civil Law Cameroon 
is that there must be a licit cause to the contract.
Two main topics will be discussed under the formation of contracts: offer and 
acceptance and consideration and cause. This chapter is devoted to the former while 
the next chapter covers the latter. The requirement of intention and certainty will not
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be treated.1 This is not to undermine its role in the formation of contracts,2 even 
though one must admit that in the case of the common law for example, the 
application of the objective test to the role of intention, limits the extent to which the 
parties’ intention govern the ascription to them of contractual duties.3 As for French 
law, there is not, in truth, any express principle that there must be an intention to 
create legal relations. However, it would be fair to say that in French law any 
serious agreement which is not contrary to ordre public is a contract.
Although in Zebulon Koshi Munshwa & Martin Ngwa Banduh v. Ngwaniba 
Stephen Njofor,4 the Bamenda Court of Appeal reaffirmed the rule that "the parties 
must mean business i.e. they must intend to enter into legal relationship", for there 
to be a valid contract, the fact of the matter is that the question of intention is rarely 
the issue before the courts in Cameroon and as a result, does not seem to raise 
problems of any practical nature.5 In Cameroon as in elsewhere, contracting parties 
rarely consider this question at all. It has even been said that it is the law itself 
which has created a presumption that business agreements are binding contracts, while 
other agreements of a social and domestic nature are not.6 This is true of both
1 For an examination o f the purpose and effect o f  the alleged rule o f English law that an agreement 
supported by consideration w ill not be enforceable as a contract unless there is additional proof o f an 
intention to create legal relations, see Hepple, Intention to Create Legal Relations [1970] C.L.J. 122 
et s.
: With regards to the common law, Professor Williston ( Williston, Contracts, section 21) has argued 
strenuously that the common law does not require any positive intention to create a legal relation as 
an element o f  contract. Whatever the merits and demerits o f that view, the conventional English view  
is that, in addition to the phenomena o f  agreement and the presence o f  consideration, a third contractual 
element is required- the intention o f  the parties to create legal relations. It is submitted that the 
Cameroonian courts are most unlikely to be persuaded by W illiston’s arguments.
3 D e Moor, "Intention in the law o f  Contract: Elusive or Illusive” (1990) 106 L .Q .R . 632.
4 B C A /1/79 (Bamenda, 10-04-1979, unreported).
5 The Cameroonian courts are hardly ever confronted with cases in which there is a contention o f  lack 
o f  intention. In other words the gist o f  the problem in many cases rarely ever centres on the question 
o f  intention. The parties do not often deny the fact that they intended to enter into a contract.
6 Tillotson, Contract Law  in Perspective. 1985, p. 9.
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systems of law under consideration.7 Suffice it to say here that Cameroonian courts 
will not, and in fact do not, enforce any contract where they find the intention to 
engage into legal obligations is lacking.8
1. THE REQUIREMENT OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.
Even though English and French law abounds with so much literature on offer and 
acceptance, on revocation, lapse of offer, the place and time of acceptance, on 
whether silence counts as acceptance etc,9 they still remain the convenient and logical 
starting point for any study on the formation of contracts, not least because it 
provides the most common framework for the analysis of contract formation.
An exhaustive survey of all apsects of offer and acceptance is not necessary. I 
shall focus on the basic concept and structure of the doctrine. My concern will be 
to analyze how the doctrine of offer and acceptance has been interpreted and applied 
by Cameroonian courts, and to consider some problems raised by the doctrine. It 
may also be of some interest to highlight some similarities and differences in 
approach between the common law and the civil law in Cameroon.
As is the case in England and France,10 in both the Common Law and Civil Law 
Cameroon, judicial inquiry into the very existence of a contract seeks to find
7 For English law, see generally Treitel, The Law of Contract, 1991, pp 149-160; Cheshire, Fifoot 
and Furmston, 1991, pp. 111-121; and for French law, see the brilliant articles by Oppetit, 
"L ’Engagement d ’honneur”, D . 1979, chr. 107; Mayer, "L ’Amitie", (1974) JCP. 1. 2663; and Camille 
Jauffret-Spinesi, "The Domaine o f Contract Law: French Report", In: Harris and Tallon, eds., 
Contract Law  Today; Anglo-French Com parisons, 1989, p. 122.
8 See Nche Mela v. Vincent Chi Nso Ngang HCB/56/86 (Bamenda, unreported).
9 See the comprehensive surveys o f Aubert, Notions et Roles de 1’O ffre et de 1’A cceptation dans la 
Form ation du Contrat, 1970; and Schlessinger, ed., Form ation o f  Contracts: A Study o f  the 
C om m on Core o f Legal System s, 1968; Parviz Owsia, " The Notion and Function o f  Offer and 
Acceptance Under French and English law" (1992) 66 Tul.L.R. 871; Corbin, "Offer and Acceptance" 
(1917) 26 Yale L.J. 169; Litvinoff, "Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative Analysis” 
(1967) 28 La. L.R. 1.
10 See generally the English and French Reports in Rodiere, ed., H arm onisation  du D roit des 
A ffaires dans les Pays du March£ Comm un - La Form ation du Contrat. 1976
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something called an ‘offer’ and something called ‘an acceptance’. Thus the basic rule 
is that a contract is concluded when a firm offer is made and this offer is 
unconditionally accepted. This rule is so entrenched in both systems that its operation 
seems to be taken for granted as a natural and logical mechanism by the courts in 
Cameroon.
The importance of offer and acceptance in contract formation is very much 
underlined by the fact that Cameroonian courts have been known to grant or deny 
damages by finding the existence or absence of a valid offer and acceptance. In 
Bassum Thadeus v. Youya Francis, 11 the Bamenda Court of Appeal, re-emphasised 
the rule that in order to decide whether the parties have reached an agreement, it is 
usual to inquire whether there has been a definite offer by one party and acceptance 
to that offer by the other. In that case the respondent offered to pay the appellant a 
block sum of money if the latter would serve in his business. It was agreed that the 
appellant would earn no salary while serving the respondent but that the said block 
sum was to be paid to him when he became "mature" enough to start his own 
business. The appellant did serve the respondent for about eight years and because 
the latter would not keep to his promise, the appellant sued him for breach of 
contract. The trial judge held that there was no contract because the respondent’s 
promise was gratuitous. This was a surprising decision in view of the fact that this 
practice is commonplace in Cameroon.
Reversing that decision, the Court of Appeal observed that that the trial judge had 
misconstrued the relationship of the parties by failing to address his mind to the 
principles of offer and acceptance. It took the view that from the conduct of the 
parties, it was clear that the requirements of offer and acceptance were satisfied, 
culminating to a contract. The appellant was therefore entitled to succeed.
In Civil Law Cameroon, article 1101 of the Civil Code lists the consent of the 
parties as one of the requirements of a valid contract. But the term consent, in 
contractual matters, bears two different connotations. In one sense it means the
11 B C A /48/84 (Bamenda, 12-07-1985, unreported).
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accord of two parties’ wills on the projected contract, or the meeting of their minds. 
In the other and more restricted sense, consent means each party’s individual 
acquiescence to the conditions of the projected contract, given with the intent of 
creating a legal obligation.12 It is submitted that actually the two references of the 
term consent do not differ in essence. Since no contract will result unless some unity 
can be reasonably predicated on what both parties had in mind, no particular 
importance will be attached to the distinction between the two meanings of the term 
consent.
The concept of consent in French law is best analyzed in terms of offer and 
acceptance.13 Put another way, offer and acceptance is an expression of consent.14 
It is thus not surprising to note that in Civil Law Cameroon, an analysis in terms of 
offer and acceptance was proffered in Ste Balton -Cameroun v. Pierre Bougha.15 
In that case the respondent sued the appellants for breach of contract, alleging that 
the latter had failed to meet up with a contractual undertaking to supply his private 
medical practice with some equipment. To support his claim, the respondent 
produced a letter in which the appellants had irrevocably undertaken to perform the 
alleged contract:
"Par cette letrre nous vous confirmons que notre societe s ’engage 
felinement et de fagon irrevocable de delivrer tout Vequipement 
medical et toutes les installations etc... pour votre nouvelle clinique 
comme convenu avec vous et que nous arrangerons la totalite du 
financement necessaire".
For their part, the appellants protested that this letter amounted to neither an offer nor 
an acceptance, with the consequence that there was no contract. But the Supreme 
Court, like the Yaounde Court of Appeal before it, was satisfied that the letter
12 Planiol et Ripert (2nd. ed. Esmein) vol. VI (1952) para. 99.
13 Ghestin, Les Obligations - Le Contrat: Form ation, 1988, para. 199; Aubert, Op. c it .. note 9, 
para. 1.
14 W eill & Terre, Les O bligations, 1986, paras. 132-3.
15 Pouvoir No. 59/CC/84-85 du 08/9/1983. (Unreported).
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amounted to an acceptance since it was clear from its content, especially the words 
"comme convenu avec vous", that the appellant had earlier made an offer. It was 
held accordingly that the respondent’s action for breach must succeed.
It is clear from the above cases that the analysis of contract in terms of offer and 
acceptance is common to both the common and the civil law. Yet this homogeneity 
of terms must not mislead one into minimizing the difference in practical results 
which can flow from the inquiry into offer and acceptance under both systems.16 
This difference is often clothed in terms of a dichotomy between objectivity and 
subjectivity, namely: that the common law applies an objective test17 in its 
interpretation and understanding of consensus whereas French law adopts a subjective 
approach.
Explained more fully, this means that the common law approach to offer and 
acceptance is empirical and generally linked to objective inferences to be drawn from 
the acts of the parties while the civil law treatment, by contrast, is made analytically 
with reference to the will (volonte) or the consent (consentement) of the parties.
The objective nature of English contract doctrine has received express judicial
recognition in Common Law Cameroon. This is evident in the decision in Bassum
v. Youya,18 in which the Bamenda Court of Appeal confirmed that,
"In answering the question as to whether there has been offer and 
acceptance, the courts apply an objective test. If the courts have to all 
outward appearances agreed in the same terms upon the same subject 
matter neither can generally deny that he intended to agree."
While the courts in Common Law Cameroon generally follow and apply the 
detailed rules of offer and acceptance that have evolved in England and other common 
law jurisdictions, there are no such detailed rules in Civil Law Cameroon. This is
16 Nicholas, French Law o f Contract, 1982, p. 59 et. s.
17 For more on the objective nature o f English contract doctrine, see e .g . Howarth, "The Meaning o f  
Objectivity> o f  Contract" (1984) 100 L.Q.R. 265, and "A Note on the Objectivity o f  Contract” (1987) 
103 L .Q .R . 527; Vorster, "A Comment on the Meaning o f Objectivity o f Contract” (1987) 103 L.Q .R. 
275.
18 Supra, note 11.
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because the Cameroonian (and French) Civil Codes do not contain any rules on offer 
and acceptance and as a result, significantly lack any coherent approach to the 
question. This brings one to another major difference between the two systems. 
French law generally embraces a wider area of fact as opposed to law than English 
law. Questions of fact are exclusively within the pouvoir souverain of the trial judge, 
with the Supreme Court or other appellate courts being able to exercise any control 
only in limited circumstances.19 Matters of offer and acceptance are considered to 
be a question of fact because the question as to whether or not there is an agreement 
is itself a question of fact. For that reason neither the Code nor any other text lays 
down any rules on offer and acceptance. The only requirement is that there should 
be agreement.
That said, there are three areas under the French Civil Code that have recently 
been interpreted as providing a predetermined pattern of offer and acceptance. These 
include article 1108 on the requirement that there should be consent of the party who 
obligates himself,20 and articles 894 on donation and 1984 on mandate21 
respectively. Since these articles are also contained in the Cameroonian Code, there 
is no reason why this kind of interpretation cannot be extended to Cameroon.
Although the relevant texts of both Civil Codes may be open to the kind of 
interpretation just canvassed above, it is nevertheless my contention that there is no 
need to stretch them to suit the offer and acceptance analysis. It seems clear to me 
that the Code is concerned throughout with the consensualist principle of mutual 
assent and not with the mechanism of its formation, which may explain why under
19 See the discussion on the Supreme Court in chapter 1.
20 See 1 Marty & Raynaud, Droit C ivil- Les O bligations, 1988, para. 107, where it is said that article 
1108 appears to require that the offer be made by the party "who obligates himself" and the acceptance 
be made by the other party. But they were careful to add that this is not necessarily the case.
21 Some authors such as Ghestin, para. 207-1 (citing Rouhette, Droit de la Consommation et Theorie 
Generale du Contrat, In: Etudes R O DIERE, n o .14, 1981, p. 259), maintain that, for the conclusion  
o f nominate contracts o f donation and mandate, "the acceptance necessarily emanates from the donee 
(art. 894) and the agent (art. 1984) and therefore it is irreversibly the donor and the principal who make 
the offer, no matter where the initiative came from and what twistings the possible bargaining might 
have undergone."
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the general part of the Code regarding a contract no reference is made to offer and 
acceptance.
Under both systems in Cameroon, offer and acceptance may be made in any form 
whatsoever, except for particular contracts where a statute requires that special 
formalities should be complied with. These formalities usually consist in the 
necessity of a written document which is registered and notarised.22 But generally, 
the offer as well as the acceptance may be express, implied or tacit.
2. OFFER AND INVITATION TO TREAT.
English law makes a distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat. The 
negotiations that lead to many contracts often involve some preliminary 
communications between parties. Not every request or statement, for example, by one 
party is to be considered an offer. For there to be an offer the maker of such request 
or statement must back it with an intention to be bound on acceptance otherwise it 
will amount to nothing more than an invitation to treat.
French law also recognises this distinction. Since an offer is an indispensable 
element of that concurrence of the wills of which the contract consists, it is always 
important to determine whether a certain declaration of will amounts to a real offer 
or is merely a declaration made without an intention of becoming bound such as a 
simple proposition {pourparlers).23
Whether a particular statement is an offer or an invitation to treat is always a 
question of fact and depends on the elusive criterion of intention.24 The distinction 
therefore is not always evident even though English law has evolved certain rules 
which prima facie determine the distinction in some stereotyped situations (such as
22 For formalities in contract, see chapter 7 below.
23 W eill & Terre, para. 134; Ghestin, paras. 203 and 206.
24 See generally, De Moor, Op. cit.. note 3.
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display of goods for sale, auction sales, advertisement, etc.).25
While both systems make a distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat, 
they sometimes differ in the way they make that distinction.26 French courts are far 
less reluctant than English courts to hold that a proposal to the public at large 
constitutes an offer. The Cour de Cassation has in fact made sweeping statements 
to the effect that "offers to the public at large" are not to be treated differently from 
"private offers".27 As long as the proposal, in being complete and firm28 reflects 
the maker’s willingness to enter into a contract on a specific set of terms, French 
courts are prepared to classify it as a contract. It follows that while English law 
construes advertisements and price lists as mere invitation to treat,29 in French law, 
there is a tendency in these cases to construe the proposal as an offer.30 Again, 
English law regards the display of goods in a shop window as an invitation to treat31 
even if the price is indicated while French law considers that as an offer.32
The courts in Common Law frequently make use of the distinction between an 
offer and invitation to treat, as the decision in the much litigated case of John
25 Treitel, p. 10 ff.
26 See generally, Schlessinger, Op. cit.. note 9, vol. 1, pp. 344-354 for the English report and pp. 356- 
366 for the French report.
27 Cass. Civ. 28 .11.1968, JCP 1969.11. 597.
28 See Viarlard, "L ’Ojfre Publique de Contrat", R .T .D .C ., 1971, 750, no. 38ff.
29 But it is possible in English Law to formulate an advert or a price list in such a way as to make it 
clearly an offer. For example, where from circumstances and words used it is clear that the advertisers 
or sender o f  price list intended to be bound: C arlill. v. Carbolic Smokeball Co. [1893] I Q .B. 526, 
where it was held that the intention to be bound was made particularly clear by the statement that the 
advertisers had deposited £1.000 in their bank.
30 See Cass. Civ. 28 .11 .1968 , On. cit., note 27.
31 Treitel, p. 12.
32 Sclessinger, on. cit.. note 9, p. 79.
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M okake v. Brasseries du Cameroun33 illustrates, the consequences of that 
distinction is far from academic. Because I shall be referring to this case many more 
times, it is important that I set out the full facts now. The plaintiff ran an off licence 
bar while the defendant was, and still is, the major brewery in Cameroon. Between 
1970 to 1974, the defendants supplied the plaintiff with drinks which the latter sold 
on a commission basis. The drinks were always supplied at the plaintiffs off licence 
premises. Sometime in 1974, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had supplied 
him with unwholesome beer, some of which he had drunk himself and been taken ill 
as a result. The plaintiff made a formal complaint to the Department of Health and 
other relevant administrative authorities. The defendants refuted these allegations 
even though it was found as a fact, by the health inspector, that some bottles of beer 
actually contained foreign substances. Thereafter, the defendants discontinued 
supplies to the plaintiff, whereupon he brought an action of breach of contract.
Several issues were raised in this case, some of which will be considered in due 
time, but the discussion here is limited to the distinction between offer and invitation 
to treat. The defendants denied that there was any contract at all between the plaintiff 
and themselves. They maintained that they used their trucks to supply drinks not only 
to the plaintiff but to other customers as well, and that the arrival of their trucks with 
drinks and their plying for trade was merely an invitation to treat which the plaintiff 
had to take up if he wished by making an offer to buy. The trial judge rejected this 
argument and held that the defendants were in breach of contract for which the 
plaintiff was entitled to damages.
The Buea Court of appeal saw it differently. It agreed with the defendants’ 
contention that the visits of their vehicles with drinks to various customers was 
merely an invitation to treat and that there was no pre-existing and continuous
33 C A SW P/14/79 (Buea, 19-12-1979, unreported). This is one o f the most litigated contract cases in 
common law Cameroon. It spanned the complete court structure, starting from the Buea High Court 
(H C SW /35/75, unreported), to the Buea Court o f Appeal, then the Supreme Court (C.S. Arret No. 
25/CC du 28 Octobre 1982, (1983) 25 Rev. Cam. Dr., 62) which in turn remitted it to the Bamenda 
Court o f  Appeal (BCA/36/83. It was explained in chapter one that it is normal for the Supreme Court, 
which is a court o f cassation to remit cases o f common law origin to the other common law court o f  
appeal.
175
contract between the parties. The decision of the trial court was thus set aside. The 
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal may well be in line with two established 
rules of English law on the subject, namely: that any statement or request lacking in 
the intention to be bound is merely an invitation to treat and secondly that, the display 
of goods is merely an invitation to treat, not an offer. Yet it is submitted that (i.e. 
if one must take the view that there was no contract) a better analysis of this case 
would have been to consider that the defendant brewery had made a standing offer 
to supply drinks to the plaintiff but that they were perfectly entitled to withdraw this 
offer anytime before acceptance. In other words, the defendant did make an offer but 
withdrew it before the plaintiff accepted and therefore could not be held to be in 
breach of contract.
My view on this is that there are good reasons for holding, as the trial judge did, 
that there was a contract. I shall advance these reasons when I consider the problems 
relating to offer and acceptance and the doctrine of consideration in subsequent 
sections.
There appears to be no instances in which the courts in Civil Law Cameroon have 
ruled that a certain act amounted to an invitattion to treat as opposed to an offer. In 
Ste. Balton-Cameroun v. Bouga, the appellants’ attempt to draw on the distinction 
between offer and invitation to treat to the effect that what had transpired between the 
parties amounted to no more than an invitation to treat was forcefully rejected by the 
Supreme Court; but the case does reveal that the distinction is also recognised in Civil 
Law Cameroon. Perhaps the courts in Civil Law Cameroon have adopted the attitude 
of their French counterparts, whereby they are more inclined to hold that a proposal 
amounts to an offer rather than an invitation to treat.
3. CONCORDANCE BETWEEN OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.
As a general rule both in English and French law, an acceptance, in order to bring 
about a contract, must comply with the offer (i) as to the terms of the offer, (ii) as 
to the manner of assenting to the offer (if prescribed) and (iii) as to the time allowed
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for acceptance.
(1). Compliance with the terms of the offer.
In English law, a communication may fail to take effect as an acceptance because 
it attempts to vary the terms of the offer.34 An acceptance not in conformity with 
the offeror’s terms, would be a qualified acceptance, operating in many circumstances 
as a cross or counter offer, which the original offeror may accept or reject. For this 
reason, the line of demarcation between qualified and unqualified acceptance is of 
great importance, although the tracing of that line is not always easy and free from 
doubt.
It is also a requirement in French law that the acceptance complies with the terms 
of the offer.35 Any real variance or reservations contained in the alleged acceptance 
destroys its character.36 This rule also finds support in the Avant-Projet of the 
revised French Civil Code: When an offer is accepted with modification or subject 
to reservations, the acceptance shall be considered only as a new offer.37 In French 
law too, it is not always easy to draw a fine line between qualified and unqualified 
acceptance.38
This issue of compliance between the terms of offer and acceptance does not seem 
to have come before Cameroonian courts but one would expect them to follow the
34 Tinn v. Hoffman & Co (1873) 29 L.T. 271; Northwestern Leicestershire D. C. v. East Midlands 
Housing Association [ 1981] W .L.R: an offer to pay a fixed price for building work is not accepted by 
a promise to do the work for a variable sum.
35 Planiol & Ripert, v o l.6 (ed. Esmein), para. 99; Weill & Terre, para. 146; Ghestin, para. 224.
36 Mazeaud (ed. Chabas), O bligations, para. 138; Weill & Terre, para. 146; Ghestin, para. 226-1.
37 Travaux 1948-1949 at 705
38 See Rieg "La Punctation", Contribution a l’etude de la formation successive du contrat, In: M elanges 
Jauffret, 1974, pp. 593 et s. He ask whether compliance must be complete and exact. In complex 
contracts he observes some conditions o f offer may well be accepted while others may be reserved for 
further negotiation. At what point therefore, he asks, are the parties bound?. For discussion o f  this 
question, see, W eill & Terre, para. 146.
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rules of the English and French law discussed above, if and when the matter comes 
before them. However, in the case of Civil Law Cameroon, some provisions of the 
Civil Code are very helpful in this regard. The fundamental rule of the interpretation 
of contracts, as set out in article 1156, is that one should "look for the common 
intention of the contracting parties rather than hold to the literal meaning of the 
terms".
But if the acceptor includes in his reply a condition necessarily implied by the law, 
it is most unlikely that the court would find anything that would rob the acceptance 
of its effectiveness. In the words of article 1135: "contracts give rise not only to 
those obligations which are stated therein but also to those which according to the 
nature of each agreement, are derived from equity, usage and law." Thus the 
addition of the offer of an obligation inherent in the law does not in any way change 
the effect of the contract proposed by the offeror.
(2). Compliance with the prescribed method of acceptance.
Where the offeror prescribes for a particular method of acceptance, he will not in 
general be bound unless acceptance is made in that way. This is true of both 
English39 and French40 laws.
But in the absence of any prescribed method, acceptance can take any form. 
Generally, the manifestation of acceptance may be express, implied or tacit. It may 
be express, such as by letter or telegram or by words or clear gesture. It may be 
implied when manifested by actions or inferred from the offeree’s conduct as was the 
case in Brogden v. Metropolitan Railway.41 There is also the burning question as 
to whether silence can constitute silence. I will briefly elaborate on acceptance by
39 See Financing Ltd v. Stim son [1962] 1 W .L.R. 1184, where an offeror who asked for acceptance 
in writing was held not bound by one that was oral.
40 Aubert, para. 281; For a brief comparative account, see David and Pugsley: Les C ontrats en D roit 
A nglais, 1985, pp. 100-106.
41 (1877) LR. 2 A .C. 666
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conduct and acceptance by silence.
(i) Acceptance by Conduct:
Acceptance by conduct was implied by the Bamenda Court of Appeal in Bassum 
v. Youya.42 It will be recalled that the defendant had asked the plaintiff to serve in 
his business, the terms being that the latter would not be paid any salary but would 
in the end be given a lump sum to enable him start his own business. It was held by 
the Court of Appeal, reversing the High Court, that the plaintiffs eight year service 
to the defendant amounted to an acceptance (by conduct) which led to a valid contract 
under which the plaintiff was entitled to recover. It should be noted that this case 
was decided in Common Law Cameroon.
As for Civil Law Cameroon, the Civil Code is instructive in the absence of any 
decided cases. As in France, it is a general rule in Civil Law Cameroon that 
acceptance may take any form, express or tacit. However, the Civil Code clearly 
lays down instances where the acceptance must be express or implied. In the case 
of formal contracts such as gifts, article 932 provides that the contract is formed only 
when it is accepted in express terms, and in the case of agency, article 1985 provides 
that acceptance of an agency may be only implied and result from the execution given 
to it by the agent.
(ii) Acceptance by Silence.
An important question relating to acceptance is whether silence can constitute 
acceptance. This question has attracted much debate,43 especially in French law.44 
It is enough to state here that, as a general rule, both in English and French Law,
4: Supra, note 11.
43 See Owsia, "Efficacy in Contract Formation: A Comparative Review o f  French and English Law” 
(1991) 40 I.C .L .Q . 784.
44 See generally Yung, ”L ’acceptation par le silence de I ’offre de contrat" In: M elanges Secretan, 
1964, p. 334 ff; Littman, "Le Silence et la Formation du Contrat" These, Strasbourg, 1969; Diener, 
"Le Silence et le Droit" These, Bordeaux, 1971.
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mere silence or inaction does not constitute acceptance.45 An offeree who stays 
silent or does nothing on receipt of an offer cannot be bound even if the offer 
clearly stated that it may be accepted by silence.46 Even the French proverb "qui 
ne dir wot consent"*1 does not seem to have any legal significance in this regard.
The decision in T.C. Anomachi v. Emens Textiles International48 is illustrative 
of the fact that the courts in Common Law Cameroon observe the general rule that 
silence does not constitute acceptance. In that case, the appellant, a solicitor, alleged 
that he had oral discussions with the director of the respondent company during which 
it was agreed that he would be appointed a retainer agreement for the said company. 
Consequently, he drafted a retainer agreement and forwarded it to the respondents. 
The respondent never signed nor returned this document to him. In an action for 
breach, the Appeal Court, upholding trial court, dismissed the action on the grounds 
that no contract existed. The court explained that there had been no acceptance on 
the part of respondents, and added for good measure that their silence or failure to 
respond to the appellant’s draft agreement could in no way amount to an acceptance.
I have not found any case in Civil Law Cameroon in which the courts have had 
to deal with the question of silence and acceptance and the Cameroonian Civil Code 
too does not directly address it. It is to be expected that when confronted with the 
problem, they will follow the general rule in French law, which is that silence does 
not constitute acceptance.
Both English and French law allow certain exceptions to the general rule. In 
English law it is accepted that in exceptional cases or where the circumstances of the
45 For English Law, see Treitel, p. 30, and Cheshire, Fifoot, and Furmston, p. 47. For French law, 
see Aubert, para. 313; Planniol & Ripert (ed. Esmein), para. 188; Nicholas, p. 72.
46 See the English case o f Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) 11 C.B. (N .S .) 869, and the decision in the 
French case o f Cass G. V. 25 Mai 1870, S. 70.1.341 where the defendant who had failed to respond 
to a letter from his bank informing him o f shares that had been offered to him was held not to be 
bound for want o f acceptance, since in law, the silence o f  a person one intends to be bound 
contractually, does not suffice, in the absence o f all other circumstances, as proof o f  the alleged  
obligation against that person.
47 W eill &. Terre, para. 130.
48 CASW P/1/73 (Buea, 16.4.1973, unreported).
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case are such that acceptance can be inferred from the silence, the offeree will be 
bound not withstanding his silence.49 In The Leonidas D,*0 the House of Lords 
had to consider an appeal from a decision that a binding agreement should be inferred 
from silence and in action. Their Lordships confirmed that a silence and inaction can 
give rise to both offer and acceptance under special circumstances but pointed out that 
no such circumstances were present in that case to justify a departure from the 
general rule that silence does not constitute acceptance. Also, in the much earlier 
case of Robert v. Hayward,51 a tenant who accepted his landlord’s offer of a new 
tenancy at an increased rent by simply staying on the premises was held to have 
accepted his landlord’s offer by silence.
In France, it has been accepted that room for exceptions to the general rule is 
implied in the statement of the court in the case of Civ. 25 Mai 1870, that its decision 
applied "en I ’absence dans routes autres circonsrances". It has been further been 
pointed out52 that certain articles of the French Code (and by analogy the 
Cameroonian Code) can be construed as exceptions to the general rule that silence 
cannot constitute acceptance. Articles 1738 and 1759 which are to the effect that 
when a written lease or tenancy expires, and the lessee or tenant continues to occupy 
the premises without any objection from the landlord, that will be considered as a 
tacit renewal of the tenancy agreement, are cited as examples.
The decision in Robert v. Hayward shows that English law too adopts a position 
that is very similar to that laid down by articles 1738 and 1759 of both the French 
and Cameroonian Codes. But it is arguable that the above case and the instances 
cited in articles 1738 and 1759 would be better explained in terms of acceptance by 
conduct rather than acceptance by silence. In Robert v. Hayward, for instance, it
49 See Treitel, pp. 31-32.
50 Allied Marine Transport Ltd. v. Vale Do Rio Doce Navegacao S.A. (The Leonidas D) [1985] 1 
WLR. 925.
51 (1828) 3 C & P. 432,
52 Weill & Terre para 130; Planiol & Ripert (ed Esmein) para 109
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would have been better to say that the tenant accepted by conduct and the landlord 
waived his right for an express acceptance.53
It is interesting to note in the light of the above comments that the decision in the 
more recent case of Rust v. Abbey Life Assurance Co.54 was rationalised in terms 
of acceptance by conduct, and not by silence. The plaintiff applied for certain 
property bonds in the defendant’s company. They were alloted to her immediately but 
signed and sent to her about three weeks later. The matter rested for some seven 
months until the price of bonds fell in the market and the plaintiff sought repayment 
of her investment by alleging, inter alia, that no contract had existed.
It was held at first instance that the contract was concluded, and that decision was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Brandon, L.J, delivering the appellate judgement, 
had this to say:
"it seems to me to be an inevitable inference from the conduct of the 
plaintiff in doing and saying nothing for seven months that she 
accepted the policy as a valid contract".55
There is one significant difference between English and French law on the 
question of acceptance by silence which must be briefly mentioned here. It is a rule 
in French law that a person who remains silent in response to an offer, which is 
entirely beneficial to him, can be assumed to be assenting to it. English law, on the 
other hand, will not give effect to such an offer because of lack of consideration.56 
This rule of French law was established in 193957 and reconfirmed in another case 
in 1969.58
53 Treitel, p. 33.
54 [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 334.
55 Id at 340.
56 For a brief comparative discussion o f this rule, see De Moor, "Contract and Agreement in English 
and French Law" (1986) O.J.L.S. 278.
57 In the case o f  Cass req 29 .3 .38 , S, 1938, 1, 380, also cited in Khan Freud: Source-book in French  
L aw , 1979, p. 334.
58 Cass G. V. 1 .2.1968, D. 1970. 422, note Puech; Kahn Freud, Sourcebook, p. 335.
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In the latter case a passer-by was injured by the burning flames of a motorcycle 
as he tried to help the cyclist who was lying unconscious after a collision with a car. 
It was held that the passer-by had intervened by virtue of a contract between himself 
and the motor cyclist, so that he was entitled to contractual damages for his injuries. 
The motor cyclist argued on appeal that there could not have been any contract, 
especially as the trial court had not pointed to any acceptance by him of the plaintiffs 
offer of assistance. Affirming the decision of the lower court, the Cour de Cassation 
ruled that there was no need to point to any express acceptance, since the address of 
an offer which is made in the offeree’s exclusive interest is presumed to have been 
accepted by him. Even though this decision has been criticised,59 it clearly lays 
down the rule in French law.
3. Compliance with time.
Acceptance, in order to bring about the formation of a contract, must be made 
while the offer is open. If a particular period of time is prescribed by the offerer, 
acceptance must be made within that period. In the absence of any fixed period of 
time, the offer is expected to remain open for a reasonable period of time within 
which acceptance must be made. Whatever is the case, acceptance must be made 
before the offer is terminated. Both in English and French law, an offer can be 
terminated in one of the following ways, lapse of time, death of one of the parties, 
rejection or cross offers, insanity or incapacity and by revocation.
The emphasis here will be only on termination by revocation because of some 
of the difficulties that it gives rise to and because of the different approaches adopted 
by English and French law.
S9 Ghestin (para. 298), argues that to give contractual effect to such an offer is to give effect to a will 
which is non-existent or fictive; and according to Nicholas (p. 73) the construction o f  the act o f a 
passer-by as an offer is very artificial.
4. REVOCATION OF THE OFFER
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In English law, the general principle is that every offer regardless of its terms can 
be revoked at anytime before it is accepted and it is immaterial that the offer is 
expressed to be open for a given time or not.6u This rule that gives the offeror total 
freedom to retract the offer before acceptance is inextricably linked to and best 
explained by the English law doctrine of consideration.61
An offer therefore becomes irrevocable if it is supported by consideration, is under 
seal, or where there has been some reliance62 or where a special statute makes it 
irrevocable.63 It is evident from the decision in Nangah v. Asonganyi,64 that the 
courts in Anglophone Cameroon will not approve of a revocation by the offeror if 
some consideration has been furnished by the offeror or if there has been part 
performance. In that case, the defendant offered to sell a building to plaintiff for 10 
million francs. The plaintiff agreed to buy the building and proceeded to make an 
advance payment of 3 million francs. When the defendant later attempted to revoke 
his offer, the plaintiff sued, asking the court for an order for specific performance. 
It was held that the defendant could not revoke his offer as the plaintiff had already 
made an advance payment of a third of the asking price.
In Civil Law Cameroon, the general rule also is that an offer is normally 
revocable before acceptance, if the offeror does not provide for any period of
w) Byrne v. Leon van Tienhoven (1880) C .P.D. 344; see also Routledge v. Grant (1828) 4 Bing 653.
61 See chapter 6 below.
62 For e.g . Lloyd v. Stanbury f 1971] 1 W .L.R. 535, where a person who had offered to sell land was 
accordingly held liable for certain expenses incurred by the offeree in reliance on the offer. See also 
Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed [1972] 1 Q.B. 60.
63 For example, the (English) Companies Act 1985, s. 82 (7); and the Uniform Law on the Formation 
of Contracts for the International Sale o f Goods (ULFIS) Art. 5(1).
64 H CB/79/85 (Bamenda, 23 .1 .1987 , unreported).
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irrevocability. This rule is not expressed in any statutory provision,65 but it is 
unanimously upheld by leading French writers66 and the courts.
Up to this point there is no difference between English and French law. The main 
difference occurs with respect to offers expressly stated to be irrevocable. While 
English courts accept the revocation of an offer even if expressly stated to be open 
for a given time, French courts will not sanction or approve such a revocation. In 
Isler v. Chastan67 with facts very reminiscent to the English case of Routledge v. 
G ran t,68 the French Cour de Cassation declared that while an offer may in principle 
be revoked as long as it has not been accepted, the position is different where the 
offeror has expressed or implied an undertaking not to revoke before a certain time 
and that, the offeror having tacitly obliged himself to keep the offer open (until the 
offeree has made his inspection), could not have revoked his offer on the day alleged 
without committing a fault of a kind which will entail liability on his part.
Under the French system, therefore, an offeror may withdraw his offer before the 
expiration of the time he allowed for acceptance but any such untimely or premature 
withdrawal may render him liable in damages. Even if the offeror prescribes no set 
period for acceptance he is still bound to keep it open for a reasonable time. If an 
offer is revoked before a reasonable time elapses or before the end of a prescribed 
time of acceptance, no contract is formed, technically speaking, since there can be 
no acceptance. But the offeree can claim compensation for the loss which the
65 But art. 932 o f the Civil Code providing that "a gift inter vivos binds the donor and has effect only  
as from the day it is expressly accepted", implicitly establishes the rule that an offer o f  a gift may be 
revoked, but this provision it is acknowledged, cannot be extended to all contracts.
66 One may cite for example, Aubry, Rau, and Bartin, O bligations, para. 343: "Since an offer is 
insufficient o f itself to bind him who made it, it may generally be revoked"; Planiol & Ripert (ed. 
Esmein), para. 131; Mazeaud/Chabas, para. 135.
67 Cass civ. 17.12.1958, D .1959, 33; Kahn- Freund, Sourcebook, p. 328.
68 (1828) 4 Bing 653.
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premature revocation caused him.69
Three main theories have been advanced to justify the offeror’s liability for 
revocation in these circumstances.70
According to one - the abuse of right (abus de droit) theory - the offeror when 
withdrawing the offer may incur a certain responsibility of a quasi-delictual nature 
that entitles the offeree to recover damages for the detriment he suffers when through 
reliance on the offer, he makes the preparation to perform. This theory is based on 
article 1382 of the French Civil Code: "any act whatever of man which causes 
damages to another obliges him by whose fault it occurred". It follows from this that 
the offeree cannot obtain damages unless he proves, in addition to revocation, a fault 
committed by the offeror.
The second theory - the preliminary contract theory71 - holds that the offeror 
offers not only to enter the principal transaction but also a preliminary contract which 
binds him to keep the principal offer open for a certain time. This preliminary offer 
being purely advantageous for the offeree, is concluded by tacit acceptance. If the 
offeror then withdraws the offer to enter the principal transaction, he is liable in 
damages for breach of the preliminary contract.72 It has been suggested that this
69 See the oft-cited case o f Jahn v. Mme Cherry, Bordeaux 17 Jan. 1870 S. 1870.2.219; See also 
Schlessinger, p. 771; The Minguet case: Cass. 8 Oct. 1958 Bull. 1.331 is also pertinent, cited in 
Schlessinger, p .770.
70 For further details o f  these theories, see generally Weill & Terre, para. 139; Planiol & Ripert (ed. 
Esmein), para. 132; Ghestin, para. 217.
71 Demolom be, Cours de Code Napol&m, T. XXXIV, Nos. et s ., p. 48 et s ., is credited with the 
formulation o f this theory. See Aubert, para. 105
72 The CA at COLMAR used this theory in a case where a subcontractor who had based his offer on 
an error o f  calculation had withdrawn it after the offeree had used it as a basis for a successful tender. 
The court held that an offer was binding 'des lors q u ’il resulre d'un accord expres ou tacite, mais 
indiscutable, qu 'elle a etc formulee pour etre maintenu pendant un delai determine’, but found that in 
the case before it no such agreement was proved. When the offeror made his offer, he did not know  
that the offeree was intending to use it as a basis for making a tender. (Colmar, 4 Feb. 1936, DH 
1936, 187).
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theory should be likened to the concept of culpa in contrahendo,73 of German origin.
The third theory - the unilateral declaration of will theory74 - attributes binding 
effects to unilateral declaration of wills. According to it, the will alone suffices to 
give rise to an obligation and therefore the will should be incorporated in the 
traditional lists of the sources of obligations. This theory has been criticised on the 
doctrinal grounds that there is no such institution as "engagement unilateral” in 
French law.75
Of the three theories, French courts seem to prefer either the theory of ‘abus de 
droit’ or the preliminary contract theory. But what is important, irrespective of the 
theory that one adopts, is that French case law and doctrine agree on the conclusion 
that an offer has to be maintained by the offeror during a certain period of time.76
While the courts in Civil Law Cameroon too can be expected to hold an offeror 
liable for untimely revocation, it is difficult to say which of these theories they will 
adopt as the basis for the offeror’s liability. In fact, it is doubtful if they will give 
much thought to such theoretical justification. Not that it matters. What actually 
matters in Cameroon is not very much the basis of the rule but the rule itself.
From what precedes above, it is obvious that there is a major difference between
73 Schwenk, "Culpa in Contrahendo in German, French and Louisiana Law” (1940) 15 T ul.L .R . 87 
at 94. According to this concept, which was formulated by Rudolf von Ihering, when two parties start 
negotiations they enter into a pre-contractual connection o f an innominate kind and tacitly concluded 
whereby a relationship o f confidence arises, imposing on the parties a duty o f diligence in regard to 
the other party’s reliance. This theory has since greatly influenced French doctrine and jurisprudence 
(see Planiol & Ripert (ed Esmein), Part I 152 para. 2 .0  It must be noted, however, that culpa in 
contrahendo is unnecessary in matters o f revocation o f offers in German law, as the BGB expressly 
pronounces that offers are irrevocable (see Schwenk, p. 91).
74 W orms, La V olon ti Unilat6rale Consid£r6e Com m e Source d ’O bligation, p. 165 et s ., is said to 
have been the principal exponent o f  this theory. See Aubert, para. 105
75 Weill and Terre, para. 139(a): "notre jurisprudence a toujours manifeste de la reticence a admettre 
la valeur de I ’engagement unilateral comme source d ’obligations".
76 This position was also taken by the commission charged with the reform of the French Civil Code. 
In article 11 o f the Avant Projet o f "Sources and Formation o f Obligation", it proposes a rule whereby 
offers stated to be open for a certain period o f  time could not be withdrawn until that period elapsed 
unless the withdrawal reached the offeree before the offer. The same rule was to apply when a period 
during which the offer was to remain open could be inferred from the circumstances. See Travaux de 
la Reforme du Code Civil, 705 1950, A. von Mehren, The Civil Law  System , 1957, p .479.
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Common and Civil law Cameroon on the question of revocation of an offer. In 
Common Law Cameroon, subject to the doctrine of consideration, part performance 
or reliance, an offer can be revoked anytime before acceptance without the offeror 
being liable. In Civil Law Cameroon, on the other hand, no consideration or part 
performance is needed in order that the offeror be held liable for revocation. As 
usual, this difference can be of practical significance in the case of conflict of laws. 
It is not impossible to a imagine a situation in which an offeror may be held liable for 
revocation in one part of the country (civil law) while he is not liable in the other part 
(common law).
It is yet to arise in Cameroon so I have had to rely on the Canadian case of 
Renfrew Flour Mills v. Sanschagrin77 to make the point. The Renfrew Mills, in 
Ontario, offered to sell flour to Sanschagrin, who lived in Quebec. The offer 
stipulated that it was to be accepted within eight weeks "otherwise this offer is to be 
withdrawn". Before the expiration of the eight weeks, the offeror wrote saying: 
"Please consider our offer... withdrawn". Sanschagrin protested, and placed an order 
for the quantity of flour stated in the offer. Not receiving delivery, he sued for 
damages. The Court of Appeal held that the law of Ontario (common law) applied to 
the transaction78 and that the principle applicable was that the offeror could retract 
his offer even before the time he expressly allowed for acceptance, if no consideration 
had been given for the promise. There having been no consideration, Renfrew Mills 
were entitled to have withdrawn their offer.
This is of course the classic common law position.79 Had it been that the law of 
Quebec (civil law) governed the transaction, Renfrew Mills may well have been held 
liable for their untimely revocation. It is suggested that were such a case to arise in 
Cameroon, it should be approached in the same way as the Renfrew case i.e. by first 
determining the applicable law before deciding the question of revocation.
77 [1928], 45 K.B. 29 (Que. C .A .).
78 Because the offer had been communicated in Ontario.
79 See The Albeko, infra, note 108.
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It must be said that the civil law rule whereby the offeror is held liable for 
untimely revocation (especially as explained by abus de droit theory) is more 
responsive to commercial and practical realities than the rule in common law 
Cameroon whereby the offeror can revoke with impunity without being liable, as long 
as he does so before acceptance. In fact this common law rule does present some 
difficulties and has been subject to some serious criticisms.80
Particular difficulties of this rule are best illustrated in the case of unilateral 
contracts where a performance is executed for a promise. Suppose, for example, A 
promises B one million francs CFA if B climbs Mount Cameroon. Suppose B subjects 
himself to considerable strain to accomplish this feat. Can A retract his offer after B 
has already done much of the climbing. On the common law principle, it is clear A 
has a legitimate right to do so since the offer has not been fully accepted. This is so 
because, technically speaking, an acceptance is only complete when the act is fully 
performed. Yet there is no doubt that B has suffered some detriment or hardship or 
loss. Is he therefore not entitled to any remedy whatsoever ?
There is evidence to suggest that in the case of unilateral contracts, the courts in 
Common Law Cameroon will treat the offer as irrevocable once the offeree has 
started to comply with the requested performance, for it is reasonable to presume an 
undertaking on the part of the offeror to be bound by his offer once performance has 
begun. Although Bassum v. Youya81 is not a classic "I will pay you a hundred 
pounds if you will walk to York" case, it is instructive here since it is concerned with 
a unilateral contract. A promised to pay B a certain block sum if B would work for 
him. B did work for A for several years. In an action by B for the promised sum, 
the Bamenda Court of Appeal held that he must succeed. Even though the court did 
not think it was making any specific pronouncement on the revocation of offers, this 
decision nevertheless establishes the fact that A could not retract his offer or renege
80 The (English) Law Reform Committee 1937 proposed that it be abolished. It was again examined 
by the Law Commission 1975 in Working Paper no. 60. In some special cases, legislation intervened
to make offers irrevocable. For example, Companies Act 1985, s. 82 (7). But this has since been parh'aUj 
repealed (f^  K.Uttr>v. Lo LstetL i^cuuvn *
81 Supra, note 11.
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on his promise after B had acted on it. This decision is laudable because it allows 
commonsense to prevail over strict law. It is thus hoped that the courts will 
consistently adopt such a position in order to circumvent any harshness that a strict 
application of the common law rule (whereby an offer can retract his offer anytime 
before acceptance) may cause.
5. SOME CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
The formation of contract by offer and acceptance, although axiomatic, has long 
been a source of conceptual difficulty.82 The classical test of offer and acceptance, 
as briefly analyzed above, is based on three basic presumptions: that two parties or 
group of parties are involved in making the contract; that their respective expressions 
are capable of being reduced to corresponding definite propositions, each 
determinable at a given time; and that, the propositions so reduced, sequentially 
follow each other to produce the contract.
In certain situations, however, these assumptions may not hold true. In such cases, 
if the courts still persist, as they very often do, in their adherence to the classical 
doctrine, the result may not only be artificial and unrealistic, but may be grossly 
unfair. For this reason, the classical doctrine of offer and acceptance as a mechanism 
for contract formation has therefore come under increasing criticism both in French 
and English law.
In France, modern doctrinal view has come to recognize that the differentiation 
of offer and acceptance on the basis of the chronological sequence of the parties 
expressions of wills, is not always easy to make. Neither is it possible to reduce 
agreement in certain complex transactions to offer and acceptance. Some writers 
consider the traditional offer and acceptance to be a somewhat arbitrary over­
simplification and point out that only in simple everyday transactions, is a contract
82 See generally Lucke, "Striking a Bargain" (1962) 3 Adel. L. R. 293.
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concluded by the simple acceptance of the offer.83 It has thus been argued that while
a contract results, in normal situations, from a sequence of an offer and an
acceptance, it is equally certain that such a mechanism is not indispensable.
The sequential order of offer and acceptance has also come under attack in
England from both academic writers and the courts. As Atiyah puts it,84
"... to insist on the presence of a genuine offer and acceptance in 
every case is likely to land one in sheer fiction, although it may be 
convenient to postulate the existence of an offer and acceptance for 
some purposes".
And Lord Denning has expressed his dislike for the classical offer and acceptance
analysis, which he attributes to textbook writers, in the following terms,85
"I do not much like the analysis in the textbook of inquiring whether
there was an offer and acceptance, or a counter offer or so forth."
Despite these criticisms, there is still a persistent judicial adherence to the 
doctrine, often at the cost of forcing the facts to fit uneasily into the marked slots of 
offer and acceptance. Not surprisingly, Cameroonian courts have also been guilty of 
this charge. The problem that this raises is not only of theoretical interest, but also 
has practical consequences as to whether a contract was ever concluded and especially 
as to the distinction between offer and an invitation to treat.
This point may be illustrated by referring again to the case of Mokake Elali v. 
Brasseries du Cameroun,86 where it will be recalled, the defendant brewery 
succeeded in convincing the Court of Appeal that the delivery by their lorries of 
drinks to the plaintiff was only an invitation to treat. It followed from that no
83 2 Ripert & Boulanger, Traite de Droit C ivil, 1957, para. 321; and Carbonnier (para.38), despite 
employing the offer/acceptance analysis, has nevertheless criticised it by arguing that the contracting 
party who had the contractual initiative is not necessarily the one from the first manifestation o f  the 
w ill derives.
84 Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 1989, p. 61; For similar caution, see Anson 
(Guest ed .), 1984, p. 22.
85 In Port Sudan Cotton Co. v. Govindaswamy Chertiar & Sons [1977] 2 LI.Rep. 5, at p. 10.
86 Supra, note 33.
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contract existed for which the defendants could be held liable in breach as the plaintiff 
was alleging. The attempts by the trial court to find in favour of the plaintiff by the 
use of concepts such as reliance and estoppel received short shrift from the Court of 
Appeal, which thought it enough to dispose of the case largely on the basis that the 
plying of vehicles by the defendant brewery amounted to no more than an invitation 
to treat.
It is not suggested that the court was entirely wrong to subject the facts of this 
case to the classical offer and acceptance analysis. Yet, one cannot help but feel that 
by ignoring the course of dealing of the parties and the reliance by the plaintiff on the 
defendant’s custom, the Appeal Court placed undue emphasis on the offer and 
acceptance doctrine, precisely on the distinction between offer and invitation to treat. 
To accept the defendants’ submissions that the plying by their lorries of drinks did 
not amount to an offer but only an invitation to treat, is perhaps stretching that 
distinction too far.
Again, in Churchill Achu v. Azire Co-operative Credit Union,87 the Bamenda 
Court of Appeal tried too hard to employ the offer and acceptance analysis. The 
plaintiff, a businessman, was a member of the defendant co-operative society between 
1983 to 1988. During that period he took out a number of loans which were duly 
repaid. Then in 1987 he won a contract to supply motorcycles to MIDENO, a 
development agency.
In order to perform this contract, he applied for a loan from the defendants. The 
defendants asked for, and received, confirmation of the said contract from MIDENO, 
plus an assurance from MIDENO that in the event that the deal went through, they 
(MIDENO) would pay the contract price direct into the plaintiff’s account with the 
co-operative society. But events were to take a different turn. Not only was the 
plaintiff’s loan application rejected for alleged irregularities in the application and 
insufficient security, he was also dismissed as a member of the society. He sued for 
breach of contract. It is not clear whether he based his action on the termination of
87 BC A /6/90 (Bamenda, 11.1.1991, unreported).
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his membership or on the refusal to award him the loan or both. In any case, the 
Bamenda High Court found for him and awarded him the generous sum of fifty 
million francs CFA in damages. The co-operative society appealed.
The Court of Appeal took the view that the plaintiff could only have been suing 
for the rejection of his loan application. On that interpretation, the Appeal Court 
held, overruling the High Court, that he could not succeed since there was no 
contract, there being no offer and acceptance. Of course, there was as yet no contract 
but was not necessary for the court to employ the offer and acceptance doctrine to 
arrive at that conclusion.
It is respectfully submitted that there are better ways at arriving at the same 
conclusion. For a start, it is trite that the defendants, like any other financial 
institution, are under no contractual obligation to accord loans to its members. Then, 
there are two other ways of looking at the case. The first one relates to the question 
of reliance on which the trial judge based his judgement. Was the fact that the co­
operative society asked for confirmation of the contract and for an assurance that the 
contract price would be paid directly to them, as well as appointing a high level 
committee (it included the general manager and his assistant) to look into plaintiff’s 
contract with MIDENO, enough to entitle the plaintiff to invoke the doctrine of 
reliance? And could the co-operative society in any way be considered to have given 
an irrevocable commitment to grant the loan? If the answer to these questions is yes, 
then the plaintiff must have a good case, and this is irrespective of whether offer and 
acceptance are clearly discernible.
On the other hand, if there was no detrimental reliance and the rejection of the 
loan application was in the view of the court, based purely on the lack of merit, then 
the plaintiff must fail. Again, irrespective of offer and acceptance.
Unlike the Mokake v. Brasseries du Cameroun, no injustice can be said to have 
been done in this case since the court rightly held that there was no contract. The 
case is cited only to emphasise the point that Cameroonian courts too, may at times 
be carried away by an over-enthusiastic application of the offer and acceptance 
doctrine.
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As already mentioned above, there is increasing criticism in France and England 
of the traditional analysis. Chief amongst the critics is Lord Denning. In Gibson v. 
M anchester City Council,88 he declared: "To my mind it is a mistake to think that 
all contracts can be analyzed into the form of offer and acceptance." He has even 
gone further to suggest that the traditional offer and acceptance analysis is "out of 
date"89 and has attempted to replace it with what may be termed an unslotted 
mechanism.
It is not and cannot seriously be suggested that the offer and acceptance analysis 
should be abandoned in Cameroon. After all, the majority of contracts in Cameroon 
are two party contracts that readily admit of the offer and acceptance dichotomy. In 
such cases, the offer and acceptance mechanism is most useful. What is suggested is 
that the Cameroon courts of both systems should be willing to recognise and 
acknowledge instances such as complex business transactions involving many parties 
and standard form contracts90 that deviate from or defy the doctrine. To deny the 
existence of a contract in such cases simply because the facts cannot be manipulated 
into offer and acceptance slots or to undertake such an artificial or arbitrary 
distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat, as the Court of Appeal did in 
Mokake v. Brasseries du Cameroon, may work great injustice at times.
6. THE TIME AND PLACE OF CONTRACT FORMATION
If the offer and acceptance takes place at the same time or at the same place (i.e. 
the parties are inter praesent.es) English and French law both agree that the contract 
is formed at the moment the acceptance is signified. However, the questions as to
88 [1978]1 W .L.R . 520 ,523.
89 Butler Machine Tool v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp. [1979] 1 W .L.R. 401, 404.
90 For problems in these area, see generally Von Mehren, "The Battle o f Forms”: A Comparative View" 
(1990) 38 A .J.C .L. 265; Adams, "The Battle o f Forms" (1979) 42 M .L.R . 715; For contracts o f  
adhesion in French law , see Rieg, "Contrat Type et Contrat D ’Adhesion” Trav. et R ech., Inst. Dr. 
Compare, Paris, t. XXXIII, 1970; Berlioz, Le Contrat d’Adhesion, 1976.
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when and where a contract is formed become important in the case where the offer 
and the acceptance take place at different moments or different places (i.e. the parties 
are inter absentes). Since the reasons for their respective importance vary, they shall 
be treated separately.
(1). The Time of Contract Formation.
It is important to determine when the contract is formed by the offeree’s 
acceptance not only because of its unavoidable relation to the problem of revocability, 
but also because it relates to matters of capacity, transfer of title and the problem of 
risk. It may also be important in determining which law is to apply in cases where 
the law is changed while the contract is under negotiation. The problem is less than 
straightforward in the case of contracts between distant parties. The archetypal case 
is a contract by correspondence.91 What if the offeror and offeree, who are 
respectively based in the common and civil parts of law of Cameroon elect to 
communicate by mail? At what moment is the contract to be considered concluded?
At common law, in matters of correspondence, the leading case of Adams v. 
Lindsell92 set up the general rule that a postal acceptance takes effect when the letter 
of acceptance is posted. Several reasons have been advanced to support the rule,93 
none of which can be said to be overwhelmingly convincing, so that a whole set of 
controversies is presented under this rule.94
91 Although every contract made by parties who are not face to face is a contract inter absentes, 
contracts inter absentes are not necessarily contracts by correspondence. For a discussion on this 
subject, see Asher Kahn, "Contracts by Correspondence" (1957-60) vols. 1-4 McGill L.J. 98-126 at 
99-101.
92 (1818) 1 B & Aid 681
93 One is that the offeror must be considered as making the offer all the time that his offer is in the 
post, and that the agreement therefore between the parties is complete as soon as the acceptance is 
posted. See Henthorn v. Fraser [1892] 2 Ch. 27, 33.
94 Evans, "The Anglo- American Mailing Rule: some problems of offer and acceptance in contracts by 
correspondence" (1966) 15 l.C .L .Q . 553.
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Some consider the rule arbitrary,95 while others have pointed to its other apparent 
shortcomings, such as making the offeror bound without knowing whether or not the 
offer was accepted, making a seller who sells his goods to a third party after waiting 
for a reasonable time for an answer liable for damages when acceptance was delayed 
or lost in the post and, worst of all, creating a contract even if the offeree withdraws 
his letter from the post office or prevents its delivery to the offeror96 or if it is lost 
through an accident in the post.97 These shortcomings notwithstanding, the rule does 
serve a useful function in that it limits the offeror’s power to revoke his offer with 
impunity.
In French law, various theories have been advanced to pinpoint the moment of 
formation. Two of these theories (declaration and expedition) contend that the 
contract is formed before the arrival of the letter of acceptance while the other two 
(reception and information) assert that the contract is formed only when that letter 
arrives at its destination.
There is no article in the French Civil Code directly supporting any of these 
theories. These theories have been criticised on different grounds and none can be 
said to be the clearly established theory. In fact, it has been argued that no general 
rule can be laid down and that the answer to the question when acceptance becomes 
effective can and should vary according to the facts, the nature of the contracts, the 
interests involved and the intention of the parties.98
The Cour de Cassation has not adopted any of the theories outright,99 whereas 
the court of appeal and other lower courts, when dealing with the question of time 
and not place of contract formation, have allowed their decisions to be governed by
95 Treitel, p. 25.
96 Nussbaum, "Comparative Aspects o f the Anglo-American Offer and Acceptance Doctrine" (1936) 36 
Col.L.R. 921
97 Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co. Ltd v. Grant (1879) 4 E x.D . 216, overruling 
British and American Television Co. v. Colson (1871) L.R. 6 Ex. 108.
98 Schlessinger, p. 1450; Carbonnier, para. 101(e); Weill & Terre, para. 152.
99 Colin et Capitant, para. 38; Planiol & Ripert (ed. Esmein), para. 187.
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equitable considerations.100 It might be fair to say however, that on the whole the 
French courts have shown a tendency to apply the theory of reception to the question 
of when the contract is formed.101
In the absence of any decided cases on the subject of contracts by correspondence, 
one can only assume that the common law rule as laid down in Adams v. Lindsell 
will prevail, if and when the courts in Common Law Cameroon are confronted with 
the problem.102
The position in Civil Law Cameroon is equally difficult to predict, partly as a 
result of the various theories that have been propounded in France, and partly because 
the Cameroonian Civil Code is silent on the matter. However, in Ste SINCOM v. 
Ste Vacalopoulos,m  the question as to when a postal notice took effect was raised. 
A notice of service had been sent by registered mail to the counsel of one of the 
parties who later claimed not to have received it. Since the mail had been registered, 
the date of posting was recorded. That notwithstanding, it was held by the then East 
(French) Cameroon Supreme Court that a postal notice takes effect, not from the date 
of posting, but from the date of reception. Even though that case did not directly 
concern a contract by correspondence, it nevertheless dealt with the posting rule and 
is therefore pertinent to this inquiry. By ruling as it did, the Supreme Court can be 
said to have endorsed the reception theory so one may expect that theory to prevail 
in Civil Law Cameroon.
It follows from the foregoing analysis that both systems in Cameroon might 
provide different answers to the question of when a contract by correspondence is 
formed. This difference is potentially a source of conflicts. Potentially because, so 
far there does appear to be no case in which both systems have clashed on the issue
100 cf. Planiol et Ripert (ed Esmein), para. 5.
101 For example, see Cass Civ. 21.72.1960, D. 1961 417, note Malaure; Kahn-Freund, Sourcebook, 
p. 345.
I0: It must be remembered that as a pre-1900 decision, Adams v. Lindsell is binding on the common 
law courts in Cameroon.
103 Arret No. 5 du 26 Fev. 1965 (1965) no. 12 B .A .C .S.C .O . 1070.
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of time in the formation of contracts. The reasons for the absence of any such cases 
are explained below under the sub-heading of place of formation. But the absence 
of actual litigation on the subject does not in any way dispense with the need for a 
brief discussion of the problem. I shall use a hypothetical case to analyze the 
problem.
Suppose X, in Buea (common law) sends by post an offer to sell goods to Y, in 
Douala (civil law), who posts back an acceptance which is lost in the post. By the 
(common) law in force in Buea, there is a contract because acceptance is effective on 
posting. By the (civil) law in Douala, there is no contract because acceptance is 
effective only on receipt. Which law is then to decide when or whether a contract was 
made?104
There are scarcely any English authorities on choice of law rules to be applied in 
deciding whether the parties to an alleged contract have reached agreement.105 It 
is proposed that if and when the Cameroonian courts are confronted with this 
problem, they should apply what is called the putative proper law as a solution.1(16 
On this approach the court will have to determine which law would be the proper law 
in the objective sense on the assumption that a contract was made.107 If, in my 
hypothetical example, the offer had stated that the goods were to be delivered and the 
price paid in Douala, then no doubt, if a contract was made, the proper law would 
be the civil law, as the contract will be most closely connected with Douala, where 
civil law operates. Then civil law would be applied to decide whether there was a 
contract, with the result that there would not be, on account of the reception theory.
104 Jaffey, Offer and Acceptance and Related Questions in English Conflict o f Laws (1975) 24 I.C .L .Q . 
603-616, discusses this problem.
103 Jaffey, Op. c it., note 104, 604.
106 Dicey and Moris (The Conflict o f Laws (9th ed.) rule 148, p. 763) favour this solution: "The 
formation o f  a contract is governed by that law which would be the proper law o f  the contract if  the 
contract was validly concluded".
107 Cheshire & North, (11th ed.), p. 216.
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This approach was used obiter in the Albeko,108 the only English case so far 
on offer and acceptance in the conflict of laws. In that case, a Swiss company 
alleged it had posted a letter of acceptance for a contract of agency to an English 
company, the would be principal. The letter was never received and it was found as 
a fact that it had not been posted, with the result that there was no contract. Even 
though the finding that the letter had not been posted was enough to dispose of the 
case, Salmon J. went further to express the view that even if it had been posted, there 
would still be no contract, because under Swiss law (which would have been the 
proper law, the offer having been communicated there and the contract of agency to 
be performed there) a contract is concluded only when acceptance is received by the 
offeror.
It is acknowledged that the putative proper law approach is not without its 
difficulties.109 First, it is not clear whether in ascertaining which is the putative 
proper law, account should be taken of an alleged choice of law in the supposed 
contract. Suppose an offer to sell goods is posted from common law Cameroon to 
an offeree in the civil law part, the goods to be delivered and the price to be paid in 
the civil law part, and the contract to be governed by the law in the common law. 
The offeree posts an acceptance, later changes his mind and cables a rejection, which 
the offeror receives first. Under common law there is a contract but under civil law 
there is not. Assuming that a contract was made, then its proper law would be the 
common law with the result that there would be a contract. But it seems both to beg 
the question and to be unjust to the offeree, to allow common law to decide that the 
parties reached the agreement, merely because the offeror claims that a contract was 
made including a provision that it should be governed by English law, when the
108 Albeko Schumaschinen v. Kamborian Shoe Machine Co. Ltd [1961] 111 L.J 519. This same 
approach was followed in Britannia S. S. Insurance Association v. Ausonia Assicurazione Spa [1984] 
2 Ll.R. 98, C .A ., on the question whether a person signing a contract had the authority to do so.
109 Libling, "Formation o f International Contracts" (1979) 42 M .L.R . 169, criticises the accepted 
wisdom o f the putative proper law and argues that the correct interpretation o f  such cases as the Albeko 
and Mackender v. Feldia), points to the importance o f distinguishing questions o f  classification  
(governed by lex fo r i) and validity (governed by the putative proper law); For other difficulties o f  the 
putative proper law, see generally Jaffey, Introduction to the Conflict o f Laws, 1988, p. 163 ff.
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offeree denies that he agreed to any such thing. This may sound theoretical and has 
certainly not happened in Cameroon. Yet one cannot exclude the possibility of its 
arising someday.110
English courts have had to consider this particular difficulty with different 
conclusions. In Mackender v. Feldia A .G .,111 Diplock L.J. thought that the 
question whether a contract had been made should not be decided by the law specified 
in a choice of law clause in the alleged contract, for if no contract had been made, 
it would follow that the law in question had not been agreed between the parties. In 
The P arou th ,112 on the other hand, the Court of Appeal seems to have accepted, 
obiter, 113 that English law, as the law which would be the implied chosen proper 
law of the contract (because the alleged contract contained a proviso for arbitration 
in English) if it was made, should determine whether it was made. It should follow 
that if the alleged contract contained an express choice of law clause then that law 
should decide whether the contract was made.
It is suggested that the better view is that of Diplock L.J. in M ackender v. 
Feldia. It by no means follows from the fact that the parties agreed on a particular 
law to govern their contract that they also agreed that it should govern the question 
of whether they had made a contract at all. In other words, the question whether the 
parties have agreed on an alleged choice of law clause could arise independently of 
the question whether the parties had reached agreement on the contract itself. One 
should therefore ignore any alleged choice of law in the disputed contract and 
determine the question whether the parties had reached agreement by an objectively 
ascertained putative proper law i.e. the laws of the province (in the case of 
Cameroon) with which the contract would be most closely connected assuming that
110 The Canadian case o f Renfrew Mills, On. c it.. note 77, is proof that situations like that can occur 
in practice.
111 [1967] 2 Q.B. 590 at 602-3.
"= [1982] 2 LL.R. 351 C.A.
113 The issue itself was whether leave should be granted for service abroad under RSC Order 11-1 on 
the ground that the contract was governed by English Law.
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it was made, as in the Albeko case.
Another difficulty with the putative proper law approach, even if ascertained 
objectively, is that it will be unjust to hold a party bound by the law of another 
province ( a common law province, for instance) in circumstances in which he is not 
bound by the law of his own province (e.g. the civil law). For example, when by his 
own law, he can change his mind between posting and receipt of acceptance, but not 
by the common law. This difficulty has been recognised by the EEC Rome 
convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations.114 
The difficulties of the putative proper law approach notwithstanding, it still remains 
the best solution to the problem of determining when a contract is made in conflict situations. 
It certainly will be useful in Cameroon and to avoid some of its difficulties, there should be 
some qualifications, possibly on similar lines to article 8 (2) of the Rome Convention.
(2). The Place of Contract Formation
It is important to determine the place of contract formation because of the problems of 
venue and the problems pertaining to the applicable law in matters of conflict of laws.
At common law, a contract is made at the place where the last act necessary for its 
formation is done. In matters of contracts by telephone, court decisions have established that 
the contract is made at the place where the recipient of the call is at the time he accepts the 
offer1
French law is not settled on this issue. It is stated in general terms that the place where 
the contract is made is that place where the minds of the parties actually meet. Where the
114 To the normal rule that the putative proper law (even including an alleged choice o f  law by the
parties) determines whether the parties reached agreement (articles 3(4) and 8), is added the following
proviso o f art. 8 (2):
"Nevertheless, a party may rely upon the law o f the country in which he has 
habitual residence to establish that he did not consent if  it appears from the
circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect o f  his
conduct in accordance with the law specified in the preceding paragraph."
115 Entores Ltd  v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 3 WLR 48 (CA).
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parties are face to face, one can easily understand this general statement but what if the 
parties are at different places?116 In this regard it is said that the place where the contract 
is formed depends on the moment it is concluded. This too is hardly a satisfactory answer 
if one bears in mind that there is not a clear cut answer to the question as to when a contract 
is formed in French law.117 However, since the majority of French decision seem to favour 
the reception theory when answering the question as to when a contract is formed, one may 
say it is admitted that the contract is formed at the place where the letter of acceptance is 
received. The Cour de Cassation has always maintained that the question is one of fact and 
therefore within the pouvoir souverain of the trial court.
In Cameroon, the question of place of contract formation does not raise any serious 
problems. It is also not of very major importance because jurisdiction is not necessarily 
determined by the place where the contract is made.118 This question only assumes 
importance in cases where the parties are inter absentes, such as in contracts by 
correspondence.
But in Cameroon, it is always very easy to determine where any given contract was 
formed. This is because the vast majority of contracts are negotiated and concluded inter 
praesentis. It is rare for a contract to be concluded entirely by correspondence. That 
contracts are almost always concluded inter praesentes can be explained by the fact that 
commercial life in Cameroon is not highly depersonalised. Also, the regularity of business 
connections (and correspondence) between different localities is not very much developed. 
People generally prefer to go about their affairs in a very local way. They will do business 
with the local carpenter, the local bank, the local bookseller, etc., and only in cases where 
the required service or goods is not available in their locality will they get involved with 
people from different places which may necessitate correspondence. Besides, the "super 
information highway" (e.g. telephone, telefax, telesales, e-mail) is not yet widely available 
in Cameroon.
116 This does not include contract by telephone. See Weill & Terre, para. 137.
117 See the respective theories discussed below above under "Time o f Contract Formation".
118 See chapter 3 above.
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CHAPTER SIX.
CONSIDERATION AND CAUSE
An essential feature of both the English common law and French civil law is the 
rule that not every promise or agreement made will be enforced by the courts. If the 
basis of such a rule was dictated by commonsense,1 the need for it was re-inforced 
by the emergence of the economic doctrine of laissez faire and autonomy of the will 
respectively as the basis of the law of contract. If these doctrines were applied 
unrestrictively, they would have ascribed legally binding effects to all agreements, 
even to the mere coincidence of the wills of the contracting parties. The consequence 
of this would have been a shift from a period of extreme formalism to one of extreme 
consensualism.
Both systems found it necessary, therefore, to evolve a test for actionability of 
agreement that will create legal obligations but they differ in the methods which they 
have adopted to distinguish between promises that are enforceable in law and those 
that are not.2 The common law found this test in that "insular doctrine and unique 
phenomenon",3 the doctrine of consideration; according to which a promise not 
under seal must be supported by consideration to be enforceable. The civil law for 
its part evolved the doctrine of cause.
In this study, these doctrines shall be treated seperately for the following reasons. 
Firstly, although the reasons for their introduction are broadly analogous,4 their
1 Sutton, Consideration Reconsidered, 1974, p .l.
2 Von Mehren, "Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative 
Analysis" (1959) 72 Harv.L.R. 1078.
3 Sutton, op.cit.. note 1, p .l.
4 David, "Cause et Consideration" In: Melanges Maury, Vol. 2, 1960, p. 113; 
Markensinis, "Cause and Consideration: A Study in Parallel" (1978) 37 C.L.J. 55.
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origins are different and so too are their respective forms. Secondly, the doctrine of 
consideration applies only in the common law jurisdiction of Cameroon while the 
application of the doctrine of cause is limited only to the civil law jurisdiction.
1. CONSIDERATION
The twentieth century has witnessed several attacks5 on and some modifications 
of the doctrine of consideration in England and various common law jurisdictions, 
especially the U.S.A (where the doctrine has received its closest scrutiny and been 
subjected to perhaps its harshest criticism).6 There have even been calls for the 
abrogation of the doctrine.7
As a result of this twentieth century revolt on the practical functioning of the 
doctrine of consideration in other common law jurisdictions, it becomes vital for this 
study to attempt to assess its value and application in Cameroon and to consider 
whether the doctrine requires any changes or modifications. In short, to discover, 
"wherein it fits and wherein it is out of joint".8 I shall start with a brief discussion 
on the origin and definition.
5 Lord Wright, "Ought the Doctrine o f Consideration be Abolished" (1936) 49 
Harv.L.R. 1125; then see, the 6th Interim Report of the Law Reform Committee, 
Cmnd. 5449, 1937 and the ensuing literature it provoked such as: Hamson, "The 
Reform o f Consideration" (1938) 54 L.Q.R 233; Mason, "The Utility o f Consideration 
- A Comparative View" (1941) 41 Col.L.R. 825, and Chloros, "The Doctrine o f  
Consideration and the Reform o f the Law Contract" (1968) 17 I.C.L.Q. 137.
6 See for example the 1941 Symposium on Consideration, covered by (1941) 41 
Col.L.R.
7 Chloros, op. cit.. note 5.
8 Llewelyn, "On the Complexity' o f Consideration - A Foreword" (1941) 41
Col.L.R. 777, 782.
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(1). THE ORIGIN AND DEFINITION CONSIDERATION.
I do not here intend to recount the history of the origin of the doctrine. Suffice 
it to say that the origin of the doctrine of consideration is obscure and controversial. 
Holmes9 thought it arose from the quid pro quo of the action of debt. Fifoot10 
found it in the bargain theory of agreements in English law and Holdsworth11 has 
suggested that it arose from the tortious nature of the action of the assumpsit, the 
detriment being the damage resulting from the breach of the obligation. The 
disagreement as to its origin notwithstanding, the doctrine gained considerable judicial 
approval in the 17th and 18th Century. It was not until 1765 that Lord Mansfield 
began questioning its validity and operational scope.
His bold attempt in Pillans v. Van Mierop12 to introduce writing in lieu of 
consideration and the failure of that attempt in Rann v. Hughes13 are already too 
well known to deserve any further treatment here. Undetered by that failure, Lord 
Mansfield next chose to equate consideration to a moral obligation,14 an approach 
which, though accepted at the time was later to be forcefully rejected by Lord 
Denman in Eastwood v. Kenyon.15
Thus for over two centuries now, English law has accepted the position that an 
informal agreement not supported by consideration cannot be enforced by the court. 
This means that consideration was firmly part of English contract law at the time it 
was introduced in Cameroon and the common law courts in Cameroon have since
9 Holmes, Common Law, (1881), chapter 7.
1U Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law (1st ed.,1949), at 398.
11 Holdsworth, The History of English Law, Vol.8 p .11.
12 (1765) 3 Burr 1663.
13 (1778) 7 Term Rep. 350.
14 In Hawkes v. Saunders (1782) 1 Cowper 289.
15 (1840) 11 Ad.& El. 438.
205
applied the doctrine very rigorously.
Like its origin, the precise definition of consideration, has provoked some
controversy and uncertainty.16 This may perhaps be due to the complex and subtle
way that the doctrine developed in England. Several divergent definitions have been
advanced.17 But the classic or traditional definition, was propounded by Lush J. in
Currie v. M isa:18
"A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist either in 
some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some 
forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or 
undertaken by the other."
This identification of consideration in terms of benefit and detriment has been
seriously questioned and is often considered as unsatisfactory.19
An alternative definition, advanced by Pollock:20
"An act or forbearance of one party, or the promise thereof, is the 
price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise 
thus given for value is enforceable",
was adopted by the House of Lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre v. Selfridge & Co. 
Ltd21 and by the English Law Revision Committee, 1937 in their report on the
16 See, Lord Wright, op. cit. note 5, 1226.
17 In Lindgren, Carter and Harland, Contract Law in Australia, 1986, p .80, 10 
definitions are reproduced.
18 (1875) L.R 10 Ex. 153.
19 Treitel, The Law of Contract, 1991, pp. 65-66; Fifoot op.cit.. note 10, p .406 
referred to the problems of benefit and detriment as follows: "The antithesis‘detriment 
and benefit’, which Victorian judges repeated as a confident formula, was at yet no 
more than a convenient phrase, and the principle which it reflected still lay open to 
the impression of new minds and new necessities." Also, Cheshire, Fifoot & 
Furmston: Law of Contract, 1991, p. 73.
20 Pollock, Principles of Contract (13th ed.), p. 133.
21 [1915] A.C. 847, 855.
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doctrine of consideration.22
Definitions such as Pollock’s emphasize the element of bargain and are indeed, 
sometimes referred to as the "bargain theory of consideration",23 clearly indicating 
that there must be some link between the forbearance or detriment sufferred or 
undertaken by one party and the promise by the other. This link is a request, or in 
the words of Pollock, the price.
Cameroonian common law courts so far, have not shown any consciousness of a 
distinction between the various definitions or any tendency to accept any of them 
outright. However, while there have been instances in which the courts have sought 
to establish the presence of consideration in terms of benefit or detriment, on the 
whole, they have shown a greater inclination towards the bargain theory.
Without undermining the definition of a legal concept as an aid to its 
understanding, I shall dismiss the failure or the reluctance of Cameroonian courts to 
adopt any one definition as of no real significance to the present exercise. After all, 
it has been said that "contract in any legal system may be based on the principle 
either of promise or of bargain, and the one has no innate superiority over the 
other. "24
What is important here, is the fact that the doctrine is firmly established in that 
part of Cameroon where the common law operates. The Cameroonian courts have 
never set out to define it. Rather, they have been concerned with the much more 
practical problem of deciding in the course of litigation whether a particular promise 
in a particular case should be enforced. It is to such concerns that I now turn.
22 Cmd. 5449, s. 17 p. 12; see also Lord Wright, op.cit.. note 5, p. 1227.
23 See for example, The Restatement of Contracts, 2d, s.75; Sutton, "Promises 
and Consideration" In: Finn (ed): Essays on Contract, 1987, p.35.
24 Fifoot, op.cit.. note 10, p.398.
(2). JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN CAMEROON.
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It follows from the the bargain theory of consideration that consideration must not 
be past, that the price paid must be paid by the promisee, that what is paid is not 
worthless but must be of some value in the eye of the law and that any act done by 
the promisee on the faith of the promise being kept will not be consideration unless 
it is expressly or impliedly requested by the promisor as the return for his promise. 
I shall now briefly consider how the Cameroonian courts have applied these cardinal 
rules of consideration.
(a). An Informal Agreement Must be Supported by Consideration
Not very often is consideration, or rather the lack of it, a main issue before the 
courts. Most cases arise out of simple contracts where the presence of consideration 
is all too obvious and is therefore not disputed. But where the courts find that it is 
absent, they certainly will refuse to enforce the agreement.
Thus in John Fonbah v. Emmanuel Ojechi,25 the plaintiff bought a gallon of 
engine oil from the defendant’s petrol garage. The defendant’s staff helped the 
plaintiff to put the oil into his car engine. When the car later developed serious 
mechanical problems, the plaintiff alleged that it was caused by the defendant’s staff 
who had negligently failed to close the engine properly after filling it with oil and he 
sued for breach of contract.
The defendant argued that neither he nor his staff was under any contract to put 
the oil into appellant’s engine and that the action of his staff amounted to nothing 
more than a gratuitous service to the plaintiff. The only contract he had with the 
plaintiff, he admitted, was the contract of sale. It was held by the Buea Court of 
Appeal, affirming the decision of the the trial judge, that no contract existed which 
required defendant to put the oil into the plaintiffs engine since there was no
25 Civ.Ap. No.CASWP/39/78 (Buea, unreported).
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consideration for such service.26
(b). Past Consideration
The general rule at common law is that past consideration (where an act is done 
well before the promise is made)27 does not amount to valid consideration. A 
typical example of past consideration is where the consideration is motivated by 
gratitude or sentiment, and does not necessarily form part of the contract. Thus 
where a contract has been concluded, a subsequent promise which is independent of 
the contract is a past consideration.28
There are no clear Cameroonian examples of actual decisions where consideration 
has been declared to be past but there have been attempts to invoke the rule. In 
David Tala Ndi v. Daniel Chamba Wanji29 the appellant, a timber dealer agreed 
to hire the respondent’s engine-saw for 30 days at a price of 30.000 francs or iroko 
timber worth that amount. The agreement was signed between the respondent and 
a certain Raphael on behalf of, and with the authority of, the appellant. This 
agreement was later read out to the appellant who then counter-signed it before the 
saw was handed over to him. In an action by the respondent for breach of contract 
(appellant had failed to pay the hire charges and to return the saw), it was argued 
rather misguidedly on behalf of the appellant that any consideration he had furnished 
was past because he had signed the agreement after it had already been concluded 
between his agent, Raphael, and the respondent.
The Bamenda Appeal Court, upholding the high court, rejected such a baseless
26 One would have thought that any chance of success that the plaintiff had who have 
been better framed in tort, precisely on negligence, assuming that he was owed a duty 
of care.
27 Eastwood v. Kenyon (1840) 11 Ad. and E.438.
28 Roscorla v. Thomas (1842) 3 Q.B. 234.
29 BCA/28/89 (Bamenda, 5/7/91, unreported).
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argument, pointing out quite correctly that the doctrine of past consideration simply 
did not arise. This was substantially one transaction, the fact that the appellant signed 
the agreement after the respondent had done so was irrelevant.
It must be said, from the authority of English decisions, that the courts are not 
irrevocably committed to carry the principle of past consideration to its logical 
conclusion as that is likely to lead to strange results in some situations. The rule has 
in justifiable situations been relaxed and applied with some measure of commonsense. 
The general guidelines are that an act done before a promise was made can amount 
to consideration for it if three conditions are satisfied: the act must have been done 
at the request of the promisor; there must have been an understanding that payment 
would be made; and payment must have been legally recoverable had it been made 
in advance.30
Although the decision in Bassum v. Youya31 cannot be considered as strong 
authority for the principle of past consideration, it nevertheless indicates that 
Cameroonian courts would be prepared to give effect to past consideration where the 
above mentioned conditions are present. In that case the defendant had promised to 
pay the plaintiff a certain undefined sum after an undefined period of time if the 
plaintiff would serve in his business. The plaintiff worked for the defendant for a 
eight years and in an action for the promised sum, the appeal court, reversing the 
high court, held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Even though the court did not discuss the three mentioned conditions, it is 
submitted that had the defendant raised the the defence of past consideration, the 
court would still have arrived at the same conclusion since the plaintiff had clearly 
acted on the defendant’s request with the understanding that he would be paid a sum, 
which sum was legally recoverable.
The real exceptions to the rule that consideration must not be past are statutory.
30 SeeLampleigh v. Brarhwait (1615) Hobart. 105 and Re Casey’s Patent (1892) 1 Ch. 
104.
31 BCA/48/84 (Bameda, 24.7.1985, unreported).
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The first one is to be found in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s.27(l)(b) to the 
effect that an antecedent debt or liability is good consideration for a bill of exchange. 
The other one is contained in the Limitation Act, 1980, s.27(5): where a debtor in 
a writing signed by him acknowledges a debt, it shall be deemed to have accrued on 
and not before that date of ackwoledgement. It is significant to point out here that 
only the former act applies in Cameroon, it being of pre-1900 birth. Therefore, there 
is only one real (statutory) exception to the rule on past consideration in Cameroon.
(c). Consideration Must Move from the Promisee
It is a cardinal principle of the common law of contract that consideration must 
move from the promisee. Expanded, this means that only the person who has 
furnished consideration in a contract can bring an action to enforce a promise given 
by the defendant in that contract. In other words, the plaintiff must be in a position 
to show that he had given value for the defendant’s. This is an age old rule32 that 
has been re-emphasised in the cases of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridges 
& Co. Ltd33 and Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation o f  New 
York,34
This rule was applied in the Cameroonian case of Ronate Tapong v. Joshua 
M obittP  I shall defer any discussion on this case until when I consider 
consideration and family arrangements in section 5 below. The rule that 
consideration must move from the promisee is rightly considered as one of the dark 
spots of the doctrine and later I shall argue and show how a strict adherence to it, 
especially in non-commercial cases, may sometimes lead to strange results.
32 See, Price v. Easton (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 433; Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 2 Q.B. 
851,859; Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) 1 B. & S. 393,398,399.
33 [1915] A.C. 847.
34 [1933] A .C.70.
3:1 BCA/31/74. (Bamenda, unreported).
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(d). Adequacy and Sufficiency of Consideration.
The basic rule is that consideration need not be adequate but must have some value 
in the eye of the law.36 This means that in general, the court will make no enquiry 
as to whether adequate value has been given or whether there is a fair equivalence of 
value.
This is well illustrated in the Cameroonian case of Francis Mokoto Ngute v. Paul 
Nwatu,37 By written agreement dated 14/9/1966, Emmanuel Ngute, the deceased 
brother of the appellant, leased out a piece of farmland to the respondent for a period 
of 40 years. The only consideration was what was described as 5.700 francs worth 
of kolanuts plus all the crops on the farmland at the expiry of the 40 years. As it 
turned out, Emmanuel died well before the expiry of the 40 years and his brother, 
Francis (the appellant) brought this action against the respondent for conversion and 
for an order that the farmland be transferred to him.
To support his case, the appellant argued that the length of the lease was 
unreasonably long and that what had been given in return was very small. It was 
held in the first place that the appellant was not a party to the contract and hence had 
no locus standi to complain. On the question of consideration, the court conceded 
that it looked derisory. Monono J even expressed some sympathy on behalf of the 
court when he said, "40 years is a long time and we cannot help wondering how 
Emmanuel knew he would live to enjoy his consideration". But sympathy was all that 
the court was prepared to offer as it did not feel compelled to "equalise" the 
obligations or interfere with the contract. The consideration, however token or 
nominal, was valid consideration.
However, while the courts will not attempt to equalise a bargain made by the 
parties, in exceptional cases an extremely conspicuous inequality may be used as
36 Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 2 Q.B. 851,859; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball 
(1893) 1 Q.B. 256; Chappell & Co. Ltd. v. Nestle Co. Ltd. [1960] A.C. 87.
37 CASWP/21/86 (Buea, unreported).
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evidence to suggest that the contract had been brought about by fraud, duress, mistake 
or misrepresentation or just possibly that there was never any intention to create legal 
relations. This certainly is the position in England38 and it can be said, that had there 
been any evidence of some vitiating factor in the Cameroonian case just considered 
above, the court would have refused to sanction the contract.
Although the law does not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, it is bound 
to consider whether consideration is sufficient. It follows that where on proper 
examination a purported consideration amounts to a mere performance of an existing 
obligation, the court will refuse to enforce such an obligation. Sufficiency of 
consideration must therefore be clearly distinguished from adequacy of consideration. 
I shall briefly consider situations in which legal arguments have been put forward in 
an attempt to determine whether the court will accept that the promise by one party 
has been sufficiently bought or paid for by consideration that has a legal value.
It is in the area of pre-existing duties that this debate is at its strongest.39 The 
question is whether a person can provide sufficient consideration by performing a pre­
existing legal duty. The answer to this question depends on how the duty arose.
The general rule is that a promise to perform a duty imposed by law does not 
amount to consideration for a promise given in return. But where a person does an 
act which is well in excess of that imposed by the law on him, that will amount to
38 For example, LLoyds Bank v. Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326, 337, where there was a 
presumption of undue influence. It should be noted that this was said to be an 
exceptional case that turned on very special facts. Normally the presumption of 
undue influence does not apply between banker and customer (NatWest Bank v. 
Morgan [1985] A.C. 686).
39 Davis, "Promises to Perfom an Existing Duty" (1938) 6 C.L.J. 202; Goodhart, 
"Performance o f an Existing Duty as Consideration" (1956) 72 L.Q.R. 490; 
Reynolds and Treitel, " Consideration for the Modification o f Contracts" (1965) 7 
Malaya L.R. 1; Aivazian, Trebilock & Penny, "The Law o f Contract Formations: The 
Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark o f Enforceability" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
173.
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consideration.40
Where the duty is imposed by contract with a third party, it is generally agreed 
that the performance of that duty can constitute consideration. Shadwell v. 
Shadwel?1 is authority for that view, but in the Cameroonian case of Ronate 
Tapong v. Joshua M obitf2 the Bamenda Court of Appeal refused to accept or adopt 
such a view. The respondent paid some money as dowry to the appellant on the 
understanding and agreement of both that the appellant would marry the respondent’s 
junior brother. The appellant eventually backed out of the arrangement and in an 
action for a refund of the money she had received, the court of appeal, reversing the 
high court, held that the respondent could not suceed.
I have already criticised the decision of this case on different grounds43 and I 
shall do so again with regard to the court’s interpretation of the doctrine of 
consideration below.44 The decision, however, should not be taken as conclusive 
proof that Cameroonian courts would never consider the performance of a duty to a 
third party as consideration since the court did not think that it was addressing that 
issue specifically. I have only cited this case to suggest that the courts have had an 
opportunity to do so, yet failed to take it. .
It was once thought that a promise owed to a third party, as distinct from actual 
performance could not amount to consideration but it is now settled in England that 
a promise to perform to a third party, no less than its actual performance, would
40 Ward v. Byham [1956] 1 W.L.R. 496; Glasbrook Bros. Ltd. v. Glamorgan 
C.C. [1925] A.C. 270; there is no Cameroonian case on this point.
4] (1860) 9 C.B (N.s) 159; Scotson v. Pegg (1861) 6 H. & N. 295.
42 BCA/31/74 (Bamenda, unreported).
43 In chapter 2, I argued that this case should have been dealt with exclusively 
according to the native laws and custom of the parties as this was what the parties 
clearly contemplated when they entered into the agreement.
44 See section 5 on Consideration and Family Arrangements (Non-Commercial 
Contracts).
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constitute consideration.45 It is hoped Cameroonian courts will do the same if and 
when the matter comes before them.
Finally, where the promisee is under a duty imposed by contract with the 
promisor, the general rule, as enshrined in Stilk v. Myrick46 is that any promise by 
him to perform that same duty does not amount to consideration. There have been 
some recent decisions, notably Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) 
Ltd,*1 which cast doubts on the age old authority of Stilk v. Myrick though not 
overruling it as such. The traditional position is still followed in Cameroon as Lucy 
Effiom v. Mafcoop (infra) demonstrates. As this case is given a detail consideration 
in the next section, there is no need to do so here.
So far, and notwithstanding the fact that there are few cases which deal with the 
theme of consideration, I have attempted to establish that the doctrine of consideration 
is fully entrenched in the contract law of Anglophone Cameroon. I shall next pass on 
to an examination of some areas48 where a stringent application of the doctrine of 
consideration, as the courts are inclined to doing, may lead to practical problems and 
illogical results. These include the modification of contracts, irrevocable offers, and 
.family or non-commercial arrangements.
(3). CONSIDERATION AND THE MODIFICATION OF EXISTING
CONTRACTS.
Traditionally, the requirement of consideration has been insisted on, not only for 
the normal formation of contracts, but also for the modification of existing contracts. 
The principle here is that the promise or performance of an action which one is
45 Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614.
46 (1809) Camp. 317.
47 [1991] 1 Q.B. 1.
48 These are discussed in Llewellyn, "When Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective" 
(1931) 40 Yale L.J. 741.
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already obliged to do under a contract with the promisee cannot be good consideration 
for a new promise. The case that is regarded as the foundation of this rule is the old 
one Stilk v. Myrick.
While some have sought to explain this case on the basis of public policy 
considerations relating to the impropriety of the pressure placed on the captain49 it 
has long been accepted that the better explanation is that of lack of consideration;50 
that is, that the promise by the captain to share the wages of deserting seamen 
between the rest of the crew was unenforceable, being unsupported by fresh 
consideration.
Although local judicial authority on this aspect is rather thin, there is some reason 
to believe that Cameroonian courts will follow the traditional rule as enunciated in 
Stilk v. Myrick, at least on the strength of the decision in Lucy Effiom v. 
Mafcoop.*1 The plaintiff contracted to build a produce store for the defendants, the 
local co-operative. The agreed price was four million francs. On commencing work, 
the plaintiff found out that the execution of the contract would be far more onerous 
than expected. The site was in a valley, thus making excavation very difficult. To 
make matters worse, there was neither water, gravel, nor stones in that area. It was 
clear, therefore, that the plaintiff would have to incur heavy extra costs. The plaintiff 
drew this to the attention of the defendants and the resident rural engineer, who in his
49 This is not entirely without support: in Harris v. Watson (1791) Peake 102, the 
ship was in danger when the captain offered the seamen 5 guineas each for 
exerting themselves to save the ship. It was held they could not recover on the ground 
that it would be against public policy to allow such claims by sailors who might, in 
emergency, force a captain to make extravagant promises.
Also, one report of Stilk v. Myrick at (1809) 6 Esp. 129 does not mention 
consideration at all and states that the principle of public policy in the Harris case 
was recognised as a just and proper policy.
Serious doubts have been casts on Espinasse’s report that explains the decision on 
public policy grounds. See, Percy’s review of Studies in Contract Law, Reiter & 
Swan, eds., 1980, in (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 853, 857, 858; see also Gilmore, 
Death of Contract, pp.23-28 for the contradictions in the various reports.
51 HCM/2/86.
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capacity as the government engineer, was official supervisor of all defendants’ 
building projects. Her demand for an extra 6 million francs was cut down to an extra 
4 million francs on the advice of the supervising engineer and with the apparent 
acceptance of the defendants.
The plaintiff duly completed the structure and was paid 4 million francs (the 
original contract price) plus another 1 million francs which the defendants submitted 
was all she was entitled to for her extra costs. The plaintiff claimed that she was due 
an extra 4 million francs and sued for the residue. It was held that the plaintiff could 
not recover on the ground that there was no consensus ad idem as to the additional 
payment of 4 million francs. But nothing was said of the extra 1 million francs that 
the defendants actually paid, i.e. the court did not explain why it thought it need have 
been paid at all by the defendants.
The judge cited no authorities in his judgement, yet had he felt the need to buttress 
his decision with authority, he might have found some comfort in Stilk v. Myrick, in 
which case he would have had to explain his decision in terms of lack of fresh 
consideration rather than the questionable lack of consensus ad idem analysis he 
employed. This is questionable because it was not found as a fact that there was no 
consensus regarding the extra payment. Either way, however, the result would be 
the same - the plaintiff would not suceed.
Strictly speaking, the Lucy Effiom  decision may be good law in the sense of 
traditional common law principles since the outcome is in line with the Stilk v. 
Myrick rule but the question must be asked whether such an outcome is desirable and 
fair. In my opinion the outcome is not fair, especially for the social and economic 
conditions of Cameroon at present. Even though the court did not explain its decision 
in terms on consideration, this case remains very pertinent to the subject of contract 
modification and I intend to use it to argue that the time has come for a shift from the 
traditional position to a more flexible and commercially friendly one.
Arguably, there is sufficient justification for caution when a court is asked to 
enforce a promise that modifies an existing contract, consideration apart. There are 
two possible reasons why a promise modifying an existing promise or contract might
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be unenforceable. The first is that the new promise might be made without sufficient 
deliberation by the promisor52 and the second is that there may be duress or more 
broadly, some reason for regarding enforcement of the new promise as objectionable.
On the first point, it must be said that while the presence of consideration may be 
evidence of sufficient deliberatness, it is not the only test of deliberateness.53 
Business and commercial arrangements often present a wide range of factors all of 
which may point to, or justify enforcement.54 In other words, they may be other 
reasons for enforcement, the absence of consideration notwithstanding. The concern 
that one might have that the agreement not be carelessly made is expended once it is 
clear that a contract (such as to build a house as in the Lucy Effiom case) has been 
made. Once parties are already in a contractual arrangement it should be possible to 
presume that any modification of the arrangement is made with the kind of care that 
would preclude any argument that the parties had no intention to alter their legal 
relationship. It is hard to understand the court’s finding that there was no consensus 
ad idem on the alleged promise by the defendant to pay for the extra costs in the Lucy 
Effiom  case, as that implies that the plaintiff knowingly incurred costs equal to the 
contract price without the consent, express or implied by the defendant. Certainly, 
if the plaintiff had been expressly told that she was not to be compensated for such 
substantial extra costs, she would surely have preferred to refuse to perform and pay 
damages, which in any case would not have been as much as the extra costs she 
incurred in performing. This is only good economic sense.55
52 Fuller, "Consideration and Fom" (1941) 41 Col. L.R. 799.
:’3 This point has been cogently argued by Swan, "Consideration" In: Reiter and 
Swan, eds., Studies in Contract Law., 1980 p.29; see also, Lord Wright, op. cit.. 
note 5, 1229.
54 In the Lucy Effiom case for instance, the unchallenged facts of the increased cost 
plus the costs and delays in hiring a new contractor may be considered good reasons 
for enforcement.
;o For an economic analysis of the law relating to contractual modifications, see 
Halson, "Opportunism, Economic Duress and Contract Modifications'' (1991) 107 
L.Q.R, 649; Aivazian, Trebilock, and Penny, Op. cit.. note 39, 173.
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The second reason that might justify a refusal to enforce the promise could be that 
there was duress or unconscionable conduct on the part of the plaintiff. The presence 
of economic duress, like fraud, might if proven, make any contract voidable.56 It 
is bad social and economic policy to enable promisors to break or threaten to break 
contracts in order to secure acts or promises additional to those which the other 
contracting party is under an obligation to perform. Here again it is questionable 
whether consideration is necessarily the doctrine best suited for preventing economic 
duress or blackmail. If a promise by one party is found to have been made as a 
result of unconscionable conduct or illegitimate pressure by the other party, that 
promise should not be enforced, whether or not there is consideration. Yet, an 
inference that can be drawn from the judgement of Lord Ellenborough in Stilk v. 
Myrick is that, had the seamen had the foresight to offer the captain anything, 
however token for his promise, that promise would have been enforceable, and it 
would not have mattered how unconscionable they were by their conduct.
The irony here is that the mere presence of consideration will permit the 
enforcement of modificatory agreements which ought not to be enforced for reasons 
of public policy while on the other hand the absence of consideration will bar the 
enforcement of a modificatory agreement, which is very necessary for commercial 
and practical reasons. What this discloses, therefore, is that consideration is not 
always the most satisfactory tool for deciding what promises are going to be or should 
be enforced by the courts.
It is heartening then to note that the courts, while adhering closely to the Stilk v. 
Myrick rule, have not been totally insensitive to the problems involved. In order to 
curb some of the problems raised by the rules that a variation of a contract (either 
increasing or reducing one party’s obligation) must be supported by consideration, 
they have developed one useful exception in the doctrine of equitable or promissory
36 Palmer and Catpole, "Industrial Conflict, Breach o f Contract and Duress" (1985) 
48 M.L.R 102, and particularly the case of B. & S. Contracts and Design Ltd. v. 
Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] 1. C.R. 419; Fleming, "Contract- Economic 
Duress - Consideration" (1989) C.L.J 363 in which is discussed Atlas Express Ltd. 
v. Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd. [1989] 1 All E.R 641.
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estoppel while creating other limitations and exceptions to the rule in Foakes v. 
Beer,57 But the most serious challenge to the validity of the Stilk v. Myrick 
principle is to be found in the recent decision of Williams v. Rofey.58 It will be of 
some interest to consider these limitations and find out how useful, if at all, they have 
been or may be to Cameroonian courts.
(a). Equitable or Promissory Estoppel
This doctrine has gone a long way to mitigate the rigours of the classical rule that 
a promise made without consideration is unenforceable. It was established by Lord 
Cairns in the leading case of Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway,59 and re-incarnated 
by Denning J. in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd.50
Although this doctrine gives certain effect to promises without consideration, 
there are some important differences between the legal effect of a promise made 
under this doctrine and the effects of a variation which is contractually binding 
because it is supported by consideration. The first one is that while a variation alters 
the parties’ position once and for all, the effect of promissory estoppel on the other 
hand, is merely to suspend rights.61 Secondly, the principle of estoppel only applies 
where it would be ‘inequitable’ for the promisor to go back on his promise without 
due notice.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, welcomed as it may have been, is not without 
its difficulty. It can only be used as a defence to an action or as a subsidiary in
57 (1884) 9 Ap.Cas. 605.
58 [1990] 1 A.E.R. 512.
59 (1877) 2 A.C. 439, 448.
60 [1947] K.B. 130.
61 Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd. [1955] 2 A.E.R 
657.
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support of a major cause of action62 but not as a new cause of action, or in the oft- 
cited dictum of Birkett L.J. in Combe v. Combe,63 "as a shield but not a sword".
The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been given serious consideration in 
Cameroon in a trilogy of cases, all involving the same defendant, Brasseries du 
Cameroun. The first was John Mokake Elali v. Brasseries du Cameroun.64 The 
defendant brewery which had been the main supplier of drinks to the plaintiffs off- 
licence bar for a period of about 4 years, discontinued the supply as a result of 
plaintiffs allegation that the defendant had supplied him with unwholesome beer. 
The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract, claiming that the defendant, 
having promised to supply him with drinks at his premises and having actually done 
so for four years should be estopped from denying that promise since it would be 
inequitable to do so in the circumstances.
The defendants for their part argued, inter alia,65 that they were under no 
contract to supply drinks to the plaintiff at his off licence bar, as the plaintiff had 
furnished no consideration for such an arrangement. The Buea High Court dismissed 
that argument and found for the plaintiff. Njamnsi J. sought to explain his decision 
thus:
"Having so agreed or promised and acted upon the agreement for a 
period of over 4 years and thereby leading the plaintiff to rely and act 
upon the agreement, the cannot therefore go back on his
promise...to the detriment of the plaintiff without being liable to the 
plaintiff in damages. In coming to this conclusion..., I find legal 
solace in the opinion of Lord Justice Denning in the Central London 
Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd.)."
That decision was reversed on appeal on the grounds that for the doctrine to apply,
62 For an illustration of its use as a subsidiary ground, see Robertson v. Ministry o f  
Pensions (1949) 1 K.B 227; Foster v. Robinson (1951) 1 K.B 149, 152.
63 [1951] 1 A.E.R 767.
64 HCSW/35/75 (Buea, 6.1.1978, unreported).
65 The defendants also argued that their actions amounted to no more than an 
invitation to treat, see chapter 5, note 33.
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there must have been an existing legal relationship between the parties at the time the 
statement on which the estoppel is founded was made. Since the Court of Appeal 
agreed with the defendants’ contention that no contract existed because of want of 
consideration, they found little difficulty in rejecting the application of the doctrine.
It is difficult to see how the judgement of the Court of Appeal can be correct. 
The court failed to take note of the fact that even if the promise to supply drinks was 
made without consideration, such was the nature of the promise that it reasonably 
induced action on the faith of it or reliance upon it. The court should simply have 
determined whether that reliance had resulted in loss to the plaintiff/respondent, and 
if yes, then allow him to recover. Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reetf6 is authority for 
the proposition that even expenditure incurred before a contract may be recoverable. 
And in Lloyd v. Stanbury67 it was held that pre-contract expenditure may also be 
recoverable if it was incurred in reliance on an agreement before that agreement had 
become a legally binding contract. The decision of the Buea High Court, for me is 
clearly the more just one.
The doctrine has however been successfully invoked in Brasseries du Cameroun 
v. Achuo Daniel.68 Between 1961 to 1973, Daniel Achuo bought drinks regularly 
from Brasseries du Cameroun to sell to the public. In 1973 he was made the sole 
distributor for the North West Province and advised by Brasseries du Cameroun to 
buy vehicles and let them on hire to Brasseries du Camerooun. He obtained several 
vehicles on hire purchase which he used for distribution and for many years 
everything moved on smoothly. Then in 1989, the company stopped supplying 
drinks to him for distribution, on the pretext that he owed them money. Mr Achuo 
did not contest the debt but explained to Brasseries du Cameroun that he could only 
pay it if he remained in business with them. Because of their decision to discontinue 
supplying to him, his trucks had become idle with the consequence that he was
66 [1972] 1 Q.B. 60.
67 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 535.
68 BCA/24/91 (Bamenda, 19/3/1992, unreported).
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incapable of meeting the hire purchase payments. His appeal fell on deaf ears 
whereupon he brought an action for breach of contract. The trial judge found for 
him.
Brasseries du Cameroun appealed, repeating their argument that no contract ever 
existed between them and the plaintiff and claiming that their relationship amounted 
to no more than isolated instances of carriage of their products by the plaintiff. This 
argument did not find favour in the appeal court which confirmed the decision of the 
trial judge. It was held that considering the length of the parties’ relationship, plus 
the fact that the respondent had relied on it, it would be inequitable in the 
circumstances for the appellant to discontinue supplies without having given sufficient 
notice to the respondent.
In the third case, Ambe John v. Brasseries du Cameroun 69 the plaintiff who ran 
an off-license bar, was a customer of the defendants for about 15 years before 
becoming a wholesaler of their products. In order to qualify as such, he was told he 
would need vehicles as well as adequate storage facilities. He complied with these 
requirements to the satisfaction and approval of the local manager of Brasseries du 
Cameroun. He then acted as their wholesaler for a couple of years, when in a bitter 
twist, very reminiscent to the Mokake v. Brasseries case, he complained that he had 
found some foreign and strange substances in some of the defendants’ products. The 
defendant in their characteristic high-handedness, refused to supply any more drinks 
to the plaintiff. He sued for breach of contract.
Not surprisingly, the defendants contended again that they were under no contract 
to sell or supply drinks to the plaintiff. The judge rejected that argument. He held 
that a contract existed and that the defendants, having conducted themselves in such 
a way as to lead the plaintiff to believe he was entitled to be sold or supplied with 
drinks, must be estopped from so denying. In other words, it was inequitable for the 
defendants to back out unilaterally of the arrangement without good reason or 
sufficient notice to the plaintiff.
69 HCB/51/90 (Bamenda, 6/4/92, unreported).
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(b). Consideration and Part Payment of an Existing Debt.
In the celebrated Pinnel’s case10 the rule was laid down that a promise to forego 
part of a debt or any liability is not enforceable unless it is supported by 
consideration. That is to say payment of a lesser sum is no satisfaction of the debt. 
This doctrine was repeated and given its modem form by the House of Lords in 
Foakes v. Beer,11 and was discussed in the Cameroonian case of Denis Ndikum v. 
North West Development Authority (MIDENO).12 The defendants placed an order 
for stationery with the plaintiff, the understanding being that payment would be made 
upon delivery. Strangely, no price was agreed at this stage. The plaintiff delivered 
the goods and the defendants accepted delivery, signing the delivery note and invoice. 
The plaintiff presented a bill for 2.5 million francs but the defendants were only 
prepared to pay 700.000 francs.
In an action by the plaintiff for the full amount, it was held that by accepting 
delivery, the defendants had by their conduct, led the plaintiff to believe that they 
would meet his asking price and were therefore bound to pay. On the question of 
consideration, the court cited with approval the Nigerian case of T.D.Amao v. A.G. 
Ajibike & 3 others13 in which Taylor J. had reproduced Lord Coke’s speech in the 
Pinnel’s case to the effect that in the absence of some new obligation or thing, a 
lesser sum cannot be satisfaction to the plaintiff for a greater one. It must be said 
that this is not a classic part payment case as the plaintiff never accepted the part 
payment at all. Yet, the case nevertheless suggests that Cameroonian courts are 
aware of the doctrine and its implications.
The rule in Pinnel’s case must also go down as one of the anomalies of the 
doctrine of consideration. It is ironic that the law refuses to accept as a good contract
70 (1602) 5 Co. Rep. 117a.
71 (1884) 9 A.C. 605.
72 HCB/6/85 (Bamenda, 10/6/1987, unreported).
73 [1955-56] W.R.N.L.R.
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an agreement whereby a creditor undertakes to release his debtor from the original 
debt in return for payment of at least some of which was owed which at least has the 
merit of assuring the creditor that the debt was not altogether lost whereas the law 
treats as a valid agreement one under which the creditor discharges his debtor from 
liability in return for something of little or no value, for example, a peppercorn.74
In order to bring the law more or less in harmony with commercial needs, several 
exceptions and qualifications to the general rule in Pinnel’s case and Foakes v. Beer 
have been created. Since these exceptions75 have not been tested in the 
Cameroonian courts, they will not be considered here.
It is clear that the purpose of the rule in Foakes v. Beer was to protect the creditor 
from the debtor’s undue pressure but it is once again questionable whether such a 
function is best performed by the doctrine of consideration, even allowing for the 
many qualifications to the rule in Foakes v. Beer. I share in the view that that 
function can be better performed by the expanding concept of duress rather than by 
the doctrine of consideration.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel and the exceptions and qualifications to the rule 
in Foakes v. Beer have no doubt watered down the rigours of the rule that a promise 
to modify an existing promise is not enforceable without a corresponding 
consideration. But despite these efforts to make the doctrine in Stilk v. Myrick less 
relevant, the doctrine has still managed to maintain life and effectiveness. That said, 
it will be interesting to see how the doctrine will survive the effects of the recent 
decision in Williams v. Rofey Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd16 and how that
74 On peppercorns, see Lord Sommerville in Chappel & Co. v. Nestle Co. [1961] A.C 
87 at 114 H.L.
75 They include, for instance, the introduction of some new element, however trivial 
(this was recognised in the Pinnel’s case itself); the rule that payment from a third 
party can constitute a full settlement of the debt; the doctrine of promissory estoppel; 
and arrangements between a debtor and his various creditors, that is composition. 
See generally, Atiyah, Introduction to Contract Law, p.43; Treitel, 8th. ed., 
pp. 116-124; and Chesire, Fifoot & Furmston, p.95.
76 [1990] 1 A.E.R. 512.
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will be considered in Cameroon.
(c). The Effect of Williams v. Rofey on the rule in Stilk v. My rick.
In Williams v. Rofey the defendants were the main contractor to refurbish a block 
of council flats. They sub-contracted the carpentry work to the plaintiff. Partway 
through the contract, the plaintiff got into financial difficulties, at least in part because 
the contract price for the carpentry work was too low. The defendants, worried that 
the plaintiff would not complete the work on time, or would stop work altogether 
(there was a penalty clause in the main contract under which the defendants would 
have been liable in the event of late completion), promised a further £10.300 to the 
agreed price of £20.000 at a rate of £575 per flat completed. On this basis the 
plaintiff continued work and completed a further eight flats. Then, suspecting that 
the defendants would default in their promise of additional payments, the plaintiff 
ceased work and subsequently sued for the additional sums in relation to the eight 
completed flats. The county court judge found for the plaintiff and the defendant 
appealed.
The main issue on appeal was whether there was any consideration for the promise 
to make the additional payments. The defendants argued that there was none as the 
plaintiff were already bound by an existing contract to do the job. But Glidewell L.J 
managed to find consideration which he outlined as follows: the assurance that the 
plaintiff would continue working and not halt work in breach of contract, the 
avoidance of the penalty clause operating, and the avoidance of the trouble and 
expense of engaging different carpenters to complete the work. In the view of the 
court of appeal, these benefits were enough to support the defendants’ promise to 
make additional payments. In reaching this conclusion, all members of the court 
were at pains to stress that they were not suggesting that the principle in Stilk v. 
My tick was wrong, but that the present case could be distinguished from it.
It is difficult however to distinguish these cases since similar benefits to those
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identified above could be said to have been present in Stilk v. My rick.11 The only 
reason for distinguishing Stilk v. Myrick seems to be related to the absence of any 
fraud or duress78 but as earlier pointed out, the accepted explanation for the decision 
in Stilk v. Myrick (or as it has been understood in modem times), is the lack of 
consideration,79 despite attempts by some to explain it on the grounds of duress.
Glidewell L.J. also placed reliance on the statements of Lord Scarman in Pao On 
v. Lau Yium to the effect that "if there is coercion, there can be no reason for 
avoiding a contract where there is shown to be a real consideration which is otherwise 
legal." But in that case, Lord Scarman was discussing an existing obligation to a 
third party as sufficient consideration and English law has always regarded this 
differently.81 Glidewell L.J. recognises this but dismisses it as insignificant and 
went on to declare that a promise of an additional payment, in the absence of any 
economic duress or fraud is legally binding because the benefit that the promisor 
derives as a result of his promise, is capable of being consideration.
The court is also dismissive of the argument that to find consideration here would 
offend against the rule that consideration must move from the promisee. The court’s 
judgement seems to indicate that that rule only means that the actions of the promisee 
must be a causal link in the process whereby the promisor receives a benefit, which
77 For instance, as a result of his promise, the captain did not have to seek 
replacement crew, avoided delays and made sure the existing crew continued to work.
78 The defendants (Rofey Bros.) did not argue that the subsequent agreement was 
pursued by fraud. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that they required 
prompt performance to avoid time penalties under the main contract.
79 The view that lack of consideration is a seperate and valid ground for refusing to 
enforce an agreed variation of a contract was recently confirmed by comments of 
Tucker J. in Atlas Express v. Kafco [1989] 1 A.E.R 641 at 646.
80 [1979] 3 A.E.R 65.
81 See Shadwell v. Shadwell (1860) 9 C.B (n.s) 159, which supports the view that the 
performance of a contractual duty owed to a third party can be good consideration for 
a promise. See also, The Euromeydon [1975] A.C. 154; and the New York Star 
[1981] 1 W.L.R. 138.
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may emanate from elsewhere.
The failure or reluctance of their lordships to go as far as saying that Stilk v.
Myrick was dead and buried is a missed opportunity. Instead they still stressed the
need to find consideration, albeit within wider limits, as Russell L.J. makes clear:
"Consideration there must... be but in my judgement the courts 
nowadays should be more ready to find its existence so as to reflect 
the intention of the parties of the contract where the bargaining power 
are not unequal and where the finding of consideration reflects the true 
intention of the parties."
Despite this insistence on consideration in some form, it could be argued that the
basic principle lying behind Williams v. Rofey Bros, is that an agreed variation of a
contract should always be regarded as binding in the absence of fraud or duress.
Another important consequence of this case is that it does cast some doubts or at 
least, opens up the possibility of reconsidering landmark decisions such as PinneVs 
case and Foakes v. Beer. After all, the parallel is obvious: whether one is dealing 
with a stricken creditor or a stricken debtor, in certain circumstances, the economic 
imperatives may dictate that financial adjustments should be made, the doctrine of 
consideration notwithstanding.82
Even though the decision in Williams v. Rofey Bros, has been regarded, rather 
surprisingly, as indefensible by some,83 it has generally received a warm reception 
both in England84 and other common law jurisdictions.85 If I have discussed this 
decision in detail it is because I think it holds some very important lessons for the 
courts of Common Law Cameroon. In the Cameroonian case of Lucy Effiom v.
82 Adams and Brownsword, "Contract, Consideration and Critical Path" (1990) 
M.L.R. 540.
83 For example, Coote, "Consideration and the Benefit in Fact and Law" (1990) 3 
J.C.L. 23.
84 Halson, "Sailors, Sub-Contractors and Consideration" (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 183; 
Adams and Brownsword, op. cit. note 82.
85 For New Zealand, see Chen-Wishart, " The Enforceabilty o f Additional Contract 
Promises: A Question o f Consideration ?" (1991) 14 NZULR 270.
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Mafcoop (supra), it was seen how the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim for an 
additional promised sum on the unconvincing ground that there was no consensus ad 
idem. Clearly, to seek the metaphysical essence of consensus ad idem only amounted 
to a denial of the contract modification (and justice). It is submitted that the same 
kind of benefits (or factual consideration) that Glidewell L.J attributed to the 
defendants in Williams v. Rofey, are easily discernible in the Lucy Effiom  case. By 
promising to pay an extra sum in return for the plaintiff’s performance, the defendant 
was spared the trouble and expense of looking for a new contractor and even more 
worrying, of looking for proper warehousing facilities to store their farmers’ produce 
for that year. There was also no duress involved in the Lucy Effiom case since there 
was evidence to indicate that the local government engineer (the official supervisor 
of such projects) had in fact, suggested an extra payment, which if true, would make 
a defence of duress difficult to support.
Strictly speaking, Williams v. Rofey is not binding on Cameroonian courts, it 
being a post-1990 decision. But it does have strong persuasive force and it would be 
preposterous for a Cameroonian court to decline to follow it only on account of the 
fact that it is post 1900. The reasoning and the commercial sense behind the 
Williams v. Rofey decision is clearly unassailable. In adopting a factual, rather than 
a legal,86 definition of consideration in that case, the English Court of Appeal has 
given effect to a subtle but significant change in the law relating to modification of 
contract. The law in Cameroon will do well with this change too.
The Lucy Effiom  case was decided in 1979 so the court did not have the benefit 
of the Williams v. Rofey decision. But it is also hoped that in future, Cameroonian 
courts might embrace the fledgling doctrine of economic duress to give effect to 
modificatory promises rather than insist on the presence of consideration which 
inevitably prevents the enforcement of such promises. True, the doctrine of economic
86 The factual definition emphasises the fact of benefit or detriment while the legal 
definition, for which Stilk v. Myrick is often cited, recognises as consideration only 
those acts which the promisor was not already under a legal obligation to perform.
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duress is not without its difficulties.87 Even in England, it is still in its early stages 
and the burgeoning case-law is yet to put the doctrine on a clear footing.88 The 
formal structure though is there, but it definitely will take sometime for the 
substantive jurisprudence to take shape.89 This, however, should not prevent the 
Cameroonian courts from embracing the doctrine.
In the present bad business climate, business people should be allowed greater 
freedom by the law to arrange their affairs, in the absence of fraud or duress. It is 
significant to note that the law on the modification of existing contracts has been 
changed in Ghana to dispense with the requirement of consideration.90 Even the 
rules in PinneVs case and Foakes v. Beer have been abolished in Ghana.91 In the 
U.S.A too, promises to modify contracts are enforceable even though on the rather 
specious grounds that a contractor who has been promised an extra sum has the 
option of performing or refusing to do so and paying damages and that his 
abandonment of this option is consideration.92
For the courts to continue to insist on the necessity of consideration for promises 
to modify existing contracts, in the absence of fraud or duress, is to deny 
enforceability to an important category of promises, namely, those that enable
87 For an analysis of these difficulties, see Trebilock et al, op. cit.. note 39, 184.
88 Phang, " Whither Economic Duress" 1990 53 M.L.R 107; and "Consideration at 
Crossroads" 1991 (107) L.Q.R 22.
89 Cf. Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction o f Contract Doctrine" (1984-85) 94 
Yale L.J 997.
90 Date-Bah, S.K, "The Doctrine o f Consideration and the Modification o f Contracts" 
(1973) 5 Rev. Ghana Law, 10; see particularly, The (Ghana) Contract Act, 1960, 
act 25.
91 The Contracts Act, 1960, section 8(2) provides: "a promise to waive a debt or part 
of a debt or the performance of some other contractual or legal obligation shall not 
be invalid as a contract by reason only of the absence of consideration therefor".
92 See Swan, "Consideration" In: Reiter and Swan, eds., Studies in Contract Law, 
1980, 24 at 27.
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businessmen to make what has been described by Llewellyn, as "the informal re­
adjustment of a going business deal."93 To deny the enforceability of such promises 
is to frustrate the expectations of businessmen. Such frustration by the flat 
mechanical application of the doctrine of consideration is most undesirable. The rule 
in Stilk v. Myrick, which is based on lack of consideration bought calculability only 
at the price of ignoring commercial reality.94 It will be a pity if the courts of 
England and Cameroon continue to fail to sense this.
(4). CONSIDERATION AND IRREVOCABLE OFFERS.
The common law rule that an offer not made under seal or supported by 
consideration can be withdrawn at anytime before acceptance can work great hardship 
on the promisee in certain cases, notably in unilateral contracts, i.e. where the 
promisor contemplates, not the creation of mutual promises, but that his promise 
should depend upon the promisee’s performance of the the act. Such contracts are 
often illustrated by the promise to pay £100 when the offeree has walked to York95 
or has climbed the flagpole96 or to give a Cameroonian hypothetical example,, when 
he has climbed Mount Cameroon mountain. Suppose the promisor spitefully revokes 
his promise before the performance is completed, should the law allow him to 
perpetrate undue hardship on the promisee under the fanciful argument that a promise 
is revocable anytime before it is accepted.
Suffice it to say that English courts have in practice, ignored this rule in cases 
where it would be unfair to uphold it: for example, where there has been clear (and
93 Llewellyn, "Common Law o f Consideration: Are There Measures?" (1941)41 
Col.L.R. 863, 867.
94 Adams and Brownsword, op. cit.. note 82, 541.
95 G.N.R v. Witham (1873) L.R 9 C.P 16 by Brett. J.
96 This is the example given by Llewelyn, "Our Case Law o f Contract: Offer and 
Acceptance, 1." (1938) 48 Yale L.J. 32.
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expected) reliance on an offer. Cameroonian courts have done pretty much the same 
thing as the Bamenda Court of Appeal decision in Bassum v. Youyaf suggests. In 
that case, the defendant had promised the plaintiff a certain block sum of money with 
which to start his own business if the plaintiff would first serve in his (defendant’s) 
business. After having had the plaintiff’s services for several years, the defendant 
tried to renege on his promise. It was held that he could not revoke his offer to pay 
plaintiff the promised sum.
What actually happened here is that the power of the offeror to revoke at anytime 
before acceptance was destroyed by the simple expedient of finding that there was a 
bilateral contract. Such a device was easy to use in this case because of the extensive 
dealings between the parties over several years. In such a situation the parties can 
more readily be held to have made a contract than in the case, say, of the offeror of 
a reward for finding a lost dog. That said, in the Bassum case, there was obvious 
reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant’s promise and the court felt that the plaintiff 
had been shabbily treated. The significant thing about this decision is that, it shows 
that where appropriate, the Cameroonian courts may finesse the traditional rules and 
effectively limit the power of the offeror to revoke. This flexibity is most welcomed.
Another class of cases in this area which can pose difficult problems for the law 
is what may be termed ‘requirement contracts’ or ‘blanket orders’. In terms of 
business use this is a very important class of contracts.98 The typical kind of 
contract is that the supplier undertakes to supply goods to the buyer at a fixed price 
for a defined or undefined period of time. The difference between this type of 
contract and a typical sale contract is that the quantity of the goods that the buyer 
may actually purchase may not be specified and the buyer may infact be free to 
purchase nothing. The usual analysis of this kind of contract is that the supplier is 
making a standing offer which can be revoked at any time. An enforceable contract
97 Supra, note 31.
98 Macauley, "The Use and Non Use o f Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry" 
(1963) 9 Prac. Law 7 at 13.
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may exist in respect of any orders that are given by the buyer before the order is 
revoked. This is, for example, the analysis of a case like G.N.R. v. Witham ."  
Here the buyer had given no consideration for the promise of the seller to supply. 
If the buyer undertook to buy everything that he might need from the seller, the seller 
may be bound to supply since the buyer has limited his freedom of action and has 
thereby provided consideration for the seller’s promise to perform.
That decision has been echoed in the Cameroonian case of John Mokake Elali v. 
Brasseries du Cameroun,100 where it was held that because the plaintiff had given 
no consideration for the defendants promise to supply drinks at plaintiff’s off license 
premises, the plaintiff could not successfully bring an action against them for breach 
when without any reasonable notice, they refused to make any further supplies to him 
after a four year relationship. The reality in cases such as this is that people do not 
generally think of consideration or of taking the option by deed. Most people in the 
plaintiff’s position would naturally think of the option or promise as really firm. For 
them, there is an express or implied undertaking to keep the promise or option open. 
Not to do so would in ordinary understanding be a breach of faith, which breach is 
most likely to result in serious loss to them. Yet, as seen in the two cases above, the 
common law, thanks to the doctrine of consideration (or rather the lack of it), 
prevents the offeree from having any claim and allows the promisor to turn his back 
on a deal deliberately made.
The general problem with this kind of case is that there may be reliance by the 
buyer on the seller as the source for the goods that the buyer may need to meet his 
commitments in a case where the buyer has not technically provided consideration. 
Fortunately the courts are sometimes more sympathetic to the loss suffered by 
promisees as a result of their reliance on an unjustifiably broken promise, even 
though they may not have furnished consideration in the strict sense of the word.
99 (1873) L.R. 9 C.P. 16.
100 Supra, note 64.
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There seems to have been very few of these cases before the English courts101 but 
in both Ambe v. Brasseries du Cameroun and Daniel Achuo v. Brasseries du 
Cameroun, the courts found for the plaintiffs, respectively sole distributor and 
wholesaler of defendants’ products. In both cases the defendants had brought to an 
abrupt end several years of business dealings with the plaintiffs. In each case, 
defendants main defence was that no consideration had been provided by the plaintiff 
and therefore no contract existed. Each time this argument was rejected. The court 
clearly felt that not only did contracts exist between the parties, but the plaintiffs had 
relied heavily on their course of dealing with the defendants.
It is perhaps significant to note that this problem has been found sufficiently 
important in the U.S.A for it to be specifically covered by the Uniform Commercial 
Code, section 2.306.102 The comment to that section makes it clear that the 
enforceability of this kind of contract may be threatened not only by the doctrine of 
consideration but also by the problem of indefiniteness. Both of these are handled by 
the imposition of a general requirement that the parties must act in good faith.
If the Cameroonian common law courts were to infer that in every bilateral 
contract there was an obligation of good faith on both sides, there would be an even 
stronger case for finding against suppliers like Brasseries du Cameroun who renege 
on their promise to supply their products out of spite. Regrettably, the doctrine of 
good faith is not recognised in Common Law Cameroon, the simple reason being that 
it has never been part of English Law. I would suggest that in the absence of a 
doctrine of good faith, the common law courts in Cameroon should respond to the 
problem of malicious revocation by imposing a requirement of reasonable notice of
101 An example is Anglia Television Ltd. V. Reed [1972] 1 Q.B. 60. It attracted a lot 
of comment, see Guest, 88 L.Q.R. 168; Ogus, 35 M.L.R. 423, and Clarke, (1972) 
C.L.J. 22.
102 Uniform Commercial Code, s.2.306:
"(2) A lawful agreement by either the seller or buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind 
of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use 
best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their 
sale."
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withdrawal.
It is not possible to pursue the whole topic of revocability here but it is hoped 
enough has been said to indicate that the problem of the revocability of offers is 
complex and a court has to tread cautiously in giving a remedy that will be 
appropriate in each case. To refuse to grant any remedy simply on grounds of want 
of consideration may be grossly unfair in cases where there clearly has been reliance.
(5). CONSIDERATION AND FAMILY (NON-COMMERCIAL) 
ARRANGEMENTS.
Two problems are involved here. The first one is common to all the situations so 
far discussed and relates to the function of consideration in determining what 
promises the law should enforce. This must be done no matter what is the context 
of the promise. The second problem, peculiar to non-commercial cases, is that the 
context is variable. In an ordinary commercial case reasons for enforcement and non 
enforcement are fairly obvious since the context indicates what kind of factors are 
likely to be important. Reliance, for example, may be a good reason.
Reliance, in the same way in the non-commercial context may well offer a good 
reason for enforcement, but it may not, if it should be the case that a perfectly 
adequate remedy is available outside the contractual context. Such differences in 
context between commercial and non-commercial cases make the application of the 
doctrine of consideration in non-commercial cases a very complex issue.
The case of Ronate Tapong v. Joshua Mobitt103 illustrates this problem perfectly 
well. The parties had entered into an arrangement whereby the appellant agreed to 
marry the respondent’s junior brother. In return the respondent paid a dowry to the 
appellant and her family. The appellant later on decided to pull out of the proposed 
marriage arrangement and undertook to repay all that she had received from the 
respondent. She did pay back some of it and then defaulted in payment of the rest.
103 Appeal No. BCA/31/74 (Bamenda, unreported).
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In an action for the residue, the Bamenda Court of Appeal, overruling the High 
Court, held that the respondent could not succeed as that would have offended against 
the rule that consideration must move from the promisee. Not only do I respectfully 
disagree with the court’s approach to this case, I also find the result unacceptable. 
I consider the decision questionable on two counts.
The first one has already been discussed in chapter two, namely, that the court 
should have applied only native law and custom since that is what the parties clearly 
had in mind when they entered into the agreement. Customary law allows for the 
recovery of such sums, and there would have been no pedantic inquiry as to the 
provenance of the consideration as marriage is treated very much as between families 
rather than as simply between individuals. In other words, under customary law, it 
will be untenable to say that the respondent was not privy to the contract or that 
consideration did not move from him. After all, it must be remembered that it is he 
(the respondent), acting in loco parentis to his junior brother who actually paid the 
dowry, which is the consideration in this case.
The second one relates to the courts’ application of the English contract law rule
that consideration must move from the promisee. The Appeal Court took the view
that the parties to the contract were the appellant and Jerome (respondent’s junior
brother). Accordingly, the respondent was a stranger to it. Delivering the judgement
of the court, Inglis, J. said,
"Where the consideration is executory the contract is binding as soon 
as the promises are exchanged. In this case the action to enforce the 
contract should have been brought by the person from whom the 
consideration moved, and he is Jerome Doctor Mobitt. The 
plaintiff/respondent, even though he paid the dowry and conducted the 
negotiations which led to the contract, is a stranger and therefore 
cannot sue on the contract."
As already indicated above, I find the reasoning of the court to be strained and the 
results they arrive to be unsatisfactory. Even if one accepts, as the court chose to do, 
that English law and not customary law governed the issue, there are still sufficient 
grounds on which the respondent could recover, which would produce a much more 
sensible result.
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One way of doing so would be to hold that the contract was between the appellant 
and respondent by which the former agreed to marry the latter’s brother in 
consideration for a dowry paid to her and her family by the latter. On this 
construction the appellant would clearly be liable in breach for failing to honour her 
own part of the contract, i.e. refusing to marry the respondent’s junior brother.
The court also based its decision on the rule of privity of contract by treating the 
respondent as a stranger to it and by intimating that had the respondent’s junior 
brother, instead of the respondent himself, brought the action, he would have 
suceeded. Now, if one were to hold that the respondent was actually a party to the 
contract as I have proposed, the application of the privity doctrine here would be 
clearly untenable. I find support for my assertion in the decision in Tweddle v. 
Atkinson, 104 In that case, a son sued on a promise in writing made to his father by 
the defendant to give a marriage portion: the document contained mutual promises 
between the plaintiffs father and the defendant, who was the father of plaintiff’s 
wife, and expressly provided that the plaintiff should be able to sue on the agreement. 
The claim was dismissed. Wightman, J., said "no stranger to the contract can take 
advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit."105 And Crompton, J., 
added that a promisee cannot bring an action unless consideration moved from 
him.106
If the plaintiff in the Tweddle case for whose benefit the contract was made is not 
allowed to sue, even with the help of an express clause stating he could do so, on the 
grounds that he was not privy to the contract and did not furnish the consideration, 
it is difficult to see how the brother of the respondent in the Ronate Tapong case 
could be expected to succeed had he brought the action himself. I still maintain that 
the parties to the contract were Ronate Tapong and Joshua Mobitt, which contract 
was entered into by the latter in his capacity as senior brother and head of family for
104 1 B. & S. 393 (Q.B. 1861).
105 Id. at 398.
106 Id. at 398.
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the benefit of his junior brother, Jerome. It was therefore wrong and irreconcilable 
for the Appeal Court to concede in one breath that the respondent had actually paid 
the dowry (the consideration) and conducted the negotiations leading to the contract 
and then declare in another breath that he (the respondent) was a stranger to the 
contract.
May I point out that my citation of the Tweddle case does not mean that I approve 
of its results. I cite it only to refute the Cameroonian court’s suggestion that the 
junior brother of the respondent (whom I consider only to be the beneficiary and not 
a party to the contract) would have succeeded had he sued. To hold as the court did 
in Tweddle v. Aitkinson, that a man cannot sue on a contract unless he is party to 
both the contract and the consideration, are clearly unjust and unfortunate in some 
cases, as the R. Tapong v. J. Mobit case reveals. This has been recognised in 
England where such results are occasionally minimised by applying doctrines of 
equity. In that way the benefit of a contract is considered as a chose in action in 
which the actual party to the contract is treated as a trustee for the beneficiary who 
is deemed to be the cestui que trust, so that a suit can be brought in the name of the 
trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust.101 This cumbrous proceeding to 
overcome the two-fold difficulty of want of privity of contract and want of 
consideration has never been used in Cameroon, even though the Tapong v. Mobit 
case presented the courts with a rare opportunity to do so.
Another possibility that would have enabled the respondent to succeed, was for the 
court to treat the respondent as a joint promisee,108 especially as it was not doubted 
that he actually made the payments to the appellant. This has the advantage in that 
it dispenses with the need to determine whether the respondent or his junior brother 
is the promisee. They will become joint promisee allowing either of them to bring 
an action. The joint promisee principle has been judicially acclaimed by judges and
107 See Vandepite v. Preferred Accident Ins. Corp., [1933] A.C. 70, 79.
108 According to this principle, one joint promisee may sue even though the 
consideration was exclusively supplied by another. For an elucidation of this 
principle, see Coote, "Consideration and the Joint Promisee" (1978) 37 C.L.J. 30.
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textwriters alike. In N.Z Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. 109
Lord Simon saw it as an "attractive proposition" while both Treitel110 and 
Atiyah111 have warmed to it. The position of the law no doubt remains that of the 
leading case of Dunlop v. Selfridge but the point that I am striving to make here is 
that the courts must try to be flexible in their interpretation and application of the 
doctrine of consideration, especially in non-commercial cases. The rules of contract 
were designed to deal mainly with commercial cases. Once they are applied outside 
that area, odd and strange results can be expected to happen.
6. ON THE NEED FOR REFORM OF CONSIDERATION.
It has been shown above that the doctrine of consideration has its absurdities. 
Holdsworth described it as somewhat of an anachronism,112 while others have even 
called for its abolition.113 It must be said however that those who want it abolished 
have focused their criticism on those indefensible aberrations, ignoring the 
significance of the doctrine. Even the Law Reform Committee 1937 is guilty of this 
biased approach. Others, such as Hamson114 have been more measured and realistic 
in their criticisms, by highlighting both the significance and weaknesses of the 
doctrine and proposing changes to some of the strange rules.
109 [1975] A.C. 154, 180.
110 Treitel, op.cit.. note 19, now seems to treat it as stating the law. See also, ibid, 
"Consideration. A Critical Analysis o f Professor Atiyah’s Fundamental Restatement" 
(1976) A.L.J. 445-446.
111 Atiyah sees it as incidental support for his more general attack on the doctrine of 
consideration. See, Consideration in Contracts: A Fundamental Restatement, 
1971, pp.41-42.
112 Op. cit.. note 11, p. 47.
113 Notably Lord Wright, op. cit.. note 5 and Chloros, op. cit.. note 5.
114 Op. cit.. note 5.
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For my part, I think what is needed in Cameroon is reform and not abolition. I 
have highlighted some problems to which the doctrine of consideration has given rise 
and I do not believe that these problems are so incurable as to make abolition the only 
solution. Therefore, instead of abolishing the doctrine, I propose that all those very 
technical and artificial rules which prevent the enforcement of certain classes of 
transactions recognised by commonsense and commercial reality as true bargains be 
excised from the doctrine or be changed in some ways.
For instance, the rule that consideration must move from the promisee has been 
shown to be capable of working injustice and yielding to strange results, especially 
in family and other benefaction cases. It has been denounced because it may "make 
it possible for a person to snap his fingers at a bargain deliberately made"115 and 
it is surely the most absurd rule of consideration. This rule should be dispensed with 
so as to enable a beneficiary to sue on a contract that was expressly made for his 
benefit, irrespective of whether he personally furnished consideration or not.
And so too is the rule barring enforcement of promises to perform an existing 
contract in return for a promise for a higher price lacking in economic sense. It has 
been argued that the position adopted by the Court of Appeal in Williams v. Rofey 
is the better one and Cameroonian courts would do well to adopt a similar position, 
rather than stick to the traditional rule as enshrined in Stilk v. Myrick. In the absence 
of fraud or duress, the courts should ignore all doctrinal complexities of pre-existing 
duty and focus on whether there was an arrangement or agreement. And if so, the 
new promise should be enforceable. By parity of reason, contracts to accept less than 
is due should also be enforceable, as long as the court is satisfied that it was not 
concluded as a result of undue pressure.
To give another example, where there clearly has been reliance to the detriment 
of the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the defendant should not be 
allowed to hide behind the facade of consideration as his only defence to an action for 
breach or damages. I shall not further multiply instances of the poor or unjust
1,3 Dunlop v. Selfridge [1915] A.C., 847, 855, per Lord Dunedin.
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working of the doctrine since they have already been discussed above.
Let me briefly consider here the suggestion that the doctrine of consideration be 
replaced as the test of intention by the sole requirement of writing. Such an idea was 
contemplated by the Law Reform Committee 1937. In paragraph 29 of their report, 
the committee take the view that writing is "persuasive evidence" of an intention not 
merely to promise, but to assume legal obligation in respect of that promise. There 
are two objections to this suggestion. The first one applies to both England and 
Cameroon and it is that, what is persuasive evidence is not the writing, but the form 
of writing. If a document is written in legal form, for example, by a solicitor or 
notary, the evidence is certainly persuasive. But to consider the mere act of informal 
writing (since the committee does not require any particular form of writing) as 
evidence of an intention to perform an act in law may greatly over-estimate the 
deliberation that usually goes with informal writing, especially in a country like 
Cameroon. It is significant to point out that the committee themselves waver in their 
view as to the persuasiveness of the evidence of writing. In paragraph 30 of their 
report, they state: "writing is good evidence of the fact that the words were used; but 
the writing affords no more and no less evidence of the intention with which those 
words were used than the speaking of the words."
The other objection is peculiar to Cameroon. To make writing the only test of 
intention in lieu of consideration begs the question as to what shall become of all 
those who cannot read and write. Any such move will be tantamount to a punishment 
for illiteracy. Yet, even those who are literate do not always put their transactions 
in writing, as it shall become obvious when the requirement of writing in contracts 
is considered in the next chapter. Writing, therefore, is not welcome as a test of 
intention in replacement of consideration. It may not be a bad idea though, to use it 
as an alternative so that a contract should be enforced by the law if either it is in 
writing or there is consideration.
Finally, the question has been mooted whether consideration should be replaced
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with the civil law doctrine of cause.116 I very much doubt the wisdom of that 
suggestion in Cameroon117 or elsewhere for that matter. This is because such a 
move will not just entail the introduction of cause and all of the reasoning behind it 
but also some fundamental tenets of the civil law of contract such as contract-consent, 
as distinct from the common law contract-bargain. And my doubts are not dispelled 
by Chloros’s118 painstaking attempt to show that the continental concept of contract- 
consent can be reduced into a set of simple and rational principles which can be 
incorporated into the English law of contract.
I believe that the correct approach is to work from what we have as consideration. 
Its defects must first be recognized after which must come the remedies. Thus far, 
it is hoped I have managed to do both. But can these remedies or changes be 
implemented in Cameroon without the help of legislation. I think not. The doctrine 
of consideration is so entrenched in the common law of contract and, judging by the 
vigour with which it is applied by Cameroonian courts, it will take more than judicial 
imagination to bring about any change. Hays119 has shrewdly and skillfully argued 
the case for legislative reform in the U.S.A while Llewelyn,120 though persuaded 
by Hays’s outline for legislative reform, remains unpersuaded that a legislative 
program, alone, can do the work. In the case of Cameroon, I am of the opinion that 
it is better that, where a defect exists, it should be removed by specific legislation. 
Indeed the American experience (and perhaps more appropriately, that of Ghana)121 
supports, to some extent, the view that piecemeal reform of the consequences of
116 Chloros, Op.cit.. note 5, 157.
117 Mason, op. cit.. note 5, 847, also believes such course to be unwise.
118 Chloros, op. cit.. note 2, 140.
119 Hays, "Formal Contracts and Consideration: A Legislative Program" (1941) 41 
Col.L.R. 849.
120 Llewelyn, Op. cit.. note 93, 863.
121 For e.g., The (Ghana) Contract Act, 1960, act 25 abolishing the rule in Pinnels 
case and Foakes v. Beer, Op. cit.. note 91.
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consideration may be preferable, say, to the wholesome adoption of civil law,122 or 
outright abolition.
2 . CAUSE .
The doctrine of consideration has no place in the civil law jurisdiction of 
Cameroon. However, in addition to the need for serious intention and consent, the 
law in that part imposes a further requirement for the formation and validity of 
contracts: that all informal contracts must have a cause. But this theory of cause of 
obligation is one of the most controversial problems in French law.123 Those who 
support the doctrine, such as Domat,124 (who is credited with the theory),125 
Pothier,126 and Capitant,127 otherwise known as "causalists" and those against it 
or "anti-causalists", such as Planiol128 and Walton129 have for long made it their 
battlefield.
That notwithstanding, the commissioners charged with the duty of preparing the 
Code Napoleon followed Domat by adopting the theory of cause. The theory is now
122 Cf. Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States of 
America. 1962, p. 121.
123 Extensive literature can be found in the Dalloz, Encyclopaedic Juridique, Vol. 
1 (1951 and supplements) under the word, Cause.
124 Domat, Loix Civiles, vol. 1, 1.1, s .l, para. 6.
12:1 In discussing the origin of the theory of cause, Planiol points out that Domat 
created the theory. See Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil (7th ed). vol.2, 
para. 1079.
126 Pothier, Traite des Obligations, 1818.
127 Capitant, De la Cause dans Ies Obligations, 1927. He is perhaps the most 
staunch and brilliant supporter of the doctrine in the modern era.
128 Op.cit.. note 125, see particularly para. 1037.
129 Walton. "Cause and Consideration in Contracts" (1925) 41 L.Q.R. 306.
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well enshrined in both the French and Cameroonian Civil Codes and represents one 
of the principal features of French Contract law, which gives more importance to the 
exchange of promises than to mere formalism.
According to the Cameroon Civil Code, there can be no valid contract without a 
cause. This is stated in Article 1108 as one of the four conditions130 that are 
essential to the validity of a contract. Article 1131 provides that an obligation 
without cause or with a false or illicit cause, cannot have any effect. And Article 
1133 defines the word unlawful: a cause is illicit when it is prohibited by law or when 
it is contrary to morality or public policy.
(1). THE MEANING OF CAUSE.
Neither Domat131 nor Pothier132 nor the Civil Code defines the word cause.
A vast amount of literature has been written in an attempt to devise an accurate
definition or to find a general definition which includes the three formulas of Domat,
yet the word cause still lacks a stable value and still does not express a single idea.
This has forced Planiol to conclude that the various classes of cause cannot by any
ingenuity be referred to as a single principle:
"Les auteurs modernes ont beaucoup travaille pour trouver une 
definition generate de la cause... Leurs efforts ont ete vains; la raison 
est la multiplicite des notions comprises sur le nom de cause, a ce qui 
est heterogene, il est impossible de donner une definition unique." 133
130 The other three being the capacity of the parties, their consent, and the existence 
of an object of the contract.
131 In indicating what he means by cause in the three categories of contract, Domat, 
Op. cit.. note 124, paras. 5-6, gives three different rules for finding the cause, but no 
single formula.
132 He too merely repeats the passages in Domat’s 4Loix Civiles’ in explaining the 
meaning of cause: "Every obligation must have an honest cause. If the cause does not 
exist, if it is false, or if it offends against good morals, the obligation is null, as well 
as the contract which includes it." Obligation, paras. 42-43.
133 Op. c i t . . note 125, para. 1035.
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For that reason I shall not here attempt the search for a simple and straightforward 
definition of cause. But in so far as it is possible to explain briefly a matter which 
has often been considered in France to be of the greatest doctrinal difficulty and on 
which the best French authorities may offer different interpretation, I shall try to 
determine what it is. To do so, two important distinctions must be made.
The first one is that between the cause of the contract and the cause of the 
obligation.134 For every contract, there are two parallel reasons or causes as to why 
the parties entered into it. On the one hand, there are personal, concrete and 
subjective motives, which may vary from contract to contract or from one party to 
the other of the same contract and on the other hand there is a logical, impersonal, 
abstract and objective reason, which is identical for all contracts of the same kind. 
The former, known as the cause of the contract, represents the motives why a party 
accepts to enter into a contract but does not constitute cause in the legal sense while 
the latter, known as the cause of the obligation, represents the reasons why he accepts 
to assume the obligation of the contract and it is this abstract reason which is the 
cause in the legal sense of the word. The importance of this distinction lies in the 
fact that when the cause is false, the contract is null135 whereas an error as to the 
motive does not affect the validity of the contract.136
The second distinction to make is that between cause and object. Article 1108 
lists the object of the contract as one of the requisites for its validity. The distinction 
between cause and object is best explained this way: object provides an answer to the 
question qui debetur? (what is owing?), cause answers the question cur debetur? (why 
it is owing?).137
134 See Dagorne-Labbe, "Distinctions entre Cause de VObligation et Cause du 
Conrrar” (1990) II J.C.P. 21546.
13:' See Civil Code, Art. 1131.
136 Code Civil Art. 1110.
137 Weill and Terre, para. 254.
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Thus in trying to determine what the cause of a given contract is, one must
eliminate both the motives and the object. However, because both are amongst the
factors that cause the contract, one may conclude that the legal concept of cause
involves a choice amongst various factors, and the selection of one having certain
characteristics. Unfortunately, there is a striking lack of agreement on the criteria
to be applied in making this selection, as Holland has rightly observed:
"It has long been settled in French law that every permissible 
agreement is legally binding, subject only to the proviso that every 
agreement must have a ‘cause’, the precise nature of which seems far 
from clear to French commentators themselves."138
The attitude towards the struggle to find a single definition which will be 
appropriate both for situations in which there is no cause and for those in which the 
cause is illicit now seems to be one of inertia and resignation. Many French 
writers139 now concede that in order to accomodate the actual practice of the courts, 
the cause in these two situations must be differently defined. That said, cause is still 
generally regarded as "le mobile, determinant de I ’oblige portant sur un ou des 
elements objectifs"140 (the determining motive of the obligee resting on one or 
several objective elements).
At this juncture, no effort shall be made to analyze and compare the views of the 
various writers on the subject. I shall instead explore the doctrine as it has been 
applied by the courts. It will be noticed that the treatment of cause is less detailed 
than than given to the common law doctrine of consideration. This is because most 
solutions (though not all) reached by French law through the medium of cause would 
be achieved in English law by having recourse to a multitude of concepts, such as 
illegality, public policy, mistake, frustration and unjust enrichment. Since some of
138 Holland, The elements of Jurisprudence, (12th. ed.), p. 284, cited in Newman, 
"The Doctrine o f Cause or Consideration in the Civil Law" (1932) 30 Can. B.R. 665.
139 Carbonnier, Obligations, para. 26; Ghestin, Contrat, para. 692, and Marty & 
Raynaud, para. 183.
140 Maury, Encyclopedic Dalloz, Verbo Cause, para. 11 (1951).
246
these concepts are treated in some detail in the next chapter, it is proposed to defer 
some treatment of the doctrine of cause until then, in,order to avoid repetition.
(2). THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSE IN CAMEROON.
Regrettably, but not surprisingly, the debate on the doctrine of cause is yet to be 
taken up by Cameroonian jurists. It is not clear whether this silence denotes a 
complete acceptance of the doctrine as faultless or whether they have simply not 
addressed their minds to the issue. What is clear, however, is that the courts in Civil 
Law Cameroon have remained impervious to the criticisms that have been levelled 
against the doctrine, in the sense that they stick to it in its classical form. In other 
words, the concepts of Domat and Pothier may be rightly considered as the 
foundation of the doctrine of cause in Civil Law Cameroon, having been so adopted 
via the French Civil Code.
The classical doctrine of cause involves the consideration of three types of 
contracts: (i) bilateral or synallagmatic, in which both parties incur obligations; (ii) 
real, in which only one party is bound, his obligation arising from the fact that the 
other party has delivered something to him and (iii) gratuitous, in which there is no 
mutuality of obligations and no previous delivery.
In synallagmatic contracts, the cause of obligation is the counter-prestation (thing 
or service) which induces each party to obligate himself to the other. The cause of 
each party’s undertaking is the undertaking of the other party.141
In real contracts142 the cause lies in the delivery of the thing which is the object 
of the obligation. This delivery is a condition necessary for the creation of a
141 For example, in a sale the thing sold is the purpose of the obligation of the buyer 
and the cause of the obligation of the seller. Therefore if it is completely destroyed 
at the time the contract is concluded, then the contract is void for two reasons, the 
obligation of the vendor being without object, while that of the vendee is without 
cause.
142 The four unilateral real contracts are commodarum, mutuum, depositum and 
pi gnus.
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contractual bond and unless it is made, the parties are not bound by any obligation 
of restitution.
In gratuitous contracts, where the beneficiary does not incur any obligation, the 
cause of the donor’s obligation must be sought in the motive of the gift or gratuity.
These concepts of Domat and Pothier have been approved by many writers and 
criticised by anti-causalists who insist that the notion of cause is quite unnecessary 
and in some cases illogical. I shall prefer not to be detained here by this debate, 
because not only the fact but the nature of cause seems to be settled in the law of 
France and Civil Law Cameroon.
Instead, I shall now move on to a more practical aspect of the doctrine - a brief 
consideration of its functions. There are essentially two: the requirement that every 
contract must have a cause and the requirement that the cause must not be illicit.
(a). The Absence of Cause.
According to article 1131 of the Cameroonian Civil Code, a contract with no 
cause has no effect. Cause, therefore, is of prime importance since its absence is 
fatal to the validity of the contract. The rule that absence of cause means no contract 
is clear enough as not to need much elaboration.
It should be said that in the type of contracts with which this study is mainly 
concerned i.e. bilateral contracts, the absence of cause is of infrequent occurence. 
This is because in bilateral contracts, the cause consists in the mutual undertakings 
of both parties. This perhaps explairtfthe lack of cases on this point in Civil Law 
Cameroon. This is not to say the courts have never declared a contract void for want 
of cause.
In N. Pauline et G. Ricardo v. consorts Z)143, the parties agreed to create a 
company that would run and manage all the commercial and industrial affairs of G. 
Ricardo (presumably a French based business) in Cameroon. The capital was to be
143 Cour Supreme, Arret no.85/CC du Juin 1973, (1976) 9 Rev. Cam. Dr. 62.
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raised by the parties themselves through the purchase of company shares. Each party 
was therefore allotted a certain number of shares. The scheme never actually took 
off and the D brothers brought an action against Pauline and G. Ricardo for breach 
of contract or rather for failure to perform.
In their defence Pauline and G. Ricardo argued that the D brothers had failed to 
take out their share allotment and as such they could not be expected to perform their 
own part of the obligation. This defence did not find favour with the Yaounde Court 
of Appeal.144 The Supreme Court, however, found little difficulty in quashing the 
court of appeal decision. Employing language of the classical school of cause, it 
said:
Attendu que, ..., dans le contrats synallagmatiques, Vobligations de 
chaque contractants trouve sa cause dans Vobligation envisagee par lui 
devant etre effectivement executee, de I ’autre contract ant; que cette 
cause fa it defaut quand la promesse de I ’une de parties n ’est pas 
executee ou s ’avere soit nulle, soit de realisation impossible. "
The court then went on to hold that by not paying or promising to pay for their 
shares, the respondents had not performed their own part of the obligations. The 
contract was thus lacking in cause and the appellants were entitled not to perform.
The interesting thing about this decision is that it demonstrates that the doctrine 
of cause does not exhaust its usefulness once the contract has been formed. It also 
ensures that the balance struck by the parties themselves in the first place is not 
disturbed during the subsequent life of the contract. It must be said that this 
extension of the doctrine of cause well into the post-formation period of the contract 
is the result of judicial activism, both in France and Cameroon, since that cannot be 
found in the earlier theories on cause. Such an extension has not always been 
welcomed by academics.143
A better example of absence of cause is provided by the decision of the French
144 It is not clear on what basis the appeal court found them liable. I have no record 
of their decision and the
Supreme Court does not discuss the court of appeal decision, it simply quashes it.
143 For example, Mazeaud/Mazeaud, Lecons de Droit Civil, Vol. 11, a, no. 266.
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Cour de Cassation in Beaubemard v. Pouverdau.H(> In that case, the court 
dismissed a genealogist claim for services rendered in drawing the attention of 
beneficiaries to the rights of succession on intestacy on the ground that it lacked cause 
since it was very unlikely that the heirs would not have known without the 
intervention of the geneologist.
(b). Unlawful Cause.
The problem of unlawful cause is to be given further treatment when the issue of 
illegal contracts is considered in the next chapter, so there is no need for a detailed 
analysis here. It suffices to say that all contracts, bilateral, onerous and gratuitous 
are invalid if the cause is unlawful.147 And the cause is unlawful if it is prohibited 
by law, or is contrary to good morals or public policy.148
A typical example of cause contrary to law would be a contract to commit a crime 
but many other examples can be imagined. For instance, all contracts prohibited by 
statute, even if not declared void by statute, shall be invalid for unlawful cause.149
Cause contrary to good morals presents a greater difficulty. There are many acts, 
the terms of which are not widely drawn, which may not be forbidden or punished 
by law, but which are generally considered immoral to such an extent that the law 
will not lend its assistance to any attempt to enforce agreements entered into with a 
view to them.
Finally, cause is unlawful if it is contrary to public policy. What constitutes 
public policy too can be elusive and may well vary from one country to another or
146 (Ch. Civ. 1st. s. civ.) April 8, 1953 (1953) Dalloz J.403.
147 Article 1131.
148 Article 1133.
149 See the Supreme court decisions in Arret no. 85/CC du 7 Juin 1973 and A rret 
du 16 Fev. 1978, both of which are discussed under the head of illegal contracts in 
chapter 7.
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from one system to the other.
I have so far sought to explain that the doctrine of cause is very much part of the 
civil law of Cameroon. Earlier, I mentioned that the doctrine of cause, despite its 
deep roots in the civil law of contract, has always been the subject of severe 
criticisms by anti-causalists. I shall now consider very briefly some of the arguments 
against the doctrine.
(3). A CRITIQUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSE.
The doctrine of cause, like consideration in common law is not without its 
difficulties. The classical theory of cause, although satisfactory in theory, does show 
its imperfections once one tries to put it in practice. This is largely due to the fact 
that the classical theory confines the courts to an investigation of the external 
elements of the contract. But contract is essentially an act of will and the justification 
of the obligation must be sought in this will. In large measure, cause is 
subjective,150 including the ideas of principal motives and subjective inducement of 
the parties.
It is in the field of gratuitous contracts that these shortcomings are most evident. 
Because the will of the donor to divest himself in favour of the donee is not supported 
by any economic counter prestation, the investigation and discovery of cause in such 
contracts can be very difficult. Theoretically his will appears to be very abstract, 
without justification to rest upon. It has thus been said that the cause in gratuitous 
contracts is, in essence, the intended lack of economic counterpart.151
Supporters of the classical theory, while protesting that cause (in gratuitous 
contracts) is not the same as motive, find a cause in the anticipated happiness of the
150 Maury, "Le Concept et Role de la Cause des Obligations dans la Jurisprudence" 
(1951) 3 R.I.D.C. 492.
151 Maury, "Essai sur le Role de la notion d ’equivalence en Droit Frangais" (1920) 
pp.71-72, cited in Catala, "The Cause o f Obligation in French Law" (1958) 32 
Tul.L.R. 477.
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object of the bounty or in the mental satisfaction, which is supposed to reward the 
doer of the generous act. Despite these protestations, it must be said that the 
distinction between cause and motive in gratuitous contracts especially is dubious, 
prompting one commentator to remark cynically that "if this is not motive, language 
has no meaning."152
In order to alleviate some of the difficulties of the doctrine of cause, causalists and 
the courts have remodelled the notion of cause, not only with regards to gratuitous 
contracts but in the field of onerous contracts as well. By proceeding into a deeper 
analysis of the will of the parties, they have conceived a more complex theory which 
is more adaptable because of its greater subjectivity.
On the whole, the doctrine of cause in French law (and in Civil Law Cameroon) 
now appears strangely diverse. In onerous contracts, cause is the intended lack of 
economic counterpart or value received, which is always the same in contracts of the 
same kind. In gratuitous contracts, which rely precisely on the intended lack of 
economic equivalence, cause is the donor’s determining motive, which relates to the 
objective element of the contract. The insistence upon economic equivalence in 
onerous contracts and the determining motive in both gratuitous and onerous contracts 
must not be contrary to the law, to public order and to good morals. It should be 
said nevertheless that the apparently multiple aspects of the cause of obligations hides 
a profound unity. The cause is always the element of justification153 of the 
obligation, the legally sufficient motive.
Anti-causalists have always maintained that the doctrine is quite unnecessary and 
in some cases illogical and should be abandoned as a result. They argue that in 
essence, cause is simply a generalized reasonable motive for making a contractual 
promise and that the whole concept now lacks content. Even foreign observers do
152 Lee, "Cause and Consideration in Quebec Code" (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 539.
153 Maury, Ency. Dalloz (1951), Verbo Cause, para. 177.
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not seem to be convinced that cause serves any useful purpose.154 According to 
Zweigert and Kotz,155 for instance, the rule that a contract without a lawful cause 
is void, means no more than that a contract is invalid and unenforceable if, on 
reading of its whole content, it is contrary to law or morals.
Anti-causalists argue further that in the case of bilateral contracts, if one party’s 
obligation has no cause, it is because the other’s obligation has no object. Cause 
therefore, they claim, is a superfluous concept. To counter this charge, causalists 
have come forward with two answers. First, they admit that decisions which are 
founded on the absence of cause could also be justified by the absence of object, but 
point out that in some cases it is easier for the courts to rely on the former because 
the object, though trivial or elusory, cannot strictly be said to be non-existent. For 
example, in cases where the object is insubstantial rather than plainly non-existent, 
such as the one involving the genealogist,1'’6 the court may prefer to rely on cause 
rather than the object.
The second answer to the charge of superfluity is that cause serves to tie together 
the two undertakings. If the thing sold has perished at the time when the contract is 
made, the contract is void for want of object. Yet, the obligation of the buyer was 
complete; he had undertaken to pay a certain sum. It is only because of the 
connection between his undertaking and that of the vendor that he cannot be held to 
pay the price. And this connection is cause, it cannot be anything else. Moreover, 
the notion of cause is very necessary in dealing with illegality in contracts. If a house 
is leased for immoral purposes, its object, which is a house, is not illegal, since the 
object itself has no moral aspect. But the undertaking of the lessor, which is the
154 Dawson, Gifts and Promises, pp. 113ff; Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at 
the Civi Law, pp. 159ff; contrast Markensinis, "Cause and Consideration" (1978) 
37 C.L.J, 53, 54, but it must be said that he is concerned to show that French law, 
through the medium of cause, reaches the same conclusions as English law attains by 
a variety of conceptual routes, rather than to consider the question of whether cause 
itself is a single concept (or the usefulness of cause).
155 Zweigert and Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, vol. II, 1977, p. 79.
136 Supra, note 146.
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cause, provides the immoral intention or destination that makes the contract unlawful.
It is by now clear that there are some interesting arguments for and against the 
doctrine of cause. This is no place to settle the issue as I am primarily concerned 
with the application of the doctrine in Cameroon, and not with the conflicting 
versions of the doctrine. The Cameroonian civil law courts are very content to apply 
it in its classical form, regardless of these criticisms. For my part, I share the view 
that the doctrine has not only a moral basis,157 but a definite practical value as well.
157 Rouast, "Enrichissement sans Cause" (1922) R.T.D.C. 35, points out that cause 
in the doctrine is the same as cause in contracts.
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CHAPTER SEVEN.
DEFECTIVE CONTRACTS.
The necessary ingredients for the formation of contracts both at common and civil 
law such as offer and acceptance, consideration and cause have already been 
considered in the previous two chapters. Yet it does not follow that where these 
requirements are satisfied, the contract automatically becomes enforceable or free 
from all defects. The contract may still be defective because the law disapproves of 
its purpose or the terms by which it seeks to achieve that purpose or because it has 
failed to comply with some prescribed formality.
This chapter is concerned with the various sorts of contractual defect. The word 
defective is used here as a term of convenience to refer to all those contracts that are 
described as void, voidable, unenforceable or illegal at common law and to those 
contracts that the civil law considers to contain some vitiating element (vices du 
consentement). I shall limit my investigation to two major categories. The first 
category deals with situations in which there are defects in reaching agreement, such 
as mistake (erreurj and misrepresentation (<dol). The second one deals with defects 
relating to the validity and enforcement of contracts, precisely formality and 
illegality.1
I. DEFECTS IN REACHING AGREEMENT
The parties may appear to have reached agreement when in fact such agreement 
was only obtained by mistake, misrepresentation or duress. When such is the case, 
any consent given is impaired, defective, and tainted by a vice that affects its
1 Questions of enforcement and illegality are, strictly speaking, not vices of consent, 
whether in English or French law. However it is convenient to treat them in this 
chapter.
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freedom. This is true of both the civil law and common law. As clearly stated in 
article 1109 of the Cameroonian Civil Code, consent is invalid when it has been given 
through error, extorted by duress, or obtained by fraud. These three are known as 
in French law as vices du consentement (vices of consent).2
English law, strictly speaking, does not refer to mistake, misrepresentation and 
duress as vices of consent but like the civil law, it treats them as factors that affect 
the reaching of agreement.3 In this sense, they correspond broadly to the civil law 
theory of vices du consentement. However, English law differs from the civil law in 
its conception of these factors. For example, it draws a distinction between the 
common law and equity in its treatment of mistake and adopts an objective approach 
when assessing these factors. In this study, only mistake and misrepresentation are 
considered.
1. MISTAKE AND  ERREUR.
Under traditional English and French contract law, a contract is formed by the 
mutual assent of the parties involved. Given this theoretical underpinning, both 
systems have struggled to provide for the existence of mistake in the formation of 
contracts. Making provisions for mistake, however, involves the delicate balancing 
of the autonomous will of the individual and the reliance interest of the parties in the 
transaction. In other words, it involves a conflict between two fundamental policies: 
promoting consent and protecting reliance. On the one hand is the need to enforce 
contracts where the parties to it have consented to be bound. But where there is 
serious error, consent may be negatived or nullified4 and the case for enforcing the
2 See Souchon, French Report, In: Rodiere, ed., Harmonisation du droits des 
affaires dans les pays du Marche Commun: Les vices du consentement dans le 
contrat. 1978, p. 46.
3 See generally, Bell and Dann, Great Britain and Ireland Report, In: Rodiere, ed., 
Op. cit.. note, 2 p. 141.
4 Bell v. Lever Bros. Ltd [1932] A.C. 161, 217, per Lord Atkin.
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contract is seriously weakened. On the other hand, there are many situations where, 
although their hopes are disappointed, the parties must be held by their bargains, if 
the stability and confidence in contractual bargains are not to be eroded.
Although the above dilemma transcends both the civil and common law systems, 
these systems do not treat contractual mistake in exactly the same way. For this 
reason, I shall examine the approach to contractual mistake in common law and Civil 
Law Cameroon separately, using English and French law as points of reference.
A. Mistake
It has become the custom for English textbook writers and commentators to 
concede readily that contractual mistake is a notoriously difficult branch of contract 
law.5 A great deal has been written on contractual mistake,6 yet the subject is still 
beset with problems of definition, with doctrinal difficulties, and with an archaic 
remedial system. One is equally perplexed by its refined distinctions, by the amount 
of controversy to which it has given rise, and by a singular failure to extract from the 
cases clear basic principles, applicable to all cases.
It is against this background that I shall attempt to tackle the problem of 
contractual mistake in Common Law Cameroon. My task is not made any easier by 
the thin local judicial dicta on the subject. However, it is not my intention to 
undertake an exhaustive survey of the subject since without sufficient local litigation, 
any attempt at a detailed treatment will only amount to a rehatch of the law of 
mistake in England, the multiple facets of which have already received detailed 
treatment in textbooks and articles. My aim here is simply to find out what the local
See for example, Cheshire, Fifoot, and Furmston: Law of Contract, (12th. ed.) p. 
228, and Grunfield, "Reflections on Some Aspects o f Operative Mistake in Contract" 
(1950) 13 M.L.R. 50.
6 On the extensive literature, see Slade, "The Myth o f Mistake in English Law o f  
Contract" (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 385; Atiyah and Bennion, "Mistake in the Construction 
o f Contracts" (1961) 24 M.L.R. 421; Stoljar, "A New Approach to Mistake in 
Contract" (1965) 28 M.L.R. 265. See also those cited in note 1 above.
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courts have made of the English doctrine of contractual mistake in the few cases 
where they have in truth had to consider the question whether an agreement is or is 
not void on the ground of mistake.
Before I consider the fundamental rules of mistake, two features of traditional 
contract approach to mistake must be briefly mentioned. The first is the role of 
equity and the second is the distinction between mistake of law and mistake of fact.
For the present exercise, I have chosen to ignore the bifurcation of mistake into 
common law and equity.7 This is not to suggest that it is of no effect whatsoever; 
after all it has come to be accepted that a wider basis for relief against mistake is 
available in equity than at common law. It has been said that mistake may be a 
ground for relief in equity even though there may be no remedy at law,8 and mistake 
in equity only makes a contract voidable. I have decided to avoid the bifurcation 
because the common law and equity have never had separate jurisdictions in 
Cameroon. Besides, since the fusion of the common law and equity in 1873, it has 
become more difficult to justify this bifurcation. In fact, in United Scientific 
Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough Council,9 the House of Lords were strongly of 
the opinion that common law and equity should no longer be regarded as distinct 
systems. It is true that these observations were not made in the context of contractual 
mistake, but they are clearly wide enough to embrace that topic. However, the rules 
of equity cut across whatever classification of mistake that one adopts.
As for the mistake of fact, mistake of law dichotomy, it is to the effect that, in 
order for a mistake to operative at common law, the mistake must be one of fact, not
7 See generally Grunfield, "A Study in the Relationship between Common Law and 
Equity in Contractual Mistake" (1952) 15 M.L.R. 297.
8 Denning LJ, Solle v. Butcher [1950] 1 K.B. 671 
at 693 (CA).
9 [1977] 2 AER 62.
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law. This was established in the case of Bilbie v. Lumley.10 Again, equity may 
offer a more generous basis for relief when the mistake can be regarded as one of 
law .11 Not much will be made here of the distinction between mistake in law and 
mistake in fact. It is enough to note that relief will sometimes be refused because the 
mistake that was made is said to be one of law rather than fact and where that is the 
case I will say so.
As already pointed out, judicial efforts at developing the law of mistake have been
a constant attempt to allow and yet control the defence of mistake. The result of this
effort has been to introduce into the law a number of requirements before the defence
of mistake will be allowed.
The first requirement is that the mistake must be "fundamental". This has been
variously stated in a number of formulations of the basis for relief for mistake. Thus
Lord Atken in Bell v. Lever Brothers said,12
"We therefore get a common standard for mutual mistake, and to 
implied conditions whether as to existing or as to future facts. Does 
the state of the new fact destroy the identity of the subject matter as it 
was in the original fact?"
Thus Lord Denning M.R., in Solle v. Butcher said,13
"A contract is also liable in equity to be set aside if the parties were 
under a common misapprehension either as to facts or as to their 
relative and respective rights, provided that the misapprehension was 
fundamental and that the parties seeking to set it aside was not himself 
at fault"
Even though the mistake may be fundamental, the usual approach is to go further
10 (1802) 2 East 469, 102 E.R. 448. This distinction is one that causes many 
difficulties. It has been argued that many of the cases that have purported to deny 
relief on the ground that the mistake was one of law and not one of fact are based on 
an unwarranted interpretation of the Bilbie v. Lumley case that first established the 
distinction. See Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, 1993, p. 145.
11 Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1, 1994, p. 318.
12 [1932] A.C. 161 at 226-227 (H.L.)
13 [1950] 1 K.B. 671 at 693 (CA).
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and investigate the nature of the mistake. There is said to be at least two kinds of 
mistake - unilateral and bilateral. Bilateral mistake may be common or mutual. 
However, for the purpose of this exercise, I prefer to categorise cases of mistake 
according to the type of mistake that has occurred. In this respect, three kinds of 
mistake are discernible: mistake as to the identity of the other contracting party, 
mistake as to the subject matter, and mistake as to the nature of the transaction. 
Common law also admits of a separate category for those cases where a party to a 
contract may be so fundamentally mistaken that he does not even realise what type 
of document he is signing. This is described as non est factum.
(i) Mistake as to the Identity of the other party.
I have been unable to find any local cases on the mistaken identity of the other 
party, and it should hardly be surprising that there is none. Because commerce is yet 
to be depersonalised in Cameroon, almost every contract to which the identity of a 
party is crucial is concluded inter praesentes. Where that is the case, it is rare for a 
party to allege that he was mistaken as to the identity of the other. Even in England, 
cases of mistaken identity where the transaction takes place inter praesentes are rare. 
Some have even argued that it is impossible.14
In the absence of local case law, I shall be content to state in outline form only, 
the position in English law,15 which position the common law courts in Cameroon 
are expected to follow if and when confronted with the problem. Since English law 
applies an objective test to mistake, it is only satisfied by an affirmative proof of an 
intent to deal with a different person from the one actually dealt with.
The affirmative proof must be of the mistake of one person’s identity for that of
14 Wade, "Mistaken Identity in the Law o f Contract" (1922) 38 L.Q.R. 204; and 
Fifoot’s English Law and its Background, p.64.
Ir* See Goodhart, "Mistake and Identity in Contract" 57 L.Q.R. 228.
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another and not of his attributes.16 Thus in Cundy v. Lindsay17 the respondent 
proved that he intended Blenkiron & Co. and not Blenkarn (with whom he dealt) and 
in Hardman v. Booth,18 Hardman satisfied the court that he intended to sell goods 
to Thomas Gandell, partner in the firm, whereas the fraud of the unauthorised clerk, 
Edward Gandell, induced Hardman to deal with him. In Ingram v. Little,19 the 
plaintiffs claim was upheld on the ground that they had intended to deal with 
Hutchinson of Stanstead House and not with the rogue before them as such. These 
are examples of mistake as to the identity for which the court declared the contracts 
void.
These cases should be contrasted with King’s Norton Metal Co. v. Eldrige 
Merrett & Co.,20 where the appellant believed he was contracting with a partner 
in the firm Hallam & Co., which in fact did not exist. As the offer must have come 
from a living person, the Court of Appeal held that he must have intended the 
swindler Wallis, who ordered the goods in the name of Hallam & Co. and to whom 
they were sent. Thus the appellants were mistaken as to the attributes of Wallis, 
fraudulently misrepresented on the note paper, but both intended him and dealt with 
him.
16 But Williams, "Mistake as to Party in the Law o f Contract" (1943) 23 Can. B.R. 
271, at 276, argues that a man’s identity is no more than the sum of his attributes.
17 (1878) 3 App.Cas. 459
18 (1863), 1 H. & C. 803.
19 [1961] 1 Q.B. 31.
20 (1897) 14 T.L.R. 98; see also Phillips v. Brooks [1919] 2 K.B. 243 and 
Sowler v. Potter [1940] 1 K.B. 271.
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(ii) Mistake as to the substance of the subject matter.
To the subject-matter of the contract, the principle that the entire absence of a 
party’s intent prevents the contract ever coming into existence, has three applications 
in English law: (a) the parties may be mistaken in that the object is non-existent at 
the time of making the contract; (b) the parties may intend different objects; (c) 
though having the same object in mind, one or both parties may be mistaken as to its 
"substance" (i.e., identity).
There appears to be no actual illustrations of situation (a) and (b) in the local case 
law. However, where there is a mistake as to the very existence of the subject 
matter, English law treats this as a case mistake and not as one of impossibility of 
performance. Thus in Couturier v. Hastie,21 the House of Lords held as void the 
sale of a cargo of corn, en route from Salonika to London, because unknown to the 
parties, the cargo no longer existed at the time of making the contract as it had 
already been disposed of at Tunis due to overheating. In Strictland v. Turner,22 
the sale of an annuity, after the death of the annuitant, was held to be void, and the 
price recoverable as for a total failure of consideration. Again, non-existence of a 
marriage, the supposed subject-matter of a separation deed, rendered the latter void 
in Galloway v. Galloway 23
The case of (b), where the parties intend different objects, is logically a case of 
ambiguity in expressing offer and acceptance, but as it results in each party intending 
a different subject-matter, hence an entire absence of consensus ad idem, it has been 
treated as mistake on the authority of the leading case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus,24 
where the sale of a cargo of cotton "ex Peerless from Bombay" was held void as two
21 (1856), 5 H.L.C. 673. See generally Atiyah, "Couturier v. Hastie and the Sale o f 
Non-Existent Goods" (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 385.
22 (1852), 7 Ex. 208.
23 (1914), 30 T.L.R. 531.
24 (1864), 2 H. & C. 906.
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ships of that name were sailing from Bombay. Whereas the plaintiff intended that in 
December, the defendant intended that in October.
In the third possibility, i.e. mistake as to the substance of the subject matter, the 
rule seems to be that even though the parties have the same object in mind, if they 
differ as to its substance, (i.e. identity), the contract is void. The analysis of the 
distinction between this and mistake as to qualities is a matter of considerable 
difficulty. Description is applied to both the substance and quality of the object. The 
general rule is that mistake merely as to quality does not render the transaction void. 
In Scott v. Littledale,25 a contract for the sale of tea was held valid at law inspite 
of a mistake as to its quality and hence as to its value. Greatly diminished value may 
affect quality but it does not change identity; thus in Kennedy v. Panama, etc., 
Royal Mail Co.,26 the contract was valid though of much less value through failure 
to secure a lucrative government contract on the faith of which they were bought.
That only mistake as to identity will suffice was underlined in Bell v. Lever 
Bros. ,27 where the respondent sought to recover in quasi-contract £30.000 paid to 
the appellant under an alleged mistake of fact. This was as to the validity of the 
compensation agreement under which this sum was paid in consideration of the 
release of the respondents by the appellant from a service contract under which he 
managed their West African interests. It was alleged that the compensation agreement 
was void as its subject-matter, the service contract, had lost its identity through 
breach by the appellant’s failure to account for some £700 profit, made in the course 
of his employment. Such breach was held to render the service contract "voidable", 
but not to destroy its identity, hence the compensation agreement was binding and the 
money paid thereunder irrecoverable.
The question of mistake as to the identity of the subject matter came up for
25 (1858) 8 E & B. 815.
26 (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 580.
27 [1932] A.C. 161.
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consideration in the Bamenda High Court in Jonas Puwo v. Ndi Cho Samson.2* The 
defendant undertook to supply the plaintiff with a gear box for a 20 ton Mercedes 
Benz truck model 26 x 24. The contract price was 1.8 million francs, of which one 
million francs was immediately advanced by the plaintiff. On taking delivery, he 
made the final payment; but on trying to fit the gear box into the lorry, it transpired 
that what was supplied was different from what had been ordered. In an action by 
the plaintiff for breach and recovery of the price, the court found as a fact that though 
the parties intended a gear box, they were mistaken as to the substance (identity). 
Consequently, the sale was void and the price recoverable as for a total failure of 
consideration. It should, perhaps, be said that the court did not have to decide 
whether the contract was void for mistake in this instance as they could still have 
arrived at the same conclusion by simply applying the principle that a man need pay 
for what another has not given, and may also recover money so paid on a total failure 
of consideration.
(iii) Mistake as to the nature of the transaction.
Affirmative proof of mistake as to the juridical nature of the transaction, similarly 
divorces the necessary intention from the ostensible dealing. Mistake as to the nature 
of the transaction is more commonplace in Cameroon. Such mistakes have mostly 
arisen in relation to written documents, either because the party in error cannot read 
(an illiterate) or cannot understand the language in which the document has been 
written (a literate Anglophone who does not understand French and vice versa). 
These are the type of mistakes for which the plea of non est factum  is invoked in 
defence.
The problem of mistakenly signed documents is given further treatment in the next 
section. It is enough to say here that the general position at common law seems to 
be that if one party intends bailment, for instance, and the other sale, or if one party
28 HCB/31/83 (Bamenda, 12-09-1984, unreported).
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intends a loan and the other a gift, no legal relationship will be created. In Olabi 
Fayez v. Cie Iiidustrielle du Cameroun,29 the appellant entered into a contract with 
the defendant for the purchase of a new car. He paid half the price and signed a 
document written in French which he understood to be the purchase agreement when 
in fact it was a loan application (demande de ftnancement d ’un vehicule) to be raised 
on a Parisian bank. The loan application was unsuccessful, so, the appellant could 
not obtain the car. The Buea Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s action for 
breach must fail as he had clearly misunderstood the nature of the transaction. In 
effect, no contract was ever concluded.
But error as to the contents of the document or terms of the transaction does not 
suffice to preclude formation. This corresponds to mistake as to attributes of the 
other party (as opposed to his identity) or mistake as to quality of the subject matter 
(as opposed to its substance). In Howatson v. Webb,30 Webb was fraudulently 
induced to execute a mortgage in the erroneous belief that he was signing a 
reconveyance of the property which had been vested in him as nominee and was held 
liable on the mortgagor’s covenant to repay.
The rule that error as to the terms of the contract will not suffice has also been 
underlined in the Cameroonian case of Ukpai Meeka v. Agip (Cameroun) S.A.31 
The plaintiff, an illiterate, entered into a contract with the defendants, distributors of 
petroleum products, whereby he was to operate and manage one of the defendant’s 
filling stations. One term of the contract was that the plaintiff would make cash 
payments for all products supplied to him. Another term was that the plaintiff would 
deposit 200.000 francs as a refundable guarantee to be paid upon termination of the 
contract. The plaintiff then paid some 500.000 francs into the defendant’s account. 
The defendants believed that 200.000 francs of that sum was to cover the deposit with 
the rest as payment for supplies. It turned out that the plaintiff was expecting that
29 HCSW/4/73 (Buea, unreported).
30 [1907] 1 Ch. 1.
31 HCSW/56/74 (Buea, unreported).
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sum to cover orders he had made because he brought an action claiming that he had 
erroneously paid that sum into the defendant’s account, which sum the defendant 
refused to return. The defendants argued that they could only refund 200.000 francs 
if and when the contract was to be terminated and since the plaintiff was not seeking 
to do so, they had to keep that as deposit as per article 6 of the agreement. The 
Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the trial court which had ruled in favour 
to the defendants. The Court of Appeal did not emphasise the difference between 
mistake as to the nature of the contract and mistake as to the terms, yet their decision 
is very much in line with the principle that error as to terms does not preclude 
formation of the contract.
(iv). Illiteracy, Language Problems and Documents Mistakenly Signed.
It happens sometimes that a party is induced by the false statement of another, to 
sign a written document containing a contract that is fundamentally different in 
character from that which he contemplated. Where that is the case, the party in error 
may be allowed to deny his signature by pleading non est factum. While such 
mistake is not confined to illiterate parties, it goes without saying that they are more 
vulnerable when it comes to written documents. In Cameroon the problem is further 
complicated by the use of two official languages - the majority of Anglophones do not 
understand French and the converse is even more true. In the light of these 
Cameroonian peculiarities, the problem of documents mistakenly signed must assume 
added importance.
English law has placed in a separate category these anomalous cases of mistake 
where parties have executed documents under a misapprehension as to their contents. 
The rule applicable in such cases has come to be that the mistaken party will escape 
liability if he satisfies the court that the signed instrument is radically different from 
what he intended to sign and that his mistake was not due to his carelessness.32 In
32 For origin of this rule, see Fifoot: History and Sources of the Common Law pp. 
231-233, 248-249.
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other words, he can invoke the plea of non est factum.
In the course of the development of the plea of non est factum, it was made 
available to a defendant who could not read, due to illiteracy or blindness, so as to 
enable him to escape liability upon proof that the written terms of the deed did not 
correspond with its effect as explained to him before he put his seal to it. It was thus 
held in Thoroughgood’s Case33 that if a person who could not read executed a deed 
after it had been incorrectly read over to him, he was not bound by it.
In the nineteenth century, the benefit of this plea was extended to those who could 
read. The justification for this was the insistence on the requirement of consensus ad 
idem in contract. Therefore in Foster v. Mackinnon34 the defendant who had 
endorsed a bill of exchange in the belief that it was a guarantee, was not bound 
because his mind did not accompany his signature. A similar decision was arrived 
at in Lewis v. Clay35 where the signature to a promissory note was fraudulently 
obtained in the erroneous belief that a private family arrangement was being 
witnessed.
While the extension of the plea to non-illiterates is welcome in Cameroon, it is 
illiterates who remain the most vulnerable as demonstrated by Direct Suppliers Co. 
Ltd v. Dairu Kila.36 The respondent, an illiterate farmer, supplied coffee produce 
to the appellants who dealt in agricultural produce. The respondent received no 
money but was issued a receipt in standard form. One of the clauses appearing on 
the receipt was an acknowledgement that the price for any produce supplied had been 
paid. The respondent was made to thumb print a duplicate of the receipt with a 
representation that the receipt would be withdrawn when payment for the coffee was 
made. In an action for the price, the appellants contended that the receipt was clear
33 (1584) 2 Co. Rep. 9a.
34 (1869) L.R. 4 C.P. 711.
33 1897) 67 L.J.Q.B. 224; and in Carlisle &. Cumberland Banking Co. v. Bragg
[1911] 1 K.B. 489.
36 BCA/28/74 (Buea, unreported).
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evidence that payment had been made. Upholding the High Court judgement, the 
Buea Court of Appeal ruled that the contents of the receipt had been misrepresented 
to the respondent who was therefore not bound by the receipt even though he had 
thumb printed it.
The doctrine non est factum was given a face-lift by the House of Lords in 
Saunders v. Anglia Building Society37 (known in the lower courts as Gallie v. 
Lee). In that case, the House of Lords tightened up the definition of operative 
mistake in cases of non est factum by restricting the category of people to whom it 
applies;38 by requiring that the mistake must be a serious one; and by insisting that 
a person who carelessly signs a document cannot rely on his mistake even if he is 
unaware of its contents.39 The burden of proof lies on the party invoking the plea. 
The main problem is to determine how different the signed document is from that 
which the mistaken party would have signed or intended to sign. There is no clear- 
cut formula laid down. In Foster v. Mackinnon, Byles J. talked of the written 
contract being "of a nature altogether different" while in Saunders v. Anglia Building 
Society the Law Lords came out with a flourish of expressions, such as "radically", 
"fundamentally", "basically", "totally", or "essentially" different in character or 
substance from the contract intended.
The difficulty facing a party who alleges that the contract he signed was altogether 
different from what he had in mind is well illustrated by the Saunders case. The 
plaintiff gave the deeds of her leasehold house to her nephew in order that he might
37 [1971] A.C. 1004.
38 The nineteenth century extension of the doctrine to those who could read was 
questioned by Salmon L.J. in Gallie v. Lee ([1969] 2 Ch. 17 at p.43) who described 
it as "one of the less happy developments of our law". But his suggestion that the 
doctrine should not apply to such persons if they were of full age and capacity was 
rejected by the House of Lords in that same case. However, the House of Lords 
seem to agree that the doctrine will not normally protect literate persons of full 
capacity.
39 On this point, see Stone, "The Limits o f Non Est Factum After Gallie v. Lee" 
(1972) 88 L.Q.R. 198, 209-210.
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raise money on it. The nephew arranged for an intermediary, Lee, to raise the 
money on a mortgage of the house. A document was prepared which was in fact an 
assignment on sale of the lease to Lee. The plaintiff did not read the document but 
signed it after having been assured by Lee that it was a deed of gift to her nephew 
(who witnessed the document). Lee raised money by mortgaging the house to a 
building society but paid no money either to the plaintiff or to his nephew, and worse 
still, failed to pay the instalments due under the transaction. In an action against the 
defendant and the building society for a declaration that the assignment was void, she 
invoked the doctrine non est factum, contending that what she had intended was a gift 
of the property to her nephew, not its outright sale to the defendant. It was held that 
the doctrine of non est factum did not apply as her mistake was not sufficiently 
serious. The "object of the exercise"40 was to enable the assignee to raise a loan on 
the security of the property for the benefit of her nephew - an object that would have 
been attained under the signed document had the defendant acted in an honest 
manner.
The case of Anye Fambo Paul v. Ruben Anusi & Oumarou Abbu Mallam41
also demonstrates that Cameroonian courts are not too easily inclined to accept the 
ipse dixit of a party who claims that the document he signed was completely different 
from that which he had actually intended. The plaintiff lent money to the first 
defendant with the second defendant acting as guarantor. The loan agreement and 
contract of guarantee was reduced into writing, thus fulfilling the formality enshrined 
in section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677. This memorandum captioned "An 
agreement for loan", upon which the action was brought was duly signed by all 
parties.
The first defendant defaulted in the repayment of the loan and in an action by the 
plaintiff, the second defendant invoked the plea of non est factum, claiming that even
40 This was considered by Russell LJ in the Court of Appeal to be of paramount
consideration ([1969] 2 Ch at 40-41).
41 HCB/90/89 (Bamenda, 06-08-90 unreported).
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though he signed the document, it had not been read to him, neither did he read it.42
Consequently, argued his counsel, he did not understand the nature of the transaction.
In the robust words of Epie J., this was indeed "an idle and absurd contention". The
judge noted that "no oppression, duress, threat, coercion, domination, pressure or
otherwise was exercised on the person of the defendant", and added that "no form of
undue influence..., deceit or misrepresentation" was brought to bear on him. He then
gave an enlightening summary of the general legal position on the doctrine non est
factum , in which he discussed the cases of Foster v. Mackinnon and Lewis v. Clay
and sought to distinguish the present case from those two:43
"The situation in the case at hand is radically different. The 2nd 
defendant admitted in his evidence-in-chief that he signed exhibit "A"
(the contract) as 1st defendant’s surety. It is therefore preposterous, in 
the light of such claiming admissions, to contend that the second 
defendant was misled into executing the agreement or the document is 
fundamentally different in character from that which he signed. The 
simple truth is that the 2nd defendant was fully aware of what he was 
doing. He intended to sign a contract of guarantee and sign it he did.
His mind accompanied his signature and went with the transaction".
The second defendant’s plea of non est factum was accordingly rejected and he was 
held liable as the guarantor of the debt, the principal debtor, the first defendant, 
having failed to repay the loan.
Another significant change that was introduced to the doctrine of non est factum  
in the Saundet's case was the quashing of the distinction between the character and 
the contents of the document. The effect of this distinction was that a defence of non 
est factum  was only available to someone who had signed a document under a mistake 
about the character and nature of the document in question; a mistake about its details 
or its contents, however serious, would not do. This distinction was seen in its full
42 There was no suggestion that defendant was illiterate and since he himself did not 
say so, one is entitled to assume that he was not.
43 It will be noticed that the judge did not at all mention the more recent case of 
Saunders v. Anglia Building Society. It is only a matter for speculation whether this 
was simply an oversight or that he did not consider it binding because it is a post 
1900 English decision.
270
glare in Howatson v. Webb.44 But in the Saunders case, the House of Lords 
virtually overruled Howatson v. Webb, holding that in future, any real serious 
mistake about the document signed could give rise to non est factum, whether it was 
a mistake as to character or as to contents. The Cameroonian courts, however, are 
still slow to take on board the rejection of this distinction. In Ukpai Meeka v. Agip 
(Cameroun) SA45 the Buea Court of Appeal held that mistake alone as to terms of 
the contract was not enough to support a plea of non est factum. As this case was 
decided in 1974, it is not clear whether the Buea Court of Appeal was simply 
unaware of the rejection of the distinction or simply chose to ignore it because they 
felt it was not binding in Cameroon, being a post-1900 English decision. Whatever 
the reason, it is hoped that in future, Cameroonian courts shall ignore the dubious 
distinction between mistake as to character and mistake as to terms or contents and 
follow the House of Lords rejection of it, which is commendable.
The last change in the face-lift of the doctrine was the insistence by the House of 
Lords in the Saunders Case that the party alleging error must not have been 
negligent. Formerly, it was irrelevant that the signatory had been careless in not 
reading the document. This was demonstrated in Carlisle & Cumberland Banking 
Co. v. Bragg46 where the Court of Appeal held that the defendant could deny his 
signature to a guarantee of an overdraft he had signed without reading, thinking it 
was an insurance proposal. But in the Saunders Case, the House of Lords overruled 
Bragg’s Case and held that carelessness of this kind precludes the defence altogether.
The Cameroonian courts are yet to rule on the effect of negligence but it can safely 
be projected that they will not allow a careless party to successfully invoke the plea 
of non est factum. The decision in the Anye Frambo case does, in fact, lend itself 
to the interpretation that negligence will deprive the alleged mistaken party of the 
defence of non est factum. In that case, the defendant stated that he neither read the
44 Supra, note 30.
43 Supra, note 31.
46 [1911] 1 K.B. 489.
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document nor was it read over to him. Since he never claimed to be unable to read, 
he must have been careless not to have read the document. On this score alone, he 
would be denied the plea of non est factum  on the strength of the Saunders decision. 
It must be emphasised however that the court rejected his plea of non est factum  not 
on the basis that he was negligent, but because they did not accept his claim that he 
did not understand the nature of the transaction.
Finally, one must conclude this discussion on non est factum  with a note about its 
vitality. There have been muttering about the continuing application of the doctrine 
from textwriters and the judiciary. For instance, it has been suggested that "It might 
have been wiser, ...to have discarded it altogether when society became more 
sophisticated";47 while Salmon LJ has expressed the view that the plea has become 
"a dangerous anachronism in modern times".48 These reservations are no doubt 
directed at England, and mindful of all the changes that have taken place since the 
doctrine was first used, it must be said that they are not entirely without justification. 
In the case of Cameroon, however, the picture is different. Illiteracy is still very 
much a social problem, coupled with the fact that even those who are literate may be 
confronted with either of the official languages that they may not understand. This 
means that people are more susceptible to make the kind of mistakes for which their 
only a defence may be a plea of non est factum. Since the law must be expected to 
take judicial notice of such social problems, any legal doctrine that can actually help 
in such cases, as the plea of non est factum does, is to be maintained. It will 
therefore be premature to describe the plea of non est factum as an anachronism in 
present day Cameroon. It is surprising that it is not pleaded as often as one might 
expect.
47 Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, p. 262.
48 In Gallie v. Lee [1969] 2 Ch at 43-44.
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B. ERREUR
The Cameroonian Civil Code, like its French progenitor, does not define error. 
However, error has been defined by French doctrine as a false representation of 
reality.49 Thus error may occur in the course of any intellectual process, but the law 
concerns itself only with the kind of error that involves the making of a juridical act 
such as a contract. In that sense, error is a false or inexact idea that a party to a 
contract has of an element of that contract.50 Since consent is the expression of a 
party’s will, any such consent prompted by error, challenges the validity of a contract 
as no valid contract can be made without the valid consent of the parties.
Like the common law, the civil law also has to grapple with the dilemma of 
protecting the freedom of the will of parties through the granting of appropriate relief 
to those whose consent has been vitiated by error on the one hand, and the need to 
protect the stability of transactions, which is strongly connected to the need to protect 
the interest of the other party who might not have shared in the error. To resolve 
these diametrically opposed interests, a compromise has been reached whereby not 
every mistake will lead to the annulment of the contract. I shall now sketch how the 
civil law in Cameroon goes about this.
The Cameroonian Civil Code only mentions two kinds of error. It says in article 
1110 that an error can only be taken into account if it affects the substance of the 
thing contracted about - erreur sur la substance nieme de la chose - and that an error 
concerning the other party to the contract - erreur sur la personne - is not to be 
taken into account unless the identity of the other party was a principal ground for 
contracting. This categorisation of error into only two types is very restricted 
because it fails to take into account other possible forms of error, such as errors
49 Weill & Terre, para. 159.
50 Weill & Terre, para. 159; See also Litvinoff, "Error in Civil Law". In: Dainow, 
ed., Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations, 1969, at 222, 225-226; and Grelon, 
L ’erreur dans la liberalires, R.T.D.C. 1981, 261.
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involving the nature of the contract, or the thing which is the contractual object, or 
the cause of the obligation, or the value*1 of the parties respective obligations. Once 
again, doctrine and jurisprudence have had to fill in these gaps in the Code. They 
broadly divide contracts into three categories - erreur-obstacle; erreur vice du 
consentement; erreur indifferent - depending on the seriousness of the error.
(i). Erreur-Obstacle.
According to the French doctrine of erreur-obstacle, only the two kinds of error - 
error as to substance and error as to the person - are to be considered as vices of 
consent. Other kinds of error not mentioned in article 1110 are not vices of consent, 
but rather obstacles to the formation of the contract.52 This is because they are 
deemed to destroy completely the consent of the party in error. It is a case of errerr- 
obstacle when the error relates to (a) the nature, (b) the object, or (c) the cause of the 
contract.
In French doctrine, an error in the nature of the contract is an insurmountable 
obstacle to the formation of a binding contract, which results in an absolute rather 
than a relative nullity.53 French courts have thus annulled contracts where a party 
who intended to obtain a regular policy from an insurance company had actually 
joined a mutual insurance association through error54 and where a party who 
intended to take a long term loan had erroneously consented to enter a deferred credit
51 Questions relating to the value or equivalence of obligations are governed by the
doctrine of lesion (article 1118 of the Civil Code). For a discussion on this, see 
Chauvel, "Erreur Substantielle, Cause et Equilibre des Prestations dans le Contrats 
Synallagmatiques". In: DROITS - Revue Francaise de Theorie Juridique, 12 Le 
Contrat, 1990, p.93 et s..
'2 See Aubert, Notions et Role de I’Offre et de I’Acceptation dans la Formation 
du Contrat. 1970, para. 286.
:>3 Weill & Terre, para. 177.
54 Req. 6 Mai 1878, D.P. 80.1.12, S. 80.1.125.
274
contract.55 I have not found any case in which the courts in Civil Law Cameroon 
have annulled a contract because a party was mistaken as to its nature.
Error as to the thing that is the contractual object may arise in situations where the 
thing involved is not in the presence of the parties, and may be sufficient to vitiate 
the consent of the parties. The Cameroonian case of Soitacam v. El Hadj. Ndamako 
Ahmadou56 provides an interesting example of error as to object. El Hadj Ndamako 
sold a small second- hand cement mixer to Soitacam, a construction company. The 
small mixer was kept alongside a much bigger one at Ndamako’s building site. 
Soitacam despatched a driver to pick up the mixer. He arrived in Ndamako’s absence 
and mistakenly collected the bigger one. Ndamako felt this was a matter of slight 
confusion but all efforts to get Soitacam to return the mixer for the smaller one for 
which they had paid, were fruitless. He therefore sued Soitacam for the return of the 
large mixer and for loss of its use. The Tribunal de Grande Instance of Foumban 
only ordered Soitacam to pay 50.000 francs, rejecting the plaintiff’s other claims. 
On appeal, the Bafoussam Court of Appeal increased the damages to 200.000 francs 
and ordered that the mixer be returned. This time Soitacam appealed.
The Supreme Court, after having censured the lower courts for failing to examine 
and determine whether the contract between Soitacam and Ndamako was valid or 
tainted by error, proceeded to direct that two solutions were available to the lower 
courts: They could have either treated the large mixer as the thing that was the 
contractual object, in which case, there was a valid contract of sale with the property 
having passed to Soitacam so that Ndamako could not claim its return; or not treat 
it as the thing that was the contractual object, in which case, there was error to which 
must be applied the provisions of articles 1110 and 1117 of the Civil Code. By 
ordering the return of the large mixer without deciding on the status of the small one, 
the Court of Appeal, in the words of the Supreme Court, "a implicitement, mais 
necessairement considere qu ’il y avait erreur sur la substance me me de la chose objet
55 Rennes, 26 Oct. 1950, Gaz. Pal. 1951.1.27.
56 C.S. Arret du 22 Mai 1980. (1980) 19 & 20 C.L.R. 139.
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de la convention". They could not then, observed the Supreme Court, with one 
stroke order for restitution against the buyer (thereby implying that the contract was 
a nullity) and at the same time award damages to the seller (thereby implying the 
existence of a contract).
Following that observation, the Supreme Court criticised the Appeal Court for 
awarding damages against Soitacam and ordering them to return the large mixer 
without making a corresponding order for the seller to either deliver the small mixer 
which the court considered to be the proper contractual object or to repay the 50.000 
francs he had received for it. The seller had therefore been unduly enriched by the 
Court of Appeal judgement. On this point, it must be said in favour of the Court of 
Appeal, that it specifically ruled that the 50.000 francs earlier paid to the seller 
should be deducted from the damages he was to receive. Even if the Supreme Court 
based its finding of unjust enrichment on the damages that were awarded to the seller, 
it would still be difficult to support the unjust enrichment thesis. It must be recalled 
that Soitacam kept the large mixer for more than a year, depriving the seller of its 
use. It is this loss of use that the seller claimed in special damages to the tune of a 
reasonable 3.000 francs a day. By awarding the seller 200.000 francs less 50.000 
francs he had received for the small but undelivered mixer, the Court of Appeal can 
hardly be accused of unjustly enriching the seller. It may be that some of the facts, 
strained and sieved through successive levels of appeal, were overlooked by the 
Supreme Court.
The unjust enrichment issue apart, the Supreme Court deserves credit for giving 
precision to the problem of error as to thing that is the contractual object in Civil Law 
Cameroon. Its directives are also in line with the position in France. In French law, 
what is usually termed error in the contractual object is actually, in more accurate 
language, an error that bears on the object of the performance of one of the 
parties.57 From that perspective, rescission may be obtained not only by a party who 
made an error concerning the performance of the other party, but also by a party who
37 See Ghestin, La Notion d’Erreur dans le Droit Positif Actuel, 1963, pp. 3-4 and
90-96.
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made an error concerning his own performance. That is to say, rescission may be
granted not only to a purchaser who, because of an error, did not buy the thing he
really intended to acquire, but also to a seller (like the one in the Soitacam case) who,
because of an error, sold a thing other than the one he intended to sell.
The third case of erreur-obstacle is that which relates to the existence o f the cause
of the contract.58 In the Cameroonian Civil Code, the reason why a person binds
himself by an obligation is called the cause of the obligation.59 For a contract to be
annulled because of an error incurred by one party the error must have determined
that party’s consent, that is, the error must affect the reason why the party consented
to obligate himself or, in other words, it must be clear that the party would not have
bound himself if such error had not been made.60 The closest that the Cameroonian
courts have come to deciding on mistake as to the cause of the contract was in
S.H .O . Afncauto v. Nga-Ondoua Joseph-Marie.61 The judgement does not state
the full facts of the case but the essentials are that the appellant had employed the
respondent on the basis of a collective labour agreement, which unknown to them at
the time, was neither applicable nor binding on them. On the strength of this
mistake, they were later to terminate the respondent’s employment who then brought
an action for the payment of what he would have earned for the remainder of his
employment. The Yaounde Court of Appeal held:
Q u’en tout etat de cause la S.H.O qui manifestement a commis une 
erreur en engageant Nga Ondoua Joseph sur la base de la convention 
collective applicable ne saurait se prevaloir de cette erreur pour 
refuser de payer les droits reclames; que conformement a un principe 
juridique constant dans les relations contractuelles, nul ne peut se 
prevaloir des ses propres erreurs pour refuser d ’executer ses propres 
obligations".
38 For the categorisation of error as to cause as error-obstacle, see the critical 
observations of Flour & Aubert, para. 193.
59 See generally, supra, chapter 6.
60 See Ghestin, Op. cit.. note 57, p. 29.
61 CS, Arret No. 53 du 28 Mars 1972, [1972] 26 B.A.C.S. 3550.
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That is to say, the appellants could not avail themselves of their error. Therefore, 
the respondent’s claim must succeed.
The Supreme Court disapproved of that reasoning, pointing out that the Court of 
Appeal, by admitting the appellant’s mistake without giving any effect to it, had failed 
to show any understanding of the scope or extent of error as a vice of consent in the 
formation of contracts. It accordingly quashed the decision and remitted the case to 
the Douala Court of Appeal. Although the Supreme Court did not make a positive 
ruling on the effect of the mistake, the tenor of its statement in quashing the Yaounde 
Court of Appeal judgement suggests that it considered the contract a nullity because 
the appellant was mistaken as to its cause. Since the reason why the appellants 
entered the contract was because of a mistaken belief that the collective agreement 
was applicable and binding, this is clearly a case of error as to the cause of the 
contract.
( i i)  Erreur Vice du Consentement.
There are two types - error as to substance and error as to the person. Only these 
two are recognised by the article 1110 Civil Code.62
Error as to substance, according to article 1110 of the Cameroonian Civil Code, 
is a cause of nullity of an agreement only when it bears on the very substance of the 
thing that is the object.63 This kind of error must not be confused with error as to 
the identity of the object. Error as to the substance of the object concerns certain 
qualities of the object that are regarded as substantial, or essential, and are to be 
distinguished from other qualities that are only secondary, which will not lead to 
annulment of the contract. This conclusion was reached as a result of the adoption by
62 This article is only concerned with contracts. There are other provisions on mistake 
relating to non-contractual issues such as article 783 (succession), articles 180-181 
(marriage), 2052-2053 (transaction).
63 Maury, "L ’erreursur la substance" In: Etudes Henri Capitant, p.491; Malinvaud, 
"De I ’erreur sur la substance" D. 1972, Chron. 215.
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French courts64 and doctrine65 of the subjective approach in determining what 
amounts to substantial qualities.
A practical consequence of the subjective approach is that rescission is more 
widely available. This is because in deciding whether to grant or to deny rescission 
on grounds of error, the courts give great weight to the reason that prompted a party 
to contract for a certain object so that rescission is granted when the error concerns 
that reason, even though nothing may be wrong with the object itself if objectively 
considered. This widening effect of the subjective view on the granting of rescission 
is kept in check by strict requirements of proof of error, the onus of which lies on the 
party alleging error.
In Mme Lando nee Ngouffo Regine v. Miko Njoh Jacques,66 the parties entered 
into a contract of lease in which the plaintiff let out property to the defendant. Rents 
were to be paid quarterly. It was a condition of the contract that the leasor would be 
entitled to rescind the contract in the event of non-payment of just one quarterly rent. 
The defendant failed to pay for two quarters and the plaintiff sued for damages and 
rescission. The defendant pleaded mistake, alleging that he had been mistaken as to 
the substantial qualities of the house he had rented, which according to him, had 
turned out to be unfit for human habitation. He contended that the contract was a 
nullity from the very beginning and therefore, no action could be brought on it. This 
no doubt was a trivial, if not idle, defence since the court found as a fact that the 
defendant had actually visited and examined the said property before the conclusion 
of the contract, never mind the fact that he had lived in it for over two years. The 
court had no difficulty in brushing aside the plea of error but more significantly, 
insisted that the defendant had failed to evince any proof of error whatsoever. So, 
it is not enough for a party to simply assert the he was mistaken, he must also be able
64 Civ. 28 Janv. 1913; S. 1913, 1, 487, cited in Schmidt-Szalewski: Jurisprudence 
Francaise 5 - Droit des Contrats, 1989, para.30.
65 Weill & Terre, para. 168, Planiol & Ripert (2nd. ed 1952) para. 218-221.
66 JC No.211 du 6 Mars 1991 (Yaounde, unreported).
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to prove that the qualities about which he was mistaken, were, for him, substantial.
As for error as to the person, article 1110 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code says that 
error is not a ground for nullity when it only goes to the person with whom one 
intended to contract unless the identity of the person was the principal reason for the 
convention. This kind of error may relate to either the physical or civil identity of 
the person or to the physical, intellectual, moral or even juridical qualities of the 
person.67 It has never been contested that any error of this kind justifies the nullity 
of the contract des que la personne avait constitue la cause principale de la 
convention.68
Error as to the person does not appear to have occupied the time of the courts in 
Civil law Cameroon so far. Understandably, it is highly unlikely (though not 
impossible) for this kind of error to occur in Cameroon where the parties more often 
than not operate inter praesentes. Even in France cases of error as to the person are 
not commonplace. However, it is enough to say that error as to the person is 
operative in contracts intuitus personae, where the personal qualities of the other 
party are material.69 Like error as to substance, error as to the person must touch 
on an essential, and an agreed quality of the person. Thus in the French case of 
Saint Jean v. Beaume70 it was held that the nationality of the buyer was not enough 
to render the contract void because it was never a matter for consideration for the 
contract.
67 Ghestin, Le Contrat: Formation, para. 410.
68 Planiol & Ripert, t. VI, p.216, no. 182; Marty & Raynaud, Obligations, para. 
143.
69 The best example is gratuitous contracts. See Grelon, op. cit.. 50, p. 268, no. 10.
70 Cass. Civ. ler, 4 janv. 1980.
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( i i i ) .  Erreur Irrelevante.
This is the third category of mistake. Unlike the other two, it has no textual 
basis. Yet, although the Civil Code says nothing whatever about it, it is agreed by 
jurisprudence that an error can be taken into account only if it is excusable.71 Cases 
in which a party has signed a document without reading it properly are often placed 
under this heading, even though they are not cases of mistake at all. Typically, an 
erreur inexcusable and therefore irrelevante occurs when the mistaken party had the 
means of acquainting himself with the true state of facts before entering the contract. 
The Cameroonian case of Lando v. Miko Njoh Jaques 72 would make a good 
example of erreur inexcusable. In an action for damages and rescission for failure 
to pay rents the defendant raised the defence of mistake: in particular that he had been 
mistaken as to the substantial qualities of the house, which he claimed was unfit for 
human habitation. His plea of mistake was rejected not on the grounds of inexcusable 
mistake, but rather on the lack of proof of mistake. But having correctly noted as the 
court did, that the defendant had not only examined the property before occupying it 
but had actually gone on to live in it for over two years, one would have expected the 
court to at least explain the decision partly in terms of inexcusable error, rather than 
solely on want of proof of error. To base the decision solely on lack of proof is to 
send a wrong signal that were the defendant able to provide such proof, his mistake 
would have been excusable and therefore operative. Yet, that would not have been 
the case. The crucial factor is that he did examine the house so that he was in a 
position to know of its true state and condition. Any claims to a mistake of that 
condition, whether proven or not, must be considered as inexcusable and irrelevant.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing consideration of mistake 
under the civil law is that the Civil Code offers judges even less (than the common 
law) in the way of firm standards for solutions of mistake cases, and that where it
71 Weill & Terre, para. 174.
72 Supra, note 66.
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does so, the rules are sketchy. The courts and doctrine have had to develop other 
rules to fill in the gaps and expand the scope of mistake to cover other situations 
involving mistake. The courts have not done much to give more precision to such 
general clauses like the requirement that the error be as to a qualite substantielle and 
most writers put the cases in a different order.
This state of affairs, as one would expect, has not helped in Civil Law Cameroon. 
It is clear from the few cases treated above that the trial courts especially have 
struggled to cope with the problem of mistake. At worst they get it wrong and at best 
they are guilty of fence-sitting, being unable to articulate any rules of law on mistake. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has been prepared, each time it has been called upon, 
to provide authoritative guidance on some of the issues.
7.1.2. MISREPRESENTATION AND DOL.
A. MISREPRESENTATION.
As a general rule a party must not make any false and misleading statements that 
induces the other party to enter into the contract. Where such is the case, there is 
misrepresentation and consent is said to be vitiated and the agreement not to be 
genuine. The law on misrepresentation in England used to be bogged down in 
technicalities until an attempt was made at reform by the Misrepresentation Act 
1967.73 Since then the law in England has been a mixture of the common law, 
equity and statute law, and further analysis reveals an intertwining of tort and contract 
law principles. The law is still complicated but the general effect of the 
Misrepresentation Act has been to improve the position of the injured party, whose 
remedies are now much in line with those of a party who suffers loss through breach.
The Misrepresentation Act 1967 does not apply in Cameroon, neither is there any
73 For an analysis of this act, see Atiyah and Treitel, "Misrepresentation Act 196T' 
(1967) 30 M.L.R. 369.
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other equivalent Cameroonian legislation. For that reason, those developments 
triggered in England by the 1967 Act cannot be said to have taken placed in 
Cameroon. The law on misrepresentation in Cameroon is still firmly rooted in the 
common law and equity. No comprehensive coverage of the subject is planned here. 
This must be so because this area is yet to be the subject of much litigation in 
Cameroon. The present treatment is therefore limited to a summary of the more 
important rules and a brief consideration of the various types of misrepresentation.
(1). The Guiding Rules.
Only two main ones are considered here.74 The first is that not all statements are 
actionable. In the context that a misrepresentation is an untrue statement of fact made 
by one party to the other which, though not forming part of the contract, is 
nevertheless one of the reasons that induces that party to enter it, such statements of 
fact, which are actionable, are traditionally distinguished from cheap sales talk, 
statements of opinions, statement of intention and statement of laws - which are not 
actionable.
This distinction is not always clear-cut and some believe it has now reached a 
stage of over-subtle complexity.75 In Bissett v. Wilkinson,76 an assertion that a 
piece of land would support 2.000 sheep was held to be merely a statement of opinion 
and therefore not actionable though it proved to be unfounded. But in Esso 
Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Mardon,11 an expert’s estimate of the future annual petrol 
sales of a filling station, resting upon negligently prepared data, was treated as a 
statement of fact and therefore actionable. The fact that the representor in the latter
74 For more, see e.g. Allen, Misrepresentation, 1988, p. 12.
73 Tillotson: Contract Law in Perspective, 1985, p. 164.
76 [1927] A.C. 177
77 [1976] Q.B. 801.
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case was an expert or so held out himself was crucial.
The second important rule relates to reliance. As with promissory estoppel, the 
essence of misrepresentation is reliance - reliance on truth and reasonable conduct in 
pre-contractual dealings. It follows from this that the injured party, in order to 
rescind the contract or claim damages, must be able to show that he relied on the 
statement and that it induced the contract. The view is taken that once this is 
established, it is no defence that the representee might have discovered its untruth by 
the exercise of reasonable care. Thus in Redgrave v. Hurd,1* a party who had been 
induced to buy a share in a business by an innocent misrepresentation as to its value 
was allowed to rescind the contract and recover the deposit paid, even though he had 
been given the opportunity of examining the accounts and so discovering the true 
position. It is doubtful if Cameroonian courts accept the Redgrave decision. 
Certainly not, if the Bamenda Court of Appeal decision in 5. Nsaiboti v. F. 
Ezeafor19 is anything to go by. In that case, the appellant attempted to rescind the 
contract of sale of a second-hand car on the alleged grounds that she had been 
induced into buying the car as a result of a representation by the vendor’s sister that 
the engine and tyres were new. The court did not accept that there had been any such 
representation so the vendor’s action for specific performance of the contract 
succeeded. But the judgement of the court also makes it clear that had any such 
representation been made, the appellant would still have failed in her attempt at 
rescission because, in the words of Thomas J.,
78 (1881) 20 Ch. D. 1.
79 BCA/6/1973 (Bamenda, 14-3-74, unreported).
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"The evidence shows that the appellant did not exercise reasonable 
diligence in the transaction. Restricted though the doctrine of caveat 
emptor might be in its application to the contract of sale, its 
application in the buying of a second-hand car is most fitting..."
This case signals a departure by Cameroonian courts from the traditional English
common law position. It shows that Cameroonian courts are very likely to deny
relief to a representee who, given the opportunity to check the truth of the
representation, chooses not to do so, or does not use or exercise reasonable care
which may help uncover any untruths. The Cameroonian position is to be preferred
to the one established by Redgrave v. Hurd. Where it is the advice or opinion of the
representor that is being relied upon, the requirement that reasonable care must be
taken in the forming and giving of that advice is obviously an appropriate one. Not
surprisingly, it is now being said that the rule that the lack of care by the representee
affords no defence to the representor should prevail only in cases of fraud; that today
it should not apply where the transaction is wholly innocent;80 and that an extreme
want of care by the representee should be taken to mean that his reliance was
unreasonable. One commentator has talked of the need "to do proper justice between
the garrulous and the gullible". 81
(2). Types of Misrepresentation.
Three types of misrepresentation are recognised in English Law, classified 
according to the state of the mind of the representor: (i) fraudulent misrepresentation 
(a dishonest assertion); (ii) negligent misrepresentation (not dishonest but careless); 
and (iii) a wholly innocent misrepresentation. All three can cause loss to the 
representee and all are actionable, with the remedies being widest in the case of fraud 
and then narrowing down in their availability for negligent and innocent
80 See for example, Howard Marine <& Dredging Co. Ltd. v. Ogden & Sons 
(Excavators) Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 574.
81 Sealy, Damages fo r  Misrepresentation, (1978) C.L.J. 229, 232.
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misrepresentation.
(i). Fraudulent Misrepresentation.
Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek82 stated that "fraud is proved when it is shown 
that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its 
truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false". A person, however, 
who honestly believes his statement to be true, cannot be guilty of fraud, however 
careless he might be and the onus is on the plaintiff who alleges fraud to prove the 
absence of an honest belief. In England the remedies available for fraudulent 
misrepresentation are damages and rescission. It must be noted that the plaintiff’s 
right to rescind was not affected by the Misrepresentation Act 1967.
In Cameroon the position is governed by the common law. Damages are 
recoverable for loss resulting from reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation in a 
common law action for the tort of deceit. The plaintiff may also rescind the contract. 
It is convenient at this point to distinguish between what may be called "rescission for 
misrepresentation" and "rescission for breach".83 Rescission for misrepresentation 
involves an allegation that there was a defect in the formation of the contract; and if 
these allegations are proven it follows that the contract is avoided ab initio. This 
means the contract is set aside and things restored, as far as possible, to the state in 
which they existed before the contract. Rescission for breach,84 on the other hand, 
involves an allegation that there was a defect in the performance of the contract; and 
the existence of that defect does not lead to the conclusion that the contract should be 
treated as if it had never existed. It follows that a party who rescinds for breach can 
claim damages for breach of the contract, while one who rescinds for 
misrepresentation has, by treating the contract as if it never existed, prima facie lost
82 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337.
83 See Atiyah and Treitel, Op. Cit.. note 73, 370.
84 Rescission as a remedy for breach is discussed in detail in chapter 8 below, see p.
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the right to claim damages for its breach. Statements to the effect that a person 
cannot rescind a contract in part, while affirming some particular term, suggest that 
the buyer cannot both rescind and claim damages. There appears to be no direct 
English authority on this point, and the answer is by no means clear. In the case of 
Cameroon, the cases reveal that the buyer is either granted rescission or awarded 
damages but not both. This point can be illustrated with the help of two cases, one 
of which resulted in an award of damages and the other in the granting of rescission.
The case of Tavalla Forchu v. Longla Joseph & Kanga Jean*5 represents the 
first instance. The plaintiff, an elderly illiterate octogenarian, bought a Toyota Hiace 
bus and put it to commercial use. The first defendant, a motor mechanic whom the 
plaintiff knew well, regularly serviced the bus. The vehicle developed some 
mechanical problems which the first defendant diagnosed to be a broken axle. This 
was promptly replaced. Shortly afterwards the plaintiff complained again about 
mechanical problems. This time the first defendant assured the plaintiff that the bus 
was in a very bad condition and advised that it should be sold for scrap. All this for 
a vehicle that was about a year old. Anyway, acting on that advice, the plaintiff 
asked the first defendant to seek a buyer. The second defendant was introduced as 
a prospective buyer and the plaintiff sold the car to him for a giveaway price, in the 
presence of the first defendant. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the bus was 
sold for a cut price because the plaintiff believed it to be heading for the scrap yard. 
But to the plaintiffs consternation, he saw the bus plying the roads in good condition 
immediately after the sale. It had not been destined for the scrap yard after all. He 
certainly had been deceived by the first defendant, so he brought an action for 
damages.
No doubt rehearsing Deny v. Peek, Inglis J. said:
"Deceit is a false representation made by the defendant knowingly, or 
without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or 
false, with the intention that the plaintiff should act in reliance upon 
the misrepresentation which causes damage to the plaintiff in 
consequence of his reliance upon it."
85 HCB/22/86 (Bamenda, 7-12-87, unreported).
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He then continued by noting that the plaintiff, an illiterate, elderly man, had no 
knowledge about cars while the first defendant knew practically everything about the 
bus in question, having regularly serviced it. In selling the bus, therefore, the 
plaintiff had relied solely on the first defendant’s assurances that the bus was in a 
very bad condition. Meanwhile only three months before the sale, the first defendant 
had repaired the axle and worked on the bus. From all these developments, the court 
was satisfied that the first defendant had knowingly made a false representation to the 
plaintiff about the condition of the bus, a representation upon which the latter had 
relied to his detriment. The plaintiff was accordingly awarded damages. It is 
interesting to note that the plaintiff did not ask that the bus be returned to him. 
Whether this was because he considered the second defendant to be a good faith 
purchaser is only a matter for conjecture. However, in the light of the court’s 
observation that "there was no evidence that the second defendant knew of the 
representation or was a party to it", it is doubtful if the plaintiff would have 
succeeded in an action for the return of the bus.
In the second case, Paul Senju v. Camer Industrielle,86 the plaintiff was able to 
rescind the contract because of the defendant’s fraudulent representation. The 
plaintiff bought what was described as a "Bussing" Super Cargo lorry from the 
defendants for the price of 3.250.000 francs. He paid 1.000.000 francs and gave the 
defendants promissory notes to the value of the balance. The lorry was then duly 
delivered to the plaintiff but shortly after delivery, the engine was discovered to be 
faulty. The plaintiff’s driver examined it and formed the opinion that the vehicle was 
not at all new as the defendants had claimed. It was towed to the defendants’ 
premises where the plaintiff complained that it was not new but reconditioned; and 
demanded a refund of the part-payment he had made.
The defendants admitted that the vehicle was returned to their premises not long 
after delivery but maintained it was brand new when they sold it. They tendered a 
certificate from the manufacturers, a purported customs certificate and an expert
86 WC/63/68 (Bamenda, 23-06-69, unreported).
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automobile engineer’s report in support of their claim that the vehicle was new. 
When these were put to strict scrutiny by the court, many irregularities were found. 
For example, the details in the manufacturer’s certificate did not tally with those of 
the automobile expert and neither of the above corresponded with any of the 
numerical details found in the vehicle itself. Also, the details on the sales invoice of 
the said lorry were different from the details of the expert’s report. It became clear 
that the vehicle represented as new in the expert’s report and manufacturer’s 
certificate was not the vehicle that was sold to the plaintiff.
The inconsistencies relating to the particulars of the lorry, the unsatisfactory nature 
of the evidence, the fact that the vehicle’s engine was found to have been resprayed, 
the breakdown etc., all led the court to the conclusion that the defendants had 
fraudulently represented the vehicle to be new. It was accordingly held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to rescission and restitution.
(ii). Negligent Misrepresentation.
The common law traditionally entertained no action for damages for non- 
fraudulent misrepresentation,87 which was classed as innocent, i.e. the maker 
believed it to be true (whether reasonably or not). However, in 1962 the Law 
Reform Committee88 recommended that damages should be given for negligent 
misrepresentation, that is, where a statement is made in the honest belief that it is true 
with no reasonable grounds for such belief. Between the making of that 
recommendation in 1962 and its enactment in 1967, there was a significant common
87 But there was an exception by way of an equitable remedy through the application 
of the general doctrine of "constructive fraud", i.e. an action would lie in negligent 
misstatement if there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties. See Nocton 
v. Lord Ashburton [1914] A.C. 932.
88 See the 10th Report, Cmnd. 1782.
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law development in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd.*9 In a 
landmark decision on negligence, the House of Lords held that where a special 
professional or business relationship, short of contract, existed between parties a duty 
of care could be owed as regards statements made and relied upon (and which caused 
financial loss). It was this ‘special relationship’ principle that led to the decision in 
Esso Petroleum v. Mardon in which a pre-contractual statement was held to give rise 
to liability in tort.
In addition to the common law recognition of liability for negligent 
misrepresentation, section 2 (1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 also created a 
statutory liability for negligent misrepresentation. Unlike the common law, this does 
not depend on any ‘special’ relationship.90 Instead the subsection requires the 
representor, if he is to avoid liability, to prove "that he had reasonable grounds to 
believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented 
were true". I will not elaborate any further on the statutory changes. At least the 
fact has been established that in England there have been recent changes both at 
common law and in statute law which have seen the recognition of liability for 
negligent misrepresentation. The question to be determined now is whether there has 
been any such changes in Cameroon.
As concerns the statutory developments, that question has to be answered 
straightaway in the negative. This is because the Misrepresentation Act 1967, being 
a post-1900 statute, does not apply to Cameroon.91 It is therefore correct to say that 
there is no statutory recognition of liability for negligent misstatement in Cameroon. 
Even from a purely common law perspective, one may say that Hedley Byrne, being 
a post-1900 decision, does not apply to Cameroon, or is at best, merely persuasive. 
Be that as it may, there is evidence to suggest that Cameroonian courts have been
89 [1964] A.C. 465; Stevens, "Hedley Bryne v. Heller - Judicial Creativity and 
Doctrinal Possibility" 27 M.L.R. 121.
90 See Howard Marine & Dredging v. Ogden & Sons [1978] Q.B.574, which has been 
the subject of notes by Sills 96 L.Q.R. 15, and Sealy 1978 C.L.J. 229.
91 See chapter 2.
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sensible enough to embrace the Hedley Byrne ‘special relationship principle’. Traces 
of the Hedley Byrne ‘special relationship principle’ were first discerned in the West 
Cameroon Court of Appeal decision in Alliance Trading Enterprises Ltd. v. 
SOCOPAO Cameroon S.A ..92 The respondents, acting in their capacity as customs 
clearing agents, negligently entered false information on customs forms of the 
appellants for which the appellants were fined by the Customs. In addition, the 
appellants suffered the humiliation of having their commercial activities investigated 
by the Gendarmes. The appellants had in fact been guilty of nothing - all their 
problems had been down to the respondents’ negligence. Delivering the judgement 
of the court, O’Brien Quinn J. echoed the ‘special relationship’ principle, when he 
said,
"It is clear that a contract existed between the appellant and the 
respondent whereby the respondent agreed to be the customs clearing 
agent of the appellant, for remuneration. By the very nature of the 
customs clearing business it is one which is highly specialised and the 
appellant was rightly entitled to rely upon the skill and diligence of the 
respondent. If, therefore, such a specialised agent acts negligently to 
the detriment of its principal, the agent is liable to its principal for 
damages resulting from that negligence."
Nowhere in the judgement was Hedley Byrne mentioned, but in speaking as the 
judge did, it must be assumed that he was applying Hedley Bryne or was at least 
aware of it. Both cases i.e. Alliance Trading and Hedley Byrne, share important 
similarities. Firstly, it was crucial in both cases that the person making the statement 
did so in the exercise of some professional skill. Secondly, just as Hedley Byme did 
for English law generally, this decision too can be credited with having given the 
judicial imprimatur to the recognition of liability in damages for negligent 
misstatement in Cameroon. This is probably the most important feature of both 
cases.
The application of Hedley Byrne may only have been implied in the Alliance
92 WCCA/2/1972 (Buea 23-3-72, unreported).
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Trading case, but in the recent case of Vincent Ndango Tayong v. Mbuy 
Sylvester,93 the Bamenda Court of Appeal did gather up and elucidate on the Hedley 
Byrne "special relationship principle". That case was a direct result of another case 
which the appellant had been involved in. And to understand it, one must first start 
with the original case. The appellant, a businesman, had been having problems with 
his bank over the handling of his account. He had noticed that for several years his 
account had been progressively debited, and wrongly. As he could not resolve the 
matter amicably with the bank, he decided to sue. The trial court found for the 
appellant and awarded him 4.287.000 francs in damages and costs. Both parties were 
not satisfied, so there was an appeal by the bank and a cross-appeal by the appellant.
The Court of Appeal felt that the best way to determine the issue would be to 
appoint an accountant to look into the disputed accounts. So here enters the present 
respondent, an accountant by profession, who was appointed as special referee to 
audit the account of the appellant with the bank from when it was opened up to the 
date of when the action was instituted. He prepared and submitted a report to the 
court. This report however was compiled from incomplete data. Frustrated by this, 
the Court of Appeal rejected the report and invited the parties to present their 
respective cases. When that had been done, the Court of Appeal, like the trial court, 
was satisfied that the bank had wrongly debited the appellant’s account. The 
appellant was thus awarded the sum of 7.835.177 francs, in addition to what he had 
been granted by the trial judge.
After that judgement, favourable as it was to him, the appellant decided to bring 
an action against the respondent. The appellant charged that by failing to prepare a 
proper report, the respondent had been negligent, and that as a result he had suffered 
loss. In dismissing this action the trial judge noted that the respondent had stated 
clearly and unambiguously that the financial report was based on incomplete data. 
It was for that reason that the report was rejected. As the respondent had discharged 
his duty towards the court in good faith, and without misrepresenting the facts, he
93 BCA/15/91 (Bamenda, 5-11-1991, unreported).
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could not be guilty of negligence. The appellant, who was surely revelling in his role 
as litigant extraordinaire, having previously succeeded against the bank, appealed.
The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the trial court to dismiss the claim, 
but employed a wholly different reasoning. Recounting the cases of Heaven v. 
P e n d e r and Donoghue v. Stevenson,95 the court said that for the appellant to 
succeed, there would have had to be a sufficiently close relationship between the 
parties to justify imposing upon the respondent a duty of care to the appellant. The 
court went on to state that according to Hedley Byme, damages for negligent, though 
honest, misstatement may be awarded where such damage is occasioned by the breach 
of duty to take care, arising from the special relationship between the parties, in 
making of such statement. Such a relationship, the court continued, may either be 
general, e.g. solicitor and client or banker and customer, or it may be a particular 
relationship created ad hoc where the facts establish that there is an express or 
implied undertaking of responsibility. In the present case, the court concluded, the 
evidence suggested no special relationship whatever between the appellant and the 
respondent. The respondent was an officer of the court and any duty he owed was 
owed to the court. That duty, as was observed by the trial judge, had been 
discharged in good faith, even if not to the satisfaction of the court. What this case 
clearly lays down is the rule that in Cameroon, the Hedley Byrne principle cannot be 
extended to experts appointed by the court. The relationship between such experts 
and the parties is not special enough to merit the application of Hedley Byrne.
The above decision is not only welcome because of its elucidation of Hedley 
Byrne, it is equally important because it shows that Cameroonian courts will apply 
it where appropriate. If the courts were not to do so, the victim of a negligent 
misstatement may be left with no remedy of damages since the Misrespresentation Act 
1967 does not apply to Cameroon. It must be remembered that prior to Hedley 
Byrne and the 1967 Act, there was neither common law nor statutory recognition of
94 (1883) 1 1 Q.B.D. 503.
95 [1932] A.C. 562.
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negligent misstatement. Now, if Cameroonian courts were to stick to the reception 
statute which says that only pre-1900 English decisions and statutes of general 
application are binding, there would be left with no option but to deny to award 
damages to victims of negligent misstatement. The only remedy would be rescission 
which, if not barred, may not necessarily be an appropriate one, involving as it does 
the setting aside of the contract. The courts surely realise that such an approach is 
bound to results sometimes in strange and unjust results, so they are prepared to 
follow the recent common law development in Hedley Byrne. That can only be 
commended.
(iii). Innocent Misrepresentation.
It has just been shown above that before Hedley Byme, there was, for most 
practical purposes, no separate legal category of negligent misrepresentation. A 
representation was either fraudulent or innocent. And innocent simply meant, not 
fraudulent. Before the advent of negligent misrepresentation, damages could not be 
awarded for non-fraudulent (innocent) misrepresentation, while rescission as already 
pointed out was not always appropriate since it involved setting aside the whole 
contract. It could be said, following the decision in Alliance Trading v. SOCOPAO, 
that the above is also true of Cameroon.
In England, there is still no right of damages for a wholly innocent 
misrepresentation - one honestly made upon reasonable grounds - but under section 
2(2) of the 1967 Act, the court is given a discretionary power to declare the contract 
subsisting and to award damages in lieu of rescission if it would be equitable to do 
so. As the 1967 Act does not apply in Cameroon, the courts there are yet to be 
vested with any such jurisdiction. And in the absence of any local cases on innocent 
misrepresentation, one has every reason to conclude that the position in Cameroon 
remains that of the common law, which is that there is no right to damages for wholly 
innocent misrepresentation that does not have contractual force but there is a right to 
rescission. This means that like the pre-1967 English position, the position in
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Cameroon at present is unsatisfactory since, in cases of wholly innocent 
misrepresentation, the entire transaction would have to be set aside (even though the 
representation may relate to a matter of relatively minor importance), if the any 
remedy at all were to be given to the representee. There is thus a strong case for a 
change in this area of the law.
B. DOL.
Next to erreur French law treats dol (fraud) as a second vice of consent. Dol may 
roughly correspond to fraudulent misrepresentation at common law but they are 
different concepts.96 For instance, non-fraudulent or non-negligent misrepresentation, 
i.e. what is known as innocent misrepresentation at common law, is of no 
consequence in French law unless it produces erreur. Further, unlike 
misrepresentation under the common law, dol is not confined to representations so 
that the difficulty that one encounters in the common law in distinguishing 
representations of opinion or intention from representations of fact, or representation 
as to the future from those as to the present, do not arise in French law.97 .
There are only two provisions on dol in the Cameroonian Civil Code. The Code
does not define dol. It just stipulates in article 1109 that "there is no valid consent
if consent was procured by dol". Then it goes on to provide in article 1116 that:
Dol is a cause of nullity of the agreement when the manoeuvres 
practised by one party are such that it is evident that without those 
manoeuvres the other party would not have contracted.
In French law, dol and erreur are inextricably linked. Traditionally, dol is 
considered as constituting a vice of consent only to the extent that it results in error 
on the part of the other contracting party. This widely held position has survived a
96 David and Pugsley, Les Contrats en Droit Frangais, 1985, p. 260
97 Nicholas, p. 97.
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serious challenge by the decision in what is now a celebrated case.98 In that case, 
an elderly lady had bequeathed certain things to her daughter and son-in-law to the 
exclusion of her son. He challenged that bequest, accusing the beneficiaries of 
certain manoeuvres against his mother. He cited as an example, the fact that despite 
her advanced age, she had been locked in a room for several hours and engaged in 
an unusually lengthy converstation prior to making the bequest. The court annulled 
certain acts of the transfer on the grounds of fraud, because the transferor had been 
victimised by the manoeuvres of the transferees, though such manoeuvres neither 
induced the tranferor into an error, nor did they constitute duress. She had simply 
been induced into a state of exhaustion. So, despite being satisfied that the dol had 
led to no error, the court still went ahead to annul some aspects of the transfer.
This decision, though running against the accepted position, is not entirely 
baseless. It is noteworthy that the French Civil Code makes no mention of error in 
article 1116, its main provision on dol. This decision is also significant in that it 
separates fraud from error, and perhaps more importantly, places fraud between error 
and duress in the general framework of vices of consent, which could make of fraud 
a useful instrument to handle situations where undue influence is exerted on a person 
in order to distort his will.99 Be that as it may, this decision has not succeeded in 
changing the traditional view that regards induced error as a component part of fraud. 
This view is widely supported by jurisprudence100 and doctrine. As one 
commentator puts it, "Ce n'est pas Vacte dolosif lui-meme qui constitue le vices du 
consentement mais Verreur qu’ilprovoque".101
98 La Cour de Colmar, Arret du 30 Janv. 1970. D. 1970, 297 note Alfandari; Sem. 
Jur. 1970, II, 16609, note Loussouarn.
99 Stark, Obligations, paras. 424-426 (1972).
100 Bonassies, Le dol dans la conclusions des contrats, These, Lille, 1955, p. 133, 
has noted that, "pour les tribunaux, il ne serait parait faire aucun doute que le dol 
a pour effets d ’entrainer dans resprit de celui qui en est victime, line erreur".
101 Souchon, Les Vices du Consentement dans le Contrat, Harminisation du Droit 
des Affaires dans les Pays du iVIarche Commun, (ed. Rodiere), French Report, p.
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There is evidence to suggest that the courts in Civil Law Cameroon follow the 
above traditional position in France. In Affaire Pothitos Emmanuel v. Louis 
Villano,102 the appellant brought an action for nullity on the grounds that he had 
been misled into error by the dol of the respondent. The Supreme Court held, 
affirming the Court of Appeal, that the action must fail because there was no evidence 
of error on the part of the appellant. By not even bothering to address the allegations 
of dol the Supreme Court seemed to imply that, granted there was dol on the part of 
the respondent, such dol was immaterial since it had produced no error. This 
decision therefore underlines the position that it is not the dol per se that counts, but 
the error it produces.
(1). Conditions For Nullity on Grounds of D ol.
Two conditions have to be satisfied before a contract is annulled for dol. Both 
these conditions can be deduced from article 1116 itself.
Firstly, the dol must have influenced the consent of the other contracting party. 
In the words of article 1116, "it must be evident that without these manoeuvres, the 
other party would not have contracted".
Secondly, the dol must involve a contracting party. Article 1116 talks of the 
"manoeuvres practiquees par I ’une des parties". This means that the dol must have 
been perpetrated by a contracting party, and not emanate from a third party. As a 
general rule, if the dol emanates from a third party, the victim cannot succeed in an 
action for nullity. This does not mean that the victim is left without any remedy. 
His remedy lies in bringing an action for damages against the perpetrator of the 
d o l m
At this juncture, it is necessary to introduce an interesting feature about dol. One
52.
102 C.S. Arret no 517 du 12 Juin 1962, (1962) no. 6 B.A.C.S.C.O.
103 Weill & Terre, para. 185; Souchon, Op. cit.. note 2, p. 55.
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that distinguishes it from erreur. Dol, unlike erreur which is treated as a question 
of fact, is regarded as a matter of law. The French Cour de Cassation has held that 
though the primary facts with regard to dol remain within the pouvoir souverain du 
juge du fond, the qualification of those facts is matter of law.104 The significance 
of this is that appellate courts such as the French Cour de Cassation (or Supreme 
Court in the case of Cameroon) do have a larger role to play in the interpretation of 
dol than erreur.
It is a good thing that appellate courts have greater powers of interpretation over 
dol because it is not always a straightforward matter. That the dol must have been 
committed with the intention to induce the other party into error is accepted. This 
has been called the element psycologique105 of the dol. Therefore, a representor is 
not liable in dol if he was himself mistaken about the misrepresentation he made,106 
or was only being negligent, not fraudulent, in providing erroneous information.107 
In the latter case, the representor may be liable though not on dol.108 That there 
must have been an act of deceit (fait de tromperie), or manoeuvres is also accepted. 
This is otherwise known as the element materiel.109 The problem of interpretation 
lies, however, in the meaning of the term manoeuvres. It is universally accepted that 
they must be illicit. But what exactly constitutes manoeuvres. For a start, it is not 
confined to representations alone. It may involve many things: tricks {artifices), lies 
(mensonges) etc. It is said to be an elastic word that looks more to the state of mind 
of the actor than the precise nature of the act itself.110 One serious question that
104 Cass. civ. 30.5.1927, S 1928. 1. 105, note Breton; see also Source-book p. 371.
10;> Weill & Terre, paras. 181.
106 Paris, Dec. 1934, S. 1935, 2, 190.
107 Req. 3 Janv. 1900, S. 1901, 1, 321, note Wahl.
108 See Trib. Gr. Inst. Brest, 5 Nov. 1974, D. 1975, 295, note Schmidt.
109 Weill & Terre, para. 182.
110 Nicholas, p. 98.
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has always troubled the courts is whether silence or reticence can be considered as 
a manoeuvres.
(2). Reticence Dolosive (Fraudulent Silence).
In view of the fact that contracts by their nature involve opposing interests, 
French law, like English law, starts from the premise that parties to a contract are 
entitled to cater for their respective interests. This means that in the absence of a 
duty of disclosure, silence carries no culpability. However, the duty to disclose 
whether it derives from agreement or from legislation is now much higher in French 
law than in English law.111 This higher duty of disclosure in French law is no 
doubt a manifestation of the increased demand for good faith in contractual relations 
under the civil law.
The attitude of French law towards reticence dolosive has evolved over the years. 
At one point the courts adopted the position that fraudulent non-disclosure "was not 
sufficient, without some other circumstance, to establish a manoeuvre illicite"u2 i.e. 
a manoeuvre constituting dol. The present case-law consensus seems to be that dol 
can consist of the silence of one party concealing from the other a fact which, had he 
known, would have prevented him from contracting.113
Although Cameroonian courts may not have been directly confronted with the 
question as to whether reticence dolosive constitutes a manoeuvres illicite, there are 
instances in which a party has been found guilty of dol in circumstances that can only 
be described as dol par reticence. One such instance is Affaire Olama Hubert v.
111 See generally Ghestin, "The Pre-contractual Duty to Disclose Information - French 
Report" In: Harris, and Tallon, eds., Contract Law Today: Anglo-French 
Comparisons, 1989, p. 151.
112 Cass. civ. 30.5.1927.
113 Nicholas, p. 99 cites many cases adopting this position.
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Societe Camerounaise de B a n q u e t  The plaintiff normally had his salary paid by 
direct bank transfer through the defendant bank. Over a certain period, his was being 
paid what was more than his actual salary. This was due to a mistake by the Ministry 
incharge of civil servants’ salaries. The plaintiff certainly knew that his account was 
being over-credited due to an irregularity, yet he elected not to draw that to the 
attention of the authorities concerned. In fact he proceeded in spending the money. 
When this was discovered, the National Treasury, using its Treasury Rights, obtained 
the excess from the bank. The bank in turn started recouping it through monthly 
deductions from the plaintiffs account. The plaintiff unashamedly sued the bank for 
breach of contract. The court was quick to dismiss the action on the grounds of dol 
by the plaintiff himself. The dol in question no doubts derived from the plaintiffs 
dishonest failure to report the irregularity in the payments from which he was unjustly 
benefitting. As this did not involve any affirmative action by the plaintiff, one should 
be entitled to consider it as a case of dol par reticence. One may also add that the 
dol in the present case is not strictly speaking a vice of consent in the sense that it did 
not occur at the level of contract formation. Nevertheless the case is instructive in 
that it shows that silence or inaction can- constitute dol.
(3). Proof of D ol
It is a final requirement of article 1116 of the Civil Code that dol must be proven, 
not presumed (// ne se presume pas, et doit etre prouve). This however does not 
mean that it cannot be proved by simple presumptions or by legal presumptions. 
After all, dol being a juridical act (fair juridique), every means of proof is 
admissible.115 The maxim that dol is not to be presumed means no more than that 
it is not to be imputed without legal evidence. Nevertheless, it can be said that 
Cameroonian courts will expect proof of dol to be stronger than the mere
114 J.C. No. 297 du 10 Avril 1991, (Trib. G.I., Yaounde, unreported).
115 Cass, civ., 4 Janv. 1949, D. 1949, 135; Gaz. Pal., 1949. 1. 145.
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preponderance of evidence. In Affaire Koto Tokoto v. Neim Sylvestre116 the 
appellant brought an action for nullity of contract (the sale of building) against the 
respondent. This action was based on claims that he had consented to the contract 
only because of the fraud and dol of the respondent. The only evidence advanced in 
support of these allegations was three letters that the appellant had written himself, 
one to the court and two to the relevant land authorities complaining about the 
contract of sale. Dismissing the action, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant 
had failed to prove the allegations of dol and fraud. It was not enough for the 
appellant to simply present letters he had himself written to the judicial and 
administrative authorities, as proof of dol. From the judgement it would appear as 
though the gravamen of the appellant’s complaint was that what he paid was more 
than the market value of the building. To this the court responded by noting that any 
difference between the market and contract price, even if it were proven, did not 
necessarily establish dol and fraud "en I ’absence d ’autres presomptions 
concordanres. " In other words, the appellant was supposed to substantiate with the 
help of more concrete evidence or presumptions, his allegations of dol and fraud. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with every aspect of the Court of Appeal 
judgement. Perhaps the courts are tough on a party alleging dol because they 
consider it to be such a serious charge to be imputed on anyone except upon legal and 
convincing reasons.
116 C.S. Arret no. 11 du 29 Octobre 1968. (1966) no 14 B.A.C.S. C.O., 2325.
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7.2. DEFECTS RELATING TO 
VALIDITY/ENFORCEABILITY.
Two issues are discussed in this section: formalities in contracts and illegality. 
With both issues, the problem is not the lack of agreement or consent. The parties 
may consent to a contract, agree on its terms and still discover that it is not valid in 
the eyes of the law or that the law will refuse to enforce it either because of the 
absence of some requisite form or because the contract is illegal or is tainted by 
illegality.
1. CONTRACTS AFFECTED BY INFORMALITY.
It has long been a general rule of both the common law117 and civil law118 that 
a contract need not be in writing to be binding.119 However, under both systems, 
there are a considerable number of statutory rules requiring certain contracts to be 
made in or evidenced in a particular form. This necessity for formal requirements 
in contracts has always been the subject of much debate in the common and civil law 
jurisdictions of the world, much of which has been critical of formal 
requirements.120 Although these criticisms led to a climate of anti-formality in the
117 Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, Law of Contract (12th. ed.) p 226.
118 This is confirmed by Rieg, Rapport sur les modes nonformels d ’expression de la 
volonte en droit civil francais, In: Trav. As s. H. Capitant, 1968, t. XX, p. 40 :
" Aujourd’hui comme en 1804, leformalisme apparait comme une exception, sinon line 
aberration".
119 I am not concerned with the kind of form that is required for promises without 
consideration like seals and deeds.
120 Lord Wright: Legal Essays and Addresses, 1939, p.226; Holdsworth: History 
of English law, vol. vi, pp. 369-97, Law Reform Committee Report, April, 1953 
Cmnd. 8809; Fridman, "The Necessity o f Writing in Contracts within the Statute o f 
Frauds" (1985) U. Tor. L.J., 43; Bridge, "The Statute o f Frauds and Sale o f Land
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U.K121 and France122 at one time, it has to be said that formal requirements have 
always been maintained and have indeed enjoyed a resurgence lately.123
In Cameroon too, there is a welter of legislation on the subject of formality in 
contracts. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the subject is yet to receive the kind 
of attention it has so far attracted in France and England. This is a sad fact because, 
if anything, the problems raised by formal requirements in contract should assume 
more importance in Cameroon than in England and France, partly as a result of the 
cleavage between the received western laws and customary law rules on form and 
partly because of the high incidence of illiteracy in Cameroon. I now propose to 
consider the laws on formality in Cameroon, assess and evaluate their usefulness and 
then conclude that the requirements of form are for the most part out of step with 
current realities in Cameroon.
(1). FORMAL REQUIREMENTS IN CAMEROON.
Formal requirements in Cameroon consist mainly of writing, registration and 
stamp duty and notarization. In Common Law Cameroon, any discussion on formal
Contracts" (1986) Can. B.R. 59
121 See for instance, Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954.
122 Meurisse, R, "Le Declin de la Preuve par Ecrit" (1951) Gaz. Pal., 51.
123 In the case of England, see for example, section 2 of the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 which has replaced section 40 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925. Under the 1925 Act it was sufficient that a land sales contract 
be evidenced by a memorandum in writing but the 1989 Act now insists that a 
contract for the sale of an interest in land must be in writing, with all its terms 
incorporated in one document. In France, there has been much talk of a rennaisance 
of formalism. See B. Berlioz-Houin & G. Berlioz, "Le droit des contrats face a 
revolution economique" In: Etudes R. Houin, 1985, p. 11; Ph. Le Toumeau, 
"Quelques aspects de revolution des contrats" In: Melanges P. Raynaud, 1986, p. 
362, para. 29. There is also a recent spate of legislation requiring an acte authentique 
for the certain contracts. A good example is La Loi du 3 Janvier 1967, pour le 
ventes d ’invneubles a construire.
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requirements must start with the English Statute of Frauds 1677. It was this statute 
that introduced for the first time in the common law the requirement of writing in 
certain types of contracts. This being a pre-1900 statute of general application in 
England, it was incorporated into the law of Anglophone Cameroon as part of the 
received legislation. The relevant sections of the Statute of Frauds with regard to the 
requirement of writing can be grouped in three areas: first, sections 4 and 17 
(subsequently amended by section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893),124 prescribe 
the writing requirement for certain classes of contract; secondly, sections 1, 2 and 3 
state that conveyances of freehold interests in land and certain leaseholds must be in 
writing; thirdly, sections 7, 8 and 9 provide, subject to exceptions, that the creation 
of trusts on land, as well as the transfer of beneficial interests in all types of property, 
must be in writing.
Sections 4 and 17 have since been amended in England. Section 4 was first 
replaced by section 40 (1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 which required that a 
contract for the sale of land must be evidenced by a memorandum in writing. Then 
recently, on the recommendation of the English Law Commission Report on Transfer 
of Land: Formalities in Contracts for Sale etc. of Land (1987),125 section 40 of the 
1925 Act has been repealed and replaced by section 2 of the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, with the requirement that a contract for the sale 
of an interest in land must be in made in writing, incorporating all its terms in one 
document, or where contracts are exchanged, in each and signed by both parties. The 
category of contracts that were covered by section 17 of the Statute of Frauds is now 
contained in sections 1 and 2 of the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 
1954. They retain writing for contracts of guarantee if they are to be enforceable. 
It must be remembered however that these post-1900 legislative modifications to the 
Statute of Frauds do not apply in Cameroon.
124 The Sale of Goods Act 1979 does not apply in Cameroon because it is post 1900.
m  1987 English Law Commission No. 164.
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The received Statute of Frauds apart, there are Cameroonian enacted statutes of 
recent origin that subject certain contracts to some kind of formality, not merely for 
the purpose of enforceability, as is the case of those within section 4 of the Statute 
of Frauds, but also from the point of view of validity. These statutes apply to the 
whole country. One important such statute is the Registration, Stamp Duty and 
Trusteeship Code 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Registration Code), article 10 
of which provides for the compulsory registration within three months of their date 
of:
"Instruments under hand only recording synallagmatic agreements, in 
particular leases, sub-leases, tranfers thereof, cancellations, 
subrogations, sales, exchanges, contracts, apportionment,... insurance 
contracts, etc."
Another one is Ordinance No. 74/1 of 6th July 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Land Tenure Ordinance 1974) establishing rules governing land tenure. It enacts in 
article 8 (1) that:
"Deeds to establish, transfer or extinguish real property rights, shall 
be drawn up by a notary, under penalty of being null and void."
The question that emerges here is whether these local statutes have replaced and 
superseded the received Statute of Frauds. The answer is not clear-cut. The Statute 
of Frauds has been applied in a few cases since the passing of similar local 
legislation. For example, in Nelson Ikome Lyonga v. Raphael Akor Foncha,126 
a contract to sub-let land was declared unenforceable by the Buea Court of Appeal, 
upholding the trial court, because it failed to satisfy the requirement of writing as laid 
down in section 4 of the Statute of Frauds. It is submitted that the court should have 
relied instead on the local legislation on the issue, which is the Land Ordinance 1974. 
The fact that the outcome would have been the same is irrelevant. Local statutory 
provisions, where they exist, should always prevail over any received ones.
The better view, therefore, is that adopted by the Bamenda Court of Appeal in
126 CASWP/26/82 (Buea, unreported).
305
Theresia Ewo v. Mary Sihnl in which the position of local statutes on formality
vis-a-vis the Statute of Frauds came to a head. The contract involved the sale of a
store in the respondent’s premises. The contract, although reduced into writing, was
neither registered in accordance with the Registration Code 1973 nor notarized as
required by the Land Tenure Ordinance 1974. In an action for breach and failure to
complete the contract price, the appellant argued that because the contract of sale was
not registered as required by Registration Code 1973, he was not bound by it. The
respondent for his part pointed out that because the contract was written, it had
fulfilled the requirements of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds. Consequently, he
argued, both parties were bound by the contract. Anyang we J., delivering the
unanimous judgement of the court, had this to say:
"The contract was for the sale of an interest in land. Therefore exhibit 
B (the purported contract of sale) would have, before the first day of 
July 1973, constituted a sufficient note or memorandum for the 
purposes of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677 to which reference 
was made in the oral arguments. However, with the coming into force 
of the Registration, Stamp Duty and Trusteeship Code on 1/7/1973, 
the registration of such instruments have become compulsory. Since 
the exhibit was, on the evidence, never registered, it was void and 
therefore unenforceable. We therefore agree with counsel for the 
appellant that the parties were not bound by it and that the learned trial 
Magistrate should never have admitted and given it legal effect".
It follows from the above that local statutes should take precedence over those 
provisions of the Statute of Frauds which they also cover. This is largely in the area 
of contracts relating to land which are now subject to the formal requirements of the 
Land Tenure Ordinance 1974 and the Registration Code 1973 and not section 4 of the 
Statute of Frauds, a fact that is well borne out by recent cases.128 However, the 
other provisions of the Statute of Frauds not covered by local legislation continue to
127 BCA/32/85 (Bamenda, 12-12-85, unreported).
128 See for examples, Nganga Ngassa Aloysius v. Alex Jabea Mbulla, CASWP/10/85 
(Buea, 17/7/85, unreported); Andreas Lobe v. Jonas Houtchou, BCA/10/83, 
Bamenda, 21-3-1984, unreported), both are discussed below.
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apply. Thus as recently as 1987, the Bamenda High Court, in Ngwa George v. Ngwa 
Martin,129 refused to entertain an action based on a contract of suretyship on 
account of the fact that there was no memorandum or note of such a contract as 
required by section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677. On the other hand, in Anye 
Fambo Paul v. Ruben Anusi & Oumarou Abba Mallam,130 the second defendant 
who had signed as a guarantor to a loan to the first defendant, was sought to 
discharge with the debt after the first defendant had defaulted to pay. The court 
stressed the fact the contract of guarantee by being reduced into writing, had fully 
complied with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds 1677.
Mindful of some stinging criticisms against the Statute of Frauds and calls for its 
abolition, one is easily tempted to welcome the fact that some of its provisions have 
been rendered redundant in Cameroon. Yet, the Cameroonian legislator cannot be 
credited with any advance in the law since the locally introduced statutes are even 
more stringent than those of the Statute of Frauds. Unlike the Statute of Frauds, they 
require much more than mere writing or evidence of such. And while failure to 
comply with the Statute of Frauds only makes the contract unenforceable, failure to 
achieve the more stringent measure of formality required by the local statutes renders 
the contract void, not merely unenforceable. Having said all these, I must now point 
out that the issue here is less whether common law Cameroon needs the Statute of 
Frauds or some other local statutes resembling the Statute of Frauds, but, rather more 
broadly, whether Cameroon’s modem legal system needs to insist upon the kind of 
formality which is inherent in some kind of requirement of writing.
Another important area in which special formality is required by the law is that 
of contracts involving an illiterate party. Such contracts are subject to the Illiterate
129 HCB/37/87 (Bamenda, 17-04-1989, unreported); see also Sylvester Ibeagha v. S.
O. Bessong (Suit No. CASWP/7/87) 1991 no. 6, Juridis. Info. 53, in which the Buea 
Court of Appeal, setting aside the judgement of the Fako High Court, held that the 
appellant could not be held liable on a contract of guarantee in the absence of any 
written evidence or memorandum as required by section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 
1677.
130 HCB/90/89 (Bamenda, 6-8-1990, unreported).
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Protection Ordinance (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1958, Cap. 83).131 The
pith and marrow of this ordinance appears in section 3, which stipulates:
"Any person who shall write any letter or document at the request, on 
behalf, or in the name of any illiterate person shall also write on such 
letter or other document his own name as the writer thereof and his 
address; and his so doing shall be equivalent to a statement-
(a) that he was instructed to write such letter or document by the 
person for whom it purports to have been written and that the letter or 
document fully and correctly represents his instructions; and
(b) if the letter purports to be signed with the signature or mark of 
the illiterate person, that prior to its being so signed it was read over 
and explained to the illiterate person, and that the signature and mark 
was made by such person."
This is obviously a complex provision but I do not believe this to be the place to 
examine the various facets of the provision such as a determination as to who is an 
"illiterate" or who is a "writer" as contained therein.132 For now, it suffices to state 
that an important object of the statute is to ensure that the contents of a document are 
fully explained to an illiterate before he appends his mark on it.
Common law Cameroon is not alone in having specific legislation relating to 
formalities in certain contracts. While the provisions of the Statute of Frauds are 
peculiar to that part of the country, analogous enactments are also to be found the 
civil law part. This is hardly surprising in view of the suggestion that a French 
Ordofinance of 1566 and possibly a later Ordonnance of 1667, were the source of 
inspiration and format of the English legislation.133 As a matter of fact, the Civil
131 This is contained in the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Cap. 83 and 
applies only in Common Law Cameroon by virtue of its past historical and legal links 
with Nigeria.
132 The ramifications of this ordinance are yet to be examined in Cameroon but for 
a discussion of the Illiterate Protection Ordinance in Nigeria, see Nwogugu, "An 
Examination o f the Protection o f Illiterates in Nigerian Law" (1968) 12 J.A.L. 32 and 
Aguda, "Illiterate Protection Ordinance Examined" (1962) 4 Nig.B.J. 35.
133 For the view that the architects of the Statute of Frauds must have been influenced 
by European models, see Rabel, E, " The Statute o f Frauds and Comparative Legal 
History” (1947) 63 L.Q.R. 174.
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Law Cameroon, thanks to its French law connection, was always more formalistic 
than Common law Cameroon until the passing of uniform statutory enactments 
throughout the country.
In support of the above view it can be pointed that the law in Francophone 
Cameroon (and France), after paying lip-service to the principles of informal 
contracts,134 proceeds to make writing and other kinds of form compulsory for 
many contracts except the most trivial ones. The requirement of writing may either 
be formal or evidential.
It is formal in some important contracts where the document must be drawn up by 
a notary or validated by a judge - a formality known as acte authentique. This 
formality is necessary for major domestic obligations such as adoption and marriage 
contracts, substantial gifts (art. 931), mortgages (art. 2127), and subrogation 
agreements (art. 1250). Where a notarized document is not needed, a privately 
signed document (acte sous seing prive) will suffice. An act sous seing prive is 
needed, for instance, in cases where the parties agree to fix an interest rate different 
from that laid down by the law.135
There are also some statutory enactments outside the Civil Code. Examples 
include article 1 of La Loi no. 61/20 du 27 Juin 1961 which provided that all acts for 
the incorporation, assignment or conveyance and termination of real property rights 
must be executed and authenticated by a notary, failure of which renders the 
transaction void. This loi which previously applied only to civil law Cameroon136
134 Article 1108 of both the Cameroonian and French Civil Codes does not even 
mention form as one of the prerequisites of a valid contract. Some French writers 
have pointed to this absence of form in article 1108 as evidence of the laws 
preference for informal contracts. See Ripert & Boulanger, T.II, para. 40. And 
others have suggested that the principle of consensualism was already so deep rooted 
in the law that the draftsmen of the civil code did not find it necessary to include it. 
See Flour et Aubert, Obligations, vol. 1. para. 299.
135 Art. 1907.
136 It will be recalled that from 1961 to 1972, Cameroon was a Federation with two 
federated states of East (Francophone) Cameroon and West (Anglophone) Cameroon. 
The laws that were enacted for East Cameroon did not apply in West Cameroon and
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has again been reiterated by article 8 (1) of the Land Tenure Ordinance 1974, which 
is of national application. It should also be noted that article 10 of the Registration, 
Stamp Duty and Trusteeship Code 1973 applies equally to Francophone Cameroon. 
The reason why the Registration Code 1973 and the 1974 Ordinance both apply 
throughout Cameroon is because, unlike the Statute of Frauds, peculiar only to 
Anglophone Cameroon and the provisions of the Civil Code, exclusive to 
Francophone Cameroon, they were enacted by the Cameroonian National Assembly 
(Parliament) after Cameroon became a unitary state in 1972.
Just as in Common Law Cameroon, there is also a formal requirement in Civil
Law Cameroon for contracts involving parties who cannot understand French. This
is found in Decree no. 60/172 of 20 September 1960 regulating the status and practice
of notaries. It provides in article 21 that
"Toutes les fois qu’une personae ne parlant pas la langue frangaise 
sera parties ou temoin d ’un acte, le Notaire devra etre assiste d ’un 
interprete assermente, qui expliquera Vobjet de la convention avant 
route ecrirure, expliquera de nouveau Vacte redige, le traduira 
litteralement, et signera comme temoin additionneV'
Although it talks of those who cannot speak French, there should be little doubt that
this provision is aimed specifically at illiterates.137 This requirement is quite
stringent because it is simply not enough that a notary is involved. It also requires
the presence of a sworn interpreter. According to article 35, failure to comply with
article 21 renders the transaction void or at best, confers it no more effect than a
privately signed agreement.
In some cases the requirement of writing in Francophone Cameroon is evidentiary 
only. That is to say if the transaction has to be proved, the party seeking to do so 
must adduce written evidence. A good example of this is provided by article 1341 
of the Civil Code which provides sweepingly that consensual transactions involving
vice versa.
137 I say so because at the time it was enacted, English speaking Cameroon had not 
yet joined French Cameroons. It is thus difficult, though not impossible, to extend 
this requirement to an Anglophone Cameroonian who cannot speak French.
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more than 500 francs, can be proved only by written evidence. Article 1341 does not 
apply to agreements in business transactions. This is because under article 109 of the 
Cameroonian Code de Commerce, as now interpreted by the courts, the judge can 
consider oral testimony, when he considers such testimony desirable, to prove any 
transaction which is commercial in the technical sense unless the law expressly 
requires a writing. Thus in Affaire Boutin Pierre v, Saugeres Rene,138 the plaintiff 
alleged that he had supplied goods to the defendant for which he was still owed 
105,500 francs. In an action for that amount, the Douala Court of Appeal dismissed 
his appeal on the grounds that the transaction satisfied neither article 1341 of the Civil 
Code which requires writing or evidence of writing for all contracts over the value 
of 500 francs nor did it provide any commencement de preuve as allowed by article 
1347. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the former East Cameroon quashed 
the decision of the Douala Court of Appeal and ruled that as this was a commercial 
transaction, article 1341 did not apply. Article 109 of the Code de Commerce 
allowed the plaintiff the possibility to adduce oral evidence to prove the contract. 
The court went on to add that even if the appellant was a layman, he would still be 
entitled to the benefit of the exception afforded by article 109 of the Code de 
Commerce as long as the defendant was a businessman.
The above outline of the various ways in which legislative power in Cameroon has 
been used to limit freedom of contract by the imposition of formal requirements in 
certain contracts is not an exhaustive account of all such legislative intervention.
138 Arret no 12 du 29/10/1968, B.A.C.S.C.O, p. 2326.
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However, those considered are the more important ones and, therefore, provide one 
with a sufficient base with which to examine the justification or rationale of legal 
formalities in contracts in Cameroon.
(2). THE FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF FORMAL 
REQUIREMENTS.139
Let me start with the received Statute of Frauds. The statute itself said, in the 
preamble, that it was "for prevention of many fraudulent practices which are 
commonly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subordination of perjury." Three 
reasons for such an enactment have been ascribed, namely: the uncontrolled discretion 
of the jury; the rule as to the incompetence of certain witnesses; and the immaturity 
of contract law in the seventeenth century.140 I shall not dwell on the Statute of 
Frauds since there are local legislation on which I prefer to concentrate.
Unlike the Statute of Frauds, the local statutes do not expressly state the reasons 
behind their imposition of formal requirements for certain contracts. Since whatever 
policies underlying these formalities are generally left .unexamined in judicial 
decisions, it will be necessary to evaluate and examine here in general terms the basis 
or the raison d ’etre of formal requirements in contracts.
I shall begin by drawing from some of the papers that have gone before on this 
subject. Atiyah,141 for instance, has argued in favour of form, laying stress on the 
fact that it saves the cost of more detailed investigation and it minimizes the risks of 
error. According to Atiyah, these are the two most important reasons for form. In
139 On the general problem of the rationale of legal formalities, see Llewelyn, " What 
Price Contract?" (1931) 40 Yale L.J. 704; Demogue: Traite des Obligations en 
Generate. 1923, paras. 235-237.
140 Holdsworth: History of English Law vol. 6, 388; Willis, The Statute o f Frauds - 
A Legal Anachronism (1928) 3 Indiana L.J. 427, 429-432.
141 Atiyah, "Form and Substance in Contract Law" in his Essays on Contract Law, 
1990, pp. 108-116.
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France,142 it has been said in support of form that it determines the time in which 
the contract was formed, it enables the parties to be more precise, clear and 
ambiguous about the terms of the contract, especially where a notary is involved,143 
and provides proof of the existence of the contract, in the case where that is disputed. 
And in Ghana, the case has been made for legislative intervention (the imposition of 
formality included) in contracts as a means of protecting consumers.144 No 
discussion on the subject of form is complete, however, without reference to that 
scholarly article by Fuller:145 Consideration and Form. Although not immediately 
concerned with any particular statute on form, Fuller’s essay raised the issue of 
"form" in relation to contracts. In such connection what was said, pertains to the 
issue that is involved in any discussion of statutes on form, namely, the relevance and 
importance of formal requirements with regard to contracts. Fuller suggested that 
formalities such as writing146 serve three principal functions in regard to contractual 
obligations: an evidentiary, a cautionary and a channelling function. It now has to 
be seen whether the statutes on form in Cameroon satisfy these functions.
The first function seems to be obvious. It is to prove or establish (a) that there 
was a contract and (b) the nature, scope and extent of its terms. By requiring either 
notarization or registration and stamp duty for various contracts, the present statutes 
in Cameroon fulfil the evidentiary function in so far as there is the need to prove that 
there was a contract. But it cannot be said they always fulfil the need to establish the
142 See Ghestin, Le Contrat: Formation, para. 271.
143 Weill & Terre, Obligations, para. 115.
144 Date-Bah, "Legislative Control in Freedom o f Contract" In: Ekow Daniels and 
Woodman (eds), Essays in Ghanaian Law 1876-1976, 1976 p. 118 et seq.
145 Fuller, "Consideration and Form" (1941) 41 Col.L.R. 799. See also the interesting 
article by Perillo, "The Statute o f Frauds in the Light o f the Functions and 
Dysfunctions o f Form" (1974) 43 Fordham L.R. 39 where the numerous functions he 
cites for the writing requirement seem to overpower the limited conclusions he 
reaches as to the prescribed content of the writing.
146 As well as consideration, with which his essay was mostly concerned.
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nature, scope and extent of its terms since even when contracts are reduced into 
writing, problems often arise with respect to understanding the precise meaning of 
what the parties have written or filling in gaps in what they have written by invoking 
some notion of "implied terms".
The second function suggested by Fuller, the cautionary function, is to serve to 
give a party pause, to oblige him to stop and think more seriously about the nature 
of the transaction into which he is entering or by which he is engaging himself in 
some burdensome, or potentially burdensome, way. This particular function has been 
utilized by the English Law Reform Committee 1937 with regard to the Statute of 
Frauds. As put by the Committee, "there is a real danger of inexperienced people 
being led into undertaking obligations that they do not fully understand".147
Although there is something in this argument in Cameroon as well, I am inclined 
to caution that it should not be carried too far or taken too seriously. It may be true 
that Cameroonians who have to enter into a written contract take more care and pay 
more attention to what they are doing, but not necessarily. Every Cameroonian 
lawyer is surely familiar with the contracting party who signs without reading, only 
to find the true nature of his obligation later, if and when litigation is threatened. 
Sometimes the contract in issue is a "standard form" contract, a contrat d ’adhesion. 
The mischiefs spawned by such contracts are now too well known,148 even in 
Cameroon, thanks to a rare inquiry by a Cameroonian scholar,149 to merit 
recounting here. Sometimes the contract is a specially made or bespoke contract, not 
confirming to a pattern. The contracting party may not have read it either because
147 English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report Statute o f Frauds and the 
Doctrine o f Consideration (1937 Cmnd.5449), at 33. This was a minority view.
148 See for e.g. Kessler, "Contracts o f adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom o f  
Contract" (1943) 43 Col. L.R. 629; Sales, "Standard Form Contracts" (1953) 16 
M.L.R. 318; Wilson, "Freedom o f Contract and Adhesion Contracts" (1965) 14
I.C.L.Q. 172; Von Mehren, "Battle o f Forms: A Comparative View" (1990) 38 
A.J.C.L.
149 Dion-Ngute, Standard Form Contracts in Cameroon, Ph.D thesis, University of 
Warwick, 1981.
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he was too lazy or disinclined to understand, or either because he was acting in 
reliance upon the word of the other party or his own recollection of what was said 
or what was intended. This problem is most certainly compounded by the inability 
of many people to read and write. And whatever the other reasons might be, they 
are many Cameroonians who do not take any more care about contracting because the 
contract is written or contained more or less in some written form than they do or 
would if the contract were merely oral. Too much emphasis, therefore, should not 
be given, in my view, to the importance of the "cautionary" function.
The third, or "channelling" function has been described as "that of denoting in and 
of itself that an undertaking is enforceable, that negotiations have ended, and that 
contractual intention is conclusively presumed".150 Here, it must be said that the 
Land Tenure Ordinance 1974, for instance, which requires notarization, does fulfil 
this function. My field trip findings confirmed that Cameroonians generally consider 
the involvement of lawyers in their affairs as an indication of the seriousness and 
importance of such transactions. There is therefore a case for saying that the 
certification of a contract by a notary impresses very strongly on the parties the fact 
that they are contractually bound, not least because it sufficiently distinguishes a 
binding obligation from one that is not.
I have so far attempted to test the requirements of form in Cameroon against what 
is generally believed, thanks to Fuller, to be the three main functions of formal 
requirements in contract. However, it is doubtful whether the Cameroonian 
Parliament had these functions in mind when it introduced the various statutes on 
form considered above. So, before any conclusions are drawn I venture to suggest 
that the major motivation behind these enactments, especially the Registration Code 
1973, was fiscal. In other words, they are what are known in France as "les 
formaUtes fiscales" requirements have been spread wide to encompass very many 
contracts, the whole exercise of registration of contracts must represent a valuable
150 The Institute of Law Research and Reform of the University of Alberta, 
Background Paper No. 12 The Statute o f Frauds (1978) p. 18, cited in Fridman: Op. 
cit.. note 120.
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source of revenue for the government.
My conclusion on the justification of formal requirements, viewed from the 
Fullerian perspective is that, to a certain extent there is undoubtedly a case in asking 
parties, particularly in relation to certain contracts, to ensure that their agreements are 
contained in some well-ordered, complete, identifiable and duly signed document. 
Many problems that can arise where a contract is in dispute may well be settled by 
reference to such writing. Fundamental issues such as certainty, intention to create 
legal relations, perhaps even mistake may be avoided by the existence of a written 
document. There is thus some validity in requiring that some contracts be formalised.
This validity is strongest in the case of contracts concerning land or an interest in 
land151 for which, it will be remembered, article 8(1) of the Land Tenure Ordinance 
1974 requires notarization. The purchase of land or a house is of particular 
significance because for most Cameroonians, it is perhaps the most important and 
most expensive transaction of a lifetime. There are other very good reasons why 
contracts relating to land deserve special treatment. One is that such contracts are of 
a kind frequently entered into by laymen, not business people, and such laymen may 
need added protection. Another is the sentimental and economic considerations that 
are involved in the purchase and ownership of land. In most parts of Cameroon, to 
own land is a symbol of status and wealth. In farming and cattle rearing areas, to 
own land is an economic imperative.
This validity is also strong in the case of written contracts to which illiterates are 
parties.152 Where a contract has to be put in writing and one or some of the parties 
are illiterate or do not understand the language being used,153 it is submitted that
151 But see Bridge, Op. cit.. note 120, who takes a contrary view. He argues against 
the writing requirement for sale of land contracts and advocates its repeal.
152 See generally Date-Bah, "Illiterate Parties and Written Contracts" (1971) 3 Rev. 
Ghana L. 181
153 For the present purpose, it should be noted that there is a vast majority of 
Anglophone Cameroonians who are proficient in English but are completely unable 
to read and write or understand French. The reverse is even more true.
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the law should protect such a party or parties by the imposition of some formal 
requirements. For this reason, the Illiterate Protection Ordinance (Common Law 
Cameroon) and the Arret No. 60/172 of 20 September 1960 (Civil Law Cameroon) 
are to be welcomed, even if they do not and cannot provide an impregnable 
protection. There is, for example, the difficulty of procuring a competent writer or 
a notary and interpreter in the remote villages. And the efficacy of the Illiterate 
Protection Ordinance depends on the availability of evidence showing whether the 
writer has or has not correctly recorded the instructions of the illiterate.
Also, contracts such as standard form contracts, whose nature is such that one 
party is in a weaker position, justify the imposition of some formal requirements. 
Formal requirements in such contracts should be used to protect weaker parties like 
consumers from the characteristic high-handedness of the usually more powerful 
parties who often draft such contracts. In France, for example, the use of form as 
a means of combatting the excesses of contracts of adhesion has gained momentum 
during the past two decades.154 Yet, despite these compelling reasons for formality 
in contracts, there are certain aspects of it that must be called to question in 
Cameroon.
(3). CRITICISMS OF THE PRESENT LAW.
Once again, I am more directly concerned with local statutory provisions than with 
the Statute of Frauds. Which is not to suggest that the Statutes of Frauds itself is 
beyond reproach. In fact, it is significant to note that numerous commentators have 
criticised the Statute of Frauds on the grounds that the reasons advanced for its 
enactment have ceased to apply and that it fails to reflect actual business practices and 
serves as an instrument for, rather than a preventive of, fraud since it is invoked only
154 For a discussion of the protection of consumers against contracts of adhesion in 
France, see generally Berlioz, Le Contrats d’Adhesion, 1976, paras. 150 et seq.; 
See also article 1 du decret du 24 mars 1978 which prohibits all clauses "ayant pour 
objet ou pour effer de constater I 'adhesion du non-professionnel ou consommateur a 
des stipulations contractuelles qui ne figurent pas sur I ’ecrit qu ’il signe".
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to enable a party to renege on an oral deal which he was reasonably expected to 
honour.155 Lord Wright once referred to it as "an extemporaneous excrescence on 
the common law".156
Well, if the Statute of Frauds can be subjected to such severe criticisms, then, the 
present local formal requirements in Cameroon, which are not only more taxing but 
which make contracts that fail to comply with them void and unenforceable, should 
suffer even harsher criticisms. The law must also be criticised for being too 
formalistic by subjecting too many contracts to some kind of formal requirement. 
Another serious defect of these requirements is their failure to make allowance for 
other kinds of form such as those prescribed by native law and custom. It will be 
helpful at this stage to expand on these points.
(i) On their broad scope.
The categories of contracts for which either writing, registration or notarization 
is required seem to be infinite. Article 10 (4) of the Registration Code 1973, for 
example, is too generic. It provides for the compulsory registration of "synallagmatic 
agreements, in particular leases, sub-leases, transfers thereof, cancellations, 
subrogations, sales, exchanges, contracts, ... insurance contracts, etc". Then, there 
is the even more generic article 1341 of the Civil Code which provides, with the 
exception of commercial contracts,157 that all transactions involving more than 500 
francs must be evidenced in writing. This rule is phrased in terms which could easily 
be construed as an absolute, substantive requirement of writing: as to matters
155 See for instance, Stevens, "Ethics and the Statute o f Frauds" (1952)37 L.Q.R. 355 
; Willis, Op. cit., note 140, 540-542; English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim 
Report, Statute o f Frauds and the Doctrine o f Consideration 1937, Cmnd. 5449; and 
Fridman, Op. cit.. note 5, 47.
156 Lord Wright, "Williston on Contracts" (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 189, 204-205.
157 Article 109 of the Code de Commerce exempts commercial contracts from this 
requirement.
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exceeding the sum of 500 francs, a writing "must be executed" (II doit etre passe 
acte).
If the above requirements were to be strictly complied with, it would mean that 
only the most trivial contracts are exempt from the demands of form. Yet, there 
appears to be little justification, under present day conditions, for the Civil Code’s 
imposition of a formal requirement upon all non-business transactions involving more 
than a paltry 500 francs. The only justification, if it can be considered as such, for 
the imposition of the registration requirement upon all those contracts outlined in 
Article 10(4) of the Registration Code 1973, is the need to raise much needed 
government revenue.
It should be noted that in practice it is possible to water down the requirements 
of article 1341 with the help of articles 1347 and 1348 of the Civil Code. Article 
1347 involves a very broad conception of the commencement de preuve par ecrit 
(commencement of proof by writing) while article 1348 embraces the notion of moral 
impossibility, that is to say it would have been morally impossible, under the 
circumstances of the case, for the party to have obtained a writing. In France, the 
scope of article 1347 has been particularly expanded by the use of procedures made 
more effective by the law of 23 May 1942, which amended articles 324 to 336 of the 
Code de Procedure Civil, by which the court, either on its own motion or upon the 
request of one of the parties, can question the parties upon the subject matter of 
litigation. The answers given by a party in response to the questions put can 
represent an admission which will constitute a commencement de preuve par ecrit. 
Moreover, if a party does not appear when summoned for such interrogation, or, 
upon appearance, does not answer the questions asked, the court can, pursuant to 
article 336 of the Code de Procedure Civil, consider this conduct as "equivalent to 
a beginning of proof by writing under the conditions of article 1347 of the Civil 
Code." It has since been suggested that as a consequence of this legislation, the 
formal requirement of article 1341 may eventually be virtually eliminated in
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practice.158
In Francophone Cameroon, it does appear as though little use has been made of 
articles 1347 and 1348 as a means of circumventing article 1341. I have found only 
one case, La Collectivite Bakoko Adie v. Mbotte Martin,159 in which article 1348 
was invoked in an attempt to defeat the requirement in article 1341, and even then 
this was unsuccessful. The facts of that case are not contained in the judgement but 
it would appear as though the action arose from an earlier criminal action against the 
respondent in which he had allegedly confessed or accepted the claim of the 
appellants. Building on that alleged confession, the appellants brought a civil action 
for damages against the respondent. The Court of Appeal was adamant that as the 
transaction which had led to the claim involved a sum over 500,000 francs, it should 
have been put into writing as required by article 1341. Since that was not the case, 
no amount of oral confession given at a criminal trial would suffice in the civil 
proceedings. The appellants were expected to produce written evidence to support 
their claim if it was to stand any chance of success. At this point the appellants 
argued that it was materially and morally impossible for them to procure any written 
proof of the transaction. Again the judgement does not state the facts on which the 
appellants based their argument of moral and material impossibility. In any case, the 
court rejected that argument and held that the claim for damages must fail since it was 
founded wholly on the respondent’s alleged confession. This decision was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court, which agreed with the lower court that the contract should 
have complied with the writing requirement of article 1341. This decision seems 
harsh on the face of it. If, as the appellant’s claimed, the respondent had confessed 
or accepted liability, albeit orally, at a criminal trial, there should be little 
justification for a civil court to refuse to act on such an admission solely on a 
technicality that the contract was lacking in form. On the other hand, may be the
158 Hebraud, Comment on the Law o f May 23, 1942 (1943) D. Rec. Crit., Legislation 
10, 11; see also Meurisse, Op. cit.. note 122.
159 Arret No. 163 du 38 Mars 1961, (1961) No.3, B.A.C.S (Cameroun Oriental).
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Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court were not too sure about the genuineness of 
the admission or the circumstances under which it was extracted. Without full 
knowledge of the facts of this case, it is difficult to comment on it. The case is 
simply cited here to show that there has been an unsuccessful attempt to invoke the 
defence of moral impossibility to circumvent the effect of failure to comply with the 
writing requirement.
That much use is not made of articles 1347 and 1348 is, perhaps, explained by the 
fact that neither the parties nor the courts always insist on a strict compliance of 
article 1341. The 500 francs that the Cameroonian Civil Code actually mentions is 
ridiculously derisory and it is, indeed, not clear whether this sum relates to French 
Franc or Francs CFA. However, it is also possible to argue that even where a party 
can successfully circumvent article 1341, he could still fall foul of the requirement 
of the Registration Code 1973, which does not allow for any such exceptions.
When everything is considered, it still has to be said that the law in Cameroon, 
by bringing too many contracts into some kind of formal regime, is guilty of 
imposing formal requirements in transactions where little evidential and hardly any 
cautionary protection is needed.
(ii) On the Workability of Formal Requirements.
Accepting, as I do, that certain transactions are of sufficient importance to support 
the use of a form if a form is needed, the question must be asked whether the 
existence of this need should be determined only by writing or notarization or 
registration and stamp duty. The answer, it is submitted, must be in the negative. 
There really is little or no wisdom in excluding oral or other kinds of form known 
to customary law, in a country like Cameroon with so many illiterates and so many 
who are still governed by customary law, which is by nature, unwriten.
Fuller observed most poignantly that:
"The need for investing a particular transaction with some legal 
formality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties that the 
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the
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situation out of which the transaction arises - including in these
‘forces’ the habits and conceptions of the transacting parties"160
This effectively brings Cameroon’s native law and customs into this discussion. 
Naturally, many Cameroonians still observe customary law. This means that they 
subject their activities, contracts included, to rules of customary law. With regard 
to formal requirements in contract, the point of departure between customary and 
modern contract law is writing. Being unwritten itself, customary law does not 
prescribe writing for any kind of contract recognised by it, including even contracts 
for the sale of land. Yet, the fact that those who adhere to customary law do not put 
their contracts in writing, never mind registering or notarizing them, does not imply 
that they do not take care when they enter into contracts or that they never comply 
with some kind of form that fulfils the so-called evidentiary, cautionary and 
channelling functions. Customary law, it needs hardly be said, is not destitute of 
form. It may not know of writing, but it maintains a considerable precision in oral 
tradition. The sale of land, for instance, must be approved by elders of the seller’s 
lineage and must be concluded in the presence of witnesses for it to be valid. And 
as if that is not sufficient proof of the contract, it is also usually accompanied by 
elaborate formalities involving, for instance, the killing of a goat and/or the doing of 
some other ceremonial act, like the offering of libation. The same is true of contracts 
of marriage, contracts for the sale of livestock and many other important transactions. 
There is, in fact, a parallel between form under customary law and the Roman 
stipula tion  which compelled an oral spelling out of the promise in a manner 
sufficiently ceremonious to impress its terms on participants and possible bystanders. 
It is therefore not proper for the law to categorise a transaction that has undergone 
such an elaborate form as void simply because it does not satisfy the kind of form 
prescribed by a statute which in any case may be alien to the parties.
Closely related to customary law is its shadow problem of illiteracy. Illiteracy
160 Fuller, Op. cit.. note 145, p. 805. The emphasis are mine.
161 Fuller, Op. cit.. 145, 800.
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remains widespread in Cameroon, in spite of the great advance in education in recent
years. This widespread illiteracy is a social fact of which the law must take account.
This the law does to the extent that it has imposed certain formal requirements aimed
at protecting illiterate parties who enter into obligations contained in written
contracts.162 I have already commended that. But my present concern is not about
illiterates and written contracts. Rather, it is about the failure of statutory enactments
to make allowance for all those who only enter into oral contracts because they cannot
read or write. To treat as void for want of writing, registration or notarization, an
oral agreement between illiterate parties, but whose existence is not in dispute,
smacks of a punishment for illiteracy. Regrettably, that is the position that the law
adopts presently. Despite the fact that writing is central to all statutory requirements
on form, (if it is not expressly required, some written document is at least
presupposed, as is the case with registration and notarization) none of the statutory
provisions makes any exceptions for illiterates. Instead, the rules they lay down are
absolute. Any failure to comply with them and the contract is void and
unenforceable. Dr Elias once said about the requirement of writing,
"We feel that- in our law, especially considering the prevalence of 
illiteracy in our country, the requirement of documents ...generally 
works hardship in many cases."163
He was indeed referring to Nigeria but inserting Cameroon for Nigeria, the truth of 
his statement still holds.
Even when the parties have managed to reduce their contract into writing, it has 
still been treated as void because it was either not registered164 or not certified by
162 See section 3 of the Illiterate Protection Ordinance 1958 (for Anglophone 
Cameroon) and article 21 du decret no. 60/172 du 20 sept. 1960 (for Francophone 
Cameroon).
163 Nigerian House of Representative Debates on the Law Reform (Contracts) Bill, 
23rd Nov. 1961, Col. 3341.
1W See Theresia Ewo v. Mary Sih, supra, note 169.
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a notary.165 The requirement of notarization in particular becomes a little bit 
superfluous when one considers the fact that the country is not exactly "blessed" with 
an abundance of notaries or solicitors. How are parties who live in areas with no 
notaries, and there are many such areas, meant to comply with these requirements? 
If the law is to insist on form, it must also provide a system that can support it. 
Ihering has explained that the extreme formalism of Roman law was supportable in 
practice only because of the constant availability of legal advice, gratis.166
(iii) On the Effect of Failure to Comply.
To urge parties towards some degree of formality, where it is needed, is not 
however the same thing as to require, as a matter of law, for the purposes of 
recognition and enforcement, that they indulge in such formality. It is bad enough 
to subject too many contracts to formality, to insist on formalities that invariably 
imply writing to the exclusion of other kinds of form known to native law and 
custom and to demand notarization, regardless of unavailability or scarcity of notaries 
in most parts of the country. But it is far worse to declare as null and void all 
contracts that fail to comply with such requirements. That is precisely what the 
Registration Code 1973 and the Land Tenure Ordinace 1974 prescribe. This can only 
make the law laughable at times. Let me elaborate.
Since no attempt has ever been made to discover what contractual practices 
Cameroonians actually follow regarding form in contracts, I decided to attempt to fill 
that gap during a field trip to Cameroon in 1992. To do so, I composed a 
questionnaire which was administered orally to no less than 200 Cameroonians. They 
included businessmen and non-businessmen, Anglophones and Francophones, village 
folks and urban dwellers, and illiterates and non-illiterates. I made the following 
findings.
165 See Nganga Ngassa Aloysios v. Alex Jabea Mbullah, infra, note 170.
166 See Fuller, Op. cit.. note 145, 802.
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Of those who were literate, about seventy percent said they would reduce their 
contracts into writing if they considered it to be of much importance or if it involved 
a substantial amount of money. Asked to give examples of such contracts, all of 
them cited land related contracts (the sale or lease of land, the sale or lease of a house 
or the construction of a house) while some referred to private car sales.
While a good many businessmen try to put their contracts in writing, I discovered 
that they generally did so only when a substantial amount of money was involved or 
when they did not know the other party sufficiently well. Where the parties know 
each other, it is not uncommon to find instances where businessmen act on mere oral 
orders. Denis Ndikum v. Mideno167 is a very good example. In that case, the 
defendant, a development agency, placed an order for stationery and other office 
materials with the plaintiff. Nothing was written of the transaction. Even the price 
was not determined. When the plaintiff eventually supplied the order, a dispute arose 
as to how much he was to be paid. He asked for 2.4 million francs while the 
defendants claimed that the value of the supplies could not amount to more than
700.000 francs. The court eventually found for the plaintiff on account of the 
defendant’s initial unchallenged acceptance of the goods.
Even more fascinating is Ngang Peter Achutako v. Achoa Fon Bande.m  In 
that case the appellant sold a hotel to the respondent for the staggering sum of 125 
million francs. Despite the colossal sum of money involved, and notwithstanding the 
fact that this sum was to be paid in tranches, the parties were prepared to invest each 
other with attributes of solvability and credibility to the extent that they concluded the 
contract orally. That this caused no surprise in the Court of Appeal for whom Inglis 
J. noted almost casually that "It must be pointed out that the agreement to sell the 
hotel and premises was never in writing. It was oral", is indicative of the fact that 
the courts must be used to such contracts. No further discussion of this case is 
needed here. It is cited, together with the Mideno case above, only as an illustration
167 HCB/6/85 (Bamenda, 10/6/1987, unreported).
168 BCA/18/89 (Bamenda, 11/12/89, unreported).
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of the extent to which contracting parties in Cameroon can place on the trust and 
word of each other without insisting on the need for any writing. And why not. This 
trust is hardly ever breached in the sense that the existence of the contract is hardly 
ever contested. In fact, in neither of the two cases was the existence of the contract 
denied by any of the parties, even in the heat of the disputes that eventually arose.
Interestingly enough, I discovered that some villagers and illiterates make a lot of 
effort to get their contracts written out for them. The vast majority, not surprisingly, 
do not. Even they, however, subject the contract so made to some kind of form 
which more than provides adequate proof of the existence and terms of the contract. 
This may mean the presence of many witnesses for both parties or some kind of 
ceremony or ritual.
Most tellingly, I discovered that even amongst those who put their contracts in 
writing, less than twenty percent actually follow it up with the requisite registration 
or notarization formalities. When I explained to them the legal consequence for 
failing to comply with any of these requirements, namely, that the contract would be 
null and void, not just unenforceable, they found that shocking. They could not 
understand, and rightly so, why a contract that has been reduced into writing and 
whose existence is not disputed by either party should be void simply because it has 
not been registered or notarized. But such is the law. And worse still, the courts 
have been known to apply it to the letter.
In Theresia Ewo v. Mary Sih,m  the appellant contracted to buy a section of the 
respondent’s premises in which she (appellant) already ran a restaurant. The sale 
agreement was put in writing. The contract price was 325.000 francs, of which
100.000 francs was paid instantly. It was agreed that if the balance was not fully 
paid by 31st December 1983 the property would revert to the respondent and the
100.000 francs advance payment refunded to the appellant. As late as June 1984, the 
appellant had not fully paid the contract price even though only 19.000 francs 
remained due. Despite the delay, the respondent still seemed prepared to receive this
169 BCA/32/85 (Bamenda, unreported).
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balance, when, as a result of a misunderstanding between the two, she (respondent) 
refused to accept the outstanding 19.000 francs and insisted instead on her contractual 
rights of rescission. According to the respondent, the appellant was in breach since 
she had failed to pay the full contract price before December 31, 1983. The 
respondent said she was prepared to refund to the appellant all that she had already 
received as part of the contract price, less 150.000 francs as damages for breach. 
The appellant for her part accused the respondent of breach and counter-claimed the 
sum of 210.000 francs as interest on all that she had paid to the respondent.
The trial court admitted the sale agreement in evidence and found for the
respondent. On appeal, the appellant contended strongly that the trial court should
never have given any legal effect to the sale contract because even though it was
written, it was not registered in accordance with article 10(4) of the Registration Code
1973. Consequently, he argued, neither he nor the respondent was not bound by it.
This argument found favour in the Bamenda Court of Appeal, which quashed the
decision of the trial court, declaring that:
"Since the exhibit was, on the evidence, never registered, it was void 
and therefore unenforceable. We therefore agree with counsel for the 
appellant that the parties were not bound by it and that the learned trial 
Magistrate should never have admitted and given it legal effect."
The contract was thus treated as void and restitution ordered. So, unlike the trial 
court, the court of appeal was quite content to confine itself to the formal status of 
the contract, to the exclusion of all substantive issues.
In another case, Nganga Ngassa Aloysius v. Alex Jabea Mbullah,m  the 
respondent sold his house to the appellant for 1.5 million francs. The parties 
themselves drew up the conveyance, i.e. without the use of a notary or solicitor. The 
respondent then continued to occupy the house long after the agreed date for his 
vacation of the premises. In an action by the appellant, the Buea Appeal Court of 
Appeal, upholding the Tiko Court of First Instance ruled that the contract was void 
and unenforceable. Inglis, J., summed it up this way:
17u CASWP/10/85 (Buea, 17-07-1985, unreported).
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"Now, there was no conveyance of the premises to the appellant, since 
the deed to establish transfer of real property right was not drawn up 
by a notary or solicitor. By virtue of Article 8 of Ordinance No.74/1 
of 6th July, 1974 the transaction was null and void. It follows that no 
property was ever passed. The appellant had no real right in the 
property".
Once again, the court shunned any substantive consideration in favour of the formal 
status.
The Francophone courts too, encouraged by the Supreme Court, have been equally
strict on their insistence on the compliance with formal requirements. In Affair
Bassama Pierre v. Essomba Jeanym the plaintiff who had been the defendant’s
tenant for several years, agreed to buy the property he was occupying, when the
defendant, apparently due to financial difficulties, decided to sell it. The sale went
through successfully, with the parties themselves drawing up a conveyance. Some
years later, and with his finances in better shape, the defendant decided to cancel the
sale, callously insisting that the contract had always been void and unenforceable
because it had not been drawn up by a solicitor as required by Loi No. 61-20 du 27
Juin 1961. The Douala First Instance Court agreed with the defendant and ruled that
the contract was void ab initio, a decision that was confirmed by the Douala Appeal
Court. Understandably dissatisfied, the plaintiff continued to the Supreme Court,
where the appeal was again rejected on the same ground of inadequate form:
"Attendu que le contrat de vente passe le 4 Mai 1970 etant nul et de 
nullite absolue parce que fait en violation de la loi no. 61-20 du 27 
Juin 1961, le juge d ’appel a, dans le but d ’empecber a Pune et Pautre 
parties contractantes de tirer profit de ce contrat frappe de nullite 
absolue, remis les parties au meme et semblable etat ou elles etaient 
avant la conclusion dudit contrat...."
The Supreme Court, like the lower courts, saw no need to go beyond the formal 
stage. The fact that the defendant had, out of his own free will, decided to sell his 
house, the fact that the parties had taken the extra measure of reducing the contract
171 Arret No. 15/CC du 13 Nov. 1986 (1990) No.l Rev.Jur.Afr., 84 (Note Francois 
Anoukaha).
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into writing, the fact that several years had elapsed before the defendant decided to 
get the contract nullified, were of no relevance. What was crucial was the lack of 
notarization.
Of course, as a matter of strict law, the decisions considered above are correct.
Yet it is arguable that in cases where the contract is evidenced in writing, with neither
party contesting its existence, and with no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or
duress, substantial and equitable considerations should take precedence over formal
considerations. Atiyah172 draws a most apt analogy with marriage when he says:
"Just as in the case of marriage it is sometimes necessary to see how 
the parties have behaved, how long the relationship has lasted, and so 
on, rather than confine attention to the formal status itself, so also in 
the case of promise it is sometimes relevant to see why the contract 
was made, or what has actually happened following the making of the 
agreement".
Sadly, the courts remain unmoved by this enlightened approach, perhaps because 
they feel completely bound by statutory provisions, a fact that has not been helped by 
the Supreme Court’s unbending stance on the issue. The cases reveal that the 
Supreme Court, more than the lower courts, champions the cause of formalism in 
contract.173 In Affaire Dikongue v. Bita,m  the Supreme Court even censured the 
Court of Appeal for accepting as valid a privately written contract for the sale of 
land. This, the Supreme Court emphasised, was in flagrant violation of the 1961 and 
1974 laws imposing the requirement of registration and notarization on such contracts. 
The law still firmly maintains that the absence of the requisite formality prevents the 
plaintiff from having any claim against a defendant who is in blatant breach or who
172 Atiyah, Op. cit.. 141, p. 112.
173 See Aff. Elessa v. Tonnang Francois, CS Arret du 4 Juin 1981 (1981) 22 & 23 
Cam.L.R. 199; Aff. Mme Mballa v. Bollo, Arret no. 25ICC/ du Octobre 1982 
(unreported); Aff. Tecto v. M. Ossongo, Arret no. 66/CC du 19 Nov. 1981 
(unreported); Aff. Mme Ngakam v. Mba Jeanne, Arret no. 72/CC du 22 Avril 1982 
(unreported). In all these cases the Supreme Court refused to treat the contracts as 
valid for the simple reason that they were lacking in one form or the other.
174 C.S. Arret no. 42/CC du 24 Janv. 1991 (1991) no.7 Jur. Info., 38.
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has chosen to ignore a serious bargain deliberately made.
Possibly the most serious criticism of statutory enactments on form in Cameroon 
is that, by allowing parties to ride free of contracts and break their promises, they 
may actually create fraud, in the sense of injustice caused by meretricious conduct. 
This criticism is brought into its sharpest focus when it is appreciated that a party can 
freely admit in court that he entered into what both parties believed to be a binding 
contract, but state that nevertheless he now wishes to take advantage of what can only 
be described as a legal technicality. In fact, it many cases the defence of lack of 
form has been pleaded as an after thought in preference to a defence that was less 
easy and therefore less convenient. This state of the law offers little to enthuse about. 
So, what ought to be done.
(4). WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH THE LAWS ON FORMALITY?
In response to the picture of the law presented above, the following main 
possibilities exist. First, formal requirements ought to be retained but they must be 
reserved only for relatively important contracts such as those relating to land or 
involving large sums of money. It has already been conceded that in land related 
contracts, for instance, form serves not only the evidentiary function, but also a 
valuable cautionary function since it compels care to be taken when entering what for 
many people is the most significant contract in their lives. The present law which 
imposes formal requirements on too many contracts needs to be replaced with one 
that seeks to preserve a proportion between means and end; it is, indeed, laughable 
to require writing for contracts involving a derisory 500 francs and equally 
preposterous to expect villagers, for instance, with no access to lawyers to notarize 
their contracts.
The second way of improving the present law even without the aid of a statute, 
would be for the courts to accept other kinds of form in contracts. I am here 
referring to native law and custom which also subjects certain contracts to various 
kinds of formal requirements. Just because these do not involve writing, registration
330
or notarization, should not make them any less valid and enforceable. Form under 
customary law is always more than sufficient in fulfilling the same functions as 
writing, registration and certification by notary. It should follow that these statutory 
prescriptions should not apply to all contracts entered into pursuant to native law and 
customs.
Finally, and most importantly, the content of the present laws on form, notably 
article 10 of the Registration Code 1973 (on registration and stamp duty) and article 
8 of the Land Tenure Ordinance 1974 (on notarization) must be diminished and 
simplified175 so that a memorandum would be sufficient if it indicated merely the 
existence of the contract. At present, a memorandum or even a carefully written 
document does not suffice for the purpose of validity and enforceability in the absence 
of registration and notarization. It is hereby suggested that as long as the existence 
of the contract is proven by simple writing or some other means, the absence of 
registration or certification by notary should not be fatal to the validity of the 
contract. At worst, enforceability, not validity, could be linked to the full compliance 
with these requirements so that the contract only becomes enforceable when the 
statutory requirements are fulfilled. In other words, the required formality will not 
have to be executed contemporaneously with the negotiations leading to either the oral 
or privately written agreement. Where the defendant does not contest the existence 
of the contract, the courts should be given the power to order the plaintiff or both 
parties to comply with the necessary requirements before the continuation of 
litigation. Since these formal requirements largely perform a fiscal role, i.e. raising 
income for the government, there is no reason why this cannot be done.
There is also a host of other measures which the courts can be encouraged to 
employ to give effect to certain contracts that may not have strictly complied with 
formal requirements. The equitable doctrines of estoppel and part performance can
175 It has been suggested that the recent multiplication of formal contracts in France 
has been made possible by the simplification of the required formalities. See 
Guerriero: L’acte juridique solennel, th. Toulouse, 1975, L.G.D.J, p .352.
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be particularly useful in this respect. In fact, in Theresia Ewo v. Mary Sih,116
counsel for the appellant submitted that since the contract had been substantially
performed by the appellant by the payment of 306.000 francs out of the agreed
amount of 325.000 francs, the respondent could not in equity rescind the contract.
This submission was rejected by the court of appeal which felt that an order for
specific performance of the purported contract would be tantamount to giving legal
effect to a contract that had already been declared void and unenforceable ab initio
for want of form. However, even if the court had been persuaded to go beyond the
formal stage and consider the substantive arguments relating to part performance, they
still possibly would have rejected it on the strength of the decision in Maddison v.
Alderson,177 in which Lord Selbourne said:
"It may be taken as now settled that part payment of purchase money 
is not enough; and judges of high authority have said the same even of 
payment in full".178
At this point, it has to be admitted that in the case of contracts for the sale of an 
interest in land, (like the Theresia Ewo case), the equitable doctrine of part 
performance has always suffered fron uncertainty as to its doctrinal justification, with 
the consequence that the decision of the House of Lords in Steadman v. 
Steadman179 has thrown the law into a state of disarray. In that case, the House 
of Lords held that the payment of respective sums of money were sufficient acts of 
part performance to render the contract enforceable. Amidst divergencies of opinion, 
the one proposition that seems clearly established is negative, viz, it can no longer 
be stated that the mere payment of money is never a sufficient act of part 
performance. It should be said that technically, Maddison v. Alderson and not
176 Supra, note 169.
177 (1883) 8 App Cas 467.
178 /bid at 479.
179 [1976] AC 536, [1974] 2 All ER 977; Wade, "Part Performance: Back to Square 
One" 90 LQR 433; Emery, "Pan Performance - No Judicial Development After All" 
(1974) CLJ 205.
332
Steadman v. Steadman, applies in Cameroon. This is because the former is a pre- 
1900 decision and therefore binding while the former is post 1900 and at most only 
persuasive. But whatever position the Cameroonian courts choose to follow, it is 
proposed that a number of non-statutory exceptions, such as estoppel and part 
performance be created or expanded so as to render some statutory requirements a 
bit nugatory. It may also be suggested that in future the courts should have the power 
to dispense with any formal requirements in the interests of justice. Such 
dispensation need not take the absolute form of contract or no-contract, but could 
assume the shape of monetary compensation for the injurious reliance falling short of 
full contract entitlement.180
If these proposals are thought in any way to be radical, may it be pointed that 
some of them have actually been given judicial expression in some decided cases. 
In Andreas E. Lobe v. Jonas Houtchou,m plaintiff and defendant entered into a 
written agreement by which the former conveyed his plot to the latter for the sum of
300.000 francs. The parties later cancelled this agreement in writing because the 
plot was too small for the defendant but entered into a new contract by which plaintiff 
was to provide a larger plot for 1.300.000 francs. A deposit of 300.000 francs was 
paid for which a receipt was issued. It was stated on this receipt that a formal 
agreement would be drawn up on payment by the defendant of the balance. Before 
that was done, a dispute arose, with the plaintiff claiming that the defendant was in
180 For example, Section 139 of the American Restatement Second on Contracts 
(American Institute 1979) provides for a remedy in the event of action or forbearance 
under a contract unenforceable for want of compliance with the Statute of Frauds. 
Such action or forbearance must be causally linked to the defendant’s promise and 
should have been reasonably expected by the defendant. The remedy is "limited as 
justice requires" in accordance with a number of criteria laid down. Section 129 
provides for specific performance of a sale of land contract where this is necessary 
to avoid injustice and the plaintiff has acted in "reasonable reliance" on the contract, 
the term "reliance" being preferred to "part performance" as more accurately 
descriptive of certain acts, such as taking possession and making renovations, that 
came within the part performance doctrine.
181 HCK/29/87 (kumba, unreported).
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breach by refusing to pay the outstanding balance. The defendant did not deny that
he had not completed the payment but contended that he was actually owing less than
what the plaintiff was claiming. Then, sensing an easy escape route out of the
contractual mire, counsel for the defendant submitted that the purported sale of land
by the plaintiff was void for lack of form as it had not been notarized in accordance
with article 8 (1) of the Land Tenure Ordinance 1974. Ignoring strict law and
invoking equity, Epuli, J. retorted:
"Equity looks on that as done which ought to be done. The purported 
sales of land were not made by conveyance, that is by deed, but by 
simple agreement reduced into writing. It is to be presumed that the 
sales would later on be perfected by proper conveyances".
He accordingly refused to hold that the contract was void. To have done so would
have been tantamount to endorsing the defendant’s blatant contempt for a contract he
not only freely entered into but had actually started to perform.
Another case in which the absence of form was not fatal to the validity and 
enforceability of the contract was Santa Ploma v. Seidu Ngula et a /.182 The facts 
were very complicated but it is enough to say that it involved the sale of cattle. The 
plaintiff claimed to have bought a total of 10 cows and 7 calves from defendants 
through various sales contracts. He was suing the defendants for breach (non­
delivery) or specific performance in the alternative. There was evidence, in the form 
of a receipt (exhibit C), to suggest that he had actually paid for 5 cows but no such 
other evidence to support his claim for the other sales. The trial judge rejected the 
receipt and dismissed all his claims.
On appeal, the Bamenda Appeal Court had this to say about the rejection of 
exhibit C:
"Although the learned trial judge rejected Exhibit ‘C’ ... we find that 
the rejection was not because the document was not genuine. It was 
because it was not stamp dutied. But the trial judge had the alternative 
of asking that the stamp duty requirement be fulfilled for the document 
to be admitted in evidence in order that justice should be done. We 
therefore rely on the document and hold that the 1st and 2nd
182 BCA/10/83 (Bamenda, 21/3/1984, unreported).
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respondents sold 5 cows to the appellant ..." l83
Since there was no other evidence, written or otherwise, of the other sales the 
appellant was alleging, that part of the claim was rightfully dismissed by the Appeal 
Court. Once again, the court allowed common sense, equity and justice to triumph 
over strict law.
Even the Francophone courts which I have already accused of paying too much 
respect to formal requirements, have not always been inclined to limit all issues to 
the formal status of a contract. They occasionally employ the doctrine of good 
faith,184 courtesy of article 555 of the Civil Code, to give effect to contracts relating 
to land which do not satisfy the requisite form. Article 555 is couched in verbose 
language but briefly, it states that where A occupies or develops land that belongs to 
B, B as the rightful owner has a right to demolish any such development without 
paying any indemnity to A, and if A is deemed to have occupied or constructed on 
the land in bad faith, he may even have to bear the costs of any work carried out by 
B .185 If, however, A is considered to be a good faith occupier, he may not be 
evicted, and if so, he will be entitled to compensation to the tune of his investment.
In Affaire Njinou Jean & Emassi Therese v. Siewe Casimir,m  the doctrine of 
good faith was applied to give effect to a contract that was lacking in the requisite 
form. The plaintiffs had sold a piece of land to the defendant by a privately written 
agreement in 1969. In 1982, they brought an action for an eviction order against the 
defendant. The Bafang High Court granted the eviction order on the rather 
unconvincing ground that the defendant was a bad faith occupier. Overturning this 
decision, the Douala Court of Appeal, while acknowledging that the contract of sale
183 Emphasis are mine.
184 It is trite law that the doctrine of good faith is not recognised in common law 
Cameroon, the reason being that it has never been part of the English law.
185 This has been reiterated by articles 2 and 3 of Law no. 82-22 du 14 Juillet 1980 
relating to bad faith occupiers.
186 C.S arret no.3/CC du 18 janv. 1990 (1992) no. 10 Jur. Info 49.
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in 1969 could be considered a nullity because it was never notarized, nevertheless
went on to hold that since
"Siewe n'etait entre en possession et en jouissance du lot litigieux 
qu’en vertu des actes prealablement signes par les intimes",
he had to be treated as a good faith occupier in the sense of article 555 of the Civil 
Code. The contract was therefore allowed to stand. This time the plaintiffs 
appealed. The Supreme Court totally agreed with the reasoning of the court of appeal 
and dismissed the appeal.
These cases reveal that the courts on both sides of the legal divide are aware of 
the dangers of always confining themselves to the formal status of contracts. They 
show that the courts are sometimes prepared, for the sake of justice, to give priority 
to other considerations. Unfortunately, those cases in which the courts have adopted 
such a bold and commendable approach are very few and may even be considered as 
aberrations in the sense that they do not actually represent the actual position of the 
law. The evidence of all the other cases on the subject suggests that the courts still 
insist on the complete execution of formal requirements at the time of conclusion of 
the contract or at the latest, before commencement of any action. Anything short of 
that and the contract is void. This, it has been argued, can sometimes result in 
injustice as it virtually allows the defendant to admit an honest obligation which the 
plaintiff was entitled to, and may have, in fact, relied upon and yet defeat its 
enforcement by pleading that the agreement did not comply with the prescribed form. 
The law must therefore move away from such a Procrustean approach. In its place 
it should adopt a more flexible approach that will allow the courts the possibility to 
weigh up the reasons in favour of recognizing and enforcing the contract and balance 
them against the lack of formality.
Since this is one area of contract law that is dominated by statute law, it will take 
legislative intervention to bring about changes. But before that is done, it will be 
incumbent on the courts to show greater awareness to the factual and legal problems 
that have been created by formality in contracts. The Bamenda Court of Appeal has 
pointed the way forward by stating that, in the absence of form, the trial judge has
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the alternative of asking that the requirement be fulfilled even after the 
commencement of action, in order that justice should be done.187 In Cameroon, 
commercial life in general and contracts in particular are nowadays hedged in by so 
many petty statutory regulations, that it would scarcely promote the interests of justice 
to drive a plan tiff from the seat of judgement merely because he has committed a 
minor transgression.
B. ILLEGALITY.
It is a settled rule both of English and French law that a contract which is illegal, 
contrary to public policy or ordre public, or immoral, is void, or at least will not be 
enforced. This rule may appear simple and clear enough yet its application has posed 
problems for the courts in both systems.188 The courts have not always been 
consistent in their application of rules on illegality. No attempt will be made here to 
reconcile the rules, neither is necessary to provide an encyclopedic account on the law 
of illegality. The aim here is to find out how the courts in Cameroon cope with the 
problems of illegality and the solutions they arrive at. This entails ascertaining what 
type of contracts are illegal and the effect or consequence of that illegality.
187 In the Sama Ploma case, supra, note 182.
188 Szladits, "Illegality o f Prohibited Contracts: Comparative Aspects" In: XXth 
Century Comparative and Conflict Law: Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. 
Yntema, 1961, p. 221; Barland, "Comparative Law: Common and Civil Law: Illegal 
and Immoral Contracts" (1954) Wis. L.R. 146.
337
(1). TYPES OF ILLEGALITY.
Under the common law, illegal contracts are variously classified. This 
classification may be based on the nature of the objectionable conduct189 or on the 
source of the rule infringed.190 Doubts have been cast on claims that these 
classifications may facilitate a generalisation of the effect of illegality191 but the 
other raison d ’etre of these classifications - that they are purely expository - seems 
more convincing.
As if to lend support to Williston’s statement that "There seems to be no 
importance to these classifications",192 the courts in Cameroon have never really 
bothered to draw on them. For ease of exposition though, I will make use of the 
typical English law classification, which divides unlawful or illegal contracts into 
those which are prohibited by statute, those illegal in the common law, and those 
contrary to public policy. But because contracts contrary to the common law and 
those against public policy overlap, I shall treat them together. This means that I will 
consider contracts prohibited by statute and contracts illegal at common law on 
grounds of public policy.
(a). Contracts Prohibited by Statute.
English law takes a hard line on statutory prohibitions. A contract that is 
expressly or impliedly prohibited is illegal and void. In Cameroon, statutes in this
189 For e.g. Pollock, Principles of the Law of Contract (13th ed.) chap. 8, p. 261, 
divides cases into those in which the contract is contrary to (i) positive law, (ii) good 
morals and (iii) public policy.
190 Here a contract that violates a statute is more likely to receive less or no support 
from the court that one that violates a rule of the common law.
191 Treitel, p. 325.
192 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), s. 1628.
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connection should not be confined to legislation enacted by the National Assembly 
(Parliament) but should include orders, decrees and ordinances by Mayors, Prefects, 
Governors, Ministers and the President, and any other persons empowered by the 
National Assembly to make them. Because there are numerous such statutes in 
Cameroon, it will be difficult, and unnecessary, to enumerate and discuss all of them. 
Only a few important ones are mentioned here.
Some of these statutes have already been considered above in relation to formal 
requirements in contract. These include (i) the Land Tenure Ordinance 1974 (article 
8 (1)), which declares that the failure to notarize deeds establishing, transferring and 
extinguishing property renders the contract null and void; (ii) the Registration, Stamp 
Duty and Trusteeship Code 1973, which imposes a requirement of registration on 
certain contracts; and (iii) the Illiterate Protection Ordinance, which guarantees some 
protection for illiterates not just in contractual matters but in whatever dealings that 
involve writing. These need no further elaboration here except perhaps to say that 
there are important in the present discussion because they declare that any contracts 
that fail to comply with them are illegal or void. A very important statute not yet 
mentioned at all is the Money Lenders Ordinance.193 This requires all money 
lenders to be licensed, so that any transaction involving an unlicensed money lender 
is illegal. Some decisions of the courts on the failure to comply with these statutes 
will be considered below under the effects of illegality.
(b). Contracts Illegal at Common Law on Grounds of Public Policy.
Some contracts are by their nature harmful to the general interests of society, and 
for that reason the courts have traditionally refused to sanction or give effect to them. 
Such contracts, which may be contrary to good morals or may be against accepted 
customs or laws of the land, are conveniently referred to as contracts against public 
policy.
193 This is contained in Cap. 124 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1958 but 
it still applies in Cameroon by virtue of her earlier association with Nigeria.
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Public policy as a concept cannot be stated in any simple proposition.194 It has 
been described as "a very unruly horse",195 and as being "so broad as to be 
hopeless".196 It follows that the number or type of contracts that can be labelled 
as violating public policy is by no means standard. Some commonly identifiable ones 
in England197 include: contracts to commit a crime, sexually immoral contracts, 
contracts that prejudice the administration of justice, contracts that corrupt public life, 
and contracts to defraud the revenue.
In Common Law Cameroon, there is no reason to suggest that the courts will be 
more welcoming to any of the above contracts. That they will be treated as being 
against public policy is borne out by the following two decisions. The first one, 
Stephen Doh v. The People,198 involved a contract to commit a crime. The 
appellant had been arraigned before the Muyuka Court of First Instance charged with 
attempted counterfeiting. The appellant had managed to extract the sum of 274.000 
francs from one Ateba with a promise that the sum would be "doubled". Perhaps this 
facts need a bit more explaining. It is not an uncommon practice in Cameroon to find 
impostors, holding out to be counterfeiters, who prey on unsuspecting victims with 
claims that they will literally double any amount of money handed to them. The truth 
about these impostors, known locally as "money doublers", is that they never do what 
they promise. Instead they abscond with any sums of money handed to them, as was 
the case in the instance case. Ateba, receiving neither the promised "doubled" 
amount nor his original outlay, was forced to complain to the Police who arrested and 
charged the appellant accordingly. The appellant was found guilty and was given a
194 For some observations on the doctrine, see generally Lloyd, Public Policy: A 
Comparative Study in English and French Law, 1953; Shand, Unblikering the 
Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the Law o f Contract" 1972 C.L.J. 144.
19:1 In Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229, 252, per Burrough J.
196 Treitel, p .324.
197 Cheshire, Fifoot, and Furmston, p. 359.
198 Criminal Appeal No. CASWP/18/C/78 (Buea, unreported).
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five year prison sentence. The trial Magistrate also ordered the appellant to refund 
the money collected i.e. 274.000 francs to Ateba, the complainant. He appealed.
The Court of Appeal upheld the prison sentence but took a different view on the 
trial Magistrate’s order that the complainant was entitled to a refund of the money 
from the accused. There was unchallenged evidence before the court that the 
complainant had entered into a contract with the accused solely for the purpose of 
"doubling" money. This was in the form of a written contract, signed by all parties 
involved. On that evidence, the Appeal Court was quick to point out that such a 
contract could not effectively be enforced in any court of law because of its illegality 
and therefore it "would be against public policy if this court should lend support to 
such agreements". In the result, the order by the trial court for the refund of the
274.000 francs was set aside.
The second case, Lt. Joseph Sonkey v. Ignatius Oputa199 involved defrauding 
the inland revenue. The appellant, an army lieutenant, ordered building materials 
from the respondent. As this was to be purchased from neighbouring Nigeria, the 
appellant instructed the respondent that on arriving in Cameroon with the goods, he 
should deposit them with a friend at a place called Man O’ War Bay (where there is 
an army barracks), and that if Customs checks prevented the goods from being taken 
there, the respondent should "drop them on the way" from where he (the appellant) 
would arrange for collection. The respondent could not take the goods to Man O ’ 
War Bay for fear of Customs, so he deposited them at a place called Debunscha. The 
appellant then arranged for a friend to collect the goods only for him to discover on 
arrival that some of it had been stolen. As a result, the appellant brought an action 
for breach of contract and lost at first instance.
His appeal was no more successful as the Court of Appeal saw no reason to alter
the decision of the lower court. Mbuagbaw J. summed up the feeling of the court by
pointing out that by drawing up a scheme to avoid the Customs,
"The parties clearly intended to defraud the government of the 
payment of import duties on the goods. ... The appellant was certainly
199 CASWP/28/80 (Buea, 17-02-1981, unreported).
341
in delicto since he knew the vital fact that would make the 
performance of the contract illegal. In our view, therefore, public 
policy does constrain us to refuse our aid to the appellant and he is not 
entitled to succeed."
In Civil Law Cameroon, the sphere of illegal contracts is established by the 
following provisions of the Civil Code:
Article 6 which states that laws relating to public order and morals cannot be 
derogated from by private agreement.
Article 1108 which lists lawful cause as one of the four conditions for the validity 
of a contract.
Article 1131 which declares an obligation with no cause or with an unlawful cause 
to be of no effect.
Article 1133 which states that a cause is illicit when it is prohibited by law, when 
it is contrary to good morals or to public good.
So, as in France, unlawful contracts in Francophone Cameroon may conveniently 
be classified into three groups: those prohibited by la loi, those contrary to bonnes 
moeurs and those contrary to ordre public. These groups are not entirely exclusive 
of each other as sometimes contracts prohibited by law and those contrary to ordre 
public overlap. In order to distinguish between the various classes of unlawful 
contracts, French courts have generally tended to treat as contracts prohibited by law 
only those that are expressly forbidden by statute, while those that are impliedly 
prohibited or those that offend against some other law are treated as contracts against 
public policy. Another distinction is then drawn between, on the one hand, contracts 
prohibited by law and contracts against public order (illegal contracts proper) and, on 
the other hand, contracts contrary to good morals (immoral contracts). Contracts 
contrary to bonnes moeurs suffer from lack of precise formulation in France and even 
less so in Civil Law Cameroon. In the context of Civil Law Cameroon, therefore, 
I shall split the discussion into two sections: contracts prohibited by statute and 
contracts contrary to public order (to which immoral contracts may conveniently be 
subsumed).
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(c). Contracts Prohibited by la loi.
The Land Tenure Ordinance 1974, and the Registration, Stamps Duty and 
Trusteeship Code 1973 mentioned above in connection to Common Law Cameroon 
also apply to Civil Law Cameroon, therefore, all contracts that fail to comply with 
them must fall under this heading. To these must be added those statutory provisions 
that apply only to Civil Law Cameroon, such as Decret No. 60/172 du 20 Sept. 1960, 
article 21 of which requires the intervention of a notary and an interpreter in all 
transactions involving a party who does not understand the French language and 
Decret-Loi du 9 Janv. 1963, of which article 5 states that only land that has been 
properly registered can be the subject of any sale, effectively forbidding the sale of 
all unregistered land. It must also be noted that all the prohibitions relating to 
unlawful cause derive from the Civil Code and are therefore statutory.
Cause as a necessary ingredient for the formation of contracts has already been 
considered.20(1 Yet, even where there is cause, the contract will be of no effect if 
that cause is unlawful. Article 1131 of the Civil Code also says when a cause is 
unlawful. This is so wide ranging that it may be possible to explain the illegality of 
almost any contract in terms of unlawful cause. For instance, it has been used by the 
Supreme Court in Affair Fotso Mbobda Jean v. Epeti Ekedi Eugenie & Ekedi 
Alice201 to explain its refusal to enforce a contract of sale of unregistered land, such 
contracts having been expressly prohibited by la loi, in this case article 5 of the Law 
of 9 January 1963. The Supreme Court also used it in C. Jaques v. W. Simon202 
against a contract of loan with an extortionate interest rate. In that case the usurious 
monthly interest rate of 35% was in breach of the Decree of 22 September 1935, 
forbidding usury.
2U0 See Chapter 6 above.
2UI C.S. Arret du 16 Fevrier 1978 (1978) Nos. 15 & 16 Rev. Cam. Dr. 241, 244.
202 C.S Arret no. 37/CC du Mars 1973 (1976) No.9 Cam. L.R. 62.
(d). Contracts contrary to Ordre Public.
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The textual basis for the concept of ordre public is provided by articles 6 and 1131 
of the Civil Code. While ordre public may be similar to the common law concept 
of public policy in some respects, it is not always the equivalent. Ordre public, for 
instance, has a much wider scope of application than public policy in the common 
law.203 It is used in the civil law both as a general standard within which the courts 
have a limited judicial discretion to impugn transactions held to offend public order, 
and also as applied to specific statutory enactments which are imperative in the sense 
that they cannot be excluded by agreement.204
Ordre public, like public policy, is hard to define. It has been said that if public 
policy can be likened to an "unruly horse" (cheval retif), then, ordre public has to be 
likened to "sables mouvants”205 (literally, moving sand). Some French 
commentators consider the common law concept of public policy to be more coherent 
than ordre public,206 but one must doubt if common lawyers accept that public 
policy is at all coherent, in view of the problems it continues to pose.
In France a distinction is sometimes drawn between ordre public textuel and ordre 
public virtue I.201 The former refers to enacted ordre public, as in article 6 while 
the latter refers to unenacted ordre public, or one deriving from illicit cause. This 
distinction carries little significance, not just because French courts rarely rely on
203 See generally Tallon, Considerations sur la notion d ’ordre public dans les contrats 
en droit frangais et en droit anglais, Melanges Savatier, 1965, 884.
204 See generally Llovd.op. cit.. note 194; Malaurie: L’ordre public et le contrat, 
etude de droit civil compare France, Anglettere, U.S.S.R., these, Paris, 1951.
205 Rapport PILON, Req., 21 avril 1931, S. 1931.1.377.
206 Tallon, Op. cit.. note 203, p .884.
207 Carbonnier para. 32; Ghestin, para. 100.
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ordre public virtuel,208 but because the French Cour de Cassation had long ago 
ruled that it is sufficient that the contract is contrary to ordre public, even if only on 
the grounds of illicit cause, without there being any need for it to be forbidden by la 
loi™
Another distinction, a more current one, that is used to differentiate between 
article 6 and article 1133 is that which divides ordre public into ordre public 
economique et social and ordre public politique et moral.210 The former comprises 
the ever-widening field of state intervention, direction and protection in the interest 
of the economic balance of the state and the welfare of the community. This 
involvement of the state in contracts, which runs against the spirit of freedom of 
contract is known as dirigisme in France.211 Examples include legislation on 
consumer contracts, rent restrictions, insurance etc. Under the ordre public politique 
et moral on the other hand, the courts may consider as unlawful those contracts that 
offend against, or tend to pose a threat to, basic constitutional principles of the state, 
the family and the individual. Ordre Public in this sense is more or less analogous 
to instances of public policy at common law, though applied over a wider range.
It is difficult to say whether the courts in civil law Cameroon make any use of 
these distinctions.212 There is as yet no evidence of any point being made of the 
difference between political and economic public order. This may be due to the fact 
there appears to be no instances of illegality based on what is termed ordre public 
politique before the courts. This is rather surprising, considering the ever worsening
208 See Hauser, "Ordre Public" Encyclopaedie Dalloz (Civil) (2nd edn) vol V, s. 13.
2U9 Cass. civ. 4.12.1929, note Esmein, S 1931.1.49, Kahn-Freund, Sourcebook, p. 
253.
210 Carbonnier para. 32; Ghestin, para. 113 ff.
211 See Ghestin, para. 118 ff.
212 In France the significance of this distinction lies in the fact that the courts seem 
to apply the doctrine of public order more leniently against violations in the economic 
than in the political sphere. See Szladits, Op. Cit.. note 188, p. 224.
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problem of corruption in public life and the mindless disregard for established 
convention. In fact, the paucity of litigation in this area should not by any means be 
taken as an indication that contracts that offend against ordre public politique are 
rarely entered into by Cameroonians. If anything, the lack of litigation is indicative 
of an acquiescence, perhpas not by the courts, but by the public, of the decline, if not 
the word decay, in the standard expected of public life.
So far, those cases in which the courts have invoked ordre public to attack and 
strike down the legality of the contract involve statutory prohibitions and can 
therefore be classed under ordre public economique. A couple of illustrations will 
suffice here. In Affair Mbobda v. Epeti Ekedi & Ekedi Alice ,213 the contract was 
void for illicit cause, but the court also added that the contract was nulle et d ’une 
nullite d ’ordre public. In Affair C.C.E.G. v. E.T. A/.,214 the parties entered into 
a contract of lease for 5 years but failed to notarize it. The Supreme Court declared 
the contract nulle et d ’une nullite d ’ordre public because article 1 of the Law of 27 
June 1961 expressly requires all leases for over 3 years to be notarized.
(2). The Consequences of Illegality.
Under the common law, if the contract is expressly prohibited by statute, it is 
illegal and void, irrespective of the intention of the legislator.215 A good example 
of an express statutory provision in Common Law Cameroon is the Moneylenders 
Ordinance 1958 which requires moneylenders to be licensed. In Ngwa George Neba 
v. Ngwa Martin™  it was held that the plaintiff could not enforce his claim for debt 
due and owing after the court discovered that he had been engaged in the business of
213 Supra, note 201.
214 C.S. Arret No. 26/CC du 12 janv. 1971 (1976) No. 9 Rev. Cam. Dr., 59.
215 Williams, "Legal Aspects o f Illegal Contracts" (1942) 8 C.L.J. 51-69; Cope v. 
Rowlands, (1836) 2 M & W 149, p. 351.
216 HCB/37/87 (Bamenda, 17-4-1989, unreported).
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moneylending at exorbitant interests rates without the requisite licence. A similar 
decision was arrived at by the Bamenda Court of Appeal in Anji George v. Chefor 
Andreas211
Where the contract is illegal by nature, no action can be brought, directly or 
otherwise, to enforce it. This is based on the maxim "ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio". Thus a party will be unable to recover by claiming damages or compensation 
for breach of contract. This explains why in Lt. Sonkey v. Oputa2n the plaintiff 
could not succeed in his action for breach of contract. That case is also authority for 
the proposition that a contract that is ex facie legal will not receive the backing of the 
courts if it can only be performed by illegality or is intended to be performed 
illegally. Since the parties intended, and indeed succeeded, in bringing the goods into 
the country without paying Customs duty, the court said that "the law will not help 
the plaintiff in any way that is a direct or indirect enforcement of the rights under the 
contract".
Where the object of the contract is illegal, the whole transaction is tainted with 
illegality and no right of action exists in respect of anything arising out of the 
transaction. The maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis applies in this 
case and no restitution can be claimed. Thus in Stephen Doh v. The People,219 
where the object of the contract was to "double" money (i.e. produce counterfeit 
notes), the money that the appellant had received in pursuit of that contract was held 
by the Court of Appeal, overruling the trial court, to be irrecoverable, 
notwithstanding the fact that a criminal conviction and prison sentence had already 
been entered against the appellant for the offence of attempted counterfeiting. In 
denying recovery, the logic behind the reasoning of the Appeal Court was 
unassailable. What if there had been no criminal action, would a civil action against 
the appellant for the recovery of the sum have succeeded?, the court inquired.
217 BCA/52/91 (Bamenda, unreported).
218 Supra, notel99
219 Supra, note 19$.
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Certainly not, they answered. Then, echoing the maxim ignorantia juris haud 
excusat, the court stressed that the party who made the payment ought to have known 
that such a contract was illegal and that if he did not, he would still be prevented 
from recovering by the above maxim. To further buttress their decision the court 
cited with approval the following statement of Wilmot, C.J. in Collins v. 
Blantorn:220
"Whoever is a party to an illegal contract, if he hath once paid the 
money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, he shall not have the 
help of the court to fetch it back again. You shall not have a right of 
action when you come into a court of justice in this unclean manner to 
receive it back."
It is clear from the above cases that the common law courts in Cameroon take a very 
uncompromising line on contracts whose illegality is highly reprehensible.
But the rule under English law that a party cannot recover what he has given 
under an illegal contract is only a general rule and as such it allows for some 
exceptions. First, where the parties are not in pari delicto, the less guilty party may 
be able to recover property that he has transferred under the contract. Secondly, 
where the contract is still executory, a party is allowed locus poenitentiae and may 
recover both money and property, provided that he starts proceedings before the 
illegal purpose has been substantially performed.221 Further still, a party can 
recover if he does not have to rely on the illegality in substantiating his claim.222 
The first two exceptions are self-explanatory but the third needs further elaboration.
The rule under the third exception has again been given judicial expression by the 
House of Lords in the very recent decision in Tinsley v. Milligan 223 Under that 
rule a plaintiff can recover if he can frame a cause of action entirely independent of
22U (1767) 2 Wils KB 341 at 350.
221 This exception has been interpreted rather restrictively by English courts, e.g., in 
Bigos v. Bousted [1951] 1 All E.R. 92.
222 Cheshire, Fifoot, and Furmston, p. 380; Treitel, p. 441.
223 [1994] 1 A.C. 340.
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the contract, so that he is not compelled to disclose the illegality. This rule, 
established as it is, both in judicial practice224 and academic writing, has not always 
met with approval.225 Following the Tinsley v. Milligan decision, it has been 
argued and demonstrated by way of examples that, contrary to judicial dicta, a party 
actually does recover property or money transferred under an illegal contract "if he 
can establish his right or title to it by relying on the contract or its illegality".226 
In other words, the party recovers not by avoiding the illegality, but by effectively 
relying on it. The logic behind that assertion - for instance, that if the transferee’s 
right derives from an illegal contract, he cannot establish it without relying on that 
contract - appears to me to be strong enough, yet the validity of the rule that recovery 
is based on the non-reliance of the contract or its illegality remains firmly embedded 
in English law, as Tinsley v. Milligan itself confirms. In any event, from a 
Cameroonian perspective, whether an action for recovery succeeds because of the 
avoidance of, or by the reliance on, the illegality is of no great import. What does 
matter is whether recovery is ever allowed on an illegal contract at all.
This matter came up for consideration before the Bamenda Court of Appeal in Toh 
John Calvin v. Nyanunga Gideon Fokumla 221 In that case the appellant brought 
an action for breach of contract, debt and detinue against the respondent. The 
appellant’s case was that he bought a piece of land from the respondent for 800.000 
francs. That sum was to be paid in instalments. He claimed that after paying a total 
of 500.000 francs, he went ahead with preparations for the development of the said 
piece of land by building a water tank, planting cypress trees and transferring sun 
dried bricks to the site for construction. He then gave the respondent a cheque for
224 See Amur Singh v. Kulubya [1964] A.C 142 (Criticised by Cornish, "Relying on 
Illegality" (1964) 27 MLR 225) and Bowmakers Ltd v. Barnet Instruments Ltd. [1945] 
K.B. 65.
22:1 E.g. Cornsih, op. cit.. note 224.
226 Enonchong, "Title Claims and Illegal Transactions" (1995) 111 L.Q.R. 135, 136.
227 BCA/16/87 (1991) 5 Jur. Info., 55.
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300.000 francs in final payment but to his surprise, the respondent returned the 
cheque, accusing him of breach and cancelling the contract.
The respondent for his part agreed that the appellant had paid 500.000 francs but 
pointed out that he had failed to make the final payment on the agreed date of 4th 
October 1985. He further complained that the cheque for 300.000 francs which the 
appellant issued as late as 13th February, 1986 was post-dated, to be cashed one 
month later. That as a result of the appellant’s failure to complete payment, plus the 
fact that the appellant had taken advantage of his absence to start unauthorized 
development of the land, he was prompted to cancel the agreement. The respondent 
then accused the appellant of breach and counter-claimed expenses which he claimed 
he incurred in providing entertainment for those who were called on three occasions 
to witness the finalization of the sale.228 On those three occasions the appellant had 
failed to show up. The question then was whether the court would enforce the 
contract or put the parties back to their status quo ante, mindful of the fact that the 
contract was void since it had not complied with article 8 (1) 2 of the Land Tenure 
Ordinance 1974 which requires notarization for all contracts for the sale of land.
At first instance, counsel for the plaintiff (appellant), not surprisingly, preferred 
to ignore the formal irregularity and argued instead that the payment of 500.000 
francs was tantamount to substantial performance, so that the only remedy available 
to the defendant, was an action for the balance. Responding, counsel for the 
defendant (respondent) said that as a matter of strict law, the plaintiff would have no 
case before a court of law since according to the Land Tenure Ordinace 1974, the 
contract itself was null and void. But he added, a touch patronisingly, that he was 
not going to press that advantage. Instead he argued that the failure to complete 
payment on the agreed date meant that consideration for the contract had not been 
completely furnished, that the delay in the completion in payment amounted to a 
breach and that for these reasons, ownership in the land never passed to the plaintiff.
228 I have already explained elsewhere that important sales transaction are usually 
accompanied with some entertainment (food and drink). Those involved are meant 
to be witnesses, not just of the sale but as to its terms too.
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The trial judge also sidestepped the issue of lack of form and declared himself 
satisfied that there was a contract, the breach of which was attributable to the 
plaintiff. He proceeded to make the following orders: that the defendant repay the 
plaintiffs 500.000 francs, and that the plaintiff should quit the defendant’s land, 
taking with him his blocks and building materials. One would have thought that this 
was a fair judgement but the plaintiff thought otherwise and appealed.
The Bamenda Court of Appeal immediately addressed the question of illegality.
The court was satisfied that this was an illegal contract so that the real question was
one of recovery of money paid or property transferred under an illegal contract. The
court recited the circumstances under which recovery was possible at common law,
namely: where the parties are not in pari delicto, where the illegal purpose has not
been substantially carried out, and where the action is founded on a right independent
of the contract or the party does not rely on the illegality. As the Court of Appeal
saw it, this case fell under the third exception. This is evidenced by the following
statement by the court:
"From the pleadings and evidence adduced it would appear that the 
substance of the appellant’s claim was founded independently of the 
contract and also he did not rely on his illegal transaction to make out
his claim."
In the result the appeal was allowed with the respondent being ordered to pay 500.000 
francs for debt due and owing, plus special damages and costs to the tune of 800.000 
francs.
The principle on which the Court of Appeal judgement is founded is plain and well 
established, yet it is submitted that its application to the facts of this case is most 
unconvincing. If, as the court categorically stated from the outset, this was an illegal 
contract, then, one fails to see how the appellant could have substantiated his claim 
without relying on the contract or its illegality. With no disrespect to the court, there 
is nothing in the facts or pleadings to support the view that there was no reliance on 
the contract. If anything, this judgement only lends credence to the argument that a 
transferee actually suceeds by relying on, and not by avoiding, the illegality. This 
is not to suggest, however, that the result the court arrived at was wrong. The result
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seems clearly desirable, it is the reasoning that is strained. It is hereby suggested that 
it was posible for the court could to employ more convincing reasoning to arrive at 
the same result. This could have been done in one of two ways. The one would 
have been to predicate the judgement on the doctrine of consideration. That is to say, 
by failing to complete payment on the agreed date, there was a failure of 
consideration on the part of the appellant. The other reason is even more 
convincing, and it would have required the court to say that the contract was null and 
void. That is only applying the Land Ordinace 1974 itself, which expressly declares 
such contracts null and void. And if the contract is void, it has to be treated as 
though it never existed, with the consequence that the parties are restored to their 
status quo ante. Any of these two methods would have led the court to the same 
conclusion but without any dubious explanation.
The final consequence under the common law to be considered here is that a 
contract cannot be enforced where the whole or part of the consideration is illegal. 
If, however, the illegal consideration merely constitutes a subsidiary or minor part 
of the total consideration, and if the illegality is not contra bonos mores, the illegal 
part of the consideration may be severed from the rest of the consideration and the 
legal promises enforced. In Samuel Atanga v. Martin Etta,229 the plaintiff sued 
the defendant for the balance of the cost price of an engine saw he had sold to a 
certain Cyprian Agbor, for whom the defendant had stood surety. At the time of 
bringing the action, only 63.000 francs of a total of 190.000 francs was owing. It 
was a term of the agreement that the defendant would be charged an extra 5.000 
francs per month for failing to pay any instalment. The trial Magistrate held, inter 
alia, that the penalty clause was illegal and on that count, dismissed the action for 
non-suit. The Appeal Court agreed with the trial court on the illegality of the penalty 
clause:
"The penalty clause in the contract is in terrorem of the respondent.
The sum payable as a penalty is not only greater that the sum owing 
but is in addition to it. It is therefore unconscionable and illegal".
229 CASWP/22/80
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But the Court of Appeal did not consider this illegality enough to warrant a refusal 
of enforcement of the contract. So while no effect was given to the penalty clause, 
the appellant was held to be entitled to the outstanding balance, plus general damages 
of 20.000 francs
In Civil Law Cameroon, the consequence of an illegal contract, whether the
illegality derives from the violation of a statute or from an offence against public
order, is that it is void and has no legal effect. It suffers from nullite d ’ordre public.
The consequences of illegality in Civil Law Cameroon are generally the same as in
France. This is perfectly demonstrated by the Supreme Court judgement in Affair
C.C.E.G v. E .T .M ,230 where it was said,
"Mais attendu que sonts nuls de plein droit toutes les actes qu’une 
disposition legale declare nul, que toute personne interessee est 
autorisee a se prevaloir d ’une telle nullite, laquelle n ’est susceptible 
d ’etre couverte ni par une confirmation ou ratification ni par la 
prescription
That is to say that when a contract suffers from nullite d ’ordre public, the nullity can 
be asserted by anyone who has a justified interest in doing so; the contract cannot be 
subsequently ratified and is not subject to any limitation of action. This statement of 
the Supreme Court is a succinct summary of the effect of illegality at civil law. The 
court felt it necessary to stress the impossibility of ratification because of the 
appellants’ contention that, since they had, in fact, deposited the contract documents 
with a notary, the contract was thereby authenticated. Dismissing that argument, the 
court first of all explained that the mere deposition of documents with a notary by the 
appellant alone does not suffice because, for there to be any subsequent confirmation 
by notarization, both parties have to be present, and then concluded resolutely that 
"toute confirmation est impossible en matiere de nullite absolue”.
That there can be no ratification in the case of absolute nullity231 was again
2311 Supra, note 214.
231 Under the civil law, the ineffectiveness of legal transactions is of two kinds: 
absolute nullity (nullite absolue) and relative nullity or voidability (annulabilite).
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underlined in Affaire Tchuente v. Societe Camerounaise d ’Expansion Economique 
(SCEE).232 As in the earlier case, the contract had not been notarized as required 
by loi no. 61/20 du 27 Juin 1961. The Supreme Court held that there could be no 
ratification because the text itself does not allow for the possibility of regularization 
of the non-compliance. The rule against ratification is not without its critics in 
Cameroon. It has been considered as "regrettable", and capable of causing 
blackmail.233
Because a contract afflicted with nullite d ’ordre public is void and has no effect, 
it follows that each of the parties is under a duty to restore to the other what he 
received as a total or partial performance of the contract. In Affair Fotso Mbobda 
v. Epeti Ekedi234 where the contract was void because it involved the sale of 
unregistered land, the defendants offered to refund the 75.000 francs which the 
appellant had paid as deposit and the Court of Appeal ordered the appellant to accept 
it. However, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant insisted that there had 
been an express agreement by both sides that in the event that the sale was not 
completed, article 1590 of the Civil Code will apply. Article 1590 provides that 
where a promise to sell is made with deposits, either party may withdraw. If such 
withdrawal is at the instance of the buyer, he forfeits the deposit and if it is at 
instance of the seller, he restores two-fold what he received. The appellant was 
saying in effect that since it was the respondents who called off the sale, they should 
have been ordered to pay him double the 75.000 francs he had paid as deposit. The 
Supreme Court rejected that argument on the ground that article 1590 could not be 
given effect because the contract was void for illegality. The contract was therefore 
of no effect, so that the appellant was entitled to no more than he had given as
232 C.S. Arret no. 18/CC du 4 Dec. 1986, (1991) no. 6 Juridis Info, 61
233 J.H. Robert, Le Droit des Societe Commerciales de l’ex-Cameroun Oriental,
ed. CLE, p. 43, cited by Nyama, Revue de Jurisprudence, (1991) no.6 Info Juridis,
p .62.
234 Supra, note 201.
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deposit.
This right of restitution, however, may be barred by the application of the maxim 
nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans. This maxim is not found in the Code 
and has no other textual basis; it has been shaped and developed by the jurisprudence 
and doctrine. Its application in French law has not always been certain.235 A 
distinction is drawn between illicit and immoral contracts. French courts are 
generally more inclined to enforce an action for restitution where the contract is illicit 
only, without being immoral.236 This distinction is, however, not always followed 
and some commentators maintain that the courts grant or refuse restitution according 
to what they see best.237
It is not clear how established, if at all, this distinction between illicit and immoral 
contract for the purpose of restitution, is in Civil Law Cameroon but the following 
two decisions appear to reflect that distinction. First, in Affaire C.C.E.G v. E. 
T.,238 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal to order 
restitution despite the protestations of the appellant that the maxim nemo auditur 
precluded that. In declaring the contract of lease illegal, the Court of Appeal had 
said,
"...si la nullite a pour effet de remettre les choses dans Vetat ou elles 
se trouvaient avant la formation du contrat il n ’empeche que le contrat 
annule a regu execution pendant pres sept ans; que pour empecher un 
enrichesement de I ’une ou I 'autre des parties, la jouissance et I 'usage 
de Vimmeuble doivent etre remuneres par la C. C.E. G, Vindemnite due 
pour le travaux ejfectues dans Vimmeuble par C.C.E.G. doit etre 
payee par E. T".
The court effectively took notice of the fact that the contract, despite being void, had
235 The recent tendency seems to be against the maxim and in favour of restitution. 
See Sabbath, Denial o f Restitution in Unlawful Transactions-A Study in Comparative 
Law" (1959) 8 I.C.L.Q. 486, 491 et seq.
236 See Aix, March 28, 1945, [1946] Semaine Juridique II. 3063.
237 7 Planiol & Ripert (ed. Esmein), paras. 748 et seq.
238 Supra, note 214.
355
actually been performed for seven years. Under such circumstances, to bring the 
lease to an end as if nothing had happened would hardly have put the parties in their 
pre-contractual position. So, to put them in that position, the court had to ensure that 
whatever was owing was paid up even if that meant giving some effect to the 
contract. Although both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court did not say so 
in their judgements, one suspects that, in objecting to restitution, the appellants (the 
tenants) were merely attempting to use the maxim nemo auditur as a cloak for their 
shameless attempt to avoid paying accrued rents. Again, without wanting to impute 
on the Supreme Court a reasoning that it did not expressly adopt, it is submitted that 
the court, if it was so minded, could have explained the rejection of the application 
of the maxim nemo auditur in this case by the fact that the contract was only illicit, 
not immoral.
The maxim nemo auditur was successfully invoked in a recent case, Affaire 
Olama v. Societe Camerounaise de Banques (S.C.B.).239 The plaintiff, a career 
Magistrate, was a customer of the defendant bank (S.C.B.). His monthly salary was 
paid by direct transfer from the Treasury to his bank account. For a certain period 
the plaintiffs account was credited with more money than he was due. Of course the 
bank was not to know whether this was an error since all it normally did was receive 
the monthly payments. This new, overcredited amount was confirmed on the 
plaintiffs statement of account. On discovering this error the Treasury ordered the 
bank to immediately repay the excess but that was not before the plaintiff had made 
use of the money. However, the bank did repay the excess to the Treasury and then 
proceeded to recoup it from the plaintiffs subsequent monthly payments. The 
plaintiff argued that the bank could not do so, accused them of high-handedness and 
sued for breach of contract and fraud, demanding the refund of the money the bank 
had already recouped plus damages. For their part the bank simply argued that they 
were entitled to do as they did and that to order restitution in favour of the plaintiff 
would be tantamount to allowing him to benefit from his own turpitude.
239 Jugement Civile No. 297 du 10 Avril 1991, (T.G.I., Yaounde, unreported)
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The court agreed with the bank’s argument and dismissed the action. One may 
wonder what turpitude the bank was referring to. One may only assume that by 
failing to notify the Treasury that he was being overpaid, the plaintiff was himself 
guilty of, at best carelessness, at worst fraud. In other words, the plaintiff had 
cheated on the Treasury. If this interpretation is correct, then the plaintiff could not 
expect to enlist the help of the law in his bid for the recovery of sums to which he 
was not entitled to have received in the first place. Once again, in applying nemo 
auditur to deny restitution the court did not make use of the illicit/immoral contract 
distinction. Yet, had it been imperative to do so, the court could have said that the 
plaintiff’s dishonest or fraudulent conduct was contra bonos mores, especially coming 
as it did from a Magistrate. It must be stressed that this attempt to explain the 
granting of restitution in the first case and the refusal of it in the second case is 
entirely mine. At no point did any court refer to them. So, perhaps the argument 
raised by some commentators in France that the courts simply do what they deem best 
is even more true in Civil Law Cameroon.
In France the courts are less than strict on contracts violating provisions in the 
economic spheres. They seem prepared to modify the strict effects of illegality in 
such contracts. This can be seen in the loose interpretation given to a certain Law 
of November 16, 1940 which provided that for "tranfers of real property inter vivos 
to be valid ... must have been authorized by the prefer".240 According to this law, 
any contract violating this provision was declared void and was not to be subject to 
ratification by subsequent authorization. That notwithstanding, the courts refused to 
declare such contracts void and maintained that only the act of transfer {mutation) was 
forbidden; the underlying contract was held valid and later authorization made the 
contract fully binding, preventing withdrawal by the vendor.241
Cameroonian courts have not adopted this soft approach on similar contracts. 
They seem content to stick to the letter of the law by invoking the full rigour of
240 Law of Nov. 16, 1940, art. 1: "... doivent etre autorisees par le prefet."
241 Cass. civ. Janv. 15, 1946, D. 1946, 341, note Hebraud.
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illegality on such contracts. This is all very glaring from the strict interpretation 
given to a similar provision to the French one considered above. In the case of 
French Cameroon, a similar law, Decret du 26 Dec. 1944 provided that all leases 
of real property for over a period of three years required the prior authorization of 
the Governor. Contracts that failed to satisfy this condition were declared void and 
not subject to ratification or limitation of action. In Societe La Libamba v. Kouoh 
Dikwamba Paul,242 the parties, in 1953 entered into a contract whereby the 
respondent leased land to the appellant for a period of 15 years. As this arrangement 
had been concluded without the requisite authorization of the Governor, the Supreme 
Court held that the lease was void. It did not matter that it had been running for 
almost ten years. The court said it was crucial that the contract had not complied 
with the necessary requirements. Ruling out any possibility of ratification, the court 
said that ratification implies that the act to be ratified at least has a certain legal 
existence, something that could not be said of the lease in question, which was a 
complete nullity because of its failure to observe the decree of 26 Dec. 1944.
It can be said from the above that Cameroonian civil law courts are tougher on 
void contracts than their French counterparts. It is submitted that the French 
modified stance, particularly towards contracts that only violate some statutory 
provisions, is the better one. It would be preferable for Cameroonian courts (of both 
systems) to distinguish, for the purpose of the effect of illegality, between contracts 
that are illegal because there are immoral or offend against public order so blatantly, 
and those that are illegal simply because the law says so. Contracts in the latter 
category are, strictly speaking, not illegal but void. Examples of such contracts 
include those that fail to comply with the requirements of Stamp Duty and 
Registration, notarization, or those that fail to obtainthe requisite administrative 
approval. The illegality in these contracts only stems from the failure by the parties 
to observe some statutory requirement. Such contracts are not prohibited by those 
statutes and cannot be considered as violating any established moral conventions. In
242 C.S. Arret no. 7 du 21 Dec. 1965, (1965) no. 13 B.A.C.S.C.O.
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such circumstances, there should be no reason why in the absence of some other 
compelling reason, the contract should not be ratified by authorization or be allowed 
to be registered or notarized. The decision in St John Shipping Co/p. v. Joseph 
Rank Ltd,243 though coming from England, is instructive in this regard throughout 
Cameron. In that case, a shipowner committed a statutory offence by overloading his 
ship while performing a number of contracts for the carriage of goods. Devlin J. 
held that he was still entitled to freight, because the object of the statute was to 
prevent overloading and not to prohibit contracts. The same can be said of several 
of those over zealous statutes in Cameroon. When they are violated, as it often 
happens, the courts should give the parties every chance to redeem the contract, either 
by imposing a fine and/or making an order that they should regularize the contractg 
so that it complies with the necessary statutory prescription or both.
243 [1957] 1 Q.B. 267.
359
CHAPTER 8
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
Assuming that the necessary requirements1 for the formation of a contract have 
been satisfied and that the contract is not tainted by any defects,2 the next logical step 
is for that contract to be discharged. There are three main possibilities for the 
discharge of contracts. The first, and natural one, is for the parties to execute or 
perform their respective obligations under the contract. The second is by breach.3 
Tlhat is, one of the parties refuses or fails to perform or adequately perform his own 
part of the obligations. The third possibility is that the contract is frustrated. Only 
discharge by breach will be considered in this present exercise. It goes without 
saying that breach of contract is a very important topic, since an overwhelming 
majority of contract cases arise out of breach or alleged breach.
Breach of contract seems to have two principal sides to it: what is breach, and 
what are the consequences that flow from it. In this chapter, I propose to say very 
little about the first question, which might require a discussion as to whether the 
contracting party undertakes only to use reasonable care to try to achieve a result, or 
whether he undertakes absolute liability to secure a result. The common law, unlike 
the civil law, takes the latter as its starting point: liability is, in the absence of other 
indications, strict (subject only to the doctrine of frustration). Since liability is not 
strict under the civil law, it being linked to fault,4 the question as to what is breach 
is the natural starting point at civil law. Be that as it may, my concern here is with
1 Offer, Acceptance and Consideration or Cause, (see chapters 5 and 6).
2 See chapter 7.
3 Reynolds, "Discharge by Breach as a Remedy" In: Finn, ed., Essays in Contract 
Law, 1987, p. 183.
4 See generally, Constantinesco: Inexecution et Faute Contractuelie en Droit 
Compare (Droit Frangais, Allemand, Anglais), 1960.
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what happens when there is a breach. So, all I propose to say here about the question 
as to what is breach is that a breach of contract is established by proof that a party 
to the contract has either failed to perform a contractual obligation in accordance with 
the standard of duty applicable to the obligation within the time stipulated for 
performance of the obligation, or he has committed an anticipatory breach.5
My emphasis is therefore firmly on remedies for breach of contract. For present 
purposes, it is assumed that there is an effective contract, that one party has failed to 
perform his undertaking and that there is no lawful excuse for this failure. The 
precise remedy of any breach of contract must depend on the particular circumstances 
of the case. Nevertheless, it is not easy to specify the notion of remedy, as English 
legal writing does not seem to provide any universal delimitation. Some authors do 
not use the expression, remedy for breach,6 while others allow it to encompass 
restitution7 and limitations8 but not termination for breach.9 It will be shown below 
that there is hardly any greater consistency used in French law to describe the 
remedies for breach of contract. However, following the examples of many 
distinguished writers under both systems,10 I shall deal with what is generally 
recognized as the three main remedies for breach: substitutionary relief or damages;
5 Carter: Breach of Contract, 2nd edn., 1991, para. 102.
6 Atiyah did not use it in his Introduction to the Law of Contract, 3rd edn., 1981, 
but uses it the 4th edn. of 1991, chapter 22.
7 Treitel, The Law of Contract, 8th edn. 1991. (Henceforth referred to simply as 
Treitel)
8 Chitty on Contracts, 26th edn., 1988, vol. i, General Principles, Part 7, chapter 
28.
9 Atiyah, Op. cit.. note 6, 4th edn., treats termination and rescission separately 
(chapter XXI) from remedies (chapter X X I1).
10 To mention only a few, Carter, Op. Cit.. note 5, para. 104; Treitel: Remedies For 
Breach of Contract - A Comparative Account, 1991, para. 1 (hereinafter referred 
to as Treitel, Remedies); Carbonnier, Droit Civil - Les Obligations, 12th edn., 
1985, para. 70, and Nicholas: French Contract Law, 1982, p. 204 (hereinafter 
referred to as Nicholas).
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specific relief and termination (including for this purpose refusal to perform). I will 
exclude questions relating to exemption clauses, agreed damages, and penalty clauses, 
in order to limit this study to those remedies available to a plaintiff or a creditor11 
conclusively to bring to an end the situation resulting from a breach for which the 
debtor is responsible.
To preface the discussion, it is perhaps useful to briefly point out some differences 
in treatment and arrangement between the two systems. Whereas English law treats 
remedies for breach of contract as a topic in its own right, French law subsumes it 
amongst aspects of the effect of contracts or obligations.12 Since the effect of a 
contract in civil law is to create an obligation, and the effect of an obligation is either 
that it be performed, whether voluntary or under legal compulsion, or that a substitute 
for performance is provided by way of damages, it is perhaps not illogical to treat 
remedies under the heading of the effect of obligations. Yet the exposition in the 
Cameroonian Civil Code - like the French Code - in which most of the texts relating 
to the issue are to be found in Chapter III (the effects of obligations arising under 
Title III - contracts and consensual obligations in general); while some appear under 
the rubric ‘the obligation to perform an action or to abstain from performing an 
action’ (section III, articles 1142-5); and others still under ‘damages resulting from 
breach of an obligation’ (section IV, articles 1146-53), is in itself disconcerting. And 
if all that is not disconcerting enough, in Chapter IV (‘Different types of obligations’) 
there is to be found article 1184, which deals with judicial rescission and also the 
creditor’s option as between specific performance and rescission.
In the face of this confusing arrangement in the Code, one is driven to refer to 
legal writing in search of clarity. This has to be French legal writing which is still
" The terms ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’ when in reference to the civil law, will be used 
in the French sense, i.e. the individuals who benefit from, or are subject to, an 
obligation of any kind, not only an obligation for the payment of money. It will 
roughly correspond to the plaintiff and defendant, though not invariably.
12 Arts. 1134-1167. Enforcement is covered by arts. 1142-1145 while damages for 
inexecution are covered by arts. 1146-1155.
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very much used in Civil Law Cameroon. Here too, it is noticed that the exposition 
of contemporary French authors is no more illuminating than that of the Code, since 
as regards remedies there is some disagreement as to the nature of contractual 
liability. Those who espouse a general theory of civil liability have analysed under 
that head tortious and contractual damages, specific performance, and judicial 
rescission as the termination of the obligations13 or the effect of contracts.14 
Carbonnier treats damages and rescission under breach of contract but discusses 
specific performance under the general regime of obligations, entitled "Le Pouvoir 
de Contrainte" (literally, the power of compulsion).15 It is perhaps only Stark who 
concentrates his analysis on remedies under the heading ‘sanctions for the breach of 
contractual obligation’.16 It is not necessary to go into the reasons for this diversity 
in approach as that does not bear on the content of the remedies that are to be 
considered here.
It is necessary, however, to say that although the difference in the external 
approach between the common and the civil law as highlighted above is more a matter 
of arrangement than of practical significance, it nevertheless reflects another 
important difference of approach between the two systems. Under the common law 
the starting point is the award of damages, specific performance being an exception. 
Put another way, the choice seems to be between damages and specific performance. 
Under the civil law, the primary remedy is specific performance. In terms of choice, 
it is between specific performance and rescission. This is mirrored in the contrasts 
between the common law’s emphasis on remedies and the civil law’s emphasis on
13 H. L. and J. Mazeaud, Lemons de Droit Civil, Book II, vol. i, 8th edn., 1991, (ed 
F.Chabas) hereinafter cited simply as Mazeaud/Chabas, Legons; See also Viney, 
Traite de Droit Civil, La Responsabilite, i: Conditions, 1982.
14 Marty/Raynaud, Droit Civil, Book II, vol. i: Les Obligations, 1962.
15 Carbonnier, l ere Partie, chapter VII; For a similar layout, see Weill and Terre, 
Droit Civil, Les Obligations, 4th edn., 1986.
16 Stark, Droit Civil : Les Obligations, 2nd edn., 1986, (eds. Henri Roland and 
Laurent Boyer).
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rights and duties. For ease of convenience of treatment, I shall take out those 
portions of the effect of contracts which relate to inexecution or remedies from their 
natural habitat in the traditional civil law arrangement, and place them in this chapter 
on remedies. That leaves me with a simple arrangement in which I will treat the 
three main remedies outlined above. No attempt will be made to provide an 
exhaustive treatment of the various remedies. I propose instead to look at how 
Cameroonian courts interpret those important general principles governing these 
remedies.
1. DAMAGES .
In line with the common law tradition, an action in damages is the basic relief for 
breach in Common Law Cameroon. This is well established but by way of example, 
it was reiterated by the Bamenda Court of Appeal in Mukoro S. Tembi v. Texaco 
Cameroon,'1 where a prayer for specific performance was met with the response 
that the fundamental rule is that specific performance will not be ordered if there is 
an adequate remedy in law. The insinuation being that the proper remedy was an 
action for damages, which was awarded to the plaintiff as a matter of course.
Although the civil law gives priority to the remedy of enforcement, it will be 
noticed, at any rate in Civil Law Cameroon, that the remedy of an action in damages 
plays a much more important role in practice than theory is prepared to accept. And 
the well established common law proposition that any breach of contract gives rise 
to a right to claim damages is also shared by Civil Law Cameroon for which article 
1149 of the Civil Code provides that compensation should be given for all loss 
(dommage, prejudice) resulting from non-performance.
There is a considerable body of law on damages under both systems18 but it is
17 BCA/47/84 (Bamenda, 13/05/1985, unreported).
18 For a comparative account, see Treitel, Remedies, ss. 40-142; For the common 
law, see the absorbing and pioneering study Washington, "Damages in Contract at 
Common Law" (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 345; "Idem Part 2" (1932) 48 L.Q.R. 90; see also
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neither imperative nor feasible to cover every strand of principle governing damages 
here. The discussion will focus on the basic principles. Before that is done, two 
interesting observations need to be made. The first is that in the law on damages 
(and remedies in general) Common Law and Civil law Cameroon follow English and 
French law very closely, perhaps more so than in the other areas considered thus far 
in this work. The second is that the basic principles governing damages are common 
to both the common and the civil law.
By and large, the principles form a coherent whole. The three main ones which 
shall be considered below are as follows. First, is the principle that damages are 
compensatory. Second, is the principle that the interests most generally protected is 
that which the plaintiff has in the contract. And finally, there is recognition by the 
law that the plaintiffs right to claim damages must be subject to some limitations.
(I). The Compensatory Nature of Damages.
Whether at common law19 or civil law,20 the purpose of the award of damages 
is to compensate the plaintiff for a loss which he has suffered as a result of the non­
performance of the contract. There are many corollaries to the compensatory 
principle but only two will be considered here. The first one is the general rule that 
damages are based on loss to the plaintiff and not on the gain to the defendant. As 
Sir Robert Megarry put it in Tito v. Waddell (No. 2) ,21
"The question is not one of making the defendant disgorge what he has 
saved by committing the wrong, but one of compensating the 
plaintiff."
Much concern has been raised, more by commentators than by the courts, that
McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 1988.
19 Treitel, p. 825.
20 Nicholas, p.219.
21 [1977] Ch. 105, 332; see also, Teacher v. Colder (1899) I F. (H.L.) 39.
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such a principle may not on all occasions be sufficient. It has been suggested that 
there is a substantial case for applying, in suitable circumstances, a measure based 
on the extent by which the defendant has benefited from the breach22 and there is 
now evidence to suggest that the courts have been taking heed to these suggestions.23
There is also some judicial authority in Common Law Cameroon for the 
proposition that the courts will not always ignore the defendant’s gain in their 
assessment of damages. In Zebulon Koshi Munshwa & Martin Ngyva Banduh v. 
Ngwaniba S. Njofor,24 the respondent, in breach of a car loan agreement with the 
appellants, seized the car and put it to use as a taxi. It was held by the Bamenda 
Court of Appeal that the second appellant (to whom ownership had passed) was 
entitled to recover all sums (found as a fact to have been 6.000 francs a day) that the 
plaintiff had made as a result of his breach. It should be stressed that decisions like 
this are the exceptions, not the rule. The courts still generally concentrate on the 
plaintiff’s loss. In this regard, it is submitted, notwithstanding the arguments in 
favour of disgorgement of the defendant’s profit from his breach of contract, that so 
long as due regard is paid to the valuation of that for which the plaintiff has bargained 
- that which he expected to receive from performance of the contract - there appears 
to be no need to resort to notions of disgorgement.
The other upshot of the compensatory principle is that, as a general rule at 
common law, punitive or exemplary damages will not be awarded for breach of
-  See for e.g., Dawson,"Restitution or Damages?" (1959) 20 Ohio St. L.J. 175 at 
185-189; Palmer, Law of Restitution, 1978, vol. 1, para. 4.9; Friedmann, 
"Restitution o f Benefits Obtained through the Appropriation o f Property on the 
Commission o f a Wrong" (1980) 80 Col. L.R. 504, 513 et seq.; and Famworth, 
"Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma o f the Disgorgement Principle in Breach o f 
Contract" (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 1339.
23 See Jones, " The Recovery o f Benefits Gained from A Breach o f Contract" (1983) 
99 L.Q.R. 443, in which he chronicles instances where the defendant’s gain has been 
used by the courts to determine the plaintiff’s loss.
24 BCA/1/79 (Bamenda, 10/04/1979, unreported).
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contract. The reasoning behind this rule is that the object for an action in damages 
is not to punish the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff. However, exemplary 
damages may be awarded as a punitive measure for the deliberate commission of a 
tort. In such cases it is said that the damages are awarded not to compensate the 
plaintiff but to express the court’s condemnation of the defendant’s conduct.25 
Where it is possible for the plaintiff to found an action both in tort and for breach of 
contract, he may be able to recover punitive damages by framing his action in tort. 
That was so in Drane v. Evangelou,26 where punitive damages were awarded 
against a landlord who was guilty both of breach and trespass because he had 
unlawfully evicted his tenant. In the Cameroonian case of Emmanuel Musoko v. 
Jesco Manga Williams,21 punitive damages were awarded against the defendant 
(landlord), who was guilty of both breach of the tenancy agreement and trespass, 
having unlawfully thrown out the goods of the plaintiff from rented premises. His 
appeal against the damages was met with even stronger condemnation from the Court 
of Appeal.28 Njamsi J., delivering the unanimous judgement of the court, described 
his conduct as ".. .not only illegal but malicious and highly provocative." The Appeal 
Court then matched their disapproval of the-defendant’s conduct by increasing the 
punitive damages that had been awarded against him by the trial court. Other 
instances in which Cameroonian (common law) courts have also awarded punitive 
damages include John Atanga & Ndifor Fombotioh v. Mbah & B.I.C .I.C 29 in 
which punitive were awarded against the defendant bank for breach of its fiduciary 
duty of care against the plaintiffs, and Eboule Ndoumbe & Office National de la
25 See the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Vol. XI, Ch. 8 s. 107- 
114.
26 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 455.
27 HCSW/19/79 (Buea, 4/4/1981, unreported).
28 CASWP/36/83 (Buea, 2/7/84, unreported).
29 HCF/38/87 (Buea, 4/4/1989, unreported).
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Lotterie Nationale v. Brufis Zacheus Ringkwi30 in which the National Lottery was 
at the receiving end of punitive damages for refusing, in breach of its contractual 
obligation, to settle what was an objectively good claim.
A most notable exception to the rule that punitive damages are not recoverable for 
breach of contract is the award of such damages for breach of promise to marry. In 
Samuel Esobe Epitime v. Ruth Nange Mbong,31 the West Cameroon Court of 
Appeal upheld the judgment of the trial court in which damages had been awarded 
against the appellant for breach of promise to marry the respondent. That case was 
decided in 1968 and was based on the application of the common law, a position 
which no longer applies in England, thanks to section 1 of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 197032 which provides that an agreement to marry 
shall not have effect as a contract and no action shall lie for breach of such 
agreement. But the Law Reform Act 1970 is a post-1900 statute and as such does not 
apply to Common Law Cameroon. This implies that the law in Common Law 
Cameroon still imposes liability for such conduct. This is illustrated by the decision 
in Ronate Tapong v. Joshua Mobit.33 In that case the Bamenda Court dismissed an 
action for breach of promise to marry, not because the party in breach was not liable, 
but because of a technicality, namely, that the party who had brought the action was 
not the one from whom consideration had moved. He was therefore not privy to the 
contract. But by admitting that had the proper party sued, he would have succeeded, 
the Court of Appeal confirmed the view that common law position which imposes 
liability for breach of contract of promise to marry still applies in Common Law 
Cameroon.
30 CASWP/44/83 (Buea, 26/6/1984, unreported).
31 [1968] W.C.L.R. 41.
32 See generally Cretney, The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 
(1970)33 M.L.R., 534.
33 BCA/31/74 (Bamenda, unreported).
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In Civil Law Cameroon the position, as underlined by article 1149 of the Civil 
Code, also starts from the proposition that damages are compensatory i.e., the 
purpose of an award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the loss which he 
has suffered as a result of the non-performance of the contract. It is true that the 
French astreinte to some extent punishes the defendant, but it will become clear when 
that concept is discussed below, that it does so for the defendant’s contumacy in the 
face of the court’s decree rather than for his failure to perform the contract.
Because the remedy of damages is not generally considered to be the primary 
remedy in the civil law systems, it is not as multi-faceted as is the case with the 
common law. Suffice it to say that the proposition that damages are compensatory 
is subject to the requirement that loss should be the "immediate and direct 
consequence of the non-performance",34 and, in the case of non-performance which 
is not attributable to dol, by the further requirement that the loss should have been 
foreseeable.35 There is also the requirement of mise en demeure, or notice to 
perform, without which in principle no damages are due.36 As these issues are 
treated in more detail under the limitations on the award of damages, no more needs 
to be said of them here.
(2). The Interests Protected.37
Two issues are involved here. The first is to determine the kind of loss for which 
the defendant will be awarded damages and the second relates to the assessment of
34 Article 1151 CC.
35 Article 1150 CC.
36 Article 1146 CC.
37 The famous and influential article by Fuller and Perdue, "Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages" (1936) 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373, classifying the interests protected 
by contract remedies into restitution, reliance and expectation, provides a useful guide 
here..
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damages, once it is established that the loss suffered is of the kind for which the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover.
(a). Recoverable Loss.
In Common Law Cameroon, the three types of interests identified in common 
law jurisdictions - loss of bargain, reliance loss and restitutionary interests - are 
generally recognized and protected.
Loss o f  bargain: At the heart of the law on damages under the common law lies 
the concept that the plaintiff is, by the award, to be put in the same position, so far 
as money can do, as he would have been had the contract been performed. Although 
that principle may not have been formally stated prior to the judgement of Parke B., 
in Robinson v. Harm an,38 there would appear to be little doubt that it has been the 
guiding spirit in the assessment of damages since the early years of the 18th 
century.39 It follows from that principle that the plaintiff is entitled to be 
compensated for the loss of his bargain, so that his expectations arising out of or 
created by the contract are protected. This process has been called compensating the 
aggrieved party for loss of his bargain or of his "expectation interests".40 For 
judicial support, if any was needed, of the assertion that the expectation interest is 
protected in Cameroon, one needs look no further than the decision of the Bamenda 
High Court in Alfred Mbah v. Roland Roman & Joseph Ncho,41 in which Arrey 
J., repeated with approval the position in Robinson v. Harman,
"Damages for breach of contract are a compensation to the plaintiff for 
the damage or loss he has suffered through that breach. He is to be 
placed in the same position as if the contract had been performed".
Sometimes, a plaintiff may have two kinds of expectations - that of receiving the
38 (1848) 1 Ex. 850, 855.
39 See in particular Washington, Op.Cit.. note 18, (1932) 48 L.Q.R. 96.
40 Fuller and Perdue, Op.Cit.. note 37.
41 HCB/73/85 (Bamenda, 26/5/1987, unreported).
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promised performance (e.g. machinery) and that of being able to put it to some 
particular use (e.g. for manufacture). In such a case, if defendant fails to deliver, the 
plaintiff will be entitled to damages based on the value of the machinery that he 
should have received and also to damages for loss of profits suffered as a result of 
the failure in delivery.
Reliance loss: In this case, the object is to put the aggrieved party into the 
situation into which he would have been if the contract had never been performed. 
This may be done by compensating him for expenses or other losses incurred in 
reliance of the contract. So far as concerns recovery by the plaintiff of his reliance 
loss, it can be said that the courts in Common Law Cameroon will allow him to 
succeed. This is demonstrated by two recent decisions. Both cases raised important 
questions relating to offer, acceptance and consideration which have already been 
considered in chapters 5 and 6 above. So, only the question of reliance damages is 
considered here. In the first case, Ambe John v. Brasseries du Cameroon,42 the 
plaintiff offered to become a wholesaler for the defendants (the largest brewery in the 
country). During the course of the negotiations, the plaintiff was told by the 
defendant’s local manager that in order to qualify as a wholesaler, he would have to 
do various acts, namely: show proof of adequate storage capacity and acquire the 
necessary means of transport. Spurred on, the plaintiff set about fulfilling these 
requirements (knocking down and restructuring his premises in the process) in 
preparation of the contract. The defendants, upon inspection and satisfaction of the 
facilities, appointed the plaintiff as their wholesaler. Business was always fine 
between the two until things took a sour turn after the plaintiff returned some of the 
defendant’s products for replacement, complaining quite rightly, that they contained 
strange substances. In the bullish manner that has become typical of many large 
corporations all over the world, the defendants responded, without warning or notice, 
by putting a complete stop to all business transactions with the plaintiff. It was held 
by the Bamenda High Court that the plaintiff must succeed in his action in damages
42 HCB/51/90 (Bamenda, 6/4/1992, unreported).
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for breach of contract. The court did not specifically say which interest (expectation 
or reliance) it was protecting but its rejection of the plaintiff’s claim for losses 
relating to a bank loan on the grounds that it was not proven to have resulted as a 
direct consequence of the contract, is indicative of the fact that the court felt it was 
protecting other losses that were incurred directly in reliance on the contract.
In the other case, Brasseries du Cameroun v. Achuo Daniel,43 the appellants had 
for many years engaged the respondent as their sole distributor in the North West 
Province. As their business expanded, the appellants advised the respondent to 
procure more lorry trucks to be used for the transportation of their products. He 
duly obliged by taking 4 Mercedes trucks on hire purchase. With the proceeds from 
the business the respondent was able to service the loan repayment with little 
difficulty. Then, without warning or notice, the appellants stopped supplying the 
respondent with their products for distribution. Not surprisingly, this caused the 
respondent a lot of hardship, not least because he was finding it impossible to keep 
up the hire instalments for the four trucks. In an action for breach of contract, the 
Bamenda High Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to be compensated for the 
loss that he had suffered as a result of the breach. The Court of Appeal said they 
saw no reason to disagree with that finding but did not say which loss was being 
redressed. However, the fact that the court felt very strongly about the hire purchase 
deal which the respondent had entered into through reliance on the appellants, implies 
that his reliance loss was a major factor in the measure of the award.
In the case just considered, the loss was definitely post-contractual (the trucks 
having been obtained well into the relationship) but in the earlier case, it is not clear 
whether the plaintiff undertook the restructuring of his premises before the contract 
was formally concluded or after. In other words, it is not clear whether the expenses 
incurred were pre or post-contractual. Either way, there is a good case for saying 
he was entitled to recover. In England, for instance, it is now settled that pre-
43 BCA/24/91 (Bamenda, 19/3/1992, unreported).
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contractual expenditure is recoverable.44 And that is so even if it was incurred in 
reliance on an agreement before that agreement had become a legally binding 
contract.45 On this interpretation, the argument by Brasseries du Cameroun in the 
Am be John case, that there was no legally binding contract between the parties at the 
time the plaintiff undertook changes to his premises (though rejected by the court),46 
would not have, granted it was accepted, absolved them from liability. The plaintiff 
would still have been entitled to succeed. Since this analysis is not that of the court, 
it can only be hoped that whenever the question eventually arises, the courts will use 
the opportunity to make it part of the case law of Cameroon that pre-contractual 
expenditure, even if incurred before the agreement becomes a legally binding 
contract, is recoverable, subject of course to the policy limitations of the notion of 
remoteness.
It must be stressed once again that in neither case did the courts think they were 
laying down any rule on the protection of the reliance interest as such. I have cited 
these cases only to show that even though the expectation loss is the primary basis for 
compensation, Cameroonian common law courts, whether consciously or not, also 
compensate reliance loss.
Restitution: The restitutionary remedy restores to the plaintiff benefits conferred 
on the defendant in the performance of the contract. It may simply be part of the 
reliance interest measure. The most obvious example is a buyer’s claim for 
repayment of the price on account of non-delivery. The restitutionary remedy may 
be awarded independently, usually to deprive the defendant of an unjust enrichment 
in cases where no breach of contract has occurred, e.g. where the contract was void
44 Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed [1972] 1 O.B. 60 and the ensuing note by Guest, 88 
L.Q.R. 168; see also Ogus, "Damages for Pre-contract Expenditure" (1972) 35 
M.L.R. 423; Clark, "Damages for Pre-contract Expenditure" (1972) C.L.J. 22.
45 Lloyd v. Stanbury [1971] 1 W.L.R. 535.
46 See chapter 6.
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for mistake or was terminated for frustration.47
The three protected interests are not entirely exclusive of each other. They do 
overlap at times in the sense that an aggrieved party may be entitled to damages for 
loss of his bargain and for reliance loss and restitution.48 And from the 
Cameroonian cases just considered, it is by no means well settled exactly when 
damages will be based on expectation as opposed to reliance or restitutionary 
interests, or to what extent one of these bases can be combined with another. But it 
can safely be said that despite the arguments of Fuller and Perdue half a century ago 
that primary protection should be accorded to the plaintiffs reliance interest, and the 
attempts to develop and apply them to England by Atiyah,49 English courts continue 
to measure his loss in a way which protects his expectation interests.50 If Fuller and 
Perdue’s message has not gained much ground in the English courts, from where the 
courts in Common Law Cameroon take their lead whenever they are minded to do 
so, then, a fortiori, it has gained even less ground in Cameroon.
In Civil Law Cameroon, the various types of interests protected by the law are 
not as well developed as they are in the common law. One reason for this is that 
French law insists, in principle, on the notion of damages consisting of a complete 
indemnity against loss, so that the distinction between reliance damages (interet
47 For an extensive discussion of restitution on the grounds of mistake, see Goff and 
Jones: Law of Restitution (4th edn) 1991, p. 107 ff, and Butler, "Mistaken 
Payments, Change o f Position and Restitution" In: Essays on Restitution, (ed. Finn), 
1994, p. 87 ff.
48 On their interrelation, see Fuller, Op. cit.. note 37, p. 71.
49 Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 1979, esp. at pp. 419-54; 
"The Theoretical Basis o f Contract Law. An English Perspective" (1981) 1 Int. R. of 
Law & Econ. 183; Ibid, "Contracts, Promises and the Law o f Obligations" In: 
Essays on Contract Law, 1990, chapter 2, p. 2 Iff.
50 See also Owen, "Some Aspects o f the Recovery o f Reliance Damages in the Law o f  
Contract" (1986) 4 O.J.L.S. 393.
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negatif) and expectation damages (interet positif) is not recognized in French law.51 
Another reason is that the Civil Code, subject to what is discussed below, does not 
make use of the distinction. And because the Code is silent, the Supreme Court is 
powerless to orchestrate any such development because it does not control damage 
awards in the same way as the appellate courts in common law jurisdictions. Its 
reviewing power is confined to questions of law so that it will only review an 
assessment of damages by a lower court if that court applied wrong principles of 
law.52 This has tended to inhibit analysis of the various elements constituting 
damages for breach of contract.
However, it is possible to extract a distinction between expectation and reliance 
loss from article 1149 of the Civil Code. This article sets out the traditional civil law 
headings under which all loss is seen as falling. It provides that the damages due to 
the creditor consists of two elements: the loss which he has suffered {la perte qu'il 
afaite) and the gain which he has failed to make {le gain dont il a ete prive) These 
phrases are better known as damnum emergens and lucrum cessans respectively, and 
are sometimes used to differentiate between reliance and expectation loss. They are 
also used in a different sense to refer to two kinds of expectation loss. For example, 
where the seller wrongfully fails to deliver the goods, the buyer can prima facie 
recover both types of loss of expectation: his damnum emergens in not having the 
goods, especially if the price at which he can buy replacement goods is higher than 
the contract price53 and his lucrum cessans loosing resale profits. Neither the Civil 
Code nor the Cameroonian courts attribute any consequences to this distinction even
51 Rouhette, "The Obligatory Force o f Contract in French Law" In: Harris and Tallon,
eds., Contract law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons, 1989, p.75; see also 
Nicholas, p.221.
5: Planiol & Ripert, vol. VII, para. 855. For more light on the role of the Cour de 
Cassation (and by analogy the Cameroon Supreme Court) in the interpretation of 
contracts, see Marty/Raynaud, Les Obligations, 1.1, 1988, para. 244.
5J Cf Sale of Goods Act 1893, s. 51(3).
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if in some cases, for example, La SA FEFRACAM v. B.E.A.C ,54 the plaintiffs 
expressly made their claims under the separate heads of damnum emergens and 
lucrum cessans. Sometimes the awards actually reflect that distinction. That was so 
in Mikes Sky lias v. Camer Industrielle.55 The parties entered into a contract in 
which the plaintiff was appointed by the defendants (dealers in Yahama motorbikes) 
as their exclusive agent in the Centre-South and the East provinces. The defendants 
were later to appoint other agents, in breach of the exclusive agency, and worse still, 
discontinued all supplies to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued, claiming damages, 
amongst other things, for the defendants failure to supply and for the lost gain from 
resale. It was held he must succeed in both claims. But Societe Express Colis v. 
S.H.O. Africauto56 is more representative of the customary practice of the civil law 
courts, whereby they simply award a global sum that covers all kinds of loss. In that 
case, the plaintiff (a haulage company) undertook to use only Mazda vehicles for 
whom the defendants were sole distributors. In return the defendants were to provide 
the plaintiffs with spare parts for the vehicles and use only the plaintiffs for all their 
(the defendants’) transportation. In breach of the contract, the defendants failed (1) 
to provide spare parts, causing many of plaintiffs vehicles to be grounded and (2) to 
provide them with transportation assignments. The Yaounde High Court awarded a 
global sum to compensate the plaintiff for the loss suffered due to defendant’s breach 
(failure to supply spare parts and to provide transportation assignments) and for loss 
of profits. The court did not (and the courts do not have to)57 make any distinction 
between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans or any seperate estimate for each head 
of loss.
A superficial comparison with the common law might suggest a striking similarity 
between, on the one hand, "deprived gain" and expectation intereset and on the other
54 J.C. No. 272 du 27 Mars 1991 (T.G.I, Yaounde, unreported).
55 J.C. No. 620 du 13 Juillet 1988 (T.G.I, Yaounde, unreported).
56 J.C. No. 480 du 16 Mai 1988 (T.G.I, Yaounde, unreported).
57 Tallon, "Remedies: French Report" In: Harris and Tallon, eds., p. 262.
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hand, "loss incurred" and reliance interest. Nicholas has pertinently demonstrated 
that this is not so, and while "deprived gain" is necessarily an expectation loss, "loss 
incurred" may be either a reliance or expectation loss.58
(b). The Assessment of Damages.
Once it is established that the loss suffered by the plaintiff is of the kind for which 
he must be awarded damages, the court has to translate that loss into money terms 
since damages always consist of a sum of money. However, because this chapter is 
primarily concerned with the availability of remedies (in this section, damages) and 
not with quantification, I shall only focus briefly on the general character of 
quantification rules. These rules are largely discretionary under both systems.59
The Common Law position is summed up by the observation that "the assessment 
of damages is not an exact science."60 This suggests that much is left to the 
discretion of the judges. It is true that there are certain guidelines for the courts to 
use as bases of their assessment but even these do not escape the discretion of the 
judges.
Where the claim is based either on reliance loss or restitution, the bases of 
assessment are so straightforward as to require any elaboration here. It is with claims 
for expectation loss that the bases for assessment becomes more complicated. For 
such claims, English law distinguishes between two methods of assessment:61 the 
difference in value and the cost o f cure. These have also been called the diminutive
58 Nicholas, p. 200ff.
59 Treitel, Remedies, ss. 99-107.
60 Per Lord Upjohn in The Heron II, Koufos v. C. Czarnikov Ltd. [1969] 1 A.C. 350, 
425.
61 Other bases of assessment relating to actual and market values, taxation {British 
Transport Commission v. Gourley [1956] A.C. 185) etc., are not considered.
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and the reinstatement measures.62 The distinction between these measures is now 
invariably explained by reference to the American case of Peevyhouse v. Garland 
Coal Co.63
While it is possible to posit from the evidence of judgement awards that the courts 
in Common Law Cameroon do recognise and apply both methods of assessment, there 
is no clear principle emerging from Cameroonian case-law (or English case-law for 
that matter) as to how the court should, in general, exercise the choice between the 
two measures. The "cost of cure" measure tends to be preferred in contracts dealing 
with premises or building works and it can be discerned in the judgement of the 
Bamenda High Court in Samuel Longla v. Compagnie Generale D ’electricite 
C a m e r o u n The defendants were contracted to instal an intercom telephone system 
in a hotel owned by the defendant. The work when supposedly completed was 
defective and as a result, the intercom system was always faulty. The plaintiff 
eventually hired another firm to remedy the defects in the telephone system. It was 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the cost of putting the defects right.
In Civil Law Cameroon, the position is not any different from that in France, 
which is that the rules which determine the assessment of damages contain 
considerable elements of vagueness and uncertainty. Even the relevant provisions of 
the Civil Code are formulated in very general terms. For example, the principle of 
full compensation as postulated in article 1149: "The damages due to the creditor are, 
in general, those arising from the loss he has incurred and the benefit of which he has 
been deprived." This is qualified by article 1151 which limits compensation to the 
"immediate and direct consequence of the breach of contract." It may be helpful to 
note that the trial judge in Civil Law Cameroon has a broad power over the
M Harris, Ogus, and Phillips, "Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus" (1979) 
75 L.Q.R. 581, 584-94.
63 382 P. 2d 109 (1962), see Treitel, p. 728.
64 HCB/54/89 (Bamenda, 4/9/1989, unreported).
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assessment of damages (which is a question of fact), over which the Supreme Court 
can exercise only a formal control i.e., if there has been an error of law. Perhaps 
because the appellate courts are hamstrung by the pouvoir souverain granted to the 
trial judge, this subject is little developed both in Civil Law Cameroon and France.
Further, since judges in Civil Law Cameroon give very brief reasons for their 
judgement, it is particularly difficult (certainly more so than in Common Law 
Cameroon) to properly grasp the process of quantification of damages. It is rather 
amazing (at least from a common law perspective) that sometimes the more elliptical 
the basis of an award or the less a judge says about that basis, the more difficult it 
is to upset it.
The overriding principle remains that enshrined in article 1149 i.e., damages 
should compensate the creditor for the loss suffered. Unlike the common law, the 
court’s disapproval or censure of the debtor’s conduct is not a factor in the 
assessment of damages under the civil law. However, Nicholas’s observation that the 
trial court can take account of it so long as it makes no express reference to it,65 is 
equally true of Cameroon.66 Finally, damages are calculated as of date of 
judgement, not date of non-performance.
(3). Limitation of Damages.
Under both English and French law, there are several doctrines limiting the 
amount which may be recovered in damages. Only the most important or frequently
65 Nicholas, p. 226.
66 Examples abound in which the court’s disapproval of the defendant’s conduct 
(precisely his bad faith) appear to be reflected in the amount of damages awarded to 
the aggrieved party. For example, Kamdem Guemmen v. Tsebo Jean-Marie (infra), 
in which the defendant was ajudged not only to be in breach of the contract by failing 
to return the hired car or pay the hire dues, but to have acted in bad faith in doing 
so. The point must be emphasised that while such a factor certainly influences the 
courts, they do not expressly use it or profess to use it in the assessment of damages.
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used ones are considered here.67
(a). Remoteness.
Under the common law the amount of damages recoverable is subject to the policy 
limitations of the notion of remoteness. This means that the plaintiff can recover only 
for those losses which were reasonably foreseeable, or of which the defendant had 
specific notice, at the time of agreement. These rules of damages are designed to 
ensure that the parties can take account of the relevant risks when making the contract 
and, in particular, in the negotiation of the price.68
The notion of remoteness is invariably illustrated by referring to the leading case 
of Hadley v. Baxendale69 in which the court set out quite deliberately to formulate 
a remoteness doctrine for contract. The case laid down two rules which must be 
satisfied before the defendant is liable. First, the loss must arise ‘naturally’ i.e. 
according to the usual course of things from such breach of contract itself. This test 
was not satisfied in Hadley v. Baxendale but was satisfied in the Victoria Laundry 
(Windsor) Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd.™ Secondly, the loss must be such as may 
have reasonably be supposed to have been in the minds of both parties at the time 
they made the contract as the probable result of the breach. For this test to be 
satisfied, the defendant must not only have been aware of the plaintiff’s special 
circumstances, but must have accepted them. However, in the wake of the decision 
in The Heron / / , 71 a much higher degree of probability is now required to satisfy 
the test of remoteness in contract. The emphasis is simply no longer on reasonable
67 Treitel, Remedies, chap. VI, identifies and discusses seven.
58 For a penetrating analysis which reveals the difficulties of drawing simple economic 
inferences from the foreseeability rules, see Perloff, "Breach o f Contract and the 
Foreseeability Doctrine o f Hadley v. Baxendale" (1981) 10 J.Leg. Stud. 39.
w (1854) 9 Exch. 341.
70 [1949] 2 K.B. 528.
71 Koufos v. C.Czarnikow Ltd. [1969] 1 A.C. 350.
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foreseeability.
Even though the law in England has travelled a long way since Hadley v. 
Baxendale,72 and despite criticisms of that case and appeals for a broader approach 
to remoteness,73 the famous case is still being loyally cited in England and very 
much remains also the sheet anchor of authority on the notion of remoteness in 
contract in Common Law Cameroon. It was applied most appropriately in Forbah 
Joseph v. National Lottery Corporation.74 The plaintiff bought a lottery ticket in 
Bamenda which was successful in the draw, with a winning amount of 2.000.000 
francs. For unexplained reasons, the defendants would not pay plaintiff immediately. 
After some vain trips to the defendants head office in Yaounde, payment was still not 
forthcoming. The plaintiff was forced to resort to court action, in which he claimed 
the amount won i.e. 2.000.000 francs, plus 4.000.000 francs for breach of contract. 
Faced with this lawsuit, the National Lottery agreed to pay the plaintiff the 2.000.000 
francs prize money. The plaintiff accepted payment but proceeded with his 4.000.000 
francs claim for breach of contract. This figure was based on the loss he claimed to 
have suffered as a result of the defendants’ undue delay in paying him the prize 
money, namely: (1) being harassed by friends who felt he had been paid the money 
and was avoiding them; (2) abandoning his application for a building loan which 
brought about a delay in the construction of his retirement home, the effect from 
which, according to him, he was still suffering because of the rise in the cost of 
building materials during the delay; and (3) the transport costs of two trips he made 
to Yaounde in pursuit of payment. The Bamenda High Court rehearsed the 
remoteness tests as laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale and ruled that the plaintiff’s 
claim satisfied neither of them. The court underlined the fact that "there were no
7: See for example the Court of Appeal decision in H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v.
Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 990 and the brief discussion by D. 
Hadjihambis, "Remoteness o f Damage in Contract" (1978) 41 M.L.R. 483.
77 Cooke, "Remoteness o f Damages and Judicial Disretion" (1978) 41 M.L.R. 288.
7J HCB/44/84 (Bamenda, 1/3/1985, unreported).
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exceptional losses resulting from the breach in the special circumstances because 
knowledge must exist at or before the making of the contract". The damages claimed 
were therefore considered as too remote, and rightly so since it is hard to imagine 
how they could have been considered otherwise. The claim for social harassment, 
for example, was nothing short of laughable. Having rejected the main claim, the 
court nevertheless accepted that the defendants were guilty of breach of contract for 
which the plaintiff was entitled to general damages.
It is difficult to say with any certainty whether the change in emphasis heralded 
by The Heron II  will be adopted by Cameroonian courts. So far there is no evidence 
of that and my informed view is that Cameroonian courts will continue to stick to the 
Hadley v. Baxendale formulation partly because they are bound by it, whereas The 
Heron II  is, in principle, at best persuasive, being a post-1900 decision, and partly 
because (like Stilk v. My rick15), it is one of those famous common law cases of 
venerable antiquity that continue to state the law no matter how much they are 
criticized or shown to be dated.
In Civil Law Cameroon, there are analogues, to the common law notion of 
remoteness. These are the requirements of directness and foreseeability. Like the 
remoteness rules, they serve to limit the amount of loss for which damages will be 
paid. Both requirements have their places in the Code. Article 1149 which provides 
for the award of damages to the creditor is therefore subject to two exceptions. The 
first is article 1150 which provides that when the non-performance is not due to the 
dol of the debtor, he is liable only for such damage that was foreseen or could have 
been foreseen at the time of the contract (qui ont ete prevus ou qu’on a pu prevoir 
lors du contrat). The other exception, as laid down in article 1151 provides that even 
where the breach is attributable to the dol of the debtor, he is only liable for such 
damage which is the immediate and direct consequence of the breach {qui est une 
suite immediate et directe de Vinexecution de la convention). The effect of both
75 (1809) 2 Camp. 317.
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articles has been finely summarised thus,76 "the debtor whose fault does not amount 
to dol is liable only for such direct damage that was foreseeable whereas the debtor 
who is guilty of dol is liable for all direct toss, whether foreseeable or not".
I have found no instances of the application of the foreseeability and directness 
rules in Civil Law Cameroon. This is perhaps to do with the fact that most breaches 
of contracts do not involve dol, which is central to both articles 1150 and 1151. It 
is probably for this reason that in France the decided cases are mainly in delict.77 
Whether that is the case in Civil Law Cameroon, I am not in a position to know since 
this study has hardly touched on delict. However, it is obvious from some 
judgements that the courts are mindful of the rules of foreseeability and directness 
when awarding damages. For example, in Societe Sigma 2000 v. Nguedia Albert™ 
the defendant refused to complete payment and take possession of a house he had 
asked plaintiffs to build because, he claimed, there were defects in the building. But 
even after the plaintiffs agreed to bear the costs (determined by an independent 
expert) of the said defects, the plaintiff would still not perform. As a result of the 
defendant’s unwarranted refusal to take possession of the house, the plaintiffs thought 
it wise to hire security guards to look after the building. In an action against the 
defendant, the plaintiffs claimed the balance of the contract price plus the costs of 
hiring security guards. The defendant hotly contested the latter claim, even daring 
to suggest that the security guards the plaintiffs were referring to, were in fact 
tenants. The court found as a fact that they were guards and held that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to succeed in both claims. This, it is submitted, is the proper decision. 
The claim based on the balance of the contract price is straightforward, thus nothing 
need be said about it. As concerns the claim for security costs, the court took the 
view that the delay in the completion of the contract was attributable to the defendant 
and although the judge did not rationalise his decision in such terms, he clearly must
76 Nicholas, p. 223.
77 Marty & Raynaud, para. 481.
78 J.C. no. 438 du 2 Mai 1988.
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have felt that this loss did not fall within the exceptions of foreseeability and 
directness. Not only was it foreseeable (and the test here is objective) that the failure 
by the defendant to take over the house would require the plaintiffs to take reasonable 
steps to prevent thieves from ransacking it, the loss thus incurred was a direct 
consequence of the defendant’s refusal to perform. It should be said that there is no 
established criterion under the civil law for determining what damage is direct.79
On the face of it, the common law rule in Hadley v. Baxendale and the civil law 
rule in article 1150 would appear to apply the same principle of foreseeability. 
However, on the question of foreseeability, the civil law departs from its usual 
attachment to the subjective test in favour of an objective criterion. Article 1150 
refers to damage "qu’on a du prevoir" (which one could have foreseen), and not 
damage "which he could have foreseen". Applying the objective criterion to the 
Affaire Sigma 2000 (which it is presumed the judge did) one easily appreciates why 
the loss incurred in security costs by the plaintiffs was considered to be foreseeable.
(b) Mitigation.
The rule that the aggrieved party is entitled to damages is also subject to the 
principle that the plaintiff must mitigate damages. Mitigation may be treated as 
involving the existence of an actual, formal duty to mitigate; or as a matter of 
causation - the plaintiff’s loss is attributable to his own unreasonable conduct and not 
to the defendant’s breach of contract.80 Either way, it involves a serious limit on the 
plaintiff’s rights. Causation is dealt with in the next section.
At common law, the duty to mitigate involves the following rules.81 First, it 
prescribes that damages should be limited to those losses which could not reasonably
79 Nicholas, p. 224.
80 See the The Soholt [1983] 1 LI. Rep. 605.
81 McGregor on Damages, paras. 273-277.
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be avoided by the plaintiff following breach.82 This explains why, when the contract 
takes place within a competitive market setting, the plaintiff normally obtains the 
difference between the contract price and the market price at the date of breach; he 
is expected to secure a substitute. Secondly, the aggrieved party may be bound to 
refrain from taking steps which in view of the default may unjustifiably augment the 
loss even though any expenses reasonably incurred in avoiding loss resulting from 
breach of contract may be charged to the defendant. Thirdly, any action that the 
aggrieved party takes after the breach, which in fact minimises or avoids the loss, 
will serve correspondingly to reduce the guilty party’s liability in damages. 
Mitigation is thus said to perform an economic function of encouraging efficiency in 
the allocation of resources.83
Without elaborating on the various rules of mitigation, it can comfortably be stated 
that the courts in Common Law Cameroon show sufficient awareness of the principle. 
This point can be supported by referring to the case of David Tala Ndi v. Chamba 
Wanji D a n ie l  in which the principle was appropriately applied. The appellant, a 
timber dealer hired the respondent’s engine saw. The contract was to run from 25th 
March 1986 to 6th May 1986 i.e. for 40 days. The appellant was to pay either 
30.000 francs in cash or in iroko timber worth that amount as the costs of hire. It 
was further stipulated that the hirer would pay a penalty of 5.000 francs for each day 
of delay until the saw was returned and pay the sum of 200.000 francs as the cost of 
the saw in the event that it was damaged. The hirer never paid the hire price, either 
in cash or kind, and worse still, failed to return the saw at the end of the agreed 
period of hire. Yet it was not until February 1987 that the owner wrote to the hirer 
demanding full payment of the rents arrears and threatening him with legal action, 
which he finally began in March 1987. The Bamenda High Court generously
82 See Bridge, "Mitigation o f Damages in Contract and the Meaning o f Avoidable 
Loss" (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 398.
83 Goetz and Scott, "The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory o f  
Contractual Obligation" (1983) 69 U. Virginia L.R. 967.
84 BCA/28/89 (Bamenda, 5/7/1991, unreported).
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awarded him a global sum of 3.630.000 francs in damages, presumably to cover his 
claim for rents arrears plus general damages for breach of contract. Stung by the size 
of the award, the hirer appealed, and argued, inter alia, that the High Court had 
erred in law in failing to hold that the plaintiff was under a duty to mitigate his 
damages. The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that the defendant was 
guilty of breach, but on the issue of mitigation, it was attracted by the appellant’s 
arguments. The court noted that the owner by his own admission, had waited for 12 
months before taking any action. In the circumstances, the Appeal Court continued, 
"the plaintiff/respondent is bound in law to have brought his claim within a 
reasonable time in order to mitigate his damage". In arriving at this decision, the 
court expressly relied on the English case of British Westinghouse Electric Co. Ltd. 
v. Underground Electric Railways,*5 in which, it will be recalled, the rule was again 
laid down that the principle in favour of compensation for pecuniary loss naturally 
flowing from the breach is qualified by the principle which imposes on a plaintiff the 
duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach, and 
debars him from claiming any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take 
such steps.
As concerns the rule against augmentation of loss, English courts have taken a 
curious stance in cases where a person who is to receive money for performing his 
part of the contract proceeds to perform in disregard of the other party’s wrongful 
repudiation of the contract. It is that the aggrieved party is, as a general rule, entitled 
to perform inspite of the repudiation and claim the agreed sum.86 In the United 
States, on the other hand, the aggrieved party is expected to desist and claim 
damages.87 It is doubtful if the Cameroonian courts accept the English view - 
certainly not in light of the decision in Fon E.F.F. Njifonuh II  v. Emens Textiles
85 [1912] A.C. 673.
86 See the leading case of White and Carter v. Mcgregor (Councils) Ltd. v. Mcgregor 
[1962] A.C. 413.
87 See Clark v. Marsiglia 1 Denio 317 (N.Y., 1845).
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International.88 The parties entered into a tenancy agreement on 1st July 1966, 
whereby the plaintiff let out his buildings to the defendants. It was agreed that either 
party could terminate the contract by giving three months notice in writing. The 
defendants, with a view to terminating the contract served the plaintiff with a notice 
to that effect, a notice which they claimed the latter refused to accept. They then 
applied and obtained a Magistrate Court order to terminate the lease, whereupon they 
vacated the premises on 25th August 1967. The plaintiff appealed against that order, 
complaining that he had not been aware of any notice. The High Court overturned 
the Magistrate Court ruling and ordered the defendants to serve the plaintiff with a 
formal notice. In contempt of the court order, the defendants refused to do so 
because they had already effectively vacated the premises. It was a further two years 
before the plaintiff took the keys from the defendants and only then did he accept that 
they had vacated his premises. In other words, he still considered them to be in 
occupation during that period. In an action for rents for that period and general 
damages for breach, it was held that he was not entitled to rents for all that period. 
He was only entitled to three months rents in lieu of notice that the defendants had 
failed to give as recommended by the High Court. The court ruled that as he had 
been aware after the Magistrate Court order that the defendants were no longer 
prepared to continue with the tenancy agreement, he had been under a duty to 
mitigate his loss. That is to say, even though the defendants were guilty of wrongful 
repudiation of the contract, by refusing to give the plaintiff a formal notice as ordered 
by the High Court, the plaintiff was not entitled to treat the contract as continuing, 
therefore, to claim rents for the period up to 1969 "would be to ask for too much 
knowing fully well on 25th August that they (the defendants) had gone". This case, 
it must be said, did not involve anticipatory breach as did the White and Carter case 
but it can be used as authority for the proposition that in Common Law Cameroon, 
an aggrieved party must not continue in the performance of an obligation which he 
is fully aware the other party has already repudiated as that may offend against the
88 HCB/24/68 (Bamenda, 5/2/1971, unreported).
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rule that he should not augment loss. As a general principle, this position similar to 
the American one, is preferred to the English view adopted in White and Carter, for 
it may be assumed (in the instant case, that in fact was true) that the repudiating party 
no longer requires performance.
Although it is not impossible to find instances in French case law (e.g. cases 
where a plaintiff was denied the cost of repairing damaged goods where this exceeded 
their diminution value) which can be rationalized in terms of mitigation, the civil law 
generally (and Civil Law Cameroon in particular) does not think in terms of the 
common law’s ‘duty’ to mitigate. The same emphasis on the ‘reasonable’ responses 
of plaintiffs to breach does not exist.
This is perfectly illustrated by Affaire Kamdem Guemmen v. Tsebo Jean 
Mane.*9 The defendant hired a car from the plaintiff at a rental cost of 10.000 
francs a day. The contract was concluded on 15th September 1987. The defendant 
duly paid for 20 days and then stopped, without returning the car. As of 11th May 
1989, the unpaid arrears, calculated by the plaintiff at 10.000 francs a day, had 
amounted to 5.500.000 francs. She sued for that sum and incredibly, the Yaounde 
Tribunal de Grande Instance held that she was entitled to every bit of it. The court 
did not even mention the fact that the plaintiff had failed to do take any action to limit 
her loss until 1989. It can also be said that by failing to take action within a 
reasonable period of time, the plaintiff was actually augmenting her loss, if one 
considers the fact that the accrued rents of 5.500.000 francs must have been well 
above the market value of the car at that time. There was no mention of this fact 
either. It must not be thought that this decision, strange as it is, is wrong in strict 
law. It is merely indicative of the absence of the principle of mitigation in Civil Law 
Cameroon.
The above civil law decision is in stark contrast with the common law decision in 
David Tala v. Chamba Wanji,90 where the Bamenda Court of Appeal held that
89 JC No. 121 du 16 Jan. 1991 (Yaounde, unreported).
9(5 Supra, note 84.
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respondent was not entitled to 12 months unpaid rents for his saw because by waiting 
for up to a year before bringing any action against the defaulting hirer, he had failed 
in his duty to mitigate the damage. So, while the owner under the common law could 
not claim just 12 months rents because of the common law duty to mitigate, the 
owner under the civil law was able to claim almost two years’ delayed rents because 
of the absence of such a duty under the civil law. This reflects a fundamental 
difference of approach to breach of contract between the two systems. The common 
law is concerned more with commercial considerations while the civil law treats 
breach of contract as a form of moral wrongdoing. Little wonder that in making the 
very generous award in the Kamdem Guemnem case, the court was particular 
motivated by its belief that the defendant had shown a lot of bad faith in failing to pay 
the rentals while retaining the car.
(c). Causation.
At common law, a plaintiff can only recover damages if there is some causal link 
between the breach and his loss. So, if one alleges that a motor mechanic did not fit 
one’s brakes properly, one will not succeed in a claim for. damages against the 
mechanic in the event of an accident, if the source of the accident is not proven to be 
brake failure. In Lawrence Finiakiy v. Pauline EpulT1 the appellant had undertaken 
to complete the building work on the respondent’s partially constructed house. The 
appellants advised that the partial structure should be demolished so that construction 
could be undertaken from scratch. This was because in his technical opinion, the half 
built structure was not strong enough. The respondent insisted that he continued with 
that structure as it was. After the roof had been mounted, a severe storm blew it 
away. The respondent brought an action for breach of contract and negligence and 
succeeded at first instance. But the Bamenda Court of Appeal had little difficulty in 
overturning the High Court decision. It was established by an independent expert, 
a local civil engineer, that the immediate cause of the roof being blown away was
91 BCA/13/82 (Bamenda, 12/7/1982, unreported).
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attributable to the insufficient number of bolts and concrete in the original structure. 
That, coupled with the fact that the appellant had warned against continuing with the 
original structure, was enough to absolve him from any fault. The court of appeal 
therefore ruled that he was not liable in damages because the cause of the damage was 
not imputable to him.
It will also be recalled that in Ambe John v. Brasseries du Cameroun92 the 
plaintiff’s claims for loss relating to a bank loan he had obtained to procure vehicles 
for the execution of a contract which the defendants had wrongfully repudiated was 
rejected on the grounds that he could not prove any direct link between the loan and 
the purchase of the lorries. Accordingly, any such losses relating to the loan could 
not be considered as emanating from the defendant’s breach.
Causation in civil law is covered by the rule of directness which has already been 
discussed above. It is that damage must be, in the words of article 1151 of the Civil 
Code, an ‘immediate and direct consequence’ of the breach. The distinction between 
direct and indirect damage is easy to illustrate but difficult to define. The easiest way 
to illustrate is by referring to Pothier’s famous example:93 if a person sells a cow 
knowing that it is diseased and conceals this fact, he is guilty of fraud, making him 
liable not only for the loss of the cow itself but for the loss of the buyer’s other 
animals which are infected by the disease. But he is not liable for the loss which the 
buyer suffers through not being able, on account of the inability to cultivate his land, 
to pay his debts so that his creditors levy execution on his property. As pointed out 
above, there are no known instances illustrating the requirement of ‘directness’ in 
contract in Civil Law Cameroon. This, it was suggested, may be due to the fact that 
the question is more relevant to tort than contract. Nevertheless, that requirement is 
firmly entrenched in the Civil Code.
92 Supra, 4 2
93 Pothier, Traite des Obligations 1761, para. 166-7, cited in Treitel, Remedies, 
para. 140.
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(d). Contributory Negligence.
Having considered remoteness, mitigation, and causation, one must for the sake 
of completion, examine contributory negligence. In the civil law, it is discussed 
under the heading of fault of the victim (faute de la victime). Whether under the civil 
or the common law, it refers to the situation in which the loss is partly attributable 
to the fault of the defendant and partly attributable to the fault of the plaintiff.
At common law the distinction between contributory negligence and the duty to 
mitigate is a source of some difficulty.94 Put simply, contributory negligence can 
be said to be an integral part of the breach while the duty to mitigate describes a 
situation where the plaintiff has failed to take positive steps to avoid or limit the 
effects of a breach caused entirely by the defendant’s faults. But it will evidently be 
difficult sometimes to distinguish between the two. In such cases, it has been 
suggested that the aim should be consistency of outcome, irrespective of which of 
them is adopted, so that if a farmer sows defective seeds knowing them to be 
defective, contributory negligence and the rules of mitigation should equally preclude 
recovery from crop loss.95 At this point, one must raise the question as to whether 
contributory negligence applies to contractual situations at all.
Although English law has been slow to allow apportionment in contract for 
contributory negligence, there can now be no doubt that the English Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 applies in a contractual context to some 
extent.96 In the recent case of Vesta v. Butcher,91 Hobhouse J., sitting at first 
instance even went as far as laying down categories of cases for the purpose of
94 See Bridge, Op.cit.. note 82, p. 403.
95 See Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law, 1985, p. 230 ("a voluntary causing 
of further damage... good seed being obtainable elsewhere").
96 Newman, "The Law Reform Act 1945 and Breaches o f Contract" (1990) 53 M.L.R.
201 .
97 [1986] 2 All ER 488, 508.
391
applying the 1945 Act to breaches of contract.98 There is no need to enumerate and 
discuss them here since the act does not apply to Cameroon.
The position in Common Law Cameroon remains that of traditional common law, 
where the received view is that there is no common law defence of contributory 
negligence to a breach of contract.99 In Robert Njeshu Lamnyam v. Jacob Tanya 
Tatnem100 the Bamenda Court of Appeal was called upon to consider a bold attempt 
by the Nkambe Court of First Instance to recognise and apply the doctrine of 
contributory negligence to contractual situations. The contract involved the sale of 
a Toyota bus by the appellant to the respondent for 800.000 francs. The respondent 
took delivery of the bus upon the part payment of 200.000 francs on 12th April 1981, 
with the balance due in August of that same year. In May 1981, the bus was 
involved in an accident. It took the respondents several months to get it repaired, 
after which it suffered a serious mechanical breakdown, necessitating another long 
stay in the garage. Up until January 1982 the residue of the price had not been paid. 
The appellant then seized and sold it to a third party, without the knowledge, consent 
or authority of the respondent. The respondent brought an action in the Nkambe 
Court of First Instance for breach of contract and restitution (for the 200.000 francs 
he had already paid). The trial Magistrate held that the plaintiff was entitled to his 
claim for restitution of the part-payment of 200.000 francs. But he dismissed the 
claim for loss due to breach, notably for repairs expenses, on the grounds that the 
respondent had been contributorily negligent in failing to keep his own side of the 
contract (i.e. the payment of the balance by August 1981) and therefore could not be 
heard to claim any money he expended in repairing and improving a vehicle which 
he had not completely paid for. This was a bold attempt to extend the effect of 
contributory negligence to the law of contract. Yet, bold as it was, it is submitted
98 Similar categories had earlier been proposed by Swanton, "Contributory Negligence 
as a Defence to Actions for Breach o f Contract" (1981) 33 ALJ 278.
99 Spowart Taylor, "Contributory Negligence - A Defence to a Breach o f  Contract ?"
(1986) 49 M.L.R. 102, 103.
100 BCA/31/83 (Bamenda, 30/3/1983, unreported).
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that its attempted application to the special facts of this case was misplaced. In fact,
it is not so much the result as the reasoning which is strained. So much so that on
appeal, the Bamenda Court of Appeal was quick to point out that the trial court’s
judgement was "confusing". The Court of Appeal was not only keen to distance itself
from the trial Magistrate’s flirtations with the doctrine of contributory negligence, but
went further to reject resolutely any application of that doctrine to contract.
Delivering the unanimous judgement of the court, Anjangwe J. said:
"From the onset we wish to point out that he has introduced into the 
judgement notions peculiarly within the purview of the law of 
negligence because contributory negligence is alien to the law of 
contract".
The Court of Appeal did in fact reach similar results but only by employing a 
different reasoning. It took the view that the contract was one of sale (and not hire 
purchase) for which property in the bus had already passed to the respondent. The 
appellant therefore had no right of seizure, the proper remedy being an action for 
damages and balance of the contract price. Similarly, the Court of Appeal would not 
entertain the respondent’s claims in damages relating to repairs, not because he was 
not entitled to undertake such repairs as the trial judge reasoned, but because he had 
failed to prove such expenses with the particularity that is required for specific 
damages. This case though, is most pertinent for the Court of Appeal ruling that 
contributory negligence has no place in contract.
It must however not be assumed that the plaintiff’s fault is never a matter for 
consideration by the Cameroonian courts. Where the plaintiff is at fault, the courts 
may refuse to award him damages or may reduce any such award. But in such cases 
they have rationalized their decision in tort, not in contract, notwithstanding the fact 
that the action may have been founded in contract. The most glaring instance in 
which this approach was adopted is the case of Alliance Trading Ente/prises Ltd. v. 
SOCOPAO Cameroon S.A.101 The respondents, (plaintiffs at first instance), had 
brought an action for breach of contract against the appellants. Their case was based
101 WCCA/2/1972 (Buea, 21-23/3/1972, unreported).
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on the following facts: that while acting as customs clearing agents, they paid custom 
dues on the appellants’ behalf for which ten Bills of Exchange were drawn by the 
appellant in payment thereof. That when presented, all ten were dishonoured. So 
they brought an action in the high court in which they claimed the amount due on the 
Bills of Exchange as special damages, plus an additional sum as general damages for 
breach of contract. The appellants (defendants at first instance) denied the claim and 
even set out a counter-claim of their own. The trial judge found that the appellants 
owed the respondent the sum claimed and gave judgement for that sum.
On appeal, the West Cameroon Court of Appeal took a completely different view 
of the whole case. First, it ruled that the appellants were not in breach of contract. 
True, the Bills of Exchange were dishonoured upon presentation to the bank but that 
was partly because they were presented long before they were due and partly because 
the appellants’ account had been frozen on the instructions of the Gendarmes, who 
were at that time carrying out a criminal investigation of the appellants’ commercial 
activities. There was no evidence that any of the Bills of Exchange were later 
presented (and then dishonoured) on the due date or after the appellants’ account had 
been unfrozen. In the absence of such evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
no breach of contract had been committed by the appellants. Further, the reason why 
the appellants suffered criminal investigations during which some of their directors 
were detained was because of certain irregularities found in their customs 
declarations. The appellants also incurred fines as a result of that. These 
declarations were made by the respondents on behalf of the appellants in their 
capacity as customs clearing agents and although the information had been provided 
by the appellants, the court was satisfied that the appellants had not furnished the 
respondent with any wrong or false information concerning their activities. In effect, 
whatever it was on the custom declarations that provoked the intervention of the 
Gendarmes, was caused by the respondents fault or negligence. From this the court 
noted that neither the non-payment of the Bills of Exchange nor the damage suffered 
by the appellants would have occurred had the respondents not made errors on the 
custom forms. Summarising its position, the court, albeit admitting that this was a
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contractual relationship, employed language redolent of judgements in tort actions:
"It is clear that the contract existed between the appellant and the 
respondent whereby the respondent agreed to be the customs clearing 
agent for the appellants, for remuneration. By the very nature of the 
customs clearing business it is one which is highly specialised and the 
appellant was rightly entitled to rely upon the skill and diligence of the 
respondent. If, therefore, such a specialised agent acts negligently to 
the detriment of its principal, the agent is liable to its principal for 
damages resulting from that negligence. Thus the respondent is liable 
...in negligence to the appellants for its actions in making wrong 
entries on the ...forms."
On the question of damages, the court held that the appellants’ claims based on 
the fines they paid as a result of such wrong entries were not foreseeable and 
therefore too remote. One is bound to disagree with the court on this particular 
point. It is common knowledge that the Department of Customs and Excise punishes 
wrong entries on custom forms with fines, so how could the court say that any loss 
resulting from such fines is unforeseeable and too remote. It was also held that "the 
intervention of the Gendarmes should be treated as a novus actus interveniens". This 
too is hardly any more convincing. Perhaps the court had become oblivious of the 
fact that this really was an action in contract, not tort. However, the appellants were 
awarded general damages for negligence and the High Court award against them was 
set aside.
This case reveals that the common law courts in Cameroon still steadfastly refuse 
to entertain the application of the doctrine of contributory negligence to contractual 
situations. But in order not to let off a plaintiff who may be guilty of fault, they have 
resorted to a subtle imposition of a tortious interpretation on an essentially contractual 
situation. So much the better if, as in the present case, it leads to the plaintiff’s fault 
being taken into account. The problem, however, is that this is a subtle and 
concealed technique and as such it may be unreliable, except in sophisticated hands.
It is strongly submitted that the courts in Common Law would do well to formally 
recognize or extend the application of the principle of contributory negligence to 
certain breaches of contract. In the case above, even though the panel was made of 
very experienced judges, their task was nonetheless made easier by the fact that the
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respondents’ liability in contract was about the same as his liability in the tort of 
negligence independently of the existence of any contract. In such a case, 
contributory negligence can easily be applied, as the court did, as if the action was 
one for negligence.
Sometimes though, liability arising from a contractual obligation may be expressed 
in terms of taking care but may not correspond to a common law duty to take care 
which would exist in the given case independent of contract. It is in situations like 
that the application of contributory negligence becomes necessary, not least to avoid 
the iniquitous situation whereby the negligent plaintiff can avoid his partial liability 
by electing to sue in contract rather than in tort. Because a Cameroonian Common 
Law court is handicapped by its inability to hold the plaintiff liable for contributory 
negligence, and because no duty of care exists in tort independent of the contract, the 
ingenious negligent plaintiff in such a case may not be held to account for his 
negligence. Even the first instance judgement by the Buea High Court in the Alliance 
Trading case, serves to underline this point. It will be recalled that at that level the 
respondent was awarded his full claim, notwithstanding the trial judge’s finding that 
he was at fault and that such fault had led to all the problems that both parties had 
faced - the respondent not getting paid on the Bills of Exchange and the appellants’ 
directors being fined and incarcerated by the Gendarmes. It can only be presumed 
that the trial judge was unable to take account of the respondents’ fault because the 
law allowed him no access to the doctrine of contributory negligence in contractual 
actions. The Court of Appeal only managed to redress the situation by treating the 
case as though it was based on negligence. As things stand, whether or not a plaintiff 
is liable for contributory negligence very much depends on the capacity or the ability 
of a judge to import a tortious interpretation to contractual situations. As this is of 
a subtle and indirect nature, it is not unlikely that in the lower courts the results may 
not always be as fair as those which an appellate court might reach. For the sake of 
predictability and fairness in results, the principle of contributory negligence must be 
extended to some contractual situations. There is hardly any doubt that the reason 
for its absence at the moment is historical, precisely because the common law and
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statute law in Common Law Cameroon is limited to pre-1900 English cases and pre- 
1900 English statutes of general application. It is for this reason that the English Law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 does not apply to Cameroon. It is 
suggested that the best way to sanction or extend the doctrine of contributory 
negligence to the law of contract in Common Law Cameroon is by legislation.
In Civil Law Cameroon, the Civil Code contains no provision expressing a 
doctrine of contributory negligence but the courts have adopted the notion of "fait ou 
faute de la victime" (act or fault of the victim) developed by French courts which 
serves the same purpose as contributory negligence. It is to the effect that if the loss 
is due to the act or fault of the victim the liability of the defendant may be 
extinguished or attenuated. It is extinguished if the act of the victim is said to be the 
sole cause of the loss, and attenuated if the fault of both parties has contributed to the 
loss.102 In the latter case there is sometimes said to be common fault (faute 
commune),103 the effect of which is that the plaintiffs damages will be reduced in 
proportion to the degree for the loss.104 There is much controversy though as to 
the exact basis of reduction in French law.105
The notion of fault of the victim was applied by the Yaounde Tribunal de Grande 
Instance in Affaire Societe SIGMA 2000.106 It will be recalled in that case that the 
plaintiff was commissioned to build a house for the defendant. It was a term of the 
contract that there would be penalties for delay. After completion the defendant 
refused to accept delivery and pay the balance of the price for the construction work 
because of certain defects. The plaintiffs agreed that the cost of correcting the defects 
should be set-off against the balance they were due, but the defendant still refused to
lo: Marty and Raynaud II paras. 497-8.
103 Mazead, Traite II para. 1505.
I0J Mazeaud, Lemons II 1 para. 594, 598.
105 Mazeaud, Traite II para. 1509 ff.
106 Supra, note 78.
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pay the balance and take over the house. In an action by the plaintiffs (the builder)
the defendant argued that plaintiffs were guilty of delay and sought to invoke the
penalty for delay clause. It was held:
" Qu ’il en decoule que le retards constate dans I ’execution du marche 
et dans la livraison de la villa lui est en grande partie imputable;
Qu ’il convient de le debouter de sa demande de ce chef."
That is to say, the delay was largely due to the conduct of the defendant, therefore, 
his claim for penalty damages based on the delay must fail. So Civil Law Cameroon, 
even in the absence of statutory provisions, has a much more direct approach to 
contributory negligence than the Common Law part.
(e). Mise en Demeure.
Literally, this means "put in delay" but I shall refer to it here as "notice of 
default". Under French law, a defaulting party is entitled to a "mise en demeure", 
that is, be reminded unequivocally by way of notice that performance is already due, 
before any action for non-performance is taken. It is the responsibility of the creditor 
to serve the creditor with a notice of default. As this is exclusively a civil law 
procedure, every bit of discussion under this head relates only to Civil Law 
Cameroon.
Strictly speaking, mise en demeure is not a limitation on damages in the sense that 
it does not determine the amount of damages that the plaintiff can claim or is entitled 
to. But it is relevant to an action in damages because it determines the time at which 
damages begin to run. Legislative basis for this can be found in article 1146 of the 
Civil Code, which provides that damages are not due until the debtor is in default.
According to article 1139 of the Code, the debtor is put in default either by a 
summons (sommation) or other equivalent act; or by the effect of an agreement 
dispensing with the need for a notice and by the simple lapse of time. A sommation 
is a formal notice demanding performance and served through a huissier. What 
constitutes the "other equivalent act" is a question of fact and therefore within the 
pouvoir souverain of the trial judge. In France this has been held to include acts as
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different as the issue of a writ or the sending of a letter.107 The same is true of 
Cameroon where in Affaire Dieye Assane v. Societe Immobilier Camerounais,m 
an assignation en refere (a writ for an action to be heard in chambers) was held to 
amount to a mise en demeure even though the parties themselves had earlier agreed 
that any mise en demeure would be served by registered mail. It can thus be said that 
the courts in France and Cameroon adopt a liberal approach as to what constitutes 
mise en demeure. It need not always be formal. This flexibility, it must be said, 
makes much sense, particularly in Cameroon. In the first place, however informal 
the notice may be, the crucial question should be whether or not it serves its purpose 
of putting the debtor on notice and in no doubt that the creditor is expecting 
performance. If it does, the lack of formality alone should not invalidate it. 
Secondly, it would be impractical, not to say insensitive, for Cameroonian courts to 
insist on only formal notices served by huissiers. In the preceding chapter, it was 
said that one main obstacle to formality in contracts is the very absence of legal 
practitioners in all parts of the country. That same argument readily fits here.
Since the purpose of mise en demeure is to impress on the debtor that performance 
is long over due, it is in principle relevant to other remedies which may follow non­
performance. 109 This relevance is underlined by the fact that the creditor’s silence 
in the matter may be regarded as an accommodation of the delay. That was exactly 
the case in Affaire Mbomiko Ibrahim v. Soitacam,U0 where the appellant’s failure 
to complain or serve the respondents with a notice of default after the latter had failed 
to complete the performance of the contract within the four months dateline, was 
considered as an acquiescence in that delay by the appellant. However, the pre­
107 Cass civ 31.3.1971, D 1971 Somm 131. For a review of case law, see Simon J-Cl 
Civ, arts 1146-1155, fasc VIII, cah I, s. 42.
Arret No. 53 du 23 Mai 1972, (1972) no.26 B.A.C.S, 3627.
109 In particular, in those cases in which rescission is permitted without recourse to the 
courts e.g. Affaire Ondoua, infra. But it will be seen in section 3 below that mise en 
demeure is not required for the defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus.
110 Infra, note 177.
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eminent function of mise en demeure is to fix the date from which remedies will 
run111 and to cause the risk to pass in a sale or similar contract.112
At this juncture it must be pointed out that even in an action for damages, the 
requirement of mise en demeure is not absolute . Article 1146 itself specifies that it 
is not necessary in cases in which the nature of the obligation is such that it can only 
be performed within a certain time and that time has elapsed. There are also other 
situations in which jurisprudence dispenses with mise en demeure. One such example 
is to be found in Affaire Arribas v. Fadel Ahmed113 in which the Supreme Court, 
following in the footsteps of the French Cour de Cassation, 114 held that mise en 
demeure is not necessary in the case where a party commits a quasi-delict in the 
execution of the contract by delivering or providing an object with hidden defects. 
In that case, the respondent had acted expeditiously by hiring a third party to remedy 
defects in the roofing of a building which the appellants had constructed for him. He 
had to do so in order to forestall the damage that water leaking from the roof was 
causing to his tenants. After the repairs had been effected, he claimed the full costs 
of repairs from the appellants. It was held that he was entitled to reimbursement 
from the appellants. They appealed, contending amongst other things, that the 
respondent could not succeed because there had been no mise en demeure from him. 
The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal for the reason already given above.
The Supreme Court has also held in CFAO v. Ndamako Ahmadou115 that mise 
en demeure is not required in the case where the non-performance of a contract for 
fixed term is due to the faute or dol of the debtor. In that case, the appellant had still 
not delivered a car the respondent had bought from him three years after the supposed
Article 1146.
112 Article 1302 Civil Code.
113 Arret du 14 Aout 1980, (1980) No. 19 & 20 Rev. Cam. Dr., 79.
114 The following decisions of the Cour de Cassation were specifically cited: Cass civ. 
25 Janvier 1904 D. 1904.1.239; Cass. Reg. 31 Oct. 1905 D.P. 1907.1.135.
115 Arret No. 13 du 15 Dec. 1977 (1978) No. 38 B.A.C.S. 5646.
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date of delivery. The respondent then brought a successful action for a refund of the 
advance payment plus damages for breach of contract. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, one of the appellant’s main contention was that there had been no mise en 
demeure from the respondent. This was rejected by the Supreme Court in the 
following words:
"Attendu qu ’au surplus la mise en demeure n ’est plus requise en cas 
d ’inexecution fautive ou dolosive d ’une obligation fixee a terme, 
comme c ’est le cas en I ’espece".
Although the court did not mention article 1146 of the Code, this decision clearly 
echoes the second limb of that article which is to the effect that where the contract 
is for a specified duration and the time for performance has passed, mise en demeure 
is no longer required.
8.2. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The remedy of an action in damages despite being the primary remedy at common 
law, is not always necessarily the best remedy. In some cases specific performance 
may seem the only sure way to satisfy the aggrieved party. Besides, it may also have 
the advantage over damages in that it often minimizes the risk of error in damage 
assessment.116 In the civil law, it has already been stated that an action for 
performance is the primary remedy. The aim of this section is to consider the 
general principles upon which specific performance may be granted under both 
systems.
(1). Specific Performance under the Common Law.
At common law, specific performance is a decree issued by the court ordering the 
defendant to carry out his contractual obligation. Failure to comply constitutes a
"ftThis consideration is developed in detail in economic terms by Kronman, "Specific 
Performance" (1978) U.Ch.L.Rev. 351
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contempt of court which may be punished by fine or imprisonment. The latter is a 
drastic recourse, which it seems, is rarely adopted for cases of contempt involving 
ordinary contracts. This is demonstrated by the case of Fon E.F. Njifonuh II v. 
Emens Textiles International. II7 The defendants, in deliberate defiance of a court 
order, refused to vacate the premises of the plaintiff which they had been occupying 
as commercial tenants. Despite this flagrant contempt, the court did not at all 
consider contempt proceedings, preferring instead to award damages for part of the 
extra period of time that the defendants occupied the premises after the decreed date 
for vacation.
One peculiar and rather regrettable feature regarding the enforcement of 
performance in Cameroon deserves some mention here. It is to do with the Police 
and Gendarmes. Sadly, some people believe that it is the duty of the Police to 
enforce contracts, a belief that is perpetrated by the Police themselves by their 
constant readiness to interfere in the private affairs of private individuals. It is 
therefore not uncommon for the Police to arrest and detain a party to a contract for 
an alleged breach of contract. This is eerily illustrated by Jonas Puwo v. Ndi Cho 
Samson.118 The plaintiff had ordered and paid for a gear box for a Mercedez truck 
from the defendant. It was in fact supplied but the plaintiff claimed it was the wrong 
model while the defendant contested it. Instead of taking the matter to a proper court 
of law for adjudication, the plaintiff opted for the dreaded Brigade Mixte Mobile (the 
state security Police or a Cameroonian stassi), better known as BMM. The defendant 
was incarcerated and, he claimed, tortured in attempt to coerce him into repaying all 
of the contract price. It is difficult to dismiss the appellants allegations of torture, 
bearing in mind that in a recent application for habeas corpus, Fombe J., with 
doughty sincerity, described the BMM cell as "a place where God is unknown and
117 HCB/24/68 (Bamenda, 5/2/1971, unreported).
1,8 HCB/31/83 (Bamenda, 12/9/1984, unreported).
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Satan reigns therein."119 The defendant somehow managed to stand his ground and 
only then did the plaintiff think of bringing a High Court action. It must be stressed 
that the law courts are generally not involved in this the kind of unfortunate practice 
just described. I have mentioned it here only to bring it to light. The Police must 
desist from such practices, not least because it undermines the due process of law. 
Fortunately, this is not part of the common law on specific performance, to which I 
now revert.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy developed by the Court of Chancery 
in England as an alternative to the common law remedy of damages, where the latter 
was considered to be inadequate or unfair.120 Its availability is thus a matter for the 
discretion of the court; no plaintiff is entitled to it as of right. But the danger of 
uncertainty that comes with discretion led the courts both to enunciate guidelines or 
principles to constrain the exercise of discretion and to classify those contracts for 
which typically specific performance will or will not be granted. The discussion is 
divided accordingly.
(a). Principles for the Exercise of Discretion.
I shall discuss what are considered to be the three main principles.121 According 
to traditional doctrine, the plaintiff must show that damages would be an ‘inadequate’ 
remedy. Such may be the case where what is promised is ‘unique’. So, if the 
plaintiff attributes to the contractual promise a subjective value which significantly
119 In Retired Justice Nyo Wakai & 172 Others v. The People HCB/19CRM/92. For 
more on that case, see comment by Muna C. in Le Monde Judiciaire (1993) Jan.- 
Mars, p.27.
1:0 See generally I.C.F. Spry: Equitable Remedies, 4th edn., 1990, p. 58 and Sharpe, 
"Specific Relief for Breach o f Contract" In: Reiter, and Swan, eds., Studies in 
Contract Law, 1980, chapter 5. For a brief historical excursus, see Jones and 
Goodhart: Specific Performance, 1986, p.3.
1=1 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Jones and Goodhart, Op. cit.. note 120, 
who treat eight altogether.
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exceeds its market value, specific performance may well be appropriate.122
The second set of principles reflects traditional equitable concerns with justice and 
fairness. English courts have, for instance, refused to grant specific performance 
where the cost of performance was out of all proportion to the benefit that would 
have accrued to the defendant,123 and where the plaintiff had acted unfairly in the 
performance of his obligations.124 Under this head, one may include the so-called 
mutuality principle. Fry elaborated on this principle125 but the accuracy of his 
statement that as a general rule, a contract must be mutual in order to be specifically 
enforced has not only been seriously questioned, but was effectively rejected in the 
English case of Price v. Strange.126 In that case, the trial judge had refused to 
grant specific performance on the ground that the contract was not capable of mutual 
enforcement when it was made. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and 
ordered specific performance. Fry’s statement of law was said to be unsupported by 
the authorities and wrong in principle.
The third set of principles relate to practical considerations. The most obvious 
example is the assumed difficulty and expense of supervision. This points to what 
Zweigert and Kotz127 diagnose as the main obstacle to the grant of specific 
performance in common law jurisdictions: the fact that its implementation remains the 
subject of loose discretionary procedures, with little law to distinguish types of claim 
and lay down and establish particular coercive techniques for their enforcement.
122 Harris, Ogus, and Phillips, Op. cit.. note 62, 589-94; Muris, "Cost o f Completion 
or Diminution in the Market Value: The Relevance o f Subjective Value" (1983) 12 J. 
Leg. Stud. 379.
123 Tito v. Waddell [1977] Ch. 106. See also Wroth v. Tyler [1974] Ch. 30.
124 Shell U.K. Ltd. v. Lostock Garages [1976] 1 WLR 1187.
125 Fry, Specific Performance, 6th edn. pp. 222-223.
126 [1978] Ch. 337.
127 Zweigert and Kotz: An Introduction to Comparative Law, (tr. Weir, 1977), 
Vol.II, pp. 155-158.
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It is clear from the cases that the courts in Common Law Cameroon generally 
apply the above principles, especially the first two, when deciding whether or not to 
grant specific performance. The case of Anye Fambo Paul v. Ruben Anusi & 
Oumarou Abbu Mallamm is a good example. The plaintiff lent money to the first 
defendant, while the second defendant stood surety. The second defendant offered 
a piece of land belonging to him as security for the repayment of the loan. The first 
defendant defaulted in the repayment of the loan and the plaintiff sued for the amount 
owing or in the alternative for an order of enforcement of the deed of prescription. 
It was held he was entitled to the whole amount he loaned plus damages and costs, 
but no more. On the alternative claim, Epie J. reached a decision which re­
emphasised the equitable, and discretionary, nature of specific performance:
"To order enforcement of the deed of prescription would be 
tantamount to making an order of specific performance of that 
particular term of the contract of guarantee relating to the land. It is 
my considered opinion that any such orders would offend against the 
principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience. A decree of 
specific performance is an equitable remedy issued by the court in the 
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. The discretion is ...exercised on 
well settled principles. The court must take into account the hardship 
which an order of specific performance would inflict on the defendant.
Again, jurisdiction in specific performance is based on the adequacy 
of the remedy at law and so it follows as a general principle that 
equity will not interfere where damages at law will give a party the 
full compensation to which he is entitled and will put him in a position 
as beneficial to him as if the agreement had been specifically 
performed."
Specific performance was also denied in Mukoro Stephen v. Texaco 
Cameroon.129 The appellant agreed to lease his land to the respondents for the 
construction of a petrol garage and in return the respondent promised to appoint him 
to manage the said garage. As a result of that promise, the appellant accepted rents 
that were substantially below the market value. When the construction of the garage 
was completed, the respondents appointed a third party to manage it, much to the
l2s HCB/90/89 (Bamenda, 6/8/1990, unreported)
l2s BCA/47/84 (Bamenda, 13/5/1985, unreported).
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consternation of the appellant, who as immediately brought an action for specific 
performance against the respondents. The Bamenda High Court rejected his claim 
for specific performance. In upholding that decision, the Bamenda Court of Appeal 
re-emphasised the point that "The fundamental rule is that specific performance will 
not be ordered if there is an adequate remedy of law." In recognition of the fact that 
the appellant had accepted such low rents on the clear understanding that he was to 
run the petrol garage, the Court of Appeal awarded him damages to make up for the 
shortfall. One is tempted to say that the award of damages was inadequate in this 
case. In the first place, it would not be wrong to say that what the plaintiff bargained 
for was ‘unique’, especially as they could not have been that many petrol garages in 
the entire Bamenda urban area at the time. Even more significantly, it is doubtful 
whether the plaintiff would have permitted the construction of a petrol garage on his 
land if he had not been promised, and did not believe, that he was to manage it. It 
is therefore submitted that on the facts of this case, a decree of specific performance 
would have been more appropriate than an award in damages.
But it is not always that a claim for specific performance is denied. In D. A. 
Nangah v. A. T. Asonganyi,[3° the defendant sold his property at the Commercial 
Avenue Bamenda to the plaintiff. The agreed price was 10.150.000 francs. Of this 
amount, 3.000.000 francs was immediately paid, with the balance due on the 
completion of the deed of conveyance. When the deed of conveyance was finally 
prepared, the defendant refused to sign it and insisted on cancelling the contract of 
sale. The plaintiff brought an action for specific performance. Citing the English 
cases of Hutton v. Watling,13i and Harnett v. Yielding,132 the court reiterated the 
principles that specific performance is based on the inadequacy of the remedy at law 
and that equity will not interfere where damages will fully compensate a party and put 
him in as good a position as if the contract had been performed. Having reviewed
130 HCB/79/85 (Bamenda, 29/1/1987, unreported).
131 [1948] Ch. 25.
,3= (1805) 2 Sd & Hef 549, 552.
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the guidelines, the court went on to hold that in the instant case, the plaintiff could 
not be adequately compensated by an award of damages "because this being a contract 
for the sale of land which land is situated at the Commercial Avenue Bamenda, it 
definitely has a peculiar value to the plaintiff."
Specific performance was again granted in another case involving land. In O f on 
Thomas v. Ejiogu Cyprien, 133 the appellant, a sawyer, borrowed the sum of 
1.519.000 francs CFA from the respondent in April 1986. It was a condition of the 
loan agreement that if it was not repaid either in cash or in timber’s worth on or 
before 31st August 1986, the respondent was to own the appellant’s piece of land 
situated at Strangers’ Quarters, Muyuka. The loan was still unpaid either in cash or 
in kind after the dateline, and in an action by the respondent, the Muyuka Magistrate 
Court held that he was entitled to take over the land that was offered as security of 
the loan. An order for the specific performance was thus decreed. This was 
confirmed on appeal but this time the Court of Appeal did not bother to say whether 
specific performance was granted because an award of damages was deemed 
inadequate or because of the special value of land. It might be thought that, like the 
Anye Fambo case above, the remedy of damages plus the full amount of the loan 
would have been adequate. But I suppose one cannot expect uniformity of results 
even on similar facts when so much rests on the discretion of the judges.
For the sake of completeness, one other form of specific relief, analogous to 
specific performance, ought to be mentioned. It involves the enforcement of 
agreements for the payment of money, typically the contract price. Unlike specific 
performance, this is not a discretionary remedy. Such a situation arose in Scholastica 
Nsaiboti v. Felix Ezeafor.'3* On April 15th 1971, the appellant bought a car from 
the respondent and paid about a third of the price, with the balance due after six 
weeks. Then on April 19, she wrote to the respondent purporting to rescind the 
contract. Although she made allegations as to breaches of conditions and warranties,
L,; CASWP/27/88 (Buea, 23/11/1989, unreported).
131 BCA/6/73 (Bamenda. 14/3/1974, unreported).
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it was clear beyond doubt that the reason she wanted out of the contract was because 
of her impecuniosity. This was evident in her letter to the defendant in which she 
complained about being unable to raise the balance within a year, never mind within 
six weeks. The respondent would have none of that and sued for the balance. The 
Bamenda High Court held that he was entitled to succeed, a decision that was upheld 
on appeal.
(b). Contract-Types.
For the purpose of granting the remedy of specific performance, the courts have
not adopted any rigid classification of contract-types. Nevertheless, some categories
of contract so regularly import features that are relevant to the principles described
above. Thus, in England, specific performance is typically available for sale of
unique goods, sale of real property and contracts conferring benefits on third parties.
Conversely, contracts of employment and for services135 and building contracts are
rarely specifically enforced.
In Cameroon one will need more cases than there are at the moment in order to
determine whether there are special contracts for which specific performance is more
likely to be granted. In the Nangah case,136 Ndoping J. said that:
"The commonest case in which the court specifically enforces a 
contract is where the contract is for the sale of land or for the granting 
of a lease. Contracts relating to land differ greatly from contracts 
respecting goods because they may have a peculiar value to the 
purchaser or lessee."
It would appear from the above that Cameroonian courts follow the practice in 
England in according special treatment to contracts relating to the sale of land or real
135 See the English Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, s. 16. In cases of 
unfair dismissal, an industrial tribunal has the power to recommend reinstatement but 
there is no power to enforce this if the recommendation is not implemented by the 
employer.
136 Supra, note 130
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estate.
Before one leaves this discussion on specific performance under the common law, 
one should refer to the recent trend in England and America whereby the courts, 
while still maintaining the traditional line that damages must be shown to be 
inadequate, are nevertheless adopting a much more flexible attitude on the matter by 
showing a greater readiness to grant specific performance.137 Sir Robert Megarry 
VC, for instance, has thought it appropriate to inquire whether specific performance 
"will do more perfect and complete justice than an award of damages".138 And in 
America, it has been suggested that the remedy of specific performance should be as 
routinely available as the damages remedy.139
Such developments cannot be said to be taking place in Cameroon. The courts 
still stick closely to the traditional principles and if anything, are slightly more 
predisposed to refuse rather than grant specific performance. There is no necessary 
cause for criticism in this conservative approach though. The kind of complex market 
arrangements for which it is said specific performance is a superior remedy are not 
commonplace in Cameroon. Likewise, there are few contracts for which it has been 
argued that long term business interests . (the so-called ‘relational’ view of the 
contracting relationship)140 depend on performance. Instead the vast majority of 
contracts are either personal service contracts or involve close personal relationships.
137 See for instance, Van Hecke, "Changing in Specific Performance" (1961) 41 North 
Carolina L.R. 1; Sharpe, Op. cit.. 120, 130-132; Linzer, "On the Amorality o f 
Contract Remedies: Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restatement" (1981) 81 Col. 
L.R. I l l ;  and Burrows, "Specific Performance at the Crossroads" (1984) 4 Leg. Stud. 
102 .
138 Tito v. Waddell [1977] Ch. 106, 322; For an account of US developments which 
are even more pronounced in their flexibility, see Linzer, Op. cit.. note 137, 126- 
130.
Schwartz, "The Case for Specific Performance" (1979/80) 89 Yale L.J. 271.
140 Mcneil, "Contracts: Adjustment o f Long-term Economic Relations) (1978) 72 NW 
U.L.R. 854; Macaulay, "Non-contractual Relations in Business" (1963) 28 Am. Soc. 
R. 55.
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In such situations, it would be insensitive for the courts to force a continuing 
relationship on the parties. This is not to suggest, however, that the courts should 
abandon the remedy of specific performance altogether. Where all indications point 
to that remedy, the courts should not feel constrained even by the alleged difficulties 
of supervision to prescribe it. Such difficulties which were more pertinent during the 
era of the struggle between the courts of law and courts of equity in England,141 are 
now believed to be exaggerated.142 And because Cameroon has never had seperate 
court structures for common law and equity, it will be out of place to even raise such 
concerns.
(2). Execution Forcee under Civil Law.
(a). The Nature of the Remedy.
It has already been said that French law is committed to the notion that the 
primary objective is performance of the contract. French legal writing refers more 
frequently to performance in kind {execution en nature) than to enforced performance 
{execution forcee) but what is important is that if the creditor cannot obtain the 
former, the law will if necessary enforce performance. The same is true of Civil 
Law Cameroon.
Two provisions of the Civil Code, articles 1143 and 1144, envisage particular 
forms of enforced performance which have the advantage of acting as security for the
141 A notable example of this conflict is Glanville’s Case (1614) Moore K.B. 838, 72 
E.R. 939, where the Chancellor issued an injunction against the execution of a 
common law judgement except upon equitable terms, the plaintiff being jailed for his 
contempt in refusing to obey the injunction, and then released by the common law 
courts on habeas corpus.
For a general discussion of this conflict, see Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 
1956, pp. 461-5.
,4: See dicta by Megarry VC in Tito v. Waddell [1977] Ch. 106, 321-2 and Lord 
Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinners v. Harding [1973] A.C. 691, 724.
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creditor without compelling a recalcitrant debtor to do anything other than pay a 
monetary sum. In the case of an obligation de ne pasfaire, article 1143 empowers 
the judge to order, at the debtor’s expense, the destruction of that which was done in 
contravention of the agreement: for example, the destruction of structures built 
without the landlord’s consent. There is no known actual application of article 1143 
in Cameroon and doubt must occur whether the courts will not hesitate to order the 
destruction of a house the construction of which infringed the rights (proprietary or 
contractual) of another. In France, for example, the courts have consistently refused 
to order reinstatement of wrongfully dismissed employees, no doubt because of the 
practical difficulties involved in such enforcement.143
Where an obligation concerns an obligation de faire, article 1144 permits the 
creditor to have the contract performed at the debtor’s expense. In Affaire Arribas 
v. Fadel Ahmed ,144 the parties concluded a contract in which the appellant (building 
contractors) agreed to construct two further floors on an existing building belonging 
to the respondent. Upon completion the owner let out the new apartments to tenants. 
Then, due to a defective drainage system put in place by the contractors these 
apartments suffered flooding, causing damage to the occupants. The contractors 
failed to respond to the owner’s demand for repairs, so in a bid to halt any further 
damage, he engaged another contractor to effect the necessary repairs. When that had 
been done, the respondent brought an action against the appellants for the costs of the 
repair work. It was held by the Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the lower 
courts, that on the strength of article 1144 the respondent must succeed in his claim 
for reimbursement for repair expenses from the appellant.
For practical purposes, these two instances (arts. 1143 and 1144), although 
considered as instances of enforced performance, differ little from the award of 
damages: the creditor still has to obtain payment from the debtor. The disadvantage
143 Cass. soc. 14 Juin 1972, D. 1973, 114, note N.Catala; JCP 1972.11. 17275, note 
G. Lyon-Caen.
144 CS Arret du 14 Aoiit 1980, (1980) No. 19 & 20 Rev. Cam. Dr. 79.
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here is that the creditor has to provide the capital for the undertaking before he is 
reimbursed by the debtor. On the other hand, the creditor does not have to show loss 
in order to invoke either procedure. This rule was firmly laid down in a French 
case145 where a party to a building scheme had sought its demolition because the 
building put up had exceeded the limits agreed in the scheme. The court below 
refused to authorise the demolition on the grounds that plaintiff had shown no 
prejudice. The Cour de Cassation quashed that decision, pointing out the plaintiff 
does not have to show any damage.
It should be noted that these two procedures involve judicial authorization. The
plaintiff cannot act on his own initiative, except in cases governed by commercial
law, where commercial custom may authorize the creditor to exploit a right of
replacement or where a notice (mise en demeure) may be sufficient. A court order
may also be dispensed with in cases of great urgency. In Affaire Arribas (supra),
one of the debtor’s main grounds of appeal was that the creditor had not obtained a
court order before embarking on repairs. To buttress this argument, he cited a
decision of the French Cour de Cassation.146 The Supreme Court responded by
declaring that judicial authorization is not always necessary and gave as an example,
a house-letting lease where the tenant may, without a court order, carry out repairs
and still claim reimbursement from the landlord on condition that he establishes,
"d’une part, que ces travaux etaient indispensables pour permettre 
rusage de la chose louee et, d ’autre part, que la depense n ’excede pas 
celle qui eut ete effectuee en y procedant de la fagon la plus 
economique"
That is to say the creditor must prove that the work or repairs carried out was vital 
and that he used the most cost effective method in doing so. The Supreme Court felt 
that this case was clearly covered by the urgency exception and as such a court order 
was not necessary. Judicial control may intervene only ex poste, in the event of an
145 Cass civ 17.12.1963, JCP 1964.11.13609 note Blaevoert, Gaz. Pal. 1964.1.158.
146 Cass. Civ. 5.6.53 D.1955, 61.
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improper exploitation of the right.147 It should be noted that in arriving at this 
conclusion, the Supreme Court also relied heavily on decisions of the Cour de 
Cassation. 148
The pre-eminence of the remedy of performance that has already been mentioned 
above should not, however, be exaggerated. It is not reflected in any legislative 
provisions since article 1184, the only general provision which refers to the three 
remedies does not give it any priority, conferring instead a free choice on the 
creditor, "either to compel the other to perform ... or to claim rescission with 
damages".
Further, article 1142 of the Civil Code which prescribes that "every obligation de
faire  or de ne pas faire gives rise to damages in the event of breach by the debtor"
seems to considerably limit the role of specific performance. Taken literally, the
provision asserts a principle denying specific performance except in the cases
envisaged in articles 1143 and 1144. In reality, the provision is confusing. As
regards obligations de faire, articles 1143 itself undermines the terms of article 1142
and in relation to obligations de ne pas faire, judicial interpretation has largely
transformed the obvious meaning of the text.149 Doctrine generally concludes that
article 1142 is badly formulated. It takes the form of a general rule, but applies only
to the limited category of personal contracts. One commentator has said,
"The least that one can say of article 1142 is that it was very badly 
drafted. It presents an imperative rule which is no more than an 
option, though, it is true, the statistically predominant one."150
147 Substitution is sometimes regarded as a form of unilateral automatic rescission. 
See Le Tourneau, La Responsabilite Civile, 1982, para. 1762.
148 Cass. Civ. 9 juillet 1945 D. 1946 Somm. 4; Civ. sect. civ. 19 juillet 1950 D.1950
Somm. 3; Civ. sect. soc. 7 dec. 1951 D. 1952. 144).
144 See Jeandidier, "L’Execution Forcee des Obligations Contractuelles de Faire"
R.T.D.C. 1976, 700ff.
150 See note to Cass. civ. 19.2.1970, Gaz. Pal. 1970.1.282.
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Article 1142 recalls, or rather, is the result151 of the maxim nemo praecise cogi 
potest ad factum  (no-one can be compelled to a specific act). And this "invasion" of 
specific performance152 overturned the principle to be found in article 1184: the 
creditor may force the other party to perform "where this is possible". Everything 
thus turns on this notion of impossibility or impossibilium nulla obligatio. First, there 
is physical impossibility, for example, where the subject-matter of the sale has been 
resold and the third party has acquired it in good faith.153 Then there is the case 
of moral impossibility: enforced performance involves compulsion on the debtor 
which is morally unacceptable. It is said that this "expresses the libertarian 
repugnance to compulsion directed against the person".154 The most frequently 
encountered examples concern artists who cannot be compelled to furnish a work of 
art or undertake some artistic activity. It was thus held in the famous Whistler 
Case155 that a painter cannot be forced to paint a portrait or to deliver one which 
he regards as unsuccessful. There does not appear to have been any cases on 
impossibility, physical or moral, in Cameroon. This, one suspects, is largely due to 
the fact that many creditors prefer to take up the option provided by article 1142, in 
other words, sue for damages rather than insist on performance.
Specific performance is also handicapped by the limited enforcement powers of 
the judge under the civil law. Contempt of court as known to the common lawyer 
does not exist in French law and in Civil Law Cameroon, and in the case of France 
physical compulsion (imprisonment for debt) for civil purposes was abolished in
151 Weill & Terre, para. 831.
152 The expression is that of Jeandidier, Op. cit.. note 14f, no. 7.
153 For a discussion of the rule that the objet must be possible and the common law 
analogy, see Nicholas, "Rules and Terms - Civil Law and Common Law" (1974) 
Tul.L.R. 966.
154 Nicholas, p. 210, citing Pothier Vente s.68; Louage s.68.
155 Cass, civ., 14 Mar 1900, D. 1900. 1. 497.
414
1867.156 The courts, however, have developed ways of enabling the creditor to 
obtain the requisite performance from the debtor without using physical compulsion. 
The most important one is the astreinte.
(b). Astreintes.
I shall only outline the principal characteristics of the astreinte here.157 The 
astreinte is a device imposed by the judge to support an order of specific 
performance, as a result of which the debtor who fails to perform must pay a 
substantial sum to the creditor for each day, week or month of delay, or even for 
each breach of an obligation de ne pas faire.158 It has a deterrent function in that 
it impels the debtor to perform voluntarily rather than pay an amount which may not 
only be substantial but also increases in proportion to his contumacy. The astreinte 
may be provisoire (provisional), implying that the judge will liquidate the sum after 
the end of the period, or definitive (final), in which case the judge cannot modify the 
amount at the end of the period. The astreinte is a judicial development and for a 
long while it was countenanced entirely by judicial practice. It was not until 1972 
that it gained legislative support in France with the passing of the Law of 5 July 
1972.159
The astreinte is used by the courts in Civil Law Cameroon even though it has no 
legislative expression in Cameroon. In Societe Sigma 2000 v. Nguedia Albert, 160
156 Tallon, "Remedies: French Report" In: Harris and Tallon, p. 267.
157 For a detailed analysis of the rules, see J. Bore, Ency. Dalloz, Droit Civil, ii, 
"A s tr e in te s Nicholas, 215ff.
158 Carbonnier, Droit Civil, vi: (11th. ed. 1982), para. 144; Weill and Terre, 1986, 
para. 834.
154 See Chabas D. 1972 Chr. 271 and Y. Lobin, "UAstreinte en Matiere Civile depuis 
la Loi du 5 Juillet 1972" In: Melanges Kayser, 1979, t.II, p. 132.
150 Supra, note 78.
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an astreinte of 10.000 francs a day was imposed against the defendant who was 
stubbornly refusing to complete payment and take over a house he had commissioned 
the plaintiffs to build.
The astreinte was also used in Mme, Karndem Guemnem v. Tsebo Jean 
Marie,161 against the defendant who had accumulated rental charges for a car for 
over 4 years. He was ordered to pay the arrears, and to return the car, the failure 
of which was to render him liable to an astreinte of 500 francs daily, not the rather 
extravagant sum of 20.000 francs a day that the plaintiff was demanding.
It can thus be said that the astreinte is now well established as a method of 
indirect specific enforcement of contractual obligations by the courts in Civil Law 
Cameroon. While the existence and legality of the institution in France were 
expressly confirmed in 1972 by legislation, its basis in Civil Law Cameroon, in the 
absence of such legislative support, is to be found in judicial practice.
8.3. REFUSAL TO PERFORM AND TERMINATION.
The defence of refusal to perform or withholding performance and termination are 
two seperate remedies but in this study, I have chosen to treat both as the third and 
final category of remedies available to an aggrieved party. It will be noticed that the 
civil law makes a sharp distinction between the two, with the former sometimes being 
part of the latter while the common law has no clear line of demarcation between the 
two. Under the common law, the distinction between the two is often blurred and 
many of the same rules apply to both. This is reflected in common law terminology 
which often refers to both remedies as rescission.162 I shall therefore attempt to 
undertake a seperate treatment of the defence of withholding performance and outright 
termination.
161 Supra, note 89.
I6: Treitel, Remedies, para. 188.
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(1). Withholding Performance.
At Common Law the lack of a clear distinction between the defence of refusal to 
perform and termination should not be taken to imply that the former is entirely 
unrecognizable. Under the common law performance can lawfully be withheld if the 
other party has not performed or is not ready and willing to perform. That will arise 
where performance by the latter is a condition precedent or a concurrent condition for 
the obligation of the former to perform. Often, the parties will make express 
provisions in the contract to this effect; but, in the alternative, they may rely on the 
court to provide an appropriate characterization of the obligations. The second 
possibility was explored in Mancho Sammy Anye v. Credit Fonder du 
Cameroon,163 in which the plaintiff made an application to the High Court for an 
interpretation, declaration or pronouncement in respect of a contract of loan and the 
defendant’s alleged breach. The plaintiff was granted a loan by the defendants (a 
kind of building society) for the construction of a house. The loan was to be 
disbursed in instalments. The security for the loan was the plaintiffs salary and land 
certificate. As concerns the salary, the plaintiff gave an irrevocable bank transfer so 
that any future repayments would be made directly to the defendants. As regards the 
land certificate, it was to be handed to the defendants as a pre-condition to the 
contract. However, because of the delay in the processing of the land certificate, the 
defendants, perhaps mindful of the lethargic rhythm of any administrative process in 
Cameroon, graciously accepted to start paying out the loan instalments to the plaintiff. 
It certainly was clear that in doing so the defendants did not waive nor intended to 
waive that pre-condition. This is because they insisted, and the plaintiff consented, 
that the Land Department should deposit the said land certificate directly with them 
as soon as it was ready. The defendants then began to disburse the loan to the 
plaintiff according to the agreed instalments until they got to the final tranche, when 
they refused to pay. This was because they had still not received the land certificate.
163 HCB/10/91 (Bamenda, 11/12/1991, unreported).
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The plaintiff accused the defendants of breach and retaliated by refusing to repay the 
loan. The defendants in turn exercised their Treasury Rights, which is tantamount 
to a lien on the plaintiff’s salary. Cornered thus, the plaintiff made this application 
in which he asked the court to interpret the contract and establish who exactly was 
in breach.
In the plaintiffs view, it was the defendants who were in breach for failing to 
disburse the last instalment of the loan. He argued strenuously that that must be the 
correct interpretation since the deposition of the land certificate was not a condition 
precedent for the complete disbursement of the loan. The court rejected that 
interpretation and ruled that on the true facts of the case, the deposition of the land 
certificate with the defendants was a condition precedent of the contract. On this 
interpretation, the plaintiff was held to be in breach. Consequently, the defendants 
were perfectly entitled to withhold performance by refusing to pay the last instalment 
of the loan.
Other special situations exist in common law where the withholding of 
performance will be lawful. These need not be elaborated upon here but by way of 
an example, the most glaring one is the unpaid seller’s lien.
The Civil Law did from a comparatively early time recognise the defence that one 
party’s obligation has not arisen.164 That defence is generally known in civil law 
systems as exceptio non adimpleti contractus even though in France, the name 
exception d ’inexecution is now preferred.I6r' This remedy enables a party to refuse 
to perform his own obligation unless the other party performs his. Notable examples 
in the Code are articles 1612 and 1613, relating to the seller’s right to withhold
164 See Pillebout, Recherches Sur L’Exception dTnexecution, 1971, p. 3ff; A. Huet, 
"Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus ou Exception D ’Inexecution" In: J-Cl. Civ., App. 
art. 1184
155 See The Ministry of Justice Circular of 15.9.1977, J.C .P.III.46255, urging courts 
to avoid the use of Latin expressions.
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delivery if buyer does not pay the price.166 Therefore, when the Douala Court of 
Appeal ordered the seller of a car to deliver it to the buyer or face an astreinte, when 
the buyer himself had not paid for the car, the Supreme Court was quick to quash that 
decision on the grounds that under article 1612, the seller was entitled to withhold 
delivery until such time that the buyer paid or was willing to pay the price.167
The exceptio is now applied to all synallagmatic contracts.168 This is explained 
by the doctrine of cause, the logic being that if each obligation is the cause of the 
other, non-performance should justifiably be met with non-performance.169 Because 
of the lack of reciprocity in contracts other than synallagmatic ones, any attempts to 
explain the use of the exceptio in such contracts by reference to cause has been 
considered to be unacceptable.
There are some main principles that govern the exceptio. The first one is that it 
does not relieve the creditor from the duty to perform. He must himself be able, 
willing and ready to perform his own obligation if the other party performs. This can 
work against a seller for instance, who may otherwise want to dispose of the goods. 
It is not that the creditor cannot make his refusal to perform permanent. The problem 
is that, subject only to the exception of perishable goods, if he intends to go any 
further than the exceptio, he must bring an action en resolution /rescission), for which 
article 1184 requires judicial intervention. In Mike Sky lias v. Camer Industrie/170 
the defendants gave the plaintiffs an exclusive agency to sell Yahama motorbikes. 
In breach of that agency, the defendants appointed other agents and then discontinued 
all supplies to the plaintiffs. In an action for damages for breach, the defendants
166 This is akin to the unpaid seller’s lien at common law: s. 39 (1) of Sale of Goods 
Act 1893.
167 SCOA-AUTO v. Ketchateng Jean, C.S. Arret No. 60 du 23.9.1976, (1976) no.38 
B.A.C.S., 5122.
168 Weill and Terre, para. 863.
169 Nicholas, p. 207.
170 Supra, note 55.
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argued that as the plaintiffs were owing them some money, they were merely 
exercising their right of exceptio under article 1612 of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs 
denied owing the defendants and pointed out that the defendants, by their conduct, 
were not just withholding performance but had effectively terminated the contract. 
In that case, the plaintiffs argued forcefully, the defendants were obliged to seek 
judicial authorization for an action en resolution and not resort to unilateral action. 
The court agreed with the plaintiffs. A similar decision was arrived at in one French 
case,171 where a creditor told the debtor to whom he had given an exclusive agency 
to sell boats, that he was terminating the agency because the latter had failed to sell 
a single boat out of their agreed yearly target of nine. It was held that while he could 
suspend the exclusive agency and appoint other sellers, he could not terminate it or 
give it to another without a total resolution of the contract for which he would need 
the intervention of the court under article 1184.
The second guiding principle on the application of the exceptio is the requirement 
that there must be a nexus or correlation between the obligation which the creditor 
is suspending and the obligation of the debtor.172 In other words, both obligations 
must be based on a "fondement commun", i.e. they must have derive from the same 
contract. It is thus said that an unpaid motor dealer who happens to obtain possession 
of the unpaid car because it has been brought into his garage for repairs has no right 
to retain it on account of the unpaid price because the obligation to pay the price, 
which arises from the contract of sale, is independent of, and has no link with, the 
contract of repair.173 Although this was not directly the issue before the court, this 
rule appears to have been observed by the Supreme Court in La Compagnie 
Frangaise de VAfrique Occidentale v. Kanga Appolinaire174 in which it ruled
171 Cass com 15.1.1973, D 1973. 473 note Ghestin, Gaz Pal. 1973.2.495.
I7: On the question of link, see Gabet-Sabatier "Le Role de la Connexite dans 
FEvolution du Droits des Obligations" R.T.D.C. 1980 p. 39 et seq.
173 Stark, para. 1637.
174 Arret No 158 du 28 Mars 1961 (1961) no. 3 B.A.C.S.C.O.
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against the seizure by the appellants of a lorry truck they had sold to the defendant 
on credit terms. The said lorry had been taken back to the appellants’ garage for 
routine servicing and they took advantage of that to seize it. They advanced as 
reasons for the seizure the fact that the driver was not in possession of the requisite 
documents for the said lorry and therefore did not have the authority of the defendant. 
This was of course not true. The real reason must have been that the defendant had 
not completed payment. Whatever the true reasons might have been, the court held 
that the appellants were not entitled to retain the lorry just because they happened to 
have it in their garage for servicing. The court did not explain the decision in terms 
of lack of a correlation between the obligation to complete payment and the obligation 
to service the car but there is no denying that such an explanation can easily be 
imputed on that decision.
It is not enough that the reciprocal obligations are correlative. According to the 
third guiding principle the obligations must also be concurrent or simultaneous. 
Therefore, once a party is to perform before the other, the defence of exceptio is no 
longer available to him. In the case of the unpaid seller’s right to withhold 
performance, the Civil Code (arts. 1612 and 1613) expressly excludes the case where 
the seller has agreed that the buyer may pay later. In CFAO v. Ndamako,115 the 
appellants contracted to sell a car to the respondent. It was expressly agreed that 
payment was to be by instalments and that it would only follow delivery. The 
appellant failed to deliver the car and the respondent brought a successful action for 
breach of contract at first instance. The appellant brought this appeal in which he 
contended that he could not be expected to deliver the car when the respondent had 
yet to pay the price. In effect he was invoking the defence of exceptio. The Supreme 
Court rejected that contention and held that the defence of exceptio was inapplicable 
because the contract clearly stipulated that delivery was to precede payment and not
175 C.S. Arret No. 13 du 15 Dec. 1977 (1978) no.38 B.A.C.S. 5646.
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run concurrently.176
For the creditor to refuse to perform, the debtor’s breach need not be total but it 
has to be serious enough. There are no established rules and the matter lies within 
the pouvoir souverain of the trial judge. Normally, the courts compare the debtor’s 
breach or failure with the creditor’s exceptio to make sure that the latter is not 
disproportionate to the former. For example, in Affaire Mbomiko Ibrahim v. 
Soitacam ,177 the respondents undertook to carry out some construction work for the 
appellant. It was agreed that the work was to be completed within four months. The 
respondents failed to meet up with the dateline but the appellant did not complain and 
allowed them carry on with the work. When the work was eventually completed, the 
appellant attempted to invoke the defence of refusal to perform on account of the 
respondent’s delay. It was held by the Supreme Court, affirming the lower courts, 
that since the appellant was fully aware of the delay and never complained about it, 
he must be taken to have acquiesced in it, and for that reason, he was not entitled to 
withhold performance.
Another aspect about the exceptio is that, contrary to the civil law’s traditional 
reluctance to sanction self help, it is available to a creditor without the need for 
judicial authorization as long as he is himself ready and willing to perform should the 
debtor do so. But as already pointed out above, if he intends to bring the contract 
to an end, he will have to apply for a court order. Any creditor who invokes the 
exceptio without a court order does so at his peril, in the event that a court later rules 
that he abused the use of that defence or that it was not the appropriate action to 
take.178
Finally, the apparent similarity between the remedy of exceptio and the droit de
176 For a similar, and earlier, decision in France, see Stark, para. 1645: en cas de 
terme pour le solde du prix, I 'exception ne pent etre invoquee que pour I ’accompte 
immediarernent due: Orleans 23 Oct. 1975, J.C.P 77, II, 18653, note Le Toumeau.
177 C.S. Arret No. 99/CC du 23 Avril 1981 (1981) Nos.21 & 22 Rev. Cam. Dr., 230.
178 See the Mike Skyllas case, supra, note 55, and the French case: Civ l sr, 5 Mars 
1974, JCP 74, II, 17707, note J. Voulet.
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retention179 (lien) needs some brief mention here. Both are confusing and have 
caused doctrinal controversy.180 In the apposite words of one commentator, "Le 
droit de retention ...est trop suivant confondupar les tribunaux et lespracticiens avec 
I ’exceptio non adimpleti contractus."18i All that needs to be said here is that both 
serve the same purpose of putting pressure on the debtor to perform. Both can also 
lead to the same result at times. For example, the unpaid seller’s retention of the 
thing sold or the depositee’s retention of the thing deposited. Yet these similarities 
may be misleading as they mask some profound differences. First, the exceptio is 
much wider in that, the creditor is not confined in retaining a specific thing to which 
the debtor is entitled. But as concerns the droit de retention, it is a rule that it cannot 
be exercised on anything other than the specific thing deposited with the depositee in 
relation to the contract.182 Secondly, unlike the exceptio, the droit de retention is 
not confined to synallagmatic contracts, neither is it confined to contracts at all.183
(2). Termination.
In this section, I am concerned with the remedy available to an innocent party by 
way of rescission or termination. The aim of the aggrieved party is no longer to 
withhold or suspend performance until the other party performs; it is to bring the 
contract to an end or to treat it as discharged by breach. Under the common law,
179 For droit de retention, see generally N. Catala, "De La Nature Juridique du Droit 
de Retention" R.T.D.C. 1967, especially pp. 9 et s., and Shapel, Le Droit de 
Retention en Droit Positif" R.T.D.C. 1981, 539.
180 See Mazeaud and Chabas, para. 1131, and Mazeaud on the droit de retention, t. 
I l l ,  para. 110 et s.
181 Rodiere, note sur Cass. 22 Mai 1962, D. 65. J. 59.
18: Stark, para. 1635; Mande-Djapou, "La Notion Etroite du Droit de Retention" JCP 
76, 1, 2760.
183 See Nicholas, p. 210.
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doubt have been cast by some commentators whether on the face of it, this is a 
remedy at all.184 It is presented as something stemming from the nature of a
contract itself; a party only undertakes certain things under the contract, and it
follows that if the circumstances in which his promise to perform or continue 
performing does not arise, he simply has no obligation, or no further obligation, to 
perform. Thus common law textbooks vary considerably as to whether particular 
topics relevant to termination are alloted to the chapter on "performance" or to that 
of "breach".185 To put it another way, the right to treat the contract as discharged 
may be regarded as one provided by the parties themselves; as such it need not be
thought of as a remedy at all, nor controlled by the law. This impression is
strengthened by the fact that the right to refuse performance can in appropriate cases 
be exercised where there is no breach at all; and that where there is a breach, a 
person exercising the right can also sue for damages. This, it may be argued, is the 
remedy; the right to regard oneself as discharged. But it could also be said that it 
was the fact of regarding that right as a remedy which led in part to the erroneous 
view once held that a person who treated the contract as discharged could not also sue 
for damages.186
It seems that this problem does not arise under the civil law, where what the 
common lawyer calls discharge by breach is more obviously treated as a remedy and 
controlled as such. In French law, the right seems to have been secured for contract 
law by importing an implied resolutive condition into all contracts: there is an implied 
resolutive condition to terminate the contract if the other party completely fails to 
perform (ne satisfera point a son engagement). At this juncture, it is proposed to 
carry out the respective common law and civil law treatment of the right to rescind
184 This is the view of Waddams, "Remedies as a Legal Subject" (1983) 3 O.J.L.S. 
113.
185 Treitel, (chapter 18) treats rescission for failure to perform under "Performance" 
and treats (chapter 19) "repudiation before performance is due" under breach, while 
Cheshire, Fifootand Furmston, (chapter 18) treat it under "Performance and Breach".
186 See Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C. 367.
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the contract.
(a). Rescission at Common Law.
The law governing the right to rescind for failure in performance under the 
common law is complex and difficult. The difficulty starts right at the level of 
terminology. The use of traditional terminology such as "rescission" or "termination" 
has been criticised. In the Photo Productions case, Lord Diplock described the use 
of the word "rescission" as "misleading", unless it was borne in mind that, in cases 
of breach, such rescission did not deprive the injured party of his right to claim 
damages for the breach.187
On an even more serious note, it can and it has indeed often been pointed out that 
although rescission may often give rise to appropriate results - allowing efficient 
detachment from unperformed contracts which are likely to prove unsatisfactory, 
saving cost by self-help, and the avoidance of the compulsory extension by the 
innocent party to the guilty party - it may equally give rise to inappropriate results, 
in enabling the innocent party to escape from a bad bargain, give him priority in 
bankruptcy situations and sometimes allowing him to take advantage of windfalls such 
as improvements to his property which were not what was asked for.188 In terms 
of social utility, then, the adoption of this remedy in some circumstances may be 
questioned: notably where the creditor can deal with the consequences of the breach 
more cheaply than the debtor, for example because he has better access to the market 
for the disposal of the defective goods.189
From the foregoing, it is evident that the courts are faced with the difficult task 
of balancing two diametrically opposed interests: that of the party seeking rescission
187 [1980] A.C. 827, 851.
188 See generally Honnold, "Buyer’s Right o f Rejection" (1949) U.Pa.L.R. 457; Priest, 
"Breach and Remedy fo r  the Tender o f Non-Conforming Goods Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: An Economic Approach" (1978) 91 Harv. L.R. 960.
189 Priest, Op. cit.. notel88.
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and that of the party resisting it. This in turn means that the exercise of the right has 
such significant remedial consequences that it needs to be controlled. To do so, the 
courts have developed certain rules and distinctions which help determine or limit the 
availability of rescission. I shall now consider the important ones with a view to 
finding out what the courts in Common Law Cameroon have made of them so far.
(i). Indirect Control On the Right to Rescission.
It was long ago demonstrated that by the importation and manipulation of what 
may be called constructive conditions in contracts the courts have in fact been able 
to give effect to significant policy judgements regarding the appropriate reciprocal 
obligations of the parties to a contract.190 By importing an order of performance 
or a requirement of readiness to perform they have avoided situations where one party 
inappropriately gives credit to another, or have given one party security for 
performance or a means of coercing performance; they have however avoided doing 
so where the result would be forfeiture or unjust enrichment. But this control, it is 
obvious, is of a subtle and indirect nature.
In general, the position in England is that only substantial or serious breaches 
justify termination. At least three techniques (depending on how one arranges them 
for exposition purposes) are available to determine when the breach is serious enough 
to entitle the innocent party to treat the contract as discharged. The account which 
follows relates to how these techniques have been followed or developed in 
Cameroon. It is fair to say that the courts in Cameroon have not always shown a 
conscious application of these techniques, yet it is possible to read or impute them 
into some of their decisions.
190 Patterson, " Constructive Conditions in Contracts" (1942) 42 Col. L.R. 903. 
Section 28 of the Sale o f Goods 1979 (U.K.) (payment and delivery concurrent 
conditions) is an example of this technique.
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The Condition/Warranty Technique:19' Some obligations in certain types of 
contract may be regarded as so important that any breach of them, with whatever 
consequences, entitles the other party to terminate the contract. Such obligations or 
terms are traditionally called "conditions". They are distinguished from "warranties", 
breaches of which, however serious, can only give rise to damages claims. In Alfred 
Mbah v. Roland Boman & Joseph Ncho,192 the plaintiff happened to have the 
necessary equipment for a petrol garage on his premises. But these equipment were 
idle because the tenant who installed them and who operated the petrol garage had 
quit. The plaintiff, with the backing of the second defendant, tried to obtain the 
franchise from British Petroleum and failed. However, B.P. intimated to the second 
defendant that they would be prepared to grant him the franchise directly, after which 
he would be free to appoint whoever he so wished to run the petrol station. The 
second defendant accepted B.P.’s offer of a franchise and then proceeded to conclude 
a contract with the plaintiff, whereby the latter was appointed a sub-agent, with the 
responsibility of running the petrol garage. It was a main term of the contract of 
agency that the plaintiff was to procure all the required fuel from the second 
defendant alone. In other words, the second defendant would obtain fuel from B.P. 
and supply to the plaintiff for retail. Business moved on well for a while until the 
plaintiff alleged that the first defendant, a driver of the second defendant, had 
supplied him with adulterated fuel. The defendants denied this allegation. An 
unsuccessful criminal charge followed against the first defendant. At that point the 
relationship between the parties became strained. Thereafter, the second defendant 
discovered that the plaintiff had been buying fuel from B.P. through a third party and 
sometimes directly, apparently using the second defendant’s name. On making this 
discovery, the second defendant wrote to B.P. to stop supplying the plaintiff with 
fuel. The plaintiff reacted by bringing this action for breach of contract and
191 Reynolds, " 'Warranty, Condition and Fundamental Term" 79 L.Q.R. 534; Shea, 
"Discharge from Performance o f Contracts by Failure o f Condition" 42 M.L.R. 623.
19t HCB/73/85 (Bamenda, 26-05-1987, unreported).
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destruction of business goodwill. The second defendant counter-claimed, arguing that 
by procuring fuel either through a third party or directly himself, it was the plaintiff 
who was guilty of breach. The Bamenda High Court found in favour of the 
defendant. In arriving at that conclusion, it is obvious that the court, though not 
directly stating as such, was clearly treating that term of the contract which required 
the plaintiff to get all his fuel through the second defendant alone as a condition. 
Since that condition had been breached, the court ruled that the second defendant was 
entitled to sue for damages193 or rescind the contract.
Perhaps the most direct application of the condition/warranty technique in 
Cameroon is that by the Bamenda Court of Appeal in Scholastica Nsaiboti v. Felix 
Ezeafor.194 In that case, it will be recalled that the appellant who had bought a car 
from the respondent, purported to rescind the contract of sale four days after taking 
possession. In support of the appellant’s attempt at rescission, counsel contended on 
her behalf, inter alia, that by section 12 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the 
respondent had no right to sell the car because it was registered in someone else’s 
name (Okafor), so that property could not pass to her. This was only an ostensible 
reason, the real reason being the appellant’s impecuniosity, as betrayed by the letter 
she wrote to the respondent, in which she pleaded with the respondent to look for 
another buyer because she would be unable to pay the balance not just within the 
agreed six weeks but even a within a year. On these facts, the Court of Appeal, like 
the High Court before it, said that there was no evidence (the car had not been 
seized, neither had anyone challenged or disturbed the appellant’s quiet possession) 
in support of the appellant’s contention that there was a breach of the implied 
condition and warranty provided by section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Since 
there had been no breach of any condition it was held that the appellant was not 
entitled to rescind the contract.
93 The court cited in this regard the case of Forslind v. Becheley Crendal [1922] SC.
H.L. 173.
194 Supra , note 134.
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The Hong Kong Fir Technique: I choose to refer to the second technique by the 
name of the case195 that brought it back to prominence in England, even though it 
actually derives from older antecedents. By this technique, the innocent party may 
terminate only if he has been substantially deprived of the whole benefit which it was 
intended that he should receive from the contract. For a time it appeared as though 
this second approach had supplanted the first. Lord Wilberforce did call it the "more 
modern doctrine",196 while in the Hong Kong Fir case itself Lord Diplock opened 
up new vistas, suggesting that the condition/warranty technique was outdated and 
ought to be scrapped.197 But the co-existence of the two techniques, and the 
continuing validity of the condition/warranty technique, was finally established in 
Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export S .A ..m  And that co-existence can also be seen in 
the case of Jonas Puwo v. Ndi Cho Samson.199 The parties entered into a contract 
in which the defendant was to provide the plaintiff with a gear box for a Mercedes 
truck for the sum of 1.800.000 francs, of which 1.000.000 francs was paid in 
advance. The defendant delivered the gear box and insisted on (and got) payment of 
the balance; but when it was tried, it did not fit into the said truck. It was discovered 
that the description of the gear box provided by the defendant did not match that 
which the plaintiff had asked for. The plaintiff brought an action for rescission of the 
contract and restitution of the price. The court concluded that there had been 
breaches of certain implied conditions of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, namely: that 
the goods shall correspond with the description (section 13); that the goods shall be 
reasonably fit for the particular purpose for which they were required (section 14 (1)); 
and that the goods shall be of merchantable quality. From that and for other reasons
195 Hong Kong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kashai [1962] 2 Q.B. 26.
196 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989, 998.
197 [1962] 2 Q.B. 26, 69.
198 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711.
199 HCB/31/83 (Bamenda, 12-9-1984, unreported).
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that are not relevant here, the court went on to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to 
rescission and a refund of the contract price plus damages for breach of contract. It 
can thus be said that the first and second technique are in play here, since in addition 
to, or as a result of the defendant’s breach of those implied conditions, the plaintiff 
was substantially deprived of the whole benefit which he should have received from 
the contract.
The Conduct o f the Party Technique: This approach asks more generally whether 
the conduct of the party in breach is such as to indicate an intention to repudiate his 
contractual obligation. It is relevant particularly to anticipatory breach, to long term 
contracts and to situations in other contracts where the innocent party may be 
regarded as justified in not carrying on because of loss of confidence in the other 
party (for example, because the goods delivered are so bad that he does not want 
them replaced). The case of Fon Fongyeh Njifornuh II  v. Guiness Cameroon 
S .A .,200 provides a perfect illustration of this technique. In December 1974, the 
parties entered into an informal arrangement whereby the respondent company was 
to hire the appellant’s premises as their depot in Bamenda. The agreed rent was 
15.000 francs monthly. The respondents took occupation and after 4 months, they 
approached the appellant with a proposal to have the agreement formalized. They 
also proposed that in view of the fact that a more permanent agreement was about to 
be entered into, consideration should be given to a reduction of the rents from 15.000 
francs to 12.000 francs, which the appellant unreservedly accepted. This new 
contract which was to become effective as from 1st April 1975 was reduced into 
writing and duly registered with the relevant government department.201 But soon 
after the contract was registered, the appellant approached the respondents’ Bamenda 
branch manager to inform him that the Ministry of Justice was negotiating with him 
to hire the very premises he had just let to them, and that he was seriously 
considering it. In reaction to that development, the respondents’ manager asked for
:o° BCA/4/78 (Bamenda, 28-5-1978, unreported).
:01 For the requirement of registration, see chapter 7.
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the appellant’s own copy of the tenancy agreement which he took together with theirs 
to the Stamp Duty department for cancellation, thereby terminating the tenancy 
agreement. It so happened that the expected occupation by the Ministry of Justice did 
not materialise. Sensing that he would lose out on both fronts, the appellant turned 
round and sued the respondents, alleging that they were in breach of their tenancy 
agreement with him. Not surprisingly, he lost at first instance in the Bamenda High 
Court. Not content, he appealed and lost again. In the Bamenda Court of Appeal, 
Wakai CJ. said that, "By his utterances and conduct, the appellant had positively 
determined the contract". He had put the future of the tenancy agreement with the 
respondents in grave doubt because he had struck a deal with the Ministry of Justice, 
which unfortunately for him did not work. In the light of that analysis, it was held 
that the appellant was in breach and that the termination of the tenancy agreement by 
the respondent was simply the natural outcome of that breach. The court was even 
mildly surprised that the respondents had themselves not brought an action for breach 
against the appellant in the first place.
It is safe to say that the right to rescind the contract under the second and third 
techniques will in most cases be exercised fairly. Since the innocent party has failed 
to receive in full what he bargained for, or has justifiably lost confidence in the other 
party, he cannot be blamed for refusing to proceed. The first technique, however, 
potentially allows a contracting party to escape from the contract on a technicality - 
depending, of course, on how ready the courts are to detect conditions. As one is 
dealing with the common law, it may not be possible to say that the innocent party’s 
right to rescission must be exercised in good faith because the common law has 
traditionally eschewed considerations of this sort. But if the plaintiff can insist on his 
legal rights without any compromise, one wonders when (if at all) such a technique 
yields fair results.
It seems to do so in the case where the innocent party is a consumer. For 
consumers damages may be an inadequate remedy; besides, they may not wish to go 
to court, and if they do, may have difficulties establishing loss measurable in a 
monetary way. Their best remedy may well be to refuse to accept unsatisfactory
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goods, or to return them. That was the option taken in the Jonas Puwo case,202 
where it will be recalled, the plaintiff insisted, and succeeded in returning a wrong 
gear box which the defendant has supplied to him. In such circumstances, it is only 
fair to expect the guilty party, especially where he is himself a dealer in such goods 
to retain the goods, not least because he is in a better position to dispose of it. 
Obviously, where the plaintiff is a dealer and can more than adequately treat or 
dispose of the defective goods, perhaps, even more so than the defendant, there is a 
strong case for questioning his insistence on his contractual right to rescission. 
Damages in such cases may be much more appropriate.
Beyond this, there is a set of restrictions, still not fully worked out, placed on the 
exercise of the right to treat the contract as discharged (by breach) by an apparatus 
of rules relating to waiver, estoppel, election and so forth. These seem to be a 
characteristic of common law systems, and they are significant in that they partly 
compensate for the lack of more formal controls of the exercise of the right which 
exists under the civil law, for instance. A good example is the highly uncertain area 
of law relating to persons who abandon or fail to exercise their rights, as by accepting 
goods which do not conform with the contract. It is astonishing that in such an 
important area the law in England remains uncertain.203 That notwithstanding, 
Cameroonian courts have been known to use the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
In Forbah Joseph v. Cameroon Bank,20* the defendant bank failed to recover 
money owed to them (for which the plaintiff stood surety) when it was due, despite 
the availability of funds in the principal debtor’s account, and proceeded instead to 
grant a further overdraft facility (to which the plaintiff was not privy) to the principal 
debtor. Later on the bank attempted to recover the money from the plaintiff. It was
203 Supra, note 118.
203 The latest leading authority suggests merely that everything turns on whether it is 
"inequitable" to go back on the concession: Societe Italo-Belge pour le Commerce et 
ITndustrie S.A. v. Palm and Vegetable Oils (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (The Post Chaser)
[1982] 1 All E.R. 19.
204 HCB/75/87 (Bamenda, 2-2-1989, unreported).
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held by the Bamenda High Court that the defendants, by failing to recover their 
money from the principal debtor’s account had waived their right against the plaintiff, 
and that the granting of further credit facilities to the principal debtor amounted to an 
estoppel. This is certainly not a typical rescission case. Nevertheless, it is pertinent 
here in so far as it demonstrates the use of waivers and estoppel.
(ii). The Need For Direct Control On the Right To Rescission ?
All that which has been considered thus far relates to indirect forms of control. 
But should there be specific and direct forms of control on the exercise of the 
contractual right of rescission? Will that be justified and practicable? Such direct 
forms of control exist in civil law systems and in the case of Civil Law Cameroon it 
will be shown below that the control is exercised sometimes by submitting the matter 
to the decision of a court and sometimes by requiring the service of notice, or a 
combination of the two.
The need for more control seems to be gaining in appeal in common law 
jurisdictions. In New Zealand, The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 recognises in 
some measure the remedial nature of discharge by breach, and substitutes for the 
common law principles the remedy of cancellation205 which is subject to the control 
of the court.206 There is however a provision (section 5) exempting from this 
control express provisions made by the parties.
In England, the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 has tightened up the 
consumer’s remedy of rejection in the sale of goods by defining the notion of 
merchantability more stringently.207 The introduction of the notion of satisfactory
205 Section 7. For a more detailed comment on that section, see Dawson and 
McLauchlan, The Contractual Remedies Act 1979, 1981, chapter 6.
206 Section 9.
207 See section 3 on the right of rejection. This section does not substitute but adds 
to section 35 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
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quality in place of merchantable quality,208 should help counteract those decisions 
where courts appear to have held goods merchantable not because they considered 
them satisfactory, but because they thought rejection too drastic a remedy: the result 
was that there was no remedy at all. But in non-consumer situations, the 1994 Act 
limits the exercise of the right to reject in cases where the breach is so slight that 
rejection would be unreasonable.209
These are isolated instances which suggest that there may be room for a general 
rubric permitting the court to intervene in some cases. If it is thought that there 
should be the possibility of such intervention on a general basis, then that will 
undoubtedly require some application or extension of the equitable jurisdiction to 
relieve against the unconscionable exercise of legal rights. There is English precedent 
for this in the decision of Lloyd J. in the The Alaskan Trader,210 where he held that 
the right to refuse to accept a breach and sue for a liquidated sum was limited in the 
last resort:
"There comes a point at which the court will cease, on general 
equitable principles, to allow the innocent party to enforce his contract 
according to its strict legal terms."
There are Cameroonian precedents too but before they are considered, mention must 
be made of an immediate obstacle here: the House of Lords decided in The 
Scaptrade2U that the equitable rules as to relief against forfeiture were inappropriate 
to the commercial relationship embodied in a time charter, and this was followed in 
the context of a licensing agreement in Sport International Bussum N. V. v. Inter-
208 See above, note 2 0 f
209 See section on modification of remedies in non-cosumer cases. This section too 
only adds to section 15 of the 1979 Act.
210 Clea Shipping Corp. v. Bulk Oil International Ltd (The Alaskan Trader) [1984] 1 
All E.R. 129.
211 Scandanavian Trading Tanker Co. AB v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The 
Scaptrade) [1983] 2 A.C. 694.
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Footwear Ltd.212 There is no meed to elaborate on these decisions here but it should 
be noted that they have been t!he subject of some attack.213 But even setting aside 
any criticisms, the decision of the House of Lords to exclude the interference of 
equitable jurisdiction from the operation of express contractual terms in time and 
voyage charter operations does; not mean that equitable intervention is inadmissible 
altogether, even in England,214 even less so in Cameroon.
Three judgements given in the then West Cameroon Court of Appeal are of first 
rate importance in that they brought into focus the debate as to whether the courts 
should grant equitable relief against forfeiture. In the first case, Menyoli Motors Co. 
Ltd v. Frederick Ezedigboh,2]S the court, applying the English decision in 
Stocklosser v. Johnson,216 upheld a general power to grant equitable relief against 
the forfeiture of the buyer’s deposit in a hire purchase contract after the rescission of 
the contract, where the sum forfeited was out of all proportion to the loss suffered by 
the seller and when it would have been unconscionable for the seller to retain the 
money. The next case, still involving a hire purchase contract, was Joe Allen 
Bartholomew (London Group) Ltd. v. Sebastien Mbinka.2xl Like in the earlier 
case, the seller (the appellants) seized and sold the truck, the subject of the hire 
purchase, after the respondent had paid a substantial amount towards the total price. 
It was held that "the actions of the appellant company were harsh and unconscionable 
in the circumstances" and that "that was sufficient to bring the case within the
2,2 [1984] 1 W.L.R. 776.
213 Gummow, "Forfeiture and Certainty: The High Court and The House o f Lords" In: 
Finn, ed., Essays in Equity, 1985, ch. 2, pp. 43-44.
214 In Giles & Co. Ltd. v. Morris [1972] 1 AER 960 at 969 Megarry V.-C said that 
the "rule" against specific enforcement is "plainly not absolute and without 
exception".
215 W .C.C.A/7/68 (Buea, unreported).
2,6 [1954] 1 Q.B. 476.
217 WCCA/4/68 (Buea, unreported).
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principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in England in Stocklosser v. Johnson 
as approved by the this same court in Menyoli Motors v. Ezedigboh". Accordingly, 
equitable relief against forfeiture was granted.
But in the third case, Ets. Tsewole v. John Holt Motors,218 the court refused to 
grant equitable relief on facts that one would be hard pressed to distinguish from 
those of the two earlier cases considered above. Not surprisingly, the issue provoked 
a serious disagreement between the Chief Justice (who dissented) and the other two 
judges, who produced the majority decision. In that case, the appellant hired three 
lorries from the respondents. When the appellant defaulted in the payment of hire 
instalments, the respondent moved in swiftly to seize all three lorries. It was found 
as a fact that the balance due to the respondents was about 2.750.000 francs and that 
they actually re-sold the lorries for 4.650.000 francs. On the evidence of these 
figures, counsel for the appellant raised the important question of equity and urged 
the court to apply equitable principles so as to enable the appellant to recover the 
balance of the proceeds of the resale, that is after the respondents must have set-off 
the sum that remained outstanding on the hire purchase contract. The trial judge 
rejected the plea, maintaining that the respondents were well within their legal rights 
of rescission, seizure and sale.
That decision was confirmed on appeal, with the Court of Appeal adding bluntly 
that "equity mends no man’s bargain except in the most exceptional circumstances". 
In the court’s view this case was not exceptional enough to warrant the grant of 
equitable relief. In arriving at this decision, the court relied heavily on the English 
case of Helby v. Mathews219 but with no disrespect to that court, it is submitted that 
that reliance was misguided. Taking a close look at the facts of that case, it is 
difficult to see how Helby v. Mathews can be considered as good authority for the 
decision in the Tsewole case, because the only similarity between them is that they 
are concerned with hire purchase contracts. In the Helby case, the appellant hired
218 WCCA/21/70 (Buea, 1970, unreported).
219 (1895) All E.R. (H.L) 21.
436
out piano to a certain B, under terms which B could own it after the payment of a 
certain amount through monthly instalments. Until such time, the piano was to 
remain the property of the appellants. It was also a term of the contract that on no 
account should B let the piano out of his possession. B was later to pledge the piano 
with the respondents without notice of the appellant’s claim. In an action by the 
appellant to recover the piano from the respondents the House of Lords held, inter 
alia, that B had not bought or agreed to buy the piano within section 9 of the Factors 
Act 1899 and so he was unable to give the respondents a good title under that section. 
The appellant was therefore entitled to succeed.
It is thus clear that the facts of the Tsewole case do not fit squarely into the Helby 
situation. However, if one questions the decision not to grant equitable relief in the 
Tsewole case, it is not so much because it is wrong in strict law, after all the hirer 
was in arrears. It is rather that having granted equitable relief in similar cases, one 
would have expected the court to do same in this case as well. This point is well 
borne out by the dissenting judgement of Cotran C.J., who, while accepting that the 
appellant was in arrears, took the view that there was a strong case for the 
intervention of equity in this case. He felt that because the owners had sold the three 
lorries for considerably more than what they were being owed as the balance, the 
hirer was entitled in equity and fairness to receive what was over and above that 
balance.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Cameroonian courts have been prepared 
in some cases to apply equity to deny the exercise of the strict right of rescission and 
its consequences. It will have been noticed that all three cases considered relate only 
to relief against forfeiture. I will not enter into dispute on the question whether any 
such equitable jurisdiction should only be associated with that to relief against 
forfeiture, or more generally with that regarding the unconscionable exercise of 
rights; or as to whether the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture should be confined 
only to certain rights, for example, property rights and if not how much further it 
should go. To do that one needs to be steeped in equity to a degree to which I have 
no pretence. Nevertheless, I take the position that, even where a problem is viewed
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purely from the contract side, there may well be situations where the traditional role 
of equity can in some form legitimately be invoked to modify strict contract rights to 
a limited extent. That Cameroonian courts have done so is to be welcome even 
though there does not appear to be many recent cases revealing the intervention of 
equity, perhaps because the need has not arisen.
(b) Rescission under the Civil Law.
Where the creditor does not wish to limit his action to the exceptio, he has a 
further option in rescission of the contract (action en resolution), with damages if 
possible. The legislative basis for rescission is article 1184 (2), "the party for whose 
benefit the contract has not been performed has the choice either to compel the other 
to perform or to claim rescission with damages". This remedy is similar to rescission 
for breach under the common law, though the two should not be confused.
The basic idea seems to be that it is better to put an end to a contract the 
performance of which has been jeopardized by a party’s breach. That is perhaps why 
article 1184 (1) confines rescission to synallagmatic contracts.220 Nevertheless, 
because of its complex history,221 the basis of rescission is disputed. It has been 
regarded, following article 1184, as resting on an implied condition resolutoire 
(terminating condition),222 although the operation of such a condition is hard to 
reconcile with the judicial character of rescission. It has also been seen as a sanction 
for bad faith or a means of compensating loss. But the most generally accepted basis 
lies in the interdependence of the reciprocal obligation of the synallagmatic contract,
220 There are a few minor exceptions, e.g. in cases of life annuities (art. 1978 of the 
Civil Code).
221 Weill and Terre, Op. cit.. notel5, para. 481; Mazeaud/Mazeaud, Op. cit.. notel3, 
para. 1088.
222 It seems that this is historically not to be derived from the Roman lex commiseria 
(resolutive condition).
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even though this does not explain why the intervention of the judge is required.223
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding its basis, judicial rescission has 
developed clear-cut features, as regards both conditions of its operation and its 
consequences.
First, there must have been a breach attributable to the debtor, that is, not 
resulting from a fortuitous event. In La Compagnie Frangaise de UAfrique  
Occidental v. Kanga Appolinaire,224 the appellant sold a Ford truck to the 
respondent on credit. The respondent duly kept up with the repayment but when the 
truck was taken into the appellant’s garage for routine servicing, they seized and 
refused to release it, under the false pretext that the driver was not an agent of the 
respondent and that he was not armed with the requisite documents to ply a heavy 
goods vehicle. The respondent reacted to this by rescinding the contract and claiming 
restitution of all sums he had already paid as part of the price. The Supreme Court, 
affirming the decision of the lower court, held that since the seizure was unlawful, 
the appellants were guilty of breach for which the respondent was entitled to rescind 
the contract and recover all sums paid to the appellants.
In another case, Affaire Ondoua,225 rescission was denied because the court 
decided that no breach was imputable to the debtor. The case concerned a contract 
of sale for which payment was to be by instalments. It was expressly stated that if 
the buyer failed to pay any instalment on the agreed date, the seller would be free to 
rescind the contract, without any indemnity. The instalment for 30 September 1969 
was late, the buyer attempting to make up for it by issuing two money orders dated 
29 October 1969 and 13 November 1969. The seller declined to accept them and 
purported to rescind the contract. The trial judge ruled that he could not. This ruling 
was based on a technicality, namely that, the seller had not given the buyer notice of
223 Carbonier, Op. cit.. notefS, para. 81, "Theorique Juridique".
224 Arret No. 158 du 28 Mars 1961, (1961) No.3, B.A.C.S. Cam. Or.
225 Arret No. 31/CC Mars 1972, (1973) No.3 Rev. Cam. Dr., 87.
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default (mise en demeure), therefore, the payment though late, was still valid. The 
Court of Appeal upheld the trial court but explained further that the late payment was 
considered valid because a debtor is allowed to avoid or defeat rescission by offering 
performance or payment after the agreed date but before any mise en demeure 226 
Since the buyer had offered payment, albeit belatedly, which the creditor refused to 
accept, and since the creditor had not put the buyer in notice, the Court of Appeal 
reasoned that no fault was imputable to the buyer and then concluded: "Qu’en 
Vabsence defaute de sa part dans Vexecution de son engagement, il ne peut y avoir 
lieu a resolution de la vente". The Supreme Court too was in total agreement with 
the Court of Appeal’s reasoning and judgement.
It would appear as though the rule that the fault must have been imputable to the 
debtor to warrant rescission is not absolute. The courts in France have been known 
to apply the remedy also where the non-performance is not attributable to the 
defendant because it results from force majeure221 So far there is no evidence of 
that in Cameroon.
Secondly, the breach must be sufficiently serious, although no legislative text 
expressly so provides. The court may not grant rescission if the non-performance is 
only partial or temporary, and whether it is either of them, is a question of fact. So 
too is the degree of seriousness. The judge has a discretionary power to decide 
whether or not to bring the contract to an end and he is not constrained by the choice 
of the plaintiff.228 Because of the pouvoir souverain of the trial judge, coupled with 
the fact that judgements are generally not elaborate, it is difficult to state with any 
certainty what factors Cameroonian courts consider in their assessment of the question 
of seriousness. However, it is possible to explain the decision in Affaire Ondoua just 
considered above, in terms of seriousness of breach, or rather the lack of it. It will
226 This is also true of France, see Nicholas, p. 238.
227 See Nicholas, pp 200-1, especially the Gare St Lazare case (Paris 13.11.1943, Gaz 
Pal 1943.2.260).
228 Mazeaud and Chabas, Op.cit.. notel3, para. 1114.
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be recalled that the seller refused to accept payment because it was late by slightly 
over a month. Under such circumstances, it could be said that the breach was either 
not sufficiently serious or that it was only partial and temporary. Such an 
interpretation, it is conceded, would still not have affected the results reached by the 
court - the denial of rescission. It is, therefore, not suggested that the reasoning of 
the court was wrong. Neither was the result. But it is submitted that the reasoning 
presently being canvassed, i.e. a rationalization in terms of the breach not being 
serious enough or that it was only temporary, does appear to be neater, if not simpler 
than that adopted by the trial court (that the buyer had not been put in notice), or that 
adopted by the Court of Appeal (that an offer of belated performance can defeat 
rescission).
The third feature on rescission is that as a general rule, the party claiming it need 
not prove loss. There is little case-law on this point in France,229 or in Cameroon, 
where one may point to the fact that in C.F.A.O v. Ndamako,230 rescission was 
granted even though there was no evidence of any loss or a claim by the party 
demanding rescission that he had actually suffered loss.
The final feature on rescission is its judicial character. For there to be rescission, 
there must be a judicial decision. This is what distinguishes the French system most 
clearly from the English one. The exercise of the right of rescission, according to 
article 1184 of the Code, is not at the free choice of the injured party: it is subject 
to the power of the court (doit etre demandee en justice). This is simply a reflection 
of French law’s dislike or rejection of self-help, expressed in the maxim nul ne peut 
se faire justice a soi-meme,231 The courts in Civil Law Cameroon, perhaps jealous 
of this power of control accorded to them by the law, have always stressed the need
229 See however, Cass, civ., 27 Apr. 1948, JCP 1948. II. 4594, note E. Becque, and 
commentary by Carbonnier, R.T.D.C. 1949, 95; the case is to be understood by 
reference to leases and the particular circumstances involved.
230 Supra, note
231 See generally Beguin, "Rapport sur 1’adage‘Nul ne peut se faire justice a soi- 
meme’ en Droit Frangais”, In: Travaux Capitant, (1966) 18, p. 41.
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for judicial intervention whenever there has been an attempt at rescission.232 In 
Affaire Frangois-Simon v. Agence Havas Afrique,233 the appellant was acting as 
agents of the respondents, with a 15% commission on all deals. Sometime later, the 
respondents proposed to reduce the appellant’s operations and drop her rate of 
commission from 15% to 12% because, they claimed, that was the rate at which they 
could operate if they were not to make any losses. The appellant’s response was to 
rescind the contract. It was held by the Supreme Court, affirming the Court of 
Appeal, that she was wrong to rescind the contract (1) because the respondents were 
not in breach - they had simply tried to renegotiate the contract by a proposing a drop 
in the amount of commission, which she was entitled to accept or refuse and (2) that 
failing an amicable renegotiation of the contract, she had to,
"soit d ’user des voies des droit pour obtenir Vexecution si celle-ci 
demeurait possible, soit de demander, a titre de sanction, la resolution 
judiciaire du contrat avec octroi de dommages-interets".
The court was saying in effect that, even if the respondents were guilty of breach, the 
appellant would still not have been entitled to automatic rescission. She would have 
had to seek a court order to rescind the contract.
Such judicial character is so inherent in the remedy that, although it can be waived 
by the parties, an automatic terminating condition is regarded with suspicion by the 
courts. Even in the face of such conditions, the courts will still expect to exercise 
some degree of judicial control. However, the judge before whom the point is taken 
cannot exercise his pouvoir souverain\ he can only verify the breach and, in 
consequence, the automatic annulment of the contract. Because of the civil law’s 
traditional loathing of self-help, the judge will, most assuredly, tend to interpret these 
clauses restrictively as well as requiring that the debtor be given a prior formal notice
232 See for example, Affaire Mike Skyllas, supra, noteSSand Affaire Ondoua, supra, 
note I IS-
233 Arret No. 13 du 18 Nov. 1976, (1977) No.36 B.A.C.S., 5285.
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that he is in breach. This approach is most glaringly illustrated in Affaire 
Ondoua, 234 where, it will be remembered, there was a stipulation that the failure to 
pay any instalment on the agreed date will leave the creditor free to rescind the 
contract. It was held that such a stipulation did not per se exempt the creditor from 
giving the debtor notice of default, neither did it dispense with the need for judicial 
control of the creditor’s right to rescission. The court was no doubt mindful of the 
fact that it could not eliminate the automatic rescission clause altogether so it 
proceeded to interpret it as narrowly as possible so as to bring it under its control.
Situations exist, however, where a judicial decision is not necessary. Article 1657 
of the Code, for example, authorizes the "automatic rescission of a sale, without 
recourse by the seller and without a formal summons to the buyer, where the period 
for collection agreed by the contract has expired". This option of unilateral rescission 
is limited to the sale of moveables, where the collection must be made by a 
prescribed date and such a date was one of the essential and determinative conditions 
of the sale. Indeed, the seller must be able to rapidly dispose of the goods with 
which he is saddled and which are in danger of deteriorating.235 French case-law 
recognizes the possibility of unilateral rescission for any contract in case of 
emergency, where continuation of the contract may cause irreparable harm. Such 
rescission takes place at the creditor’s own risk and the courts exercise ex poste a 
very strict control on the option, which remains exceptional.236 It is also likely that 
the Cameroonian courts will excuse unilateral rescission in the case of an emergency, 
not least because the Supreme Court has been known to hold that where there is an 
emergency, the creditor need not put the debtor in notice of breach.237 The
234 Supra, note 22.£
235 The possibility of replacement is sometimes analysed as unilateral rescission: see 
note by Ghestin on Cass, com., 15 Jan. 1973, D. 1973, 473, 475.
236 Ghestin, Conformite et garantie dans la vente (1983), para. 183 ff.; Simler, "La 
Resiliation Unilateral Anticipee du Contrat a, Duree Determinee", JCP 1971.1.2413.
237 Set Affaire Mbomiko Ibrahim v. Soitacam, discussed above, note m
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Supreme Court has equally accepted, albeit obiter, that the parties can waive the
requirement of judicial control so long as any clauses for automatic rescission are
expressly provided and agreed upon. In Affaire Dieye Assane v. Societe Immobilier
Camerounais,238 the parties entered into a contract of lease, the appellant being the
tenant. Clause 3 of the contract read thus:
"En cas de non-payement d ’un terme et quinze jours apres une mise en 
demeure par la lettre recommandee restee sans ejfet, le present bail est 
resilie de plein droit... sans pour cela que soit besoin d ’une decision
judiciaire".
In effect, only a notice of default was required of the creditor, a court order having 
been expressly excluded. The appellant defaulted and the respondents duly served 
him notice. But before the expiry of the agreed 15 days after notice, the respondents 
applied and obtained a court order for rescission. The Supreme Court observed that 
the parties had unequivocally waived the need for a court order and found nothing 
wrong with that clause but went on to quash the decision of the lower court on the 
grounds that the respondent could not exercise his right of rescission before the 
agreed 15 days after notice to the appellant had elapsed. So, in Cameroon too, it is 
risky business for a party to undertake extra-judicial, unilateral rescission as the court 
may eventually hold that it was unjustified or unwarranted at great expense to the 
creditor. That risk certainly was not lost on the creditor in the case just considered, 
who still thought it necessary to apply for a court order even though the contract had 
clearly relieved him of that requirement.
Although judicial control is said to be the hallmark of the civil law system, it is 
interesting to note that the courts in Common Law Cameroon are not always receptive 
to self-help either. True, the common law does not, in principle, require judicial 
intervention for rescission, yet there is a growing tendency among some judges in 
Common Law Cameroon to frown upon extra-judicial rescission. In Mancho Sammy 
v. Credit Foncier,239 the defendant building society unilaterally rescinded a loan
238 Arret No. 53 du 23 Mai 1972 (1972) no.26 B.A.C.S., 3626.
239 Supra, note .
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agreement by refusing to disburse the last instalment to the plaintiff on the grounds 
that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy a condition precedent of the contract: that he will 
deposit his land certificate with the defendants before the disbursement of the last 
instalment. Having rescinded the contract, the defendants also went on to exercise 
their Treasury Rights over the plaintiff’s salary in a bid to recoup all that had already 
been paid to him. The court had no difficulty in establishing that there was indeed 
such a condition precedent which the plaintiff had clearly not fulfilled. But the crux 
of the matter was whether the defendants were entitled to automatic rescission. 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued vigorously that what should follow naturally and 
logically from such breach (if there was any), is a court action by whoever claims to 
be the victim of the alleged breach. Only the court, he concluded, should be able to 
say if the disputed contract has been breached, and if so by whom and then enter the 
appropriate order or orders. For his part counsel for the defendant was content to say 
that the victim of a breach has a legal right to resort to any reasonable means to 
recover any sums he is owed, and added that, "this does not necessitate the 
intervention of the court". Ruling on this issue, Tenghen J. warned that it was 
"particularly dangerous and highly risky, thus compromising the security of 
contracts" if a party to a contract was to assume the double role of party and judge. 
He therefore sided with counsel for the plaintiff that the court alone should decide on 
whether or not a contract has actually been breached. This kind of insistence on 
judicial intervention by a common law court may be put down partly to cross­
fertilization or rather, may be considered as an example of an established civil law 
practice creeping into the common law jurisdiction.240 But it may also be that 
judges, even those of an entirely common law persuasion, generally dislike self-help, 
perhaps because they see it as usurping their powers or role. In an earlier case,
240 The judge concerned in this case, Tenghen J. is an Anglophone who prior to his 
transfer to the common law jurisdiction (Bamenda), had worked in the civil law 
jurisdiction. It is therefore not unlikely that his legal reasoning must have been 
shaped or reshaped, even if only to a small extent, by some civil law conceptions and 
judicial attitudes.
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Robert Njeshu Lamyam v. Jacob Tanya Tatnem,241 the Court of Appeal strongly 
condemned the appellant for rescinding the contract (by seizing the car that was the 
subject of the sale contract) without seeking judicial approval. It is regrettable 
though, that in the Court of First Instance, Magistrate Munongo, also lamenting the 
failure of the appellant to enlist the help of the law, felt that the appellant should have 
sought the intervention of the Police: "He did not call in the aid of the Police". In 
light of what has already been said about Police involvement in the enforcement of 
contracts,242 such a suggestion, especially coming as it does from a court official, 
is mind-boggling to say the least.
The above case also highlights the dangers of undertaking non-judicial, unilateral 
rescission. The case concerned the sale of a bus. Part of the price was paid instantly 
with the balance to be paid later. When it was not forthcoming, the appellant (seller) 
without the knowledge or consent of the respondent (buyer), seized and sold the bus 
while it was in a garage undergoing repairs. The appellant did so in the full 
confidence that the contract was one of hire purchase which the respondent had 
breached and which gave him the option of seizure since the property in the goods 
would not have passed to the buyer. But the court ruled that it was a contract of sale 
for which the property in the goods had passed to the buyer. The appellant’s only 
course of action therefore was an action of the balance of the price and damages for 
breach of contract but not seizure. But because of the illegal seizure, the appellant, 
far from the being the victim of breach, was himself guilty of breach of the contract 
of sale and found himself in the vulnerable position of being charged with conversion 
by the buyer, if he was so minded. It may therefore be advisable for any party 
alleging breach, especially if the breach is disputed, to seek clarification from the 
courts as to whether there is indeed a breach and as to what is the proper rescission 
is the proper remedy. But to suggest, as Tenghen J. appeared to do in the Mancho 
Sammy case above, that "only the court alone" can decide on these issues, is too
241 BCA/31/83 (Bamenda, 30-3-1984, unreported).
242 See the section on specific performance above.
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sweeping and cannot be said to categorically represent the position of the law on this 
topic in Common Law Cameroon. Despite signs of hostility towards self-help, it 
will be correct to say that the common law rule which holds that rescission does not 
need judicial control is still true in the common law jurisdiction of Cameroon.
4 . CONCLUSION.
Given that so much has so far been considered on the battery of remedies available 
to an aggrieved party, it will be useful by way of conclusion, to recapitulate some of 
the main points. As concerns the common law the remedy of damages takes 
precedence over that of specific performance, with rescission being somewhat 
marginal. And while the famous dictum of Holmes that "the duty to keep a contract 
at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it - 
and nothing else"243 should not be taken literally or too seriously,244 it has to be 
said that the common law rules in their total effect express a concealed value 
judgement which is hostile to the notion that the plaintiff is entitled to specific 
performance. It was pointed out that there is now an increasing willingness in 
England to grant specific performance but that there is no such corresponding 
evidence in Anglohone Cameroon. The Cameroonian common law courts, more than 
their English progenitors, stick to the rule that an action for specific performance and 
the attendant injunction, is the exception rather the rule. A potential plaintiff, apart 
from being unable to obtain a decree of specific performance, will also find it hard 
to attempt to secure performance by fixing and enforcing a penalty; and if the 
defendant does not perform, the plaintiff though able to sue for damages, is expected 
to mitigate any loss.
In contrast, the civil law was shown to be committed to the notion that the primary 
objective is performance. This is confirmed by the number of legal solutions such
243 "The Path o f the Law" (Collected Legal Papers p. 175); (1897) 10 Harv. L.R 462.
244 Nicholas (p. 206), regards it as exaggerated.
447
as judicial assessment of the severity of the breach, to justify rescission; the role of 
astreinte, but also the requirement of mise en demeure, conferring on the debtor a last 
chance to perform, and perhaps even the terminology which regards an award of 
damages as a substitute for performance. At the heart of this is discernible a 
commitment to the principle of the binding quality of contracts: "the law of the 
parties", in the words of article 1134 of the Code must be respected like the law of 
Parliament. This principle has so often be reiterated by the courts in Civil Law 
Cameroon that it will take too long to enumerate and discuss them.
It was also noted that despite the pre-eminence of performance, the ranking of 
remedies in Civil Law Cameroon is more a question of the circumstances, with the 
remedy best suited to the situation being adopted. And that remedy for most parties 
appears to be an action for damages, not performance. Obviously, where the 
relationship between the parties has been seriously strained, many an aggrieved party 
has found it more practical to seek damages against the defaulting party rather than 
insist on performance.
As concerns termination, it was noted that under the civil law a much clearer 
distinction is drawn between withholding performance and outright rescission while 
the two are very closely linked under the common law. Another distinguishing 
feature between both systems is the judicial character of rescission under the civil 
law. However, it was revealed that the common law courts do not entirely embrace 
or condone self-help.
This study may not have canvassed the entire body of contract law covered by 
damages, and it was never intended to do so, yet it is hoped that it does provide 
sufficient insight into that important area of the law in Cameroon.
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CHAPTER 9.
THE FUTURE OF CONTRACT LAW IN CAMEROON.
This thesis has not covered all fundamental areas of contract law, but it neither 
intended nor promised to do so. However, it is believed that of those topics covered, 
sufficient has been said to depict the working and the state of contract law in 
Cameroon. In what state, therefore, is the law of contract? Is it in a state of 
regression, stagnation or progression? To talk of regression would be alarmist, 
especially if one accepts the fact that the received laws were still very much in their 
infancy in the years immediately after independence. On the other hand, any talk of 
progression would be an overstatement, in view of the conspicuous absence of any 
worthwhile developments. On the evidence of the analyses so far, it would be fair 
to say that contract law in Cameroon is in a state of stagnation. Perhaps it would be 
better to describe it as "non-developmental".1
In this closing chapter, it is not necessary to repeat the individual issues already 
considered during the course of this study. Instead, it is proposed to look at the 
whole study from a macroscopic rather than a microscopic perspective. I shall say 
straightaway that no major significant development, judicial2 or legislative,3 can be
1 Family law in Cameroon has also been described as such, see Ngwafor, "Family 
Law Trends in Cameroon: A Non-Developmental Process" (1985) Annual Survey of 
Fam. L., 5-15.
2 One thing of note worth mentioning is the extension to Common Law Cameroon of 
the special character of administrative contracts which Civil Law Cameroon inherited 
from France. This implies that the law of contract in Common Law Cameroon is 
different from that in England and other common law jurisdictions in one important 
respect, namely, that it recognises a special regime for administrative contracts.
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said to have taken place in Cameroon ever since independence. That is why I take 
the view that the development of contract law has stagnated.
In the course of this study, I have been able to detect two diametrically opposed 
trends in Cameroonian judicial attitudes. The one is the marked reticence by the 
courts to break with English and French conditions of the past that may have no place 
in present day Cameroon. This sometimes leads to a ritualistic, and often 
mechanistic, application of rules of English and French contract law. This practice, 
which was most prevalent in the years immediately after independence, can be put 
down to the dominance of the judiciary at the time by expatriate (British and French) 
personnel. The other trend, and this is the more recent one, is the marked absence 
of any reference to English or French law, or any reference to any law for that 
matter. In other words, the courts do not expressly state which rules of law they are 
applying. That explains why in some of the cases considered in this thesis, it was left 
for me to imply, depending on the decision arrived at, the rules of law that were 
applied by the court.
In the light of these contrasting trends, both of which are criticised below, the 
single most important desideratum for contract law in Cameroon is for the received 
English and French laws to be adapted and attuned, where appropriate, to peculiar 
Cameroonian realities. This is neither an exciting nor a thundering proposition, yet 
it is strongly submitted that whatever changes may be needed to give contract law a 
forward push must revolve around this simple proposition. I shall now elaborate on 
this theme.
The problem of adaptation in Cameroon of rules of English and French contract 
law is a dual one. The first relates to what I shall call contemporary relevance. By 
this I mean that the law of contract must evolve with the society which it purports to 
govern. It must keep pace with changing conditions of its society. It has then to be
3 One may also mention the various statutes that have been passed by the 
Cameroonian legislator in the area of formality in contracts, not so much to supplant 
but to strengthen those that were already in place as part of the general English and 
French law.
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recognised that some age old broad general principles of English or French law of
contract may be insufficient in themselves to provide for some present day
Cameroonian conditions. However, the need for contemporary relevance is not
confined to Cameroon. It applies to other societies. Lord Wright made the point
splendidly in the case of England when he observed:4
"When we examine the accidents of procedure or judicial or social 
intolerance or prejudice out of which so many dogmas and rules 
originated, and see to what different conditions and circumstances they 
were adapted, we are less likely to view them all with superstitious 
veneration; we are freer to consider how far, with conditions of life 
and thought, they fit in with reason, justice and convenience".
Carbonnier has also made the point for contemporary relevance in France when 
he talks of the need to take "une voie moyenne: entre le passe et Vavenir... ".5
The other problem relates to the differences in the conditions and realities, 
whether past or present, between England and France on the one hand, and Cameroon 
on the other hand. The predicament in Cameroon therefore is doubly difficult in that 
not only is the universal problem encountered of age old concepts that may be 
unsuited to contemporary conditions but also the problem that concepts based on the 
received laws may in some cases be alien to the attitude and ways of the local 
community. On the factual basis of such differences, the view is taken that it is not 
always proper for Cameroonian courts to apply to a local problem solutions worked 
out in England or France.
Where a Cameroonian court recognises the unsuitability of a rule of English or 
French contract law or of a particular English or French decision but renders a 
decision giving lipservice to that rule or to the doctrine of stare decisis, the most 
problematical of alternatives obtains. In the first place, the mechanistic application 
of the received laws, especially in the face of compelling Cameroonian peculiarities 
is sometimes bound to result in risible justice. But even where a "just result" is
4 Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses, 1939, preface, p. XVII.
5 Carbonnier, Introduction, In: L ’Evolution Contemporaine du Droits des Contrats,
Joumees Savatiers, 1986, p. 30.
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achieved, and there are cases in which Cameroonian courts’ distortions of English 
cases or rules of French law have produced illogical but just results, neither 
continuity and certainty nor adaptability of the law are achieved. The law is not 
really adapted since on the surface the old English or French rule survives.
Ultimately, legal rules, whether derived from English or French law, are 
justifiable only in terms of their justice and social utility. It can no longer be true to 
say, if it ever was, that the use of terms such as "judicial policy" and "social 
expediency" introduces "deleterious foreign matter into the water of the common 
law".6 Undoubtedly, precedent and tradition are important, and often compelling, 
considerations in legal reasoning. But the law in Cameroon should not be enslaved 
to the received English and French customs and usages of the past, however beguiling 
their judicially enshrined legacies may at first appear. Respect for received solutions 
to problems presented by recurring social phenomena must be balanced against a 
recognition of the inevitable movement and diversity of society. The continued 
relevance of the English common law and the French civil law, and possibly their 
very existence in the Cameroonian setting, demands that their rules be subject to 
constant scrutiny and adjustment in the cold light of social reality.
If countries such as Australia7 and New Zealand,8 with arguably closer cultural, 
educational and political ties with Britain, have conceded and are responding to the 
emerging differences between their respective common law and that of the England, 
then, a fortiori, Cameroon should act with even more decisiveness. The most fitting 
example in this regard however must be Canada. Like Cameroon, her laws are 
traceable to the English common and French civil law. Yet while Canada still draws 
nourishments from these sources, few would demur that the Canadian courts and
6 Rootes v. Shelton (116) C.L.R. 383 at 386-387, per Kitto J.
7 See e.g. Ellinghaus, "An Australian Contract Law" (1989/90) 2 J.C.L. 13-33; 
Ellinghaus, Bradbrook, and Duggan, The Emergence of Australian Law, 1989.
8 Sir Robin Cooke has recently proclaimed that "a distinct New Zealand national legal 
identity" has emerged. See Cooke, "The New Zealand Legal Identity", speech 
delivered at the New Zealand Law Conference, October 1987, p. 2.
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legislator have developed and encouraged more distinctly Canadian approaches to law. 
This is true of both the common and civil law Canada.9
Contemporary relevance need not be achieved at the expense of certainty in the 
operation of the law. Nor should the need to take into account differences between 
two countries involve the revolutionary overthrow of the established received laws. 
This point brings to me the second, and even more worrying, judicial trend in 
Cameroon. A close look at recent judicial decisions by Cameroonian courts will lead 
to a shocking revelation, which is the almost total lack of authorities and articulation 
of rules of law. The vast majority of recent decisions are singularly void of any case 
law precedent, either local or foreign. So, one often finds a change from a situation 
in which there is an almost ritualistic use of English precedence to one in which none 
is used at all. As in the former situation, there is not much to commend in the latter 
case. For a common law judgement to contain virtually no scintilla of authority is 
unacceptable.
Perhaps Cameroonian judges do not bother to explain and justify their decisions
in the safe knowledge that there is not at present a large group of sophisticated critics
to analyse the words and effect of those decisions and because the general public is
still mystified by and less interested in the work of the courts. But that is bound to
change, if not sooner then later. Whatever be the case, it is important for the courts
to express clearly in their decisions exactly what it is that they are doing and why.
In doing so, they must reflect the conditions and realities in Cameroon, and ensure
that all relevant considerations of policy are at all times articulated and explored. It
has been stated:10
"The fundamental root, the base, of contract is society. Never has 
contract occurred without society; never will it occur without society;
9 For the common law, see Milner, "The Common Law o f Contract: Some Aspects o f  
Form, Agreement and Consideration" In: McWhinney, ed., Canadian Jurisprudence 
- The Civil Law and Common Law in Canada, 1958, pp. 90-117; For the civil
law, see Crepeau, "La Theorie Generale des Contrats dans le Droit Civil de la 
Province de Quebec" In: McWhinney, ed., pp. 119-143.
10 McNeil, The New Social Contract, 1980, pp. 1-2.
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and never can its functioning be understood isolated from its particular 
society."
On the question of the slavish application of the received laws, the courts in 
Francophone Cameroon are more culpable than their Anglophone counterparts. One 
can of course raise the argument in their defence that they are given little room for 
judicial innovation because of the primacy of the Civil Code in particular, and 
legislation in general. Yet, there are instances in which the Code is silent, some of 
which are highlighted in this study. In such cases, it cannot be said that Cameroonian 
civil law courts have seized the initiative to develop a distinctive Cameroonian 
solution. Instead, their visceral reaction has always been to look up to solutions 
worked out in France, ignoring of course that such solutions might have been arrived 
at in response to policy and other considerations that may be relevant only to France. 
It is not suggested that such solutions cannot work in Cameroon. In fact they often 
do, though not necessarily faux de mieux. In other words, Cameroonian civil law 
courts will never be in a position to know whether there can be a more inspired local 
solution to any problem if they continue to be diffident in their own innovative 
ability.
It is not only those areas where the Civil Code is silent which call for judicial 
intervention. Without suggesting that the courts should flout the provisions of the 
Code, one must nevertheless remind them of the need to reconsider very seriously 
those provisions that are glaringly anachronistic. It is certainly not asking too much 
of the courts to undertake a subtle manipulation of such provisions so as to 
circumvent any harsh or strange results which their rigorous application may bring 
about. And in doing so the courts can find justification, if any is needed, in the fact 
that the French Civil Code, of which the present Cameroonian Civil Code is merely 
a copy, was not drafted in response to Cameroonian conditions. No less a figure than 
Rene David has conceded that "the individualism of the French civil code is not 
necessarily suitable for all societies and can be tempered by societies, whether
4 5 4
traditional or modern, where a collective spirit prevails".11 Even in France, this 
individualistic ethic is no longer as profound as it used to be. The social and 
economic metamophorses that France has undergone this century have sapped the 
individualistic philosophy of some of its vigour.12
It may be true that the civil law does not expressly recognise the doctrine of 
precedent, but the French Cour de Cassation and the lower courts in France often 
refer to "jurisprudence constante" (established case-law) in their judgements. The 
civil law courts in Cameroon, with the limited exception of the Supreme Court, have 
failed to do so.
Cameroonian common law and civil law courts must realise that it is only by
shaping the received English common law and French civil law of contract to accord
with Cameroonian circumstances, needs and values that the independence of contract
law in Cameroon will become more pronounced. The autonomous quality of a
nation’s case-law lies in the shape in which it is cast by the particular situations
brought before its courts. This point has been emphasised most brilliantly by
Fuller13 with regard to the common law:
"The courts of the common law do not lay down their rules in 
advance, but develop them out of litigated cases. This inevitably means 
that the shape taken by legal doctrine in a particular jurisdiction will 
be influenced by the accidents of litigational history within that 
jurisdiction."
To suggest that Cameroonian courts should "Cameroonise" their decisions does 
not imply that they must desist from citing and having regards to English and French 
decisions. I have deplored the overt and excessive reliance on English and French 
solutions but the way forward is not by a complete severance of the link between 
decisions arrived at in England or France. To do so would only amount to what the
11 David, " Contract law and Civil Wrongs in French speaking Africa" In: Integration 
of Customary and Modern Legal Systems in Africa, 1964, p. 165.
12 See Mestre, "L’Evolution du Contrat en Droit Prive Frangais" In: L ’Evolution 
Contemporaine du Droit des Contrats, Journees Savatier, 1986, p. 42.
13 Fuller, Anatomy of Law, Penguin, 1971, p .139.
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American philosopher Morris Cohen calls "the principle of polarity", which is to say 
that to ignore either pole of a problem is to miss the full reality. On the one hand, 
to insist on applying only those solutions developed in England and France is to 
underestimate the differences in social and economic conditions that exist between 
Cameroon and these western countries. On the other hand, to insist on applying only 
Cameroonian solutions to local contractual problems, is to overestimate such 
differences.
I accept that Siedmann’s theory about the non-transferability of laws14 is 
generally correct. However, I do not believe that it retains a discomforting relevance 
to contract law in Cameroon. In other words, while there are differences between 
Cameroon, and England and France that warrant different judicial attitudes and 
legislative solutions,15 there are equally enough similarities to justify the continuous 
relevance of English and French contract law to Cameroon.16 It is desirable 
therefore that Cameroonian courts should continue to have regard to significant 
developments in the law of contract of other countries such as England and France 
where a number of legislative reforms and judicial innovations have been undertaken 
with apparently beneficial results. Cameroonian courts need a path finder as they 
chart the legal course.
The point has been made that most of the private law of all the modern legal 
systems of the Western world (and also of some non-Western countries), apart from 
the Scandinavian, derives more or less directly from either Roman Civil Law or
14 See Siedmann, Op. cit.. chap. 1, note 21.
15 In this regard, one may cite as an example the fact that many Cameroonians are 
still governed by native law and custom. In chapter it was suggested that the non­
native courts must take judicial notice of this reality when confronted with a case in 
which the parties contemplate customary law.
16 As commerce expands and becomes more sophisticated, it may be imperative for 
Cameroon to look up to England and France, who already have sufficient legal 
experience in dealing with the problems that such growth gives rise to. This may be 
very important from an economic point of view, especially in attracting the foreign 
investor.
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English Common Law.17 Cohen and Cohen,18 discussing contract, make this
interesting observation:
"And if the diversity of theories of contract is startling, one may find 
equal cause for wonder and reflection in the fact that thinkers and 
societies that are poles apart geographically, economically, and 
culturally, so often agree on specific rules of contract. The excerpts 
from the Civil Code of Spain showing basic contract rules equally 
valid in France, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Holland, Italy, Mexico, 
Portugal, and many other lands, and equally honored across eighteen 
or more centuries, offer a substantial challenge to the view that law 
reflects all the changes of changing economics and all the 
diversities of diverse civilizations."
Echoing this observation in France, Carbonnier has said,19 with regard to the 
relevance of comparative law, that, "C’est une opinion repandue qu’il aurait un role 
a jouer, plus considerable qu ’ailleurs, dans le droit des contrat".
I am therefore firmly of the view that Cameroon should maintain the received 
common and civil laws, but at the same time, Cameroonian courts must seek to 
achieve solutions suited to particular circumstances and community values in 
Cameroon.
The responsibility for shaping the future of contract law in Cameroon cannot and 
should not be borne entirely by the courts. The academics and the legislator must 
play their part. If, as proposed, the courts start to pursue initiatives which may not 
always be the same as those taken in England and France, it will be incumbent on 
Cameroonian academics to analyse those decisions for the benefit of the domestic
17 Watson, Legal Transplants- An Approach to Comparative Law, 1974, p. 22. 
He also cites Roscoe Pound who has written that, "The history of a system of law is 
largely a history of borrowing of legal materials from other legal systems and of 
assimilation of materials from outside the law."
18 Cohen and Cohen: Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, 1951, p. 
101.
19 Carbonnier, Op.cit.. note 5, p.32.
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audience, and, indeed, the broader international legal community.
The legislator has by far the most important role to play in the quest for an 
improvement in the state of Cameroonian contract law. Most of the required reform, 
especially in areas such as conflict of laws and formality in contracts, would have to 
be kick started by legislation. I make no claims that legislation would solve all the 
problems that come across the whole spectrum of contract law in Cameroon. But I 
remain convinced, in view of the judicial indifference to innovation, that it may be 
the best way to bring about change.
The final form of legislation on any issue must not be extemporaneous. It must 
be the subject of intensive study and criticism. I believe that the responsibility for 
making proposals for reform is very largely that of academics. The academic 
certainly cannot legislate but he can at least point to the undesirability of existing 
rules of law, to the desirability of substituting them for others and to possible ways 
of bringing them about. What is therefore needed are concrete proposals for reform 
rather than suggestions that somebody else should do something. It is in response to 
the belief that a beginning must be made somewhere, for nothing can be gained by 
hesitation and diffidence, that I have produced this thesis. It may not have been about 
reform, yet it may serve to assist those who may be called upon to formulate 
proposals for reform. Even more importantly, it is hoped that this study may serve 
as a starting point for future discussion, or as a stimulant for further, wider and 
deeper studies of contract law in Cameroon.
As I end this long and often lonely exercise, it is my parting wish that I have not 
fallen foul of Nietzsche’s observation, that the most common stupidity consists in 
forgetting what one is trying to do. In other words, I hope that I have sustained my 
promise to contribute to the description, presentation and analysis of contract law in 
Cameroon.
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